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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the development and success of Spanish naval policy during 
the reign of Ferdinand VI focusing on the period from the end of the War of 
Austrian Succession in 1748 to Ferdinand’s death in 1759.  During this time, more 
specifically during the premiership of the Marquis de la Ensenada which ended in 
1754, the navy was made the object of a major expansion programme intended to 
improve its ability to enforce and defend Spanish interests within Europe and in 
the Americas.  Ensenada aimed at expanding Spain’s navy by building ships and 
creating a solid supporting infrastructure for them.  He sought to modernise the 
technology used in the Spanish navy through studying that of its rivals, while at 
the same time developing the domestic agricultures and industries that supplied it 
and encouraging service in it, whether at the arsenals or on ships, by offering 
good conditions and attractive pay.  Although Ensenada achieved some success, 
his removal from power at an early stage prevented his project from reaching 
fruition.  Furthermore, the cutbacks that followed his removal demonstrated the 
extent to which the Spanish Navy depended upon the support of a monarch or 
minister for political and financial backing since the idea that Spain needed a 
powerful navy was not necessarily high on the agenda at the Spanish Court.  This 
was probably because the navy, though effective in carrying out routine 
operations such as the transport of Crown property or troops, had not had the kind 
of success nor demonstrated the kind of aggression necessary in defending 
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There were several monetary denominations used by the Spanish during Ferdinand 
VI’s reign.  The following are the most common and those that are frequently referred 
to in this thesis. 
 
Vellon Real (Real de Vellón) – A mostly-copper coin derived from the original silver 
coin, the Real.  By the middle of the eighteenth century, the vellon real, which was 
made up of 34 maravedis, was the standard currency employed in peninsular Spain. 
 
Vellon Escudo (Escudo de Vellón) – Again, by the middle of the eighteenth century 
this was a mostly copper coin derived from the gold coin, the Escudo.  According to 
Hamilton (1944), pp.22–3, and Francisco Olmos (1999), p.354, the smallest 
denomination of the escudo was the veintén, a copper alloy, which was equal to 20 
vellon reals.  This conversion, however, does not square with the figures in this study 
which, if we accept Hamilton’s conversion, would become excessively high.  Instead, 
in the Ordenanzas de Marina (1748), vol.II, trat.8, tit.10, art.2, p.230, the vellon 
escudo is stated as being equal to 10 vellon reals.  I have followed the conversion 
given in the Ordenanzas in this study. 
 
Pesos – The currency principally used in the Americas.  It consisted of 15 vellon reals 
and 2 maravedis. 
 
See Hamilton (1943), Hamilton (1944) and Francisco Olmos (1999) for more detailed 




The measurements given in the text are the Spanish measurements unless otherwise 
specified.  Thus, references to feet and inches are Spanish feet and inches which are 
longer than English feet and inches.  When the reference is to English feet and inches 




The translations from the Spanish in the text are my own.  See Appendix 19 for the 
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CHAPTER 1.  Introduction and Literature Review 
 
In 1748 Ferdinand VI of Spain signed the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle thereby 
initiating an era of peace in his territories which was to last until his death in 
1759.  During this period, his most powerful minister, Zenón de Somodevilla y 
Bengoechea, Marquis de la Ensenada (1702–1781), instituted wide-ranging naval 
reforms.  They included the modernisation and enlargement of the naval arsenals 
in Ferrol, Cartagena and Cádiz, as well as the introduction of a vast naval 
shipbuilding programme, new ordinances for naval officers and legislation 
designed to increase recruitment and resources.  These efforts, he argued in his 
Representations to Ferdinand VI, would endow the Spanish Crown with the 
maritime power it needed to maintain its European status and its empire in 
consonance with its eighteenth-century circumstances. 
The focus of most English-language histories on eighteenth-century Spain has 
been on its foreign policy.  This, since it describes the context in which the 
Spanish navy operated and dictated many of its activities, is a necessary precursor 
to any study of the subject.  Thus, in the middle of the eighteenth century, the 
Spanish Crown was, and considered itself to be, one of the leading European 
powers with interests to defend within Europe itself and, more particularly, within 
the Mediterranean.  As a result, throughout the first half of the eighteenth century 
Spanish foreign policy was largely determined by ambitions to reverse the 
consequences of the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht and recover Gibraltar, Minorca and 
its Italian territories. 
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As Geoffrey Symcox argued ‘Spanish ambitions posed the most direct threat to 
the Utrecht settlement’1 while Nicholas Rodger, agreeing with him, further added 
that enforcement of this treaty was the principal reason behind the Anglo-French 
alliance of 1716 to 17312.  Spain’s territorial losses at Utrecht significantly 
reduced its power in the Mediterranean, a region which Lynch acknowledges as ‘a 
natural priority for a power with a long Mediterranean coastline and with territory 
and trade in the region’3.  Spain’s Italian possessions were given to Austria, 
making the latter the most powerful European state in the Italian Peninsula, whilst 
Gibraltar and Minorca provided Britain with ideal strategic bases from which to 
exert naval power in the Mediterranean and thus pose a threat to Spain on all its 
coasts.  It was not surprising, therefore, that the recovery of these areas became a 
key objective for the Spanish monarchy. 
The Spanish Crown’s first concerted effort to recoup its losses was the dispatch of 
the invasion fleet to Sardinia in 1717 which was promptly followed by another 
sent to recover Sicily in 1718.  These attempts were countered by Britain, France, 
Austria, the Netherlands and later Savoy in the War of the Quadruple Alliance 
which lasted until 1720 when Spain was once again forced to accept the terms of 
Utrecht.  This situation did not last for long, however, as, in order to regain what 
the Spanish monarchy viewed as its rightful inheritance, Spain persistently opted 
for war.  To this end, it waged an undeclared war with Britain in 1727 and became 
embroiled in the wars of the Polish Succession (1733–38) and the Austrian 
Succession (1740–48).  It also employed diplomatic means to achieve its 
objectives in this area.  First, with the Treaty of Vienna, Spain entered a short-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Marino (2002) p.116 
2 Rodger (2004) p.227 
3 Lynch (1989) p.131 
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lived alliance with Austria designed to guarantee the Infante Charles an Italian 
inheritance through marriage with the Austrian Habsburgs.  This was superseded 
by the Convention of el Pardo signed with Britain which resulted in the latter’s 
support for Charles’ accession to the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza in 1732.  
Spain then allied itself with France through the First and Second Family 
Compacts, signed on 7 November 1733 and 25 October 1743 respectively, 
whereby the latter promised assistance in the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca 
from Britain.  At the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, Spain had 
yet to regain Gibraltar or Minorca but by now the Infante Charles had established 
and acceded to the Crown of the Two Sicilies and his brother, Philip, was Duke of 
Parma and Piacenza.  A period of peace in Italy ensued that was to last, largely 
undisturbed, until the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.  This was not because 
Spanish interests in Italy had disappeared with Ferdinand VI’s accession to the 
Spanish throne but because by 1748 the Spanish Bourbons had regained the 
Italian territories they had lost at Utrecht.  The recovery of Gibraltar remained a 
constant of Spanish foreign policy into the nineteenth century and beyond as did 
that of Minorca until its capture in 1782, both places proving important Spanish 
objectives during the Seven Years’ War and the War of American Independence, 
as well as during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 
Italy’s eighteenth-century history has been studied in Harold Acton’s The 
Bourbons of Naples (1734–1825), Gregory Hanlon’s, Early Modern Italy, 1550–
1800 and a volume edited by John Marino titled Early Modern Italy 1550–1796.  
They all recognise Spain’s influence in the Italian Peninsula up to 1748 but this 
becomes less marked with the cessation of active Spanish military intervention in 
Italy after that date.  As a result, it is frequently thought that Spanish interest in 
! %!
Italy ended then too, especially as Spain’s Italian policy in the first half of the 
eighteenth century has frequently been credited to Philip V of Spain’s wife, 
Elizabeth Farnese, and her dynastic ambitions to provide for herself and her two 
sons, Charles and Philip.  Since it is also reputed that Ferdinand VI and his 
Farnese half-brothers did not get on, it has consequently been assumed that 
Spanish interests in Italy were very largely abandoned during Ferdinand’s reign 
only to re-surface during Charles III’s rule. 
John Lynch, in particular, has promoted this view, arguing that Spanish foreign 
policy in the Mediterranean up to 1748 had confused strategic objectives ‘with the 
purely dynastic ambitions of Elizabeth Farnese, whose Italian policy did not serve 
Spain in any discernible way’4.  The study of the navy during Ferdinand VI’s 
reign, however, suggests that the Mediterranean remained an important strategic 
field for the Spanish along with the lines of communication with Italy, the 
Balearics and North Africa.  One of the clearest expressions of this is the 
construction of the naval arsenal in Cartagena which transformed it from a galley 
base to one designed to support large capital ships, a transformation which began 
in 1749.  The construction of the Cartagena arsenal has been described by Pérez-
Crespo Muñoz, who, despite identifying Ferdinand’s reign as a key period in the 
arsenal’s development, does not comment on its significance within the context of 
Spain’s naval or Mediterranean policies5.   
Works by naval historians such as Nicholas Rodger and Richard Harding 
demonstrate, that Spain had proven a real challenge to Britain in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Lynch (1989) p.131 
5 Pérez-Crespo Muñoz (1992) 
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Mediterranean6.  Despite defeats such as those at the Battle of Cape Passaro in 
1718 and the capitulation by Charles of Naples (future Charles III of Spain) to 
Martin’s squadron in 1742, Spain could continue to challenge the terms forced 
upon it at Utrecht and this challenge was a significant factor in putting 
considerable strain on British naval power in the Mediterranean, an effort that was 
evident from Vice-Admiral Nicholas Haddock’s and Vice-Admiral Thomas 
Mathews’ experiences in command of the Mediterranean squadron during the War 
of Austrian Succession7.  Though, as Harding has argued in The Emergence of 
Britain’s Global Supremacy, the causes of this strain were Mathews’ inefficient 
command and that the British Royal Navy with its many commitments was too 
thinly spread to prevent the French and Spanish convoys from getting through 
thus reducing the effectiveness of the traditional British war strategy of 
blockading the enemy into surrender8.  
Despite the Spanish monarchy’s continued interests within European waters, the 
increased activity by Europe’s maritime powers across the Atlantic also meant 
that Spain was forced to defend its American empire with considerable more 
effort and the conflicts in which Spain was involved during this century reflect 
this.  The War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739–1748), the Falkland Islands’ Crisis of 1770 
and the 1789 Nootka Sound incident were the immediate results of disagreements 
regarding trade and settlement in America between Britain and Spain.  Spain’s 
involvement in the Seven Years’ War and the American War of Independence 
was also largely determined by imperial ambitions across the Atlantic and both 
conflicts saw large-scale naval and military activity in the Americas.  They !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Rodger (2004) p.240 and Harding (1999) pp.189–201 
7 See Harding (1995) pp.121–2 
8 Harding (2010) p.104, 129–39 
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formed part of what Jan Glete in Navies and Nations has referred to as the ‘great 
maritime contest for world power’9 which, he believes, saw Europe divided into 
two hemispheres, one maritime and one continental, with Spain, Britain and 
France gradually disentangling themselves from continental commitments to 
concentrate on their imperial and maritime ambitions.  This contest has been 
studied by naval historians like Richard Harding and Paul Kennedy from the 
viewpoint of establishing how and when Britain obtained overall maritime 
sovereignty10. 
In War and Trade in the West Indies 1739–1763, Richard Pares analyses the 
relationships between England, France and Spain in the West Indies and, in 
particular, how these affected and were affected by Europe.  As he demonstrates, 
increasing interest in the Americas by Europe’s Atlantic maritime nations was 
very damaging to Spain’s empire.  The Asiento and the South Sea Company, the 
commercial privileges granted Britain in 1670 (and renewed in 1715), the 
logwood and Honduras settlements, the formation and activities of guardacostas, 
privateering and Newfoundland fisheries all resulted in discord among the 
European maritime powers.  He argues that this was a situation the Spanish 
Crown found impossible to resolve.  The harm caused to Spain by the increased 
presence of the British, the French and the Dutch across the Atlantic has been 
illustrated in great detail by Geoffrey Walker in his book Spanish Politics and 
Imperial Trade, 1700–1789.  Here the author traces the gradual breakdown of the 
fleet system at the beginning of the eighteenth century demonstrating that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Glete (1993) vol.I, p.262 
10 Harding (1999) and (2010) and Kennedy (1976) 
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sixteenth- and seventeenth- century Spanish practices for the management of the 
American territories had become outdated and inadequate by the eighteenth. 
Spanish anxiety increased in proportion with growing foreign curiosity and 
exploration in areas where Spain had always claimed a monopoly.  In particular, 
British expeditions, such as those in search of the Northwest Passage and Anson’s 
voyage to the Pacific from 1740 to 1744, with rumours of a follow-up expedition 
in 1749, were cause for concern though the French, with men such as Louis 
Éconches Feuillée and Amedée-François Frézier making forrays into the South 
Pacific, were also seen as a threat.  Apprehension was evident in such works as 
Noticia de la California (1757) by the Jesuits Miguel Venegas and Marcos Burriel 
which promoted Spanish settlement on the northwest coast to forestall its 
European rivals.  These warnings were heeded by the Spanish Crown which 
sought to improve its defences in the South Seas during Ferdinand’s reign, even 
building a castle and inhabiting the island of Juan Fernández with a view to 
preventing British intrusions.  These efforts have been described by Woodward in 
Robinson Crusoe’s Island11.  Furthermore, the writings of Spanish asentistas, 
such as Jerónimo de Uztáriz (1670–c. 1732)12 and Melchor Rafael de Macanaz 
(1670–1760)13, revealed unease over what they perceived as an excessive 
economic reliance on Indies revenue.  David Ringrose, writing an economic 
history of Spain14, argued that, though Spain, as separate from the Spanish Crown, 
could survive without revenue from the Indies, the Spanish monarchy could not.  
By the 1780s, he claims, the Crown was caught in a dangerous situation whereby 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Woodward (1969) pp.79–87  
12 Uztáriz (1724) 
13 See Kamen (1965) pp.699–716 
14 Ringrose (1996) 
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45% of its peacetime income was directly or indirectly derived from the 
colonies15.  Thus, as the western European powers became increasingly active in 
the Americas, sea power took on a new significance for a Spanish Crown very 
aware of its financial dependence on the Indies and feeling its empire threatened. 
In order to protect its American empire, the Spanish monarchy maintained a 
permanent fleet in the West Indies, known as the Armada de Barlovento.  Its size 
varied depending on the political situation from an average of four or five ships 
during peacetime to between ten and a dozen in times of war.  The only history 
dealing specifically with this fleet is that of Bibiano Torres Ramírez16 who ends 
his account with the War of Spanish Succession and the Spanish monarchy’s 
replacement of independent regional fleets with a single Armada Real in 1714.  
The Armada de Barlovento, however, existed as a squadron within the Spanish 
navy throughout the eighteenth century and functioned as a key component of 
Spanish naval policy. 
McNeill’s Atlantic Empires of France and Spain: Louisbourg and Havana 1700–
1763 gives the most detailed study of this fleet’s strategic role.  He describes the 
squadron’s function as being to safeguard the flotas travelling to and from Spain 
to New Spain and Veracruz, to prevent contraband and to act as guardacostas, as 
well as to threaten Britain’s trade route to Jamaica and to facilitate an amphibious 
attack on Britain’s North American colonies during wartime17.  Ogelsby, in an 
article on the Havana squadron during the War of Jenkins’ Ear18, agrees with 
McNeill arguing that the Armada de Barlovento carried out these tasks fairly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Ibid. p.93 
16 Torres Ramírez (1981) 
17 McNeill (1985) pp.87–91 
18 Ogelsby (1969) pp.473–88 
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successfully.  Ogelsby demonstrates that, as a result of the squadron’s activities, 
treasure fleets reached Spain during wartime and that the defeat of the Havana 
squadron remained a necessary step in any attempt to capture these fleets, citing 
the example of the action between Sir Charles Knowles and Admiral Reggio in 
the Old Bahama Channel on 1 October 174819.  Additionally, the squadron is 
considered to have made a significant impact in the capture of enemy shipping 
during this conflict.  As Ogelsby argues, the Havana squadron has failed to get 
much recognition but a study of its activities during this period suggests that its 
commanders carried out their duties remarkably well, given their government’s 
orders and the conditions which they faced20. 
Neither author, however, argues that the squadron did not have its limitations.  
When Vernon attacked Portobello and then Cartagena in 1740 and 1741 
respectively, he was not concerned as to whether there was a Spanish squadron in 
the vicinity, thus demonstrating the Spanish navy’s inability to act as a deterrent 
to Britain, at this time Spain’s most active enemy in the West Indies.  The 
squadron’s inability to challenge an enemy battlefleet was also evident in the 
1762 British capture of Havana.  David F. Marley21, while describing Cuba’s lack 
of preparation for an attack as the principal reason behind its capture, also 
highlights how ineffective the Havana squadron was at protecting its base.  By 
contrast, historians such as McNeill and Kuethe argue that this was in keeping 
with Spain’s traditional defensive strategy in the West Indies which relied on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Ibid., p.488 
20 Ibid., p.473.  See also Newton (1987), pp.31–73, which includes a biography of Admiral Torres 
who spent the majority of his active career as the head of the Havana squadron 
21 Marley (1992) pp.293–305 and (1994) pp.403–417 
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using local resources to hold out until reinforcements from Spain could arrive 
while allowing the hostile climate to take its toll on the enemy22.   
The capture of Havana in 1762, however, was of particular significance to the 
Spanish navy since, as Syrett describes it in his account of the British siege, 
Havana was ‘the centre of Spanish power in the Caribbean’ being the Spanish 
navy’s main base in the West Indies, a rendezvous for homeward-bound flotas, 
and dominating the lines of communications between Spain and her American 
mainland colonies23.  Havana’s geostrategic location as a natural base between the 
Caribbean and the Atlantic was well understood by the Spanish monarchy as is 
demonstrated by Serrano Alvarez in his history of the Havana dockyard from 
1700 to 175024.  Additionally, in 1713, Bernardo Tinajero de la Escalera, 
secretary of the Council of the Indies who was appointed first Ministro de Marina 
e Indias in 171425, suggested making Havana Spain’s principal naval shipbuilding 
yard not only because of its convenient location but also because of its abundance 
of good-quality timber and plentiful supply of cheap slave labour.  Jean Orry, then 
Philip V’s favourite, preferred the purchase of ships of the line from abroad and 
so Tinajero’s plans were shelved.  However, his ideas would influence José 
Patiño’s thinking.  The latter, as Secretary of the Treasury, War, State and the 
single department of Navy and the Indies from 1726 to his death in 1736, 
instituted widespread naval reforms and established a large shipbuilding 
programme that, between 1728 and 1737, resulted in the construction of 32 new 
ships of the line (or battleships as they will also be referred to), twelve of which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Kuethe (1986) p.13 and McNeill (1985) pp.101–2 
23 Syrett (1970) p.xiii 
24 Serrano Álvarez (2008) 
25 Baudot Monroy (2012) pp.45–6 
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were built at Havana26.  Serrano’s history relates the development of naval 
construction in Cuba, which took place to begin with under the auspices of the 
asentista Juan de Acosta27 who dominated naval construction in Havana until the 
creation of the Royal Havana Company in 1740.  This trading company was given 
the shipbuilding contract in 1741 under the assumption that its profits from 
tobacco would easily cover the expenses of shipbuilding.  It found, however, that 
shipbuilding was a far more expensive enterprise than had been expected and, as a 
result, was petitioning the Crown to be allowed out of the contract from as early 
as 1745.  Ferdinand VI finally freed the Company of shipbuilding responsibilities 
in 1749. 
After the Royal Havana Company built its last ships, naval construction in 
Havana came under the direct management of the Crown through the figure of the 
Comisario Ordenador, Lorenzo de Montalvo.  However, since shipbuilding was 
halted until 1756, by which time Ensenada’s shipbuilding programme had been 
substantially reduced, there is not much written on these years and accounts only 
begin again after 176328.  Occasionally, the fact that shipbuilding did not continue 
in Havana during these years has resulted in certain misinterpretations.  Inglis, for 
example, in an article on shipbuilding at Havana, wrote that Ensenada ‘Ferdinand 
VI’s most able minister, did not neglect the navy, but devoted his efforts to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Figures compiled from Harbron (1988) pp.166–7.  These were built in the old dockyard within 
the town walls before construction of the new arsenal at La Tenaza just outside the city walls 
begun in 1735. 
27 Serrano Alvarez (2006) pp.7–31 
28 For example Serrano Álvarez (2009) pp.71–100, and Kuethe and Serrano Álvarez (2007) 
pp.763–776 
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reforming Spain’s internal economy and royal rents’ when in reality the opposite 
could be argued29.  
The increased commitment which was required of Spain to defend its interests in 
America and the Mediterranean coincided with the creation of a permanent 
Spanish navy composed of purpose-built battleships.  A royal decree of 14 
February 1714 replaced regional fleets with a single Armada Real.  Its creation 
also represented the movement towards centralisation of state power following the 
Bourbon accession.  John Lynch in Bourbon Spain 1700–1808 and J. H. Elliott in 
Imperial Spain 1469–1716 have both held that what are frequently defined as 
reforms were, in fact, just a general reorganisation by the Spanish state, in which 
the improvement of Spain’s military and naval forces was included, the better to 
serve the interests of the Crown.  As a result the contract system, whereby such 
matters as shipbuilding, recruitment and victualling were delegated to private 
contractors, as described by Carla Rahn Phillips in Six Galleons for the King of 
Spain and The Treasure of the San José, no longer existed in the mid-eighteenth 
century though vestiges of it still influenced how the navy was run. 
In the Age of Reason, science played an increasingly important role in the 
development of navies, not only in the improvement of arts, such as navigation 
and shipbuilding, but also in strengthening the relationship between the central 
government, naval administration and the navy itself.  As Antonio Lafuente and 
Manuel Sellés30 demonstrate, for example, the Academy of Guardias Marinas, 
with a sciences-orientated curriculum, created an officer class, of which Jorge 
Juan y Santacilia (1713–1773) and Antonio de Ulloa (1716–1795) were prime !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Inglis (1985) p.52, footnote 21 
30 Lafuente and Sellés (1988) pp.45–119 
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examples, whose loyalty was to the state and whose education had been such that 
they could shape their experiences into cogent institutional knowledge. 
Naval expansion and reform was so closely associated with the Marquis de la 
Ensenada during Ferdinand’s reign that when this minister was exiled in 1754 it 
was expected that these projects would come to an end.  Benjamin Keene, British 
ambassador to Spain between 1748 and 1757, wrote: ‘Ensenada’s mighty projects 
of a marine have been cut short.  No more ships are to be built’31.  Keene’s 
prediction was correct, Spanish naval shipbuilding slowed dramatically until it 
was taken up again after 1763.  That it was so short-lived has led several 
historians to underestimate the significance of Ferdinand’s reign in the 
development of the Spanish navy during the eighteenth-century and to attribute 
many of its features to Charles III’s.  But, though Ensenada’s premiership was 
short-lived, it still represents an important phase in the evolution of the Spanish 
navy. 
Another offshoot from naval reform being closely associated with Ensenada has 
been that opinion of its value has often been linked with the assessment of his 
person, especially as he became a contentious character following his removal 
from power.  After 1754, Keene criticised Ensenada openly, suggesting that he 
was anti-British and corrupt with a tendency to self-aggrandizement.  This 
depiction of Ensenada has percolated through many British-sourced works, most 
notably William Coxe’s Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon.  
Coxe’s criticism of Ensenada is interesting as it describes his ‘most reprehensible 
defect’ as that of ‘[e]rroneously persuading himself that his country had nothing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Quoted in Coxe (1813) p.173 
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to fear from France, and every thing from England, he sacrificed the military to 
the naval department’32.  Discussion regarding Ensenada and, in turn, naval 
reform has been further complicated by the comparison of his approach to foreign 
policy with that of his rival minister in Ferdinand VI’s government, José de 
Carvajal y Lancaster (1698–1754).  The debate over who was the more powerful 
or better minister has divided historians, as demonstrated in the collected essays 
on Ferdinand’s chief ministers, so that those who support Carvajal have generally 
been dismissive of Ensenada’s naval reforms and those who defend Ensenada 
have been unstinting in their approval of them33.  These diametrically opposed 
positions have affected how the navy’s development has been perceived, 
effectively blocking the development of a balanced, critical assessment. 
The most extensive work written on Ensenada is that of the nineteenth-century 
historian Antonio Rodríguez Villa34.  Comprising a compilation of original 
documents, this is an invaluable source for the study of naval reform though it 
does not comment critically on the topic.  Ensenada’s latest biographer, José Luis 
Goméz Urdáñez, on the other hand, proposes that Ensenada and Carvajal, along 
with the king’s confessor, Francisco Rávago y Noriega (1685–1763) and the 
queen, Barbara of Braganza (1711–1758), governed jointly while keeping an 
unstable and panic-prone Ferdinand VI under control.  Within this dynamic, 
Ensenada remained the dominant character.  On Carvajal’s death in 1754, 
however, the political balance was destabilised and this resulted in a conspiracy 
against Ensenada headed by Fernando de Silva Mendoza y Toledo, Duke of 
Huéscar (1714–1776).  Goméz Urdáñez portrays Ensenada as an intelligent and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Coxe (1813) p.171 
33 See, for example, the various arguments in Delgado Barredo and Gómez Urdáñez (2002). 
34 Rodríguez Villa (1878) 
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talented reforming minister and emphasises his belief that France and Britain, and 
not just Britain, were both Spain’s rivals, and that his naval regeneration projects 
were sound as a result.  Nevertheless, he states that these policies have already 
been studied by the naval historians Cesáreo Fernández Duro and José Patricio 
Merino Navarro and therefore he focuses primarily on Ensenada’s domestic 
reforms. 
Fernández Duro’s multi-volume Armada Española desde la Unión de los Reinos 
de Castilla y de Aragón remains the most complete history of the Spanish navy.  
Written at the end of the nineteenth century by a retired naval officer, it was 
composed with evident patriotic zeal but is, nevertheless, a valuable source for the 
study of Ferdinand VI’s naval policy.  His account of the period extends to an 
analysis of Ensenada’s Representations to the King, in which he considers 
Ensenada’s priorities as being the generation of funds and then the creation of a 
strong navy.  In terms of naval reform, Fernández Duro’s main focus is 
shipbuilding, specifically the importation of British artisans to work in Spanish 
dockyards.  His analysis of the period also includes chapters on some of the small 
confrontations in which Spanish ships distinguished themselves and on the 
morería, the Spanish naval campaign against Barbary privateers. 
Fernández Duro’s work has been an important influence and source for most 
histories on the subject since, including Merino Navarro’s history of the Spanish 
eighteenth-century navy.  This author seeks to demonstrate that there occurred an 
important naval revival in Spain following the accession of the Bourbons which 
resulted in an impressive Spanish turnout at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805.  
Moreover, the navy was an essential feature of Spanish foreign relations and so 
‘the study of the navy, from this point of view, is an introduction to the study of 
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international relations’35.  His analysis of Ferdinand VI’s reign focuses on naval 
shipbuilding and on the matrícula de mar, a register of Spain’s coastal 
populations listing the available seamen that could be called upon to man the 
navy. 
The employment of British shipwrights and the adoption of a la inglesa (or 
English-style) naval construction has, unsurprisingly, attracted some of the 
greatest interest in Ferdinand VI’s naval policy because it was such a marked 
feature in its development36.  An extensive work on the subject is that of the 
published proceedings of a congress held to commemorate the battle of Trafalgar 
between 3 and 5 November 2005.  The papers published in Technology of the 
Ships at Trafalgar represent the various approaches to eighteenth-century Spanish 
naval design and the differences of opinion as to the worth of introducing a 
foreign form of construction.  In it, L. D. Ferreiro examines the role of 
‘technology transfer’ seeing it as a valuable tool for modernisation despite its 
inherent disadvantages, arguments which he reiterates in his book Ships and 
Science37.  He posits that the apogee of Spanish naval construction was reached 
under José Romero y Fernández de Landa (1735–1807) and Julián de Retamosa in 
the late eighteenth century but he acknowledges Ensenada’s and Jorge Juan’s 
roles in the devolopment of the Spanish navy and considers Juan’s Examen 
Maritimo Théorico Práctico (1771) a significant work in the universal evolution 
of naval architecture.  Harbron examines Spanish naval construction as a 
combination of British shipbuilding techniques, French administration and 
Spanish know-how resulting in a formidable Spanish fleet at Trafalgar, again !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Merino Navarro (1981) p.10 
36 See Appendix 4 for a list of ships launched during this period. 
37 Ferreiro (2007) 
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reiterating the ideas he had put forward in his book Trafalgar and the Spanish 
Navy38.  José María Sánchez Carrión’s paper on François Gautier’s work in Spain 
as Director of Construction from 1765 and founder of the Spanish Corps of Naval 
Engineers adopts a different viewpoint.  According to the author, Gautier, as Jorge 
Juan’s replacement, introduced French-style naval construction and thus corrected 
many of the faults created during Juan’s administration by the employment of 
British artisans.  Opinion as to the relative value of a la inglesa design is, 
therefore, divided. 
Most of the studies that have used primary sources in the analysis of a la inglesa 
construction, however, have been carried out by Spanish historians following 
certain recurring lines of approach.  Most significantly, a la inglesa design has 
been perceived as an interruption of the natural evolution of Spanish design as 
represented by José Antonio de Gaztañeta at the beginning of the century, 
continued by his protégé, Ciprián Autrán, and later re-introduced with Romero y 
Fernández de Landa and Retamosa.  In this argument, Spanish design is generally 
credited as being intrinsically superior39 and this line has been accepted by foreign 
historians working from secondary sources.  Harbron, for instance, stated that:  
The leading English and Irish constructores hired by Jorge Juan from 1749 
to 1770 were not “naval architects” as we understand the term today.  However, 
the Spanish experts they worked for, such outstanding ship designers as Juan de 
Acosta and Cipriano de Autrán, were professionally trained in a manner that was 
not available in England at that time40.   
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38 Harbron (1988) 
39 See, for example, Merino Navarro (1981) p.348, argued that ‘What to me appears serious in the 
Spanish case is that we do not see a homogenous evolution in changes, except for two exceptions, 
Gaztañeta-Autrán and Gautier-Romero-Retamosa.  In between a couple of dramatic alterations 
were made, without there being, however, a scientific or real reason to justify it.  It is normal, in 
these circumstances, that noticeable defects should have been found in Spanish battleships built 
approximately between 1750 and 1778–80’. 
40 Harbron (1988) p.37 
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Other than the author’s debateable assessment of who could be classified 
as a ‘naval architect’, the imported British shipwrights were in charge of Spanish 
naval construction and not subservient to local artisans in this activity at this time.  
Additionally, none of them ever worked in Havana during Juan de Acosta’s time 
there41 or under Autrán, who, as Master Attendant at La Carraca, was only in 
charge of ship maintenance while Matthew Mullins, as Master Shipwright, was in 
charge of shipbuilding.  In addition, the attempt has been made to de-foreignise it 
by insisting that rather than calling it a la inglesa, which translates into ‘English-
style’, it should be called Jorge Juan’s method because, as Merino Navarro has 
argued, ‘he was the one that organised it and was present in all the juntas and who 
received overall powers to fix its characteristics and adopt its proportions’42.  In 
this study, it will generally be referred to as a la inglesa because of its succintness 
since its meaning is easily identifiable and it accurately conveys that it was a 
Spanish style of construction based on a British system.  A third approach within 
this ‘nationalist’ argument has been that the Spanish navy adopted British 
construction methods and improved on them.  Soler Pascual, for example, noted 
that in a la inglesa construction ‘the methods employed in the British Isles were 
copied and bettered’43 and, most recently, Rivera has argued in a detailed 
description of a la inglesa designs, that the Spanish took the 1745 Establishment, 
which was outdated and resulted in the construction of unseaworthy ships, and 
improved upon it by applying Spanish and French design features thus creating 
far superior ships to the British in the pre-Thomas Slade era44. 
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41 See Serrano Álvarez (2006) pp.7–32 
42 Merino Navarro (1981) p.347 
43 Soler Pascual pp.285–6 
44 Rivera (2012) pp.1–2 
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This approach has enforced certain limitations on the analysis of the shipbuilding 
programme carried out during Ferdinand VI’s reign.  Firstly, many historians have 
focused excessively on design, perceiving it as a static, non-evolutionary object.  
This precisely is what Rivera has done by focusing his study on the designs 
created at the 1752 Council of Constructors, now to be found at the Museo Naval, 
Madrid, without analysing the people involved, the process of implementation, the 
resources and materials, the social and political situation which affected the 
programme at Court and at the Naval Departments and without analysing it as an 
evolving process that did not remain stationary between 1749 and 1759.  
Secondly, by ignoring this evolutionary approach and, more specifically, by 
overlooking the process by which British designs were adapted to suit Spanish 
materials and resources and vice versa it is very difficult to examine it within the 
context of the debate over the value of technology transfer as a vehicle for 
modernisation though it is, in fact, one of the most striking examples of it in the 
eighteenth century. 
Technology transfer, or the adoption by a state of an alien form of technology in 
order to improve its own, remains a popular form of modernising technologically-
complex systems, such as ships and the infrastructure to maintain them, and 
industrial espionage was a constant feature of eighteenth-century European 
navies.  Despite this, there is a lack of agreement over its implementation.  
Though many perceive it as a useful method by which to modernise quickly, as, 
for instance, does Gardiner in The Line of Battle Ship45, there are those who 
consider its benefits limited.  Cipolla in his study of seventeenth-century arms 
manufacturing, for example, quotes S. Herbert Frankel, stating that ‘at first sight !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Gardiner (1992) p.9 
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the problem might appear to be merely one of introducing new methods of 
production and the instruments, tools or machines appropriate thereto.  But what 
is really involved is a vast change in social beliefs and practices’ and concluded 
that: 
 For meeting any new situation, new thoughts, new aptitudes, new action 
will be required …  It is because all these new activities are not independent of the 
existing institutions into which they have to be fitted, and which have in turn to be 
adjusted to them, that the process of change is so complex and, if it is to proceed 
harmoniously, necessarily so slow46. 
This argument has been reiterated by naval historians such as Pritchard in 
his analysis of French naval shipbuilders47 and, in the Spanish case, it is precisely 
this area of the implementation of a la inglesa construction which caused the 
greatest difficulties though it is not necessarily the case that technology transfer 
had no lasting benefits.  Only by carrying out a closer examination of the 
implementation and development of a la inglesa shipbuilding will it be possible to 
see how effective technology transfer was in this particular case. 
Outside the subject of design and the two histories of the Spanish navy by 
Fernández Duro and Merino Navarro, there are several monographs covering the 
period of Ferdinand’s reign which focus on particular areas relating to the navy.  
These include Rosa Maria Pérez Estévez’s book48 on the treatment of vagrants in 
Spain, which, as a result of Ensenada’s reforms, involved their employment in 
dockyards.  Her chapter on this contains an invaluable account of their everyday 
life in the naval arsenals at Ferrol, Cadiz and Cartagena.  There are studies on the 
development of the naval hospitals and the Naval Surgeon’s College such as 
Mikel Astrain Gallart’s Barberos, Cirujanos y Gente de Mar: La sanidad naval y !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Cipolla (1965) pp. 129–30 
47 Pritchard (1987) pp.7–8 
48 Pérez Estévez (1976) 
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la profesión quirúrgica en la España ilustrada and Salvador Clavijo y Clavijo’s 
La Trayectoria Hospitalaria de la Armada Española.  Juan A. Diez Aja in La 
Fusión del Hierro y las Fábricas de Liérganes y La Cavada and Alcalá Zamora y 
Queipo de Llano Historia de una empresa siderúrgica española have both studied 
the development of Spanish naval gunnery.  Scientific institutions related to the 
navy have also been examined in, for example, Lafuente and Selles’ study of the 
Royal Observatory at Cadiz.  And, finally, several histories exist of Spain’s naval 
bases and dockyards, such as Juan Castanedo Galán’s history of the royal 
dockyard at Guarnizo49, José Manuel Serrano Álvarez’s El Astillero de la Habana 
y la Construcción Naval 1700–1750 or José Quintero González’s El Arsenal de la 
Carraca (1717–1736).  These provide interesting case studies of the naval 
reforms at work but do not necessarily place them in the context of higher 
government and the development and implementation of naval policy.  Moreover, 
they have in large part been motivated by the desire to demonstrate the advances 
which the Enlightenment effected in Spain rather than their importance within the 
context of Spain as a naval power.  More recently, a number of biographies of 
significant individuals of this period have been published, such as Valverde’s 
biography of Jorge Juan y Santacilia and Baudot Monroy’s biography of Julián de 
Arriaga but, here again, Valverde’s study places more emphasis on Juan’s 
activities as a scientist and diplomat rather than as a naval officer and Baudot 
Monroy, when discussing Arriaga’s time as Naval Minister, focuses mainly on 
Spanish foreign policy50. 
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Studies of the Spanish navy as a whole have, therefore, analysed the reform of the 
Spanish navy at this time within the context of the whole eighteenth century with 
historians, such as Harbron and Merino Navarro, interpreting it largely as an era 
of progressive development resulting in a good turnout by the Spanish navy at the 
Battle of Trafalgar in 1805.  This approach places greater emphasis on the subject 
of Spanish ship design which, though important and a key component of any 
study of Ferdinand VI’s navy, represents only one aspect in the study of a navy.  
While studies focusing on sub-topics within the subject of Ferdinand VI’s navy, 
such as the studies of institutions like the Royal Observatory or the Academy of 
Naval Surgeons, the construction of the naval arsenals and the biographies of 
naval officers or the study of the use of vagrants in the Spanish navy, have largely 
ignored the broader, strategic implications of their subjects within the 
development of the navy.  As a result, there is little analysis of the success, or 
otherwise, of Ferdinand’s navy, his reforms, use of men, materials and resources 
and the success of the navy in attaining Spain’s foreign policy objectives.  By 
contrast there are many more studies which examine other European navies in this 
way, for instance Pritchard’s51 and Dull’s52 works on the French Navy, Bruijn’s 
on the Dutch navy53 or those on the British navy, like Baugh’s British Naval 
Administration in the Age of Walpole54, Rodger’s The Wooden World and The 
Command of the Ocean55, Lambert’s War at Sea in the Age of Sail56, Harding’s 
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The Emergence of Britain’s Global Naval Supremacy57 or Black and Woodfine’s 
The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century58. 
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CHAPTER 2.  The Marquis de la Ensenada and the Navy 
 
Ensenada, during his time in power, presented Ferdinand VI with a series of 
memoranda advising him on government and policy1.  Ferdinand’s melancholic 
disposition all too often plunged him into fits of anxiety and uncertainty2 and so 
Ensenada, bearing in mind his monarch’s delicate mental and emotional health, 
presented his ideas in an as optimistic a manner as possible, always emphasising 
their feasibility.  Nevertheless, they still represent Ensenada’s clearest written 
expression of his project and give a good picture of how he ran the government 
while in power.  Above all else, they demonstrate the predominance of the navy in 
his thinking and show the pertinacity with which he pushed Ferdinand towards 
developing Spain’s naval power. 
In 1746, with Spain still at war, Ensenada advised the new monarch in his Idea de 
lo que parece preciso en el dia para la dirección de lo que corresponde á Estado 
y se halla pendiente3, to decide upon a ‘punto céntrico’ (key objective)4 towards 
which all his efforts would be directed and suggested that this be peace5.  He 
elaborated on the concept, stating that only peace would allow Spain’s commerce, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The memoranda were submitted privately but they were published in full by Rodríguez Villa, 
who consulted them in the then Marquis of la Ensenada’s collection, see Rodríguez Villa (1878) 
p.ix. 
2 Keene frequently alludes to this, for example when describing the balance of power at the 
Spanish Court between Barbara of Braganza, Ensenada, Carvajal and Rávago, he states: ‘This 
important consideration of keeping the King easy in his mind, and on foot, I may say, is what 
maintains this disjointed administration in the state it is’, see Keene to Holdernesse, Madrid, 22 
August 1751, Kew SP94/140. 
3 Rodríguez Villa (1878) pp.31–42 
4 Ibid. p.31 
5  Opinion among historians varies as to where the incentive for peace originated at this time, 
whether from Ferdinand, Carvajal or Ensenada, see Delgado Barredo and Gómez Urdáñez (2002) 
for various points of view.  It was, however, a policy followed tenaciously throughout Ferdinand’s 
reign  becoming one of its defining characteristics. 
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manufacturing and agriculture to flourish.  Additionally, it would provide much 
needed relief for the Spanish population by allowing a reduction in taxation and 
making it possible for Indies treasure to go to the Crown rather than to foreigners.  
Ensenada insisted, however, that a durable and honourable peace could only be 
obtained if the Spanish monarchy could defend its interests with force, for which 
reason it was vital that Ferdinand should expand Spain’s military and naval 
strength. 
By the following year the end of the War of Austrian Succession was in sight and 
Ensenada began to elaborate his plans for a post-war Spain in greater detail6.  
These included a section on the navy7 in which he argued that the Spanish 
monarchy, more than any other power, given its geographical nature as a 
peninsula with extensive coasts and a vast overseas empire needed a navy fit for 
purpose.  Additionally, only with naval power could Spain force its rivals, France 
and Britain, to respect Spanish interests.  For these reasons, Ensenada advised 
Ferdinand that he should concentrate, ‘above all else, on the expansion and better 
management of his fleets’8.  The plan he put forward was for the construction of 
fifty battleships in Spain and Havana over a projected eight years of peace during 
which the King would be required to invest an annual sum of a million pesos.  At 
the same time, Ferdinand would need to solve Spain’s acute shortage of able 
seamen.  According to Ensenada, this shortage resulted from the small size of 
Spain’s population, limited maritime commerce and the depredations of Barbary 
privateers, further compounded by Spanish sailors’ lack of experience which 
required, say, twenty-five seamen to be employed on tasks in which the British !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Rodríguez Villa (1878) pp.43–65, Aranjuez, 18 June 1747 
7 Ibid. pp.62–4 
8 Ibid. p.62 
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might use only six.  Only through making naval careers more attractive by 
offering higher, punctually-paid salaries, implementing exemptions and reliefs 
within the navy, welcoming foreigners into Spanish service and permitting free 
trade between Spanish ports and America as a way in which to increase the size of 
Spain’s merchant fleet could this shortage be offset. 
A year later, in 1748, Ensenada submitted a memorandum specifically on the 
development of the navy9.  Again, this reiterated the reasons why Spain needed a 
navy and insisted that for these reasons ‘one can deduce that this area of 
government merits your majesty’s principal attention’10.  Despite the War of 
Austrian Succession having come to an end and Spain now being in a state of 
peace within Europe, Ensenada argued that the King’s existing fleet should be 
kept on active duty, with six ships protecting Spanish coasts and merchantmen 
from Barbary privateers and eight ships the empire, half of these permanently in 
the Caribbean as guardacostas and the remainder convoying fleets across the 
Atlantic.  Meanwhile the navy’s planned expansion should begin, although quietly 
so as not to rouse foreign suspicions.  Six ships should be built annually at each of 
Spain’s naval Departments – Ferrol (which, due to its geographical situation on 
the route to America and northern Europe, would be Spain’s principal arsenal), 
Cadiz and Cartagena – and three in Havana.  This would be funded with 
3,879,086 vellon escudos in Europe and 782,093 pesos in America, which in total, 
Ensenada argued, would only amount to about a third of the expenditure on the 
army.  He conceded that Court expenditure should take precedence over that of 
the navy but, ‘as it is vital to develop a fixed system for the navy and to keep to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Ibid. pp.109–111, Aranjuez, 28 May 1748. 
10 Ibid. p.109 
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it’11, he begged the King to make it his policy to fund the navy consistently with 
any outstanding funds being invested in this service.  Ship construction would be 
delayed a further two years in order to allow timber to season and for resources, 
such as iron parts, artillery, ammunition, sailcloth and cordage, to be stockpiled.  
Though Ensenada did not state this here, he also intended to use this time to 
investigate foreign navies so as radically to modernise Spain’s shipbuilding 
techniques and infrastructure.  In his conclusion, he reminded Ferdinand of the 
significance of naval power, arguing that, if, in 1739, the Spanish monarchy had 
had fleets of 40 ships off Cape Finisterre and 15 to 20 ships off Cartagena, had 
fortified coasts and ports in Galicia and had encouraged privateering, Britain 
would not have risked war.  Once Ferdinand did have this navy, France would 
seek an alliance in the hope of combining their navies against Britain just as 
doggedly as Britain would pursue an alliance to prevent this from happening. 
Thus by 1751, Ensenada had already pushed consistently to persuade Ferdinand 
of the need for a powerful navy.  He had also put forward various ideas as to how 
to achieve this and what benefits they would bring Ferdinand.  It was in his 1751 
Representation12, however, in which he set out most clearly the key concepts of 
his naval plan, expressing this within the confines of Spain’s foreign policy and 
economy.  Ensenada’s foreign policy objective remained, as put forward in 
previous memoranda, that of re-establishing the respect for the Spanish Crown 
which it was widely felt its European rivals had lost for it but, also, because these 
concerns were equally pressing, continuing to give support to the two Infantes, 
Charles and Philip, in their dominions in Italy, beginning to work towards the 
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12 Ibid. pp.113–142. 
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recovery of Gibraltar from Britain and preventing foreign powers from 
encroaching on Spanish territories in America.  On all these fronts, Spain’s two 
greatest opponents would be Britain by sea and France on land.  Spain could not 
hope to have either the military power of France or the naval power of Britain but 
fortunately, he argued, France and Britain would once again soon be at war with 
each other.  In this situation, Spain could remain neutral while being courted by 
both powers for an alliance that would tip the scales of the contest.  Furthermore, 
this would lever Britain into returning Gibraltar and France into ceding 
Bellaguardia and many of the commercial privileges it held in Spain’s empire.  
This would only occur, however, if Spain had suitable sea and land forces.   
Ensenada first turned his attention to the army, arguing that, at that time, it 
comprised 133 battalions, which, after those necessary to man Spain’s various 
garrisons, fortresses and coastal defences had been deducted, only left 59 
battalions and 43 squadrons for campaigning.  France, on the other hand, had 377 
battalions and 235 squadrons, which meant that, in times of peace, it had 244 
battalions and 167 squadrons for campaigning, plus a population capable of 
boosting these figures during wartime.  To remedy this situation, he proposed that 
the King invest in modernising fortifications and coastal defences while 
increasing the size of the army and adding 20 new foreign battalions. 
The navy’s situation, on the other hand, was more critical because Spain only had 
18 ships of the line and 15 smaller vessels in comparison to Britain’s 100 
battleships and 188 smaller vessels.  Nevertheless, as the Spanish navy would 
only have to fulfil a defensive role within its own metropolitan and colonial 
waters, it did not have to be as large as Britain’s and a force of 60 battleships with 
numerous frigates and smaller ships would be sufficient in the immediate future.  
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He then re-outlined his proposed shipbuilding programme before describing the 
progress made since 1748.  Work on the arsenals at each of the Departments was 
progressing fast13.  Timber and other supplies had been procured in preparation 
for ship construction to begin in 1752.  Three British master shipwrights had been 
appointed and were proving their skills by building four 70-gun ships, a frigate 
and a packet boat14.  Having accomplished this, in early 1752, they would attend a 
Junta scheduled to be held in Madrid to draw up a shipbuilding establishment for 
the Spanish navy.  Other specialists, such as master sailmakers and ropemakers, 
were also being brought into Spanish service from abroad.  Not only would 
Ferdinand soon have numerous battleships but they would be built in line with 
Europe’s cutting-edge technology and methods. 
The difficulties in recruiting sufficient manpower still remained and, as Ensenada 
acknowledged, these would always be difficult to overcome.  The number of 
officers produced by the Academy of Guardias Marinas covered current needs 
but a greater number of officers would soon be necessary and it was therefore 
imperative to encourage this by enhancing the prestige of the officer class.  It was 
also vital to make service at sea more attractive to ordinary sailors.  Significant 
progress in this field had already been made since 1748 and a longer period of 
peace with the encouragement of trade and fishing would further improve matters.  
The practice of offering better and regularly-paid wages and salaries, as well as 
encouraging foreigners into Spanish service, already meant that, by the time he 
was writing, there were many more volunteers, a great improvement on the past 
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13 La Carraca had been built in the 1730s but it was now being expanded, while Ferrol and 
Cartagena were begun in 1749 largely from scratch (previously Cartagena had operated as a galley 
base and its installations reflected this). 
14 See p.71 
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when most ships had been manned by forced labour.  With time and by adopting 
French, Dutch and British recruiting methods, Ensenada affirmed the problem of 
manning the ships could be dealt with reasonably satisfactorily. 
Once the Spanish monarchy had the army and navy which Ensenada wanted in 
addition to a 30-million-peso back-up fund which he also proposed organising, he 
felt, no one ‘knowledgeable in the matters of Royal Princes’ could deny that 
Ferdinand would be ‘the arbiter of peace and war between France and Britain, and 
even within Europe’15. 
Ferdinand’s greatest obstacle would be financing such an expansion.  Ensenada 
estimated the Crown’s revenue, excepting proceeds from the Indies, at an annual 
26,707,649 vellon escudos.  He advised that this be divided: 15 million going into 
the army, 5 million into the navy and the remaining 6,707,647 into royal palaces, 
stables, parks, providing an income for the former queen (Elizabeth Farnese) and 
other government expenditure.  He calculated that six more years of peace would 
be required to put his military and naval plans into effect and this, he also 
reckoned, would be the period required for the Treasury to recover from the 
previous conflict-ridden half-century.  After these six years, he proposed that the 
regular annual revenue be divided into 19 million escudos for the army, 6 million 
for the navy and 9 million for the rest.  The seven-million-escudo sum shortfall on 
the then current revenue could be made up out of his proposed economic reforms 
(namely the introduction of the single tax which would redistribute dues more 
proportionately and the establishement of an international bank, the Giro Real, in 
1749), the redemption of juros (annuities) and alcabalas (excise taxes), the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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privatisation of tax collection, the development of and greater control over the 
tobacco trade and profits resulting from the expansion of Spain’s manufacturing 
industries.  During his time in power, Ensenada carried through or made a start on 
many of these proposed economic reforms.  He begun the attempt to introduce the 
única contribuición (or single tax) by carrying out a general survey (catastro) of 
the Spanish population between 1750 and 1754.  The implementation of the single 
tax was abandoned following Ensenada’s removal from government and a later 
attempt to introduce it during Charles III’s reign also failed as a result of 
opposition from the grandees and nobles of Spain.  This partly explained the 
attempt to remove Ensenada from power in 1754 by the Duke of Huéscar, leader 
of the grandee party at Court.  In addition to this, Ensenada also improved the 
Crown’s finances by re-negotiating the relationship between the Church and the 
Spanish state through the signature of a Concordat with Rome in 1753, by 
establishing the Giro to facilitate the payment of Spain’s foreign debts and 
prevent American silver from leaving the Peninsula and, finally, by completing 
the privatisation of tax collection16.  Returning to his plans to fund his projects, 
Ensenada excluded Indies revenue, calculating it would generate an annual 12 
million escudos in the future, because he considered it too unpredictable and 
should, therefore, only be employed on creating the above-mentioned 30-million-
peso reserve fund to be used in the eventuality of a war.  These funds were to be 
kept easily accessible but actively employed for the encouragement of Spanish 
trade, manufacturing and agriculture.  Ensenada reasoned that Spain was at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the rest of Europe because of its dry climate, which caused 
frequent droughts and held back population growth, even though that could, to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 See Gómez Urdáñez (1996) pp.177–220. 
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some extent, be offset by improving the country’s infrastructure with the building 
of canals and roads and by reducing internal tax barriers.  The fund could be used 
towards this end and, despite it being expensive and time-consuming,  
that which is not begun is never finished, and if the great Louis XIV issued 
laws and ordinances, which were and are still followed with such good results, 
why could they not be adopted and practised in Spain with your Majesty as 
king?17. 
These, thus, were the main tenets of Ensenada’s ideas: a long era of peace during 
which Spain would determinedly but quietly expand and modernise its navy and 
army, having recourse to foreign expertise while at the same time employing, as 
far as possible, Spanish resources.  This would be funded by an enlarged Treasury 
– the result of financial reforms – improved internal communications and greater 
profits from commerce, agriculture and industry.  Once this had been achieved 
Spain would once again become a successful European power, capable of 
defending its interests while remaining neutral in the wars that would undoubtedly 
break out between France and Britain.  In all of this the navy would play a 
predominant role not just because Ensenada was originally a naval administrator 
and therefore favoured the service but because he credited it with being the key 
component in Spain defending its interests. 
The Representations written by Ensenada not only outline how he sought to 
govern when he was in power but they also make it possible to deduce some of 
the influences on his thinking.  Among these, were a number of published works 
that stressed the importance of naval power to Spain.  The most influential being 
Jerónimo de Uztáriz’s Theórica y Practica de Comercio y de Marina, en 
diferentes discursos, y calificados exemplares, que se procuran adaptar a la !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Ibid. p.141 
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monarquia española18.  This was primarily an economic treatise arguing, along 
mercantilist lines, that Spain’s financial troubles resulted from an excessive export 
of bullion from the Peninsula which only the development of trade and 
manufactures could correct.  Chapters 65 to 77, however, argued that naval power 
was vital for his proposed development of Spain’s economy.  His proposals bore 
similarities to Ensenada’s project19.  Both men, for example, insisted on Spain’s 
need for a powerful navy, first because it was a peninsula, second because Spain’s 
coasts were indefensible without one, and finally because Spain had an empire to 
protect20.  Uztáriz’s emphasis was that substantial commerce would be impossible 
without a powerful fleet21 and, in making a list of the reasons why Spain needed 
naval power, only placed last out of a total of nine points, the argument that with a 
navy the King would  
be respected, and feared by all princes, republics and states, and at the 
same time be courted for his alliance, friendship and protection, which will never 
be achieved by land forces alone, even when they are very numerous22.   
This, by contrast, was Ensenada’s key argument.   His ideas for the 
economy, the navy and the army were all directed towards making the Spanish 
monarchy a power to be reckoned with within Europe arguing that only then 
could it prosper.   
The navies Uztáriz and Ensenada envisioned, therefore, were fundamentally 
different despite the fact that some overlap occured.  Both wanted fleets of about !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 First published in a very limited edition in 1724 but then revised and enlarged by the author in a 
second edition of 1742 which was the more significant treatise (see Hamilton (1935) p.114 and 
Grice-Hutchinson (1978) p.161), as well as being the edition which Ensenada had in his library, 
see Gómez Urdáñez (1996) p.270.  References in this chapter are taken from the first edition 
published in English in 1752 which was translated from the 1742 edition in Spanish. 
19 Gómez Urdañez (1996) p.270 
20 Uztáriz (1752) p.226, 227. 
21 Ibid. p.226. 
22 Ibid. p.232 
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fifty ships of the line23 to act against Spain’s principal rivals, for Uztáriz24, 
France, Britain and Holland, for Ensenada, Britain.  Uztáriz reached his fixed 
number with a view to what was necessary to protect Spanish commerce but 
Ensenada reached his bearing in mind Spain’s naval strategy against Britain, so 
his estimate remained flexible and dependent on the size of the British navy.  Both 
also agreed shipbuilding should employ Spanish raw materials as far as possible25 
but whereas Uztáriz’s ships would be built using Gaztañeta’s designs26 Ensenada 
wished to adopt the best methods available among foreign shipbuilding practices 
to produce a more up-to-date, warlike fleet.  Ensenada also wished to develop the 
arsenals at Ferrol, Cartagena and Cadiz, making them Spain’s chief shipbuilding 
yards, whereas Uztáriz adhered to Tinajero’s 1713 construction programme27 
making Havana Spain’s principal shipyard28.  They did agree wholeheartedly, 
however, on the need to improve recruitment, through adopting the French 
method of matrícula de mar29, bettering the treatment of sailors, allowing them 
certain exemptions and guaranteeing regular pay.  An area in which they were at 
great odds, however, was on the subject of finance, for, whereas Ensenada 
preferred relying on regular ordinary revenue to fund a permanently active navy 
(as described above), Uztáriz wanted to fund naval development with revenue 
from the Indies, generating an additional income through fitting out battleships as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Ibid. p.233 
24 Ibid. p.260 
25 Ibid. p.249, 288 
26 Ibid. p.238 
27 AGI Indiferente 2644, Bernardo Tinajero de la Escalera to José de Grimaldo, 15 January 1713 
28 Uztáriz (1752) p.271 
29 Ibid. pp.301–5  
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merchantmen and privateers during peacetime and diverting funds away from the 
army, as well as reducing expenses by having battleships laid up in ordinary30. 
Another important eighteenth-century work was Bernardo de Ulloa’s two-volume 
Restablecimiento de las Fabricas, y Comercio Español published in 1740.  In it, 
the author, quoting Uztáriz extensively, stated that all his proposed economic 
reforms would be worthless without investing an annual 5 million pesos, 
generated in the Indies, on the Armada Real.  His ideal fleet would consist of a 
hundred ships of between 50 and 100 guns, as well as 25 frigates of 16 to 30 
guns31.  Thus a size significantly larger than that suggested by either Ensenada or 
Uztáriz and, in light of the cost of building such a fleet, unrealistic. 
The works of Uztáriz and Ulloa themselves developed from a tradition of writing 
advisory treatises on the running of the country to the monarch that had existed in 
Spain since the sixteenth century.  Among these authors, known as arbitristas, 
who had advocated the need for a navy were Philip II’s advisor Luis Ortiz in a 
Memorial para que no salga dinero del reino written for Philip II in 1558, Pedro 
Fernández de Navarrete (1564–1632) in Conservación de monarquías (1626), 
Sancho de Moncada (b. 1580) in Restauración política de España (1619), Diego 
Saavedra Fajardo (1584–1648) in Idea de un príncipe político cristiano (1640) 
and Miguel Alvarez Osorio y Redín in Memoriales (1686).  All of these employed 
similar arguments, such as the Spanish empire’s geographical nature and 
commercial needs, to encourage the Kings of Spain to expand the monarchy’s 
naval power.  Their writings remained accessible and influential in the eighteenth 
century, even being re-published, like Sancho de Moncada’s Restauración !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Ibid. p.271, 276–8 
31 Ulloa (1740) vol.II pp.355–57 
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política de España which was re-printed in 1746 with a new dedication by 
Francisco Manuel de Mena to Ferdinand VI.  In it the author emphasised the need 
for Spanish goods to travel in Spanish ships and for Spaniards to become skillful 
mariners32.  A literary tradition that favoured naval expansion, therefore, already 
existed.  Since it generally valued the navy in terms of its use to Spain as a 
commercial power rather than, like Ensenada’s thinking, as a European power, it 
would be impossible to suggest that Ensenada’s opinions were formed by it but he 
would certainly have been familiar with its reasonings and, furthermore, this 
tradition of writing about the importance of the navy meant that it was not an alien 
concept to Spain’s educated classes. 
A more significant formative experience for Ensenada was the environment in 
which he developed as a government functionary and naval administrator in the 
first half of the eighteenth century.  Since the navy’s unification as a single 
Armada in 1714 under the leadership of the first Secretary of State for the Navy, 
Bernardo Tinajero de la Escalera33, this force had been undergoing a rigorous 
process of centralisation and expansion.  In 1713, Tinajero had submitted a plan 
for a state-organised navy, involving an extensive shipbuilding programme in 
Havana and guaranteeing Spanish naval independence from France34.  This had 
failed to materialise at that time but it was taken up by Ensenada’s predecessors, 
José Patiño (1666–1736) and José del Campillo y Cossío (1693–1743).  Patiño, 
one of Alberoni’s protégés and frequently referred to as the father of Spain’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Moncada (1746) pp.37–40 
33 As Secretary of State and Secretary of the Indies and War, Tinajero unified the King’s various 
fleets into one single Real Armada, governed by one administrative body and under the authority 
of an Intendente General de Marina. 
34 AGI Indiferente 2644, Tinajero de la Escalera to Grimaldo, 15 January 1713 
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eighteenth-century navy35, rose through the ranks of the naval administration 
before being appointed to the new post of Intendente General de Marina on 21 
January 1717 with overall control of the navy.  From this post, and later as 
Secretary of State for the Navy and the Indies, he created the administrative 
framework within which the navy would function for the remainder of the 
eighteenth century36.  He was responsible for the creation of numerous 
administrative bodies, such as the Cuerpo de Ministerio, the Comisaría de 
Ordenación and the Contaduría de Marina37.  The structure of the navy’s officer 
and mariner classes was also given shape at this time by legislation covering naval 
officers, the recruitment of mariners and the organisation of marine infantry and 
artillery38.  He instituted a shipbuilding programme, designed by the Master 
Shipwright, Antonio de Gaztañeta (1656–1728), with construction taking place at 
the royal dockyards of Guarnizo and Havana.  Moreover, in 1717, the Academy of 
Guardia Marinas was founded in Cádiz for the education of an élite officer class 
in an attempt to create a broad curriculum combining the French, theory-based 
approach with the British midshipman system.  And, in 1726, the three 
Departments of Ferrol, Cadiz and Cartagena were formed.  The first extended 
from the French border along Spain’s northern Cantabrian coast and was the 
intended base for the Atlantic squadron, the second covered Spain’s western coast 
along Portugal down to Gibraltar and trade to the Indies and the third extended 
from the Straits of Gibraltar along the Mediterranean coast to the border with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Quintero González (2004) p.32 
36 See Baudot Monroy (2012), pp.41–95, for a detailed description of Patiño’s reforms. 
37 Ordenanzas e instrucciones generales formadas de Real Orden de lo que se debe observar por 
los Intendentes y demás Ministros de Marina (Cadiz, Geronymo Peralta, 1736), the ordinances 
were introduced by a decree dated 1 January 1725 but remained unpublished until 1736, see 
Guzmán Raja (2006) pp.72–3. 
38 Instrucción sobre diferentes puntos que se han de observar en el Cuerpo de Marina de España y 
han de tener fuerza de Ordenanza hasta que Su Magestad mande publicar las que inviolablemente 
deberán practicarse [Cadiz, 1717]. 
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France and was to serve as the base for the Mediterranean fleets.  Each 
Department was intended to have its own self-contained naval arsenal at their 
capital but only that of la Carraca (Cadiz) was begun during Philip V’s reign39.  In 
1726, Patiño assumed the Secretaryship of the Navy and the Indies, State and 
War, making him, as later Ensenada became, effective head of the government. 
Similarly, Campillo y Cossío began his career in naval administration in 1717, 
occupying various posts at Seville, Guarnizo, Cadiz and Santoña before being 
appointed Comisario de la Marina in 1728, in which post he oversaw Gaztañeta’s 
shipbuilding at Guarnizo.  He later transferred to Havana, where he played a key 
role in the decision to expand and move the dockyard outside the city walls.  In 
1733, he transferred to the army becoming Intendant in Montemar’s army in Italy 
until 1737 and then Intendant General of the army in Aragon.  In 1741, he became 
Philip V’s premier minister having been appointed Secretary of State for the 
Treasury, Navy, War and the Indies.  While in power he focused mainly on 
expanding the fleet to counter the British in the War of Jenkins’ Ear rather than on 
reform but he set out his ideas in a several texts, the most influential being Nuevo 
Sistema de Gobierno para la América published posthumously in Madrid, in 
1789.  He also wrote ‘Lo que hay de más y menos en España’ and ‘España 
despierta’, which were circulated in manuscript form among the members of his 
government40.  In these writings, he emphasised that Spain should invest in a navy 
in order to succeed as a European power and to protect its empire, for which 
reasons he advised the King to order the simultaneous construction of numerous 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Construction on La Carraca began in 1731, but construction on Ferrol and Cartagena began 
under Ensenada’s regime. 
40 See the Introduction in Mateos Dorado (1993). 
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warships in each of the three Departments and to develop Spain’s forests41.  The 
similarity of his ideas to Ensenada’s are noticeable, not only in relation to the 
navy but also in their respective economic ideas, namely in their belief in the 
single tax and the need to abandon tax-farming in favour of state-organised tax 
collection, which Campillo introduced in Seville, La Mancha, Toledo, Córdoba 
and Palencia in 1741 and Ensenada extended to the rest of Spain during 
Ferdinand’s reign. 
In many ways Ensenada’s career is similar to that of Patiño and Campillo y 
Cossío.  The son of a poor hidalgo family from Navarre, Ensenada was 
discovered by Patiño working in a ship consignment company in Cadiz and 
entered naval administration as his protégé.  He took part in the capture of Oran in 
1732 and in the Infante Charles’s campaigns in Naples from 1733 to 1736 (at 
which time he was granted the title of marquis de la Ensenada).  In 1737, he was 
appointed secretary of the newly-created Admiralty, governed by the Infante 
Philip as Almirante General de la Armada.  While Philip held this post and before 
he departed for Italy, this body exercised overall command of the navy and it was 
dominated by Ensenada.  In 1740, when Philip, and Ensenada with him, departed 
for Italy, power reverted to the Secretary of the Navy.  Philip V recalled Ensenada 
to Spain following Campillo’s death in 1743 and from this point he accumulated 
key positions in government so that by Ferdinand’s accession in 1746, he was 
Secretary of State for the Navy and the Indies, War and Treasury.  The naval 
reforms he instituted first from the Admiralty and then as Secretary of the Navy 
furthered the centralising and expansionist policies of Patiño and Campillo, whose 
initiatives he acknowledged in his 1747 Representation when he concluded that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Ibid. pp.112–3 
! #*!
they, like him, had been entrusted with such extensive powers by the King for the 
good of the state42. 
Thus Ensenada’s policies fitted within a tradition of thought that had existed in 
the navy since at least the beginning of the century.  It is important to emphasise 
the great extent to which Ensenada was a product of the institution through whose 
ranks he had risen because, just as his proposed reforms reflected the entrenched 
institutional ideas of the navy, so also did his conceptual blind spots reflect how 
sea power was understood in the Spanish navy.  Ensenada’s career path, in many 
ways, mirrored that of Patiño and Campillo y Cossío, who had dominated naval 
reform in the preceeding half century and his own reforms were also intended to 
expand Spain’s naval power while bringing it squarely under the monarchy’s 
control – a process that was continued during Charles III’s reign after 1759.  This 
was an approach also approved by arbitristas, such as Uztáriz and Ulloa, who 
backed the idea of naval power as an important safeguard to Spanish commerce.  
In their turn all of these reforms were influenced by the works of earlier 
arbitristas and by admiration for France’s seventeenth-century naval reforms, 
more specifically its administrative system43. 
In attempting to convince Ferdinand VI to give primacy to the development of his 
navy, Ensenada employed arguments that had been used to convince earlier 
monarchs of the significance of naval power.  Thus many of his proposed 
improvements had been suggested before, such as the need for substantial naval !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Rodríguez Villa (1878) p.64 
43 The continued admiration which the Spanish had for France’s seventeenth-century naval 
reforms  is illustrated by a letter written by Ensenada to France’s naval minister, Rouillé, Retiro, 6 
July 1750 (AGS Marina 712, ff.351–2) in which Ensenada commented that the French navy had 
come to be ‘greatly envied and respected’ and that ‘having established deep roots in Ordinances 
and individual rulings for its whole and each of its parts from which other nations have much to 
learn’. 
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expansion using Spanish resources so as to develop Spanish industry, the 
development of naval infrastructure and the need to ensure that it was fully 
centralised and consistently funded.  But what marks out Ensenada as different 
from his eighteenth-century predecessors is that he had attempted this in the 
Peninsula on so large a scale and at such speed.  In addition his predecessors had 
not attempted to employ ordinary revenue to finance the attempt nor carried out 
such extensive research abroad and in the Peninsula with the single-minded clarity 
of purpose to modernise the navy’s infrastructure, technology and organisation.  
As a result, the difficulties Ensenada’s project encountered were different and, in 
many ways, of a substantially greater order. 
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One of the defining features of Ensenada’s policies was his belief that Spain 
needed to modernise its navy and that this could only be achieved by a detailed 
investigation into the navies of its European rivals and by introducing foreign 
infrastructures and methods of construction at home.  As noted in the introductory 
chapter, the value of this type of technology transfer remains a contentious issue 
among historians and, therefore, this particular ‘Anglo-Spanish’ example merits a 
closer analysis.  This chapter, therefore, studies the role of technology transfer in 
the development of the Spanish navy during these years within the context of 
local considerations with a view to a better understanding of the advantages and 
limits it provides. 
Jorge Juan y Santacilia’s Mission to London 
The most significant enterprise abroad organised by Ensenada’s government was 
the mission to London carried out by the naval officer Jorge Juan y Santacilia 
(1713–1773) from March 1749 to April 1750.   
In 1748, Juan was charged with travelling to Britain under the guise of being a 
mathematics instructor while all the while studying the British navy, in particular 
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its shipbuilding, and recruiting shipwrights to work in Spain1.  The choice of Juan 
for this venture demonstrated the value which Ensenada attached to it.  In 1735, 
Juan had been one of two Spanish naval officers selected from the Academy of 
Guardias Marinas, to accompany the French Academy of Sciences expedition to 
determine the shape of the earth by measuring a degree of the meridian in South 
America2.  The expedition was interrupted by, among other events, the War of 
Jenkins’ Ear, which broke out in 1739.  During this time, Juan and Antonio de 
Ulloa (1716–1795) reformed Pacific coastal defences in anticipation of British 
attack, most notably Anson’s expedition (1740–1744), and carried out research 
for two works which they co-authored.  The first was a lavish multi-volume 
account of the Spanish empire written for public circulation and intended to 
demonstrate that Spain too could make notable contributions to Enlightenment 
travel literature and, the second, a critical examination of this empire, intended for 
private circulation at Court, to determine necessary reforms3.  The two officers 
returned to Europe separately, Juan reached France safely where he was elected a 
Fellow of the Royal Academy of Sciences while Ulloa, after his ship was seized, 
spent some time as a prisoner of war in Britain where he was elected a Fellow of 
the Royal Society.  Thus, by 1748, they had guaranteed their positions in Spanish 
society having participated in a prestigious scientific expedition, carried out high-
responsibility duties in defence of the empire, written two important books and 
been given entry to prestigious foreign institutions. 
                                                      
1 MNM MS 2162, ff.2–4, ‘Instrucción reservada de lo que de orden del Rey debe observar el 
Capitán de Navío D. Jorge Juan …’, San Lorenzo el Real, 27 October 1748 
2 See Ferreiro (2011) pp.47–9. 
3 Juan and Ulloa (1748, 5 vols.), Relacion Histórica del Viage a la América Meridional (Madrid: 
Antonio Marin) and (1826), Noticias Secretas de America (London: John Murray).  The latter was 
printed from a manuscript copy obtained by the editor, David Barry, during his travels in Spain. 
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The form of naval espionage Juan was being asked to carry out was not unusual in 
Europe at this time.  Peter the Great had visited British dockyards and recruited 
British shipbuilders at the turn of the century, though, in contrast with Jorge Juan, 
his activities had been sanctioned by the British4.  The French frequently sent 
their shipwrights to study foreign techniques.   Blaise Geslain, for example, 
travelled to Britain in 1729 and 1739 and Blaise Ollivier to Britain and the 
Netherlands in 17375.  The Swedish shipwright, Fredrik Henrik af Chapman, 
resided in London from 1750 to 1754 and was temporarily arrested for recruiting 
shipwrights from Deptford.  He also spent some time working at Brest and in the 
Netherlands so, on his return to Sweden, he was well versed in European naval 
construction6.  The British preferred studying captured ships in order to pick up 
on foreign advances which could be incorporated into their warships rather than 
sending specialists abroad.  British travellers on the Continent, moreover, 
frequently visited foreign dockyards reporting back their observations7.  Hence, 
Ensenada’s policy of modernisation through the observation of other European 
powers fitted within an existing and respected method of reform. 
After a 29-day journey from Cadiz, Juan arrived in London on 1 March 17498.  
On 9 March, he attended his first meeting at the Royal Society9, where he 
subsequently became a regular visitor, before being put forward for election as a 
                                                      
4 See Massie (1980) pp.291–310 
5 See Roberts (1992) p.25 for a more detailed list of expeditions. 
6 See Harris (1989) pp.20–4 
7 Examples of travellers who visited Spanish dockyards, include Richard Twiss in 1772 and 1773 
and Joseph Townsend in 1786 and 1787, who both included detailed descriptions of Cartagena 
arsenal in their accounts. 
8 AGS Marina 316, Juan to Ensenada, 6 March 1749 
9 RS, Journal Book of the Royal Society, 1748–51, vol.XXI, p.80  
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Fellow that April10.  In London, he lived under his own name without raising 
suspicion.  David Cheap, former captain of HMS Wager on Anson’s expedition, 
even approached him enquiring if the Spanish Crown would be interested in 
purchasing HMS Anson.  This frigate had been intended for the 1749 expedition 
to the South Seas but this had been cancelled following protests from the Spanish 
who objected that the British would be trespassing11.  Cheap was probably 
unaware it had been Juan who had discovered HMS Porcupine and Anson fitting 
out at Deptford and pushed the Spanish ambassador in London Ricardo Wall 
(1694–1777) into action to prevent it12.  The incident had alerted British 
authorities to a potential spy and Juan noted that gaining access to naval 
dockyards became more challenging after this but, as yet, they were unaware he 
was the culprit13. 
In addition to the primary aspect of his brief, that of the recruitment of British 
shipwrights and artisans to work in Spain, Juan was also to inspect British naval 
technology and report back sending models and plans.  An example of the method 
through which his observations were analysed with a view to their adoption in 
Spain is provided following an order from Ensenada, dated 29 May 1749, asking 
Juan to examine British hydraulic machinery14.  Juan replied forwarding him 
drawings of machines for dredging, building at sea and another for ‘removing 
                                                      
10 Ibid. p.92.  Juan was put forward by Benjamin Robins (co-author of Anson’s Voyage), Charles 
and William Stanhope, John Ellicott, Martin Folkes and Sir William Watson. 
11 AGS Marina 233, Juan to Ensenada, London, 2 October 1749.  The offer was rejected but 
details were forwarded to Cadiz merchants via the Naval Intendant, Francisco de Varas y Valdés, 
describing it as a recently built frigate which, having been built as half frigate, half trading vessel, 
would be suitable for trade with the Americas, AGS Marina 316, Ensenada to Varas, 20 October 
1749. 
12 AGS Estado 6915, Wall to Carvajal, London, 17 April 1749 
13 AGS Marina 233, Juan to Ensenada, 19 May 1749 
14 AGS Marina 233, Ensenada to Juan, Aranjuez, 29 May 1749 
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water with fire’15.  These were then forwarded by Ensenada to Cosme Alvarez, 
the Intendant at Ferrol, who was asked to write a report on them16.  The latter 
replied that ‘it would always be good to look at the models, in particular Mr 
Vauloüe’s drop hammer, which seems very clever to me though somewhat 
complex’17.  Juan was already having two sets of models made, one for Alvarez 
and the other for Francisco Varas y Valdés, the Intendant at La Carraca18.  Though 
we do not know whether any of these were subsequently purchased by the 
Spanish arsenals, what this example demonstrates is the method whereby 
Ensenada did not necessarily take Juan at his word but instead obtained second, 
third and even more opinions from those in Spain’s arsenals on ideas sent back by 
Juan. 
Juan also purchased numerous quantities of books and instruments for Spanish 
individuals as well as institutions.  After Juan’s departure, their despatch was 
arranged by Miguel de Ventades, treasurer at the Spanish embassy, who generally 
sent them to Varas in Cadiz, since it was the most frequented trade route between 
London and Spain.  Varas’s correspondence gives an indication of the sheer 
volume of items being sent, he reports receiving, for instance, 12 chests and one 
trunk on board Sara, Captain Diego Colnet, on 17 November 1750; six large 
boxes and two small ones on board Sn Jorge, Captain Juan Jones, on 15 
September 1750; five boxes of books and mathematical instruments on Britania, 
                                                      
15 Ibid., Juan to Ensenada, London, 7 August 1749.  This machine could possibly be Newcomen’s 
steam pump but it is always referred to in this way in Spanish correspondence. 
16 Ibid., Ensenada to Alvarez, Madrid, 27 August 1749 
17 Ibid., Alvarez to Ensenada, Ferrol, 23 September 1749 
18 Ibid., Ensenada to Alvarez, Madrid, 1 October 1749 
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Captain George Massam, on 28 July 175019.  And as an indication of shipping 
costs, he reports sending eights chests of mathematical instruments to Bilbao in 
La Margarita under Captain Antonio de Laredo at a cost of 600 vellon reals20.  
Juan’s purchases for naval institutions received in Cadiz to 4 November 1750 
included: 
 For the Academy of Guardias Marinas:  
One 48-inch and one 24-inch telescope, as well as 15-foot extra large 
telescope, an astronomical pendulum, a micrometre, various models of suction 
and force pumps, a pair of magnetic bars with their equipment, and two boxes of 
Latin and English books. 
For the arsenals: 
Two models of pile drivers. 
And, for the Academy of Surgeons: 
  Reflection and refraction microscopes, a complete ‘pneumatic machine’, a 
weighing machine for liquids and solids, ‘a tube for electricity’ (possibly an early 
piece of laboratory equipment for conducting experiments in electricity) and a 
burning lense.  
Juan finished this list noting many instruments for these institutions had yet to be 
finished21.  He did not list the books so, unfortunately, we cannot know exactly 
                                                      
19 AGS Marina 712, f.364, Ensenada to Varas, Madrid, 16 November 1750, f.366, Varas to 
Ensenada, Cadiz, 17 November 1750, f.367, Varas to Ensenada, Cadiz, 15 September 1750, and 
f.368, Varas to Ensenada, Cadiz, 28 July 1750. 
20 Ibid., f.392, Juan to Ensenada, London, 17 March 1750 
21 Ibid., ff.404–5, Juan to Ensenada, Cartagena, 4 November 1750 
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what he purchased but they were probably similar in subject to Antonio de Ulloa’s 
remittances from France and the Netherlands as listed in Appendix 2.   
After his return to Spain in 1750, Juan became the most influential naval officer in 
the development and modernisation of the Spanish navy during Ferdinand VI’s 
reign.  In effect, he became the link between the senior naval administration at 
Court and that in the arsenals. 
He travelled regularly from one to another of these supervising the construction of 
naval infrastructure and shipbuilding.  In 1750, he was in Cartagena working with 
the Engineer-in-Chief Sebastián Feringán on the arsenal and reforming 
Cartagena’s sail and rope production.  On 13 June 1751, he was ordered from 
Madrid to Ferrol to do the same at Sada.  He was also to advise on the number and 
location of dry docks to be built, masting engines, ship design and works on 
Ferrol arsenal.  In fact, he was ‘to agree and set solid rules for all their findings in 
matters which may need them’22.  In 1752, he was in Madrid chairing the Council 
of Constructors that would formally establish a la inglesa naval construction in 
Spain and, from October, in Cadiz reorganising education at the Academy of 
Guardias Marinas, advising on the sailcloth- and sail-making facilities at Puerto 
Real and Puente de Zuazo as well as examining existing ships and those being 
built.  He was also instructed to review La Carraca arsenal with the engineer, José 
Barnola, and draft a plan and budget for its reform23.  After Cosme Alvarez’s 
death in 1753, Juan was appointed Director of the works at Ferrol which he 
visited immediately and, in 1754, he returned to Cartagena in order to advise on 
                                                      
22 AGS Marina 319, Ensenada to Juan, Aranjuez, 13 June 1751 
23 AGS Marina 321, Ensenada to Juan, Madrid, 3 October 1752, and AGS Marina 322, 
‘Presupuesto del costo que tendran las obras que se proyectan hacer en el arsenal de la Carraca’, 
Juan and Barnola, Cadiz, 30 January 1753 
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Feringán’s work on the arsenal and dry docks, to supervise Bryant’s shipbuilding 
and to review rope-making24.  He then returned to Cadiz ‘with the aim of putting 
his Company [of Guardias Marinas] into order’25.  In 1756, he assessed the 
progress of the Engineer-in-Chief of Ferrol arsenal, Francisco Llobet26, which he 
revisited in 1758 when he was sent to improve the factory at Sada27.  In this same 
year, he attended the repairs to the dry docks in Cartagena28.   
With Jorge Juan’s return, new methods and techniques were introduced in Spain 
requiring different infrastructure.  Stoving-ovens for bending plank, for example, 
were bought for each of the Departments, that of La Carraca being ordered by 
Mathew Mullins, the new British Constructor, directly from Britain29.  The most 
significant modernisation of Spanish naval infrastructure at this time, however, 
was the construction of dry docks at Cartagena and Ferrol30.   
The need for dry docks in Spain was probably well understood before Juan’s visit 
to London and the designs of those that were built were not necessarily based on 
                                                      
24 AGS Marina 322, Ensenada to Perea, Huoni and Count de Itre, San Lorenzo, 30 October 1753 
and AGS Marina 323, Arriaga to Juan, Madrid, 28 July 1754 
25 AGS Marina 323, Arriaga to Juan, Madrid, 17 August 1754 
26 AGS Marina 326, ‘Expediente’ on ‘Obras del proyecto de Ferrol’, 1756 
27 AGS Marina 328, Arriaga to Juan, Madrid, 8 June 1758 
28 Ibid., Juan to Arriaga, Cadiz, 13 March 1758 
29 For Ferrol, see AGS Marina 318, Alvarez to Ensenada, Ferrol, 28 April 1750; for La Carraca see 
AGS Marina 319, Varas to Ensenada, Cadiz, 27 December 1750 and Varas to Ensenada, 3 August 
1751; Juan reported they had already gotten one for Cartagena in AGS Marina 316, Juan to 
Ensenada, London, 22 April 1749. 
30 The possibility of building at La Carraca had existed since the 1720s, Juan and the engineer José 
Barnola’s ‘Plan General’, Cadiz, 30 January 1750, also included dry docks and a proposal by 
Mullins to build one for the Crown was given serious consideration (AGS Marina 327, Mullin’s 
proposal (revised), Carraca, 15 October 1757, and Arriaga to Victoria, Madrid, 5 September 1757) 
but, as La Carraca was built on a very deep topsoil of mud, topographical and financial 
constrictions made this impossible.  The first dry dock at La Carraca, called ‘San Carlos’, was not 
completed until October 1786.  Two further dry docks were built, called ‘San Luis’ and ‘San 
Antonio’. 
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British or French examples31, but, following his return in 1750, Juan was 
instrumental in arranging and supervising their construction. 
In April 1749, a British merchantman arrived from London with six chests which 
included models of dry docks.  These were sent to La Carraca to be examined by, 
among others, Ciprián Autrán, the Master Attendant at La Carraca who, before 
Juan’s mission to London, had expected to take charge over the new construction 
programme.   Autrán reported that they were insufficiently deep if they were to 
take large ships32.  Juan, however, replied:  
 D. Ciprián de Autrán is right in saying that to careen his ships in his 
system the docks need to be deeper but thanks to God that they will not be built 
nor repaired by his method.  The small dock in Cartagena will only have 17 
English feet of water and the larger one 21.  In the first the Septentrión and similar 
ships will be careened and in the second those of 100 guns.  While Ciprián calls 
for (to careen ships of only 70 guns) 19 cubits of water in the dock, making it 36 
English feet33.   
Until Ferdinand’s reign the arsenal at Cartagena had only been designed 
for galleys but, in 1748, proposals were submitted for a new arsenal capable of 
catering for the largest warships in the Spanish navy34.  The project which was 
finally accepted was that by the engineer, Sebastián Feringán, in 1749.  It had 
slipways to build three ships at once but no dry docks.  These first appear in a 
revised plan of 1751, where, in the place of the three slipways, there are two dry 
docks on either side of two slipways and a storehouse.  The final layout of this 
area was finalised later in that year when the two dry docks were placed side by 
                                                      
31 Except for the gates of the large dry dock in Cartagena which were designed by Bryant like 
those of the dry dock at Plymouth (or Plymouth Drydock?), see AGS Marina 322, Feringán to 
Arriaga, Cartagena, 4 September 1755. 
32 AGS Marina 316, Varas to Ensenada, Cadiz, 8 April 1749 and Autrán to Ensenada, Carraca, 8 
June 1749 
33 Ibid., Juan to Ensenada, 22 April 1750 
34 Among them Autrán’s. 
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side to the right of two construction slipways.  The pumps to empty them only 
appeared in 1752.   
At Ferrol, construction on dry docks began later and first appeared in the plans of 
Ferrol arsenal in 1751 or 1752.  There were four in total, two large, two small and 
each with a slipway in between them.  However, evidence that their construction 
had begun did not appear until 1754 when a progress report by the Engineer, 
Francisco Llobet, illustrated the area being excavated for this purpose.  Llobet, 
who had been forwarded the approved plans of the dry dock drawn by Juan, in 
June 1754 also questioned the depth of the dock as Autrán had done in 1749 but 
Ensenada instructed him to adhere to Juan’s original. 
The docks built in Cartagena were the first to be completed.  Unfortunately, 
problems were encountered in both when they were first tested.  In February 
1758, James Banks, the consul at Cartagena, reported that ‘a frigate was put into 
one of the new docks, but immediately on pumping out the water, the back part of 
the dock blew up in such a manner that to save the frigate the water was let in 
again and she taken out’35.  Juan was asked to return to Cartagena to remedy the 
situation but before he arrived the larger dry dock was tested with similar 
results36.  The Commander General at Cartagena, Marquis Spínola, described the 
incident saying that the Terrible had been put into the dock on 11 March and the 
water pumps set to work immediately.  On the morning of the 14th, when the shift 
at the pumps was being relieved, ‘a universal movement and breaking of the 
stonework was observed by the area of the gates which had been presaged in the 
                                                      
35 Kew SP94/157, ‘Extract of a letter from Banks’, 22 February 1758, sent by Ruvigny de Cosne to 
Pitt, Madrid, 27 February 1758. 
36 AGS Marina 328, Juan to Arriaga, Cadiz, 13 March 1758, acknowledging orders of 7 March. 
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nights before with the harsh work required to shut them and which was not 
eventually possible’37.  As matters stood on 15 March, they could neither finish 
closing nor open the gates, water was flooding in even though they continued to 
work the pumps and Edward Bryant, the British Master Shipwright, was making a 
plan of the damage.  Once Juan arrived, a congress was held on 25 May attended 
by Spínola, the Intendant Francisco Barrero y Peláez, the Engineer-in-Chief 
Feringán, his assistants José Dufresne and Mateo Vodopich38, Bryant39 and Juan 
to discuss necessary repairs and the proposed reinforcement of the walls 
surrounding the gates in order to allow them to withstand the pressure from the 
water.  Juan later reported that various solutions had been put forward but that 
only the one he, along with Bryant, had proposed had been considered feasible 
and that it was ‘the same as that generally and openly practiced in Britain’40.  By 
October 1759 Juan reported that repairs were nearly complete and he had 
successfully flooded the dock41.  On 17 November the Septentrión was put into it 
and by the 19th the water had been pumped out successfully42.  Thus for the first 
time Spain had a functional dry dock in the Peninsula permitting it to maintain 
effective reserve fleets just as Britain had been able to since 1495, Sweden since 
1724, Denmark since 1739 and France since 1740 when they built their first dry 
docks43. 
                                                      
37 Ibid., Spínola to Arriaga, Cartagena, 15 March 1758 
38 The latter took over from Feringán in 1762 and remained in charge of the works at Cartagena 
until his death in 1787. 
39 Bryant was involved in developing the dry docks from the beginning and in charge of building 
the gates. 
40 AGS Marina 329, Juan to Arriaga, Cadiz, 21 March 1759 
41 Ibid., Juan to Arriaga, Cartagena, 10 October 1759 
42 Ibid., Barrero to Arriaga, Cartagena, 21 November 1759 
43 Lambert (2000) p.36 
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Substantial reforms were also made during Ferdinand’s reign in rope- and sail-
making.  In the past, these areas of naval construction had been the preserve of 
private contract-holders.  On 29 April 1749, however, Alvarez was informed it 
was now considered expedient that ‘a Department has everything it needs within 
it, the King has decided that rope and sail be made provisionally in Sada by the 
new masters expected from London on the Royal Treasury’s account’44.  As an 
indication of the speed with which this facility was expanded, Alvarez’s review of 
the site in 1749 mentioned it had thirteen looms, with the space for 23 and a 
warehouse for ropemaking but, by June 1752, he noted that a further expansion by 
50 looms, to add to the 100 already functioning there, was viable45.  The decision 
to establish sail and rope facilities at Cartagena was made in October 175046.  
Juan was to experiment  in these in order to produce regulations on the production 
of both these materials.  In Cadiz Department, Varas reported having founded a 
sailcloth factory in Real del Puente which was functioning ‘in the new British 
method’47.  And in 1754, Arriaga noted the closure of the rope factory at Isla de 
León because that run by the State in Real del Puente could now cover the 
Department’s needs48. 
In terms of infrastructure, there was a large expansion in the quantity of looms 
and many, certainly those at Sada, were built to designs Juan had brought from 
                                                      
44 AGS Marina 233, Ensenada to Alvarez, Aranjuez, 29 April 1749 
45 Ibid., Alvarez to Ensenada, Ferrol, 26 August 1749 and AGS Marina 320, Perea to Ensenada, 6 
June 1752.  Also noteworthy as an example of Spain recruiting men for specialist industries from 
abroad in the past is that the looms were under the charge of a Dutchman, native of Bergen-op-
Zoom, and the ropewalk under that of a Scottish man called Adam. 
46 AGS Marina 318, Ensenada to Barrero, Madrid, 29 October 1750 
47 AGS Marina 320, Varas to Ensenada, Cadiz, 27 June 1752 
48 AGS Marina 323, Arriaga to Ensenada, Cadiz, 9 April 1754 
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London in 174949.  Additionally, English-style ovens for tarring rope were also set 
up in each of the Departments which, in contrast to previous Spanish and Dutch 
practices, ensured the inside, not just the circumference of the rope, was tarred50.   
The reform of the rope- and canvas-making processes in Spain originated, yet 
again, with Juan.  On 9 September 1750, he wrote Ensenada: 
 Although Your Excellency did not charge me in my orders with examining 
the rope and sail factories, being persuaded that these could be improved to the 
extent that we no longer require foreign assistance, I went to examine them with 
the Intendant D. Francisco Barrero and found precisely the key fault which, I am 
persuaded, is responsible for why until now we have not had good qualities of 
either of these materials51. 
Juan explained that hemp fibres could be divided into three categories 
based on their quality.  Whereas other countries only employed the first type for 
sail and running rigging, the second, combined with the first, for less significant 
cables and the last only for mooring ropes, in Spain, third-grade hemp fibre was 
used without distinction the same as first or second-grade hemp.  Consequently, 
he proposed experimenting by making rope entirely from the first two and 
monitoring how this affected their cost.  He thought it would also have the 
additional benefit of reducing the overall weight of rope carried per ship.  
Similarly, in the production of sail, other countries only used first-grade hemp 
while in Spain they employed both the first and second grades.  Again, Juan 
proposed experimenting with this, as well as developing new methods of stitching 
sail and tarring rope.  He was granted permission by Ensenada, who instructed 
                                                      
49 AGS Marina 316, Juan to Ensenada, London, 2 December 1749.  Several parts of these were 
made to order in Valencia, Spain’s traditional canvas-making area, so undoubtedly they would 
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50 AGS Marina 322, Arriaga to Ensenada, Cadiz, 2 January 1753 and Ensenada to Arriaga, 
Madrid, 9 January 1753, on that for Cadiz, which was ordered from Britain after the factory at 
Seville reported they would be unable to make it. 
51 AGS Marina 318, Juan to Ensenada, Cartagena, 9 September 1750 
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Barrero to provide Juan with two to three thousand quintals of hemp for this 
purpose52.  Similar excercises were also carried out at the other Departments, 
particularly at Sada and a system of testing developed whereby samples would be 
produced in Cartagena and then tested in Sada while, similarly, samples produced 
in Sada were tested in Cartagena.   
Thus, following his return from Britain, Juan played a prominent and active part 
in the development of Spanish naval infrastructure and shipbuilding throughout 
Ferdinand’s reign.  In this, he was influenced by his experience in Britain.  This 
was evident, for example, in his insistence they build shallower dry docks like the 
British, English-style ships, pumps and stoving-ovens, or that they be more 
particular about the type of hemp they use in rope and sail.  When in London, 
Juan had written to Ensenada: 
 These three days of Easter I have been busy studying the River, its 
dockyards, docks, engines, and works by means of a friend, which I have seen 
with very great pleasure and envy …  Leaving other matters aside, what I will say 
to Your Excellency, especially because of the zeal with which you honour our 
backward country, is I hope to God many of our old oversights might be 
corrected53. 
On his return to Spain, his career was dedicated to making these 
improvements. 
Antonio de Ulloa’s expedition to France, the Netherlands and 
Sweden 
In this chapter, Juan and the repercussions of his expedition to London receive the 
most attention in relation to the modernisation of the Spanish navy through the 
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53 AGS Marina 233, Juan to Ensenada, London, 9 April 1749 
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study of the techniques and practices characteristic of other European navies.  
This is because they had the most significant effect on the development of the 
navy during Ferdinand’s reign, not just through recruitment of foreign artisans but 
also as a result of Juan’s role in its development on his return to Spain.  
Nevertheless, Juan was not the only person sent abroad and, among the others, 
was his colleague on the South American expedition, Antonia de Ulloa, who 
travelled to France, the Netherlands and Sweden between 1750 and 175154.  His 
influence on the development of the Spanish navy was also important. 
Ulloa had returned to Madrid in 1746 following the South American expedition to 
write the Relación Histórica del Viage a la América Meridional and the Noticias 
Secretas de America in which he, rather than Juan, was responsible for writing up 
their research and putting it through the press55.  After this, at the end of 1749, 
Ulloa was sent to visit France and the northern countries with instructions to make 
a wide range of observations but with a focus on naval matters56.  He arrived in 
Toulon in November 1749 and travelled up to Paris, which he made his base for 
visits to France’s northern coastal towns before leaving for the Netherlands in 
April 1751 and then Sweden in August 175157. 
Ulloa was a keen observer and provided Ensenada with a wealth of information 
on the French navy in particular but also on hydraulic engineering and 
manufactures in the Netherlands and the timber trade in Sweden.  He reported on 
                                                      
54 Others included the artillery officers Damaso de Latre and Agustín Hurtado sent to London from 
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56 AGS Marina 712, no.555, ‘Instrucción reserbada de lo que de orden del Rey ha de observar el 
Capitán de Navío Dn Antonio de Ulloa, en los encargos del Servicio de SM …’, [1749]. 
57 AGS Marina 316, Ulloa to Ensenada, Toulon, 20 November 1749, and AGS Marina 234, 
Marquis del Puerto to Ensenada, Hague, 12 August 1751 
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current affairs such as uncertainties over the future of the navy following 
Maurepas’ fall, the promise that Rouillé had for the development of the French 
navy and the decision made by a Council of War to focus on building warships 
with three decks rather than two58.  More relevant to the current topic, however, 
he wrote comprehensive accounts on all he observed, providing Spain with a 
wealth of information on France’s navy59.  His observations were read by 
Ensenada who, if he considered them useful to a particular individual, would 
forward them to that person so that the arsenal papers in the Archives in Simancas 
are saturated with Ulloa’s memorials.  Feringán and Alvarez had copies of his 
description of the Toulon arsenal, Juan had his reports on French sail and rope 
facilities and Antonio de Perea, Intendant at Ferrol, had his report on French 
methods of timber seasoning.  The informational value of his mission was 
substantial.  His report on Toulon, for example, included descriptions of the old 
port, the new shipyard, the marine assembly, the ropewalk, the general storehouse, 
the artillery storehouse, the smithy, the armoury, the bakery, the Royal Naval 
Academy, the offices, the geography of Toulon Bay, a description of the naval 
engineer in charge, the fortifications, the number of ships, the amalgamation of 
the galley officers into the main officer corps, details on masts and supplies and, 
finally, officers’ salaries60. 
Ulloa, like Juan, also bought and transmitted to Spain large quantities of books 
and maps.  On 10 April 1750, for example, he wrote that he was sending three 
                                                      
58 Ibid., Ulloa to Ensenada, Toulon, 20 November 1749, AGS Marina 318, Ulloa to Ensenada, 
Paris, 20 August 1750 and Ulloa to Ensenada, Paris, 21 September 1750 
59 See Appendix 1 for a list, written by Ulloa, of the accounts he had written in France. 
60 AGS Marina 712, no.617, ‘Memoria: Arsenal, Dársenas y Bahía de Toulon: sus noticias’, Ulloa, 
Paris, 20 March 1750. 
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chests of books to Cadiz61.  Before he left Paris, he wrote a list of these providing 
a valuable insight into what was considered of interest at home, especially since 
he noted to whom he was sending them62. 
After Juan had reported that Dutch sail and rope artisans were considered the best 
in Europe, Ulloa was asked to recruit these to work in Spanish arsenals63.  Ulloa 
did not, however, consider it a particularly useful method of learning from abroad 
and expressed his reservations, stating:  
 In St Malo, in Brest, in L’Orient, in Rennes, in Rochefort, in Nantes and in 
Angers, where there are considerable sail and rope making facilities, I have 
examined these in sufficient detail to be informed on the subject and I know that 
they can be made, without the help of foreigners, just as good in Spain as those 
produced in the Netherlands64. 
In the end, Ulloa spent only a short time on this task before travelling north and 
most of the effort in recruitment was carried out by the Marquis del Puerto, 
Spanish ambassador to The Hague65.  Three rope makers – Jacob Soneman 
(Cadiz), Juan Hankszengult (Ferrol) and Juan de Graaf (Cartagena) – and three 
canvasmakers – Pedro Reyersmolenar (Cadiz), Floro Tymese along with his son 
(Cartagena) and Enrique Juan Janseruys (Ferrol)  – were recruited with great 
effort66.   
Though they were signed on as masters in their profession, Ensenada ruled that 
they were not to be put in charge of the factories until their skills had been proven.  
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62 See Appendix 2 
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64 Ibid. 
65 Joaquín Ignacio Barrenchea y Erguiñigo, Marquis del Puerto (1681–1753), Spanish ambassador 
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66 AGS Marina 234, Ensenada to Alvarez, Madrid, 24 August 1751, Maraver to Ensenada, Bilbao, 
13 March 1752, Perea to Ensenada, Esteiro, 1 August 1752, and Ensenada to Barrero, Aranjuez, 
12 May 1753 
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Furthermore, they were not to vary ‘the method established by D. Jorge’67.  On 
examining the facilities at Puerto el Real, Pedro Reyersmolenar reported that he 
could not work with the looms and machinery unless it was in the Dutch style68.  
Whether or not the others encountered similar difficulties, it is certain that 
Ensenada soon became disillusioned with them.  On 28 August 1752, Ensenada 
told Puerto not to bother sending the Dutch loom and the brother-in-law of one of 
the Dutchmen as ‘this subject will be of little talent in producing sailcloth as are 
all the masters that have been sent’69.  Between December 1752 and January 
1753, Ensenada ordered for the Dutch at Cadiz and Ferrol to be dismissed from 
the service70. 
The Recruitment of British Shipwrights and Artisans 
One of the most significant outcomes of this practice during Ensenada’s time of 
looking outwards at what Spain’s European rivals were doing was the creation in 
Spain of a la inglesa, or English-style, naval construction.  This originated, like so 
many of the other reforms, with Juan’s time in London.  
On his arrival in London, Juan immediately set about his most essential task, that 
of recruiting shipwrights71.  By 20 March 1749, he reported that he had made a 
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governar al maestro Jacome Balerino en la comisión a que passa a Génova’ and Arriaga to 
Ensenada, Cadiz, 12 September 1752.  
 ! &* 
contact who was well informed on the activities of the Thames and willing to act 
as his guide72.  This was probably Alexander French, a ship chandler based at 
Cherry-Tree Gardens, Rotherhithe.  French would later confess that he had been 
introduced to Juan at about this time by the Spanish ambassador in London, 
Ricardo Wall, whom he had known as a child in 1732 or 1733 when his father 
was based in Seville73.  It was through him that Juan gained access to Rotherhithe, 
a shipbuilding community on the Thames above Deptford, with many private 
yards and a large Irish Catholic population. 
At Easter, Juan visited Rotherhithe and Deptford and met two Thames 
shipwrights74.  The first a Mr Birth [Bird?] he described as ‘without doubt the best 
in Britain’ but since he was ‘a man of many millions of pounds sterling in wealth, 
having several of his own docks and building many ships on his own account’, he 
would prove a very unlikely recruit.  The other was Richard Rooth, owner of a 
private shipyard in Rotherhithe, whom Juan described as a Catholic, native of 
London who felt his business had slumped since the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion and 
who could be enticed into Spanish service.  Thus far, Rooth had agreed to draw 
Juan a plan for a 70-gun warship and Juan noted that if Rooth were taken on, he, 
Rooth, would assist in finding a second shipwright. 
Ensenada was pleased but cautioned: 
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The selection of builders being one of the points on which we should focus 
our greatest attention, His Majesty has ordered you to be absolutely sure of Mr 
Rooth’s ability before formally accepting him, not just from what you can deduce 
from his plans … but also from the actual practice of shipbuilding and his 
reputation among shipbuilders, because experience has shown us, with no little 
cost and prejudice to the service, that instead of those who are useful we have 
admitted, based on their own words, useless foreigners who have done nothing of 
what they promised75.   
He also emphasised Juan should not just be finding a second but also a third and 
even a fourth shipbuilder because ‘we have three Departments and the aim is to 
build at each of them simultaneously’.   
On 19 May 1749, Juan reported that not only was he satisfied with Rooth’s skills 
but that  
he looked upon it as a great fortune having come across him, for not only 
was he the best he had seen in drawing lines plans and knowledgeable in the 
theory of shipbuilding, but he made the most beautiful ships on the River, which 
those in the know said had very good qualities at sea76. 
By this time, however, Juan doubted he could recruit more like Rooth, saying that 
he had, in fact, approached others, offering greater sums than that given Rooth, 
but they consistently refused to leave their country77.  He reassured Ensenada, 
however, that he was maintaining the project’s secrecy, only confiding in those 
who were already implicated.  In June, he was still in search of a second 
constructor having recently been rejected by a potential candidate who had 
initially seemed promising78. 
Not until July did Juan succeed in recruiting another skilled professional.  This 
was the canvas-maker, Patrick Lahey, an Irish Catholic, whom Juan was pleased 
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to recruit believing the Irish made the best sailcloth in Britain.  Lahey argued that 
as making good quality sailcloth depended on:  
using good quality hemp, cleaning and threading it well and having good 
officials and looms to weave it, it was vital in order to create the quality of factory 
Your Excellency wishes to found, that he should initially set off with two officials 
and his wife (whom he considers a very talented spinner) to instruct others; also 
taking looms and spinning instruments because, he said, a great part of the quality 
was determined by using steel looms with tempered combs used here [London] 
and a factory he doubts he will be given or that they have in Spain: additionally, 
he asks Your Excellency for a daily salary of half a pound sterling and a bonus of 
50 pounds to transport himself with his family and two officials to Ferrol79. 
Ensenada agreed to Lahey’s terms and instructed Juan to begin extracting these 
families from London, Rooth’s in particular80.  The latter, however, proved 
uncooperative and in answer to Ensenada’s frequent requests to get Rooth out, 
Juan replied he had not stopped trying, having made: 
 repeated journeys down the River where he [Rooth] lives: and in reply he 
promised that, on fifteen days of his frigate being finished, he would go: for 
which reason I wrote to Your Excellency, in a past post, that he would begin his 
journey the coming week.  After this he was taken ill and had been sick for fifteen 
days: he was now healthy and promised to set off the following week81. 
Ensenada grew increasingly concerned that Rooth and others Juan had by then 
recruited might change their minds or be discovered and repeatedly told Juan that 
he should despatch them ‘as soon as possile, because the time has come when 
they are truly vital, especially the Constructors’82. 
In addition, Juan was becoming concerned at the substantial sums Rooth was 
asking to borrow to settle his business.  But, on 31 December 1749, he could 
finally report:  
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 Not with little trouble and expense have I been able to extract the builder 
Rooth from this city.  It is over a month and a half that he has been promising his 
departure from day to day; but that day has not arrived until today and he is now 
en route for Dover: he was involved in trade in such a manner that he has not been 
able to remove himself from it without abandoning 7,000 pounds sterling in the 
hands of bad payers and with me having to give him, in 200 pound increments, 
the total of 900 to satisfy his creditors and ensure the safety of his properties here.  
Only in this way has it been possible to arrange his journey83. 
In July, Juan had turned his attention to methods for shipping out a noticeable 
number of artisans from London.  The difficulties entailed were exemplified by 
the seizure of the Dorothy and Mary at Portsmouth en route to Spain on 1 August 
1749.  On board were a group of woollen manufacturers and a cargo of machinery 
recruited and purchased under Carvajal’s direction to reform the royal textile 
factory at Guadalajara.  The agent in charge, Richard Metcalfe, was also on the 
ship and was subsequently imprisoned.  Not only were British customs on the 
alert for artisans being smuggled out of Britain but, in 1750, an ‘Act for the 
effectual punishing of persons convicted of seducing artificers in the 
manufactures of Great Britain or Ireland’ was passed to be put into force from 24 
June 175084.  Despite the extra expense, therefore, Juan proposed sending a few 
men at a time in any merchant ship sailing to any port near Ferrol.  As for looms, 
models and other machinery, he proposed they should only be sent on Basque 
merchantmen regularly trading between the Thames and Bilbao85. 
At the end of September, he refined this plan further.  British customs were so 
diligent in examining ships sailing directly to Spain that he now thought it would 
be best to send his recruits, a few at a time, in ships sailing to Oporto in Portugal 
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84 Statutes at Large, vol.V, pp.733–5.  It enforced a similar Act passed during the reign of George 
I.  Punishment would entail severe fines and imprisonment, should the offence be repeated.  It was 
mainly the product of the recruitment by foreigners of woollen and fabric manufacturers and not 
shipwrights, but it applied also to the latter. 
85 AGS Marina 233, Juan to Ensenada, London, 25 August 1749 
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and from there escorting them, by land, to Ferrol or to send them to France and 
from there to Spain, either by land or sea86.  He preferred the latter as a safer 
option and, although Ensenada was concerned the British shipwrights and artisans 
might be tempted to stay in those countries, he told Juan to proceed as he thought 
best87.  In the end, all three routes were employed.   
All three master shipwrights travelled via France.  Rooth went to Boulogne where 
he awaited the second master shipwright, Matthew Mullins, and the master joiner, 
James Pepper88.  Juan had originally hoped that, once Rooth was in France, 
Mullins would secure the third master shipwright89 but this plan failed and Juan 
complained that ‘they have left me in the situation of needing to recruit anew; 
which is more difficult than before because all those remaining with any talent are 
devout Protestants’90.  In February, his hopes for a third constructor were dashed 
once more when the man he thought he had enlisted changed his mind91.  It was 
not till the end of March that he engaged Edward Bryant, ‘director and master at 
Birth’s factory, which I wrote to Your Excellency is the best in this River, 
including those from the King’s yards’, along with his colleague and a joiner, 
William Richards and the latter’s brother, Stephen Richards92. 
It was Bryant’s absence from work which finally brought Juan’s activities into the 
open.  The Secretary of State, the Duke of Bedford93 was informed by Mr Bird 
that Bryant, shipwright and foreman at Elias Bird & Co at the Greenland Dock, 
                                                      
86 Ibid., Juan to Ensenada, London, 11 September 1749 
87 Ibid., Ensenada to Juan, 28 September 1749 
88 AGS Marina 234, Juan to Ensenada, London, 21 January 1750, 7 
89 Ibid., Juan to Ensenada, London, 31 December [1749] 
90 Ibid., Juan to Ensenada, London, 15 January 1750 
91 Ibid., Juan to Ensenada, London, 5 February 1750 
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had been absent for ten days and was thought to be en route to Ferrol but that he 
had not left Britain yet94.  On 3 April, Juan received news that Bryant’s party had 
arrived safely in France but he also discovered that ‘the River was in commotion; 
that Mr Birth whom Bryant worked for, swore he would do everything possible 
and pay any price until he found out who was sending so many people out of the 
Kingdom, which is found to be to Spain’95.  Juan consulted Wall and they agreed 
that he and his two assistants should leave immediately, disguising their departure 
as a trip to the country96.  At Dover, Juan had second thoughts and returned to 
London by himself on 7 April wishing to evacuate the families of his shipwrights 
and artisans before he left97.  According to Wall, all was so quiet for a few days 
that, by 11 April, Juan was debating collecting his belongings from his residence 
but, the following morning, Wall heard that ‘the chaplain [Alexander Lynch] 
whom he [Juan] used to communicate with the artisans had been arrested’98.  With 
this news, the evacuation became more urgent, especially as the Happy Jane, a 
merchantman belonging to Rooth which was supposed to transport all the families 
along with her captain and Rooth’s business partner, had been seized.  At last, 
with himself disguised as a mariner, Juan managed to evacuate himself and the 
families on a Bizcayan merchantman.  He reported from Calais:  
 Despite the orders given to all the ports by the Duke of Bedford, I have not 
only succeeded in getting myself to safety by means of my disguise but also all 
the families of the Englishmen I have sent, along with two lads, relatives and 
apprentices of Rooth, who were in danger in London’s River.  Today I go to 
Boulogne where they are in hiding to send them from there to Ferrol; I wanted to 
do so by sea, but the women tremble with such fear of some accident that they do 
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not dare go this way for which reason I have determined, even though it is more 
expensive, to send them by land99. 
By 11 April 1750, however, the British authorities had a fairly clear idea of what 
had happened.  Wall reported that on his regular visit to Bedford, he had noticed 
that  
 even though he is a man who does not conceal his thoughts, I recognised 
in his manner of addressing me that he already knew something from having 
examined the chaplain and many others during these last few days …  I also 
pretended and affected more tranquility than what I really felt100.   
Bedford finally reproached Wall on the subject on 22 April complaining of Juan’s 
transgression and noting that ‘the manner in which they [the British government] 
had handled such a serious business, in itself, demonstrated the respect they had 
for us because they could have done so without leaving him [Juan] without any 
protection whatever’.  Wall appeased Bedford saying that ‘the [Spanish] 
government had had no part in it and that, if D. Jorge was in anyway guilty, it was 
in having accepted a request by some British subjects … of moving to Spain’101.  
Bedford, however, had been aware of Juan’s activities for a while, Benjamin 
Keene, the British ambassador in Madrid, having written to him on 16 February 
1750: ‘I have been told that the Spanish officer of Marines now in London, who is 
Fellow of the Royal Society has orders to endeavour to debauch one of the two 
principal ship builders in England into the service of Spain’102.  Bedford replied 
on 24 May 1750: ‘The proceedings of some persons in debauching our artificers 
were well known and might in other times have set the two nations in a flame, as 
you may hint to Mons. Ensenada if you think it proper’103.  Of greater significance 
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to the British government at this time, however, was the asiento treaty being 
negotiated between Keene and Carvajal in Madrid which prevented more serious 
diplomatic repercussions to Juan’s mission.  Measures were taken, nevertheless, 
to prevent further defections and both Captain Thomas Foley of HM Sloop 
Savage104 and Captain Barker of HM Sloop Wasp105 were stationed in the 
Channel to intercept ships carrying artisans to Spain in the spring of 1751. 
Despite Juan’s sudden departure from London, he had engaged sufficient 
artificers to have fulfilled his brief.  There were three master shipwrights with two 
assistant shipwrights, six apprentices, two master joiners with one assistant, a 
master sail sailmaker with two assistants and a master ropemaker with his 
assistant106.   Once these reached Spain, they encouraged others to join them so 
the population of British dockyard workers increased significantly in the next few 
years and continued to be welcomed by the Marquis de La Ensenada107. 
The three shipwrights – Richard Rooth, Matthew Mullins and Edward Bryant – 
whom Juan recruited to be Master Shipwrights, or Constructors, as they were 
called in Spain, had all reached Ferrol by mid-May 1750108.  At first, it was 
thought that all three should remain some time in Ferrol, each building a ship 
demonstrating their skills as shipwrights, before then moving on to their 
respective Department.  After it became evident, however, that the three would be 
unlikely to work well at the same place, in particular Bryant and Rooth, as the 
latter resented Bryant being considered his equal when Bryant had only held the 
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post of third shipwright in London, Ensenada decided to send Mullins to La 
Carraca and Bryant to Cartagena immediately109. 
While the test ships were being built, timber for the forthcoming shipbuilding 
programme was stockpiled, slipways were built, workmen were recruited and 
artisans continued to arrive from Britain.  Then, at the end of January and 
beginning of February 1752, orders were sent to the Intendants of the 
Departments to send the British Constructors to Madrid for a Council of 
Constructors, to be chaired by Juan and ‘to agree with the other builders of the 
other Departments the regulations which, with uniformity, should be followed in 
shipbuilding’110.  Bryant and Mullins were in Madrid by the end of February and 
Rooth in March.  By this time, Almon Hill and David Howell had arrived in Cadiz 
as Assistant Shipwrights but they were soon to be promoted to Master 
Shipwrights.  Hill travelled to Madrid with Mullins while Howell remained at La 
Carraca to supervise progress on the África.  The Council sat until July drawing 
up plans and regulations for ships of each rate based on British designs.  The 
shipbuilding programme began while they were still in Madrid with orders being 
sent to their Assistants, William Richards111 in Cartagena, William Turner in 
Ferrol and David Howell in La Carraca. 
On their return to their Departments, they all carried their official patents.  Bryant 
and Mullins were also appointed Assistant Master Attendants with an additional 
60 vellon escudos per month, while Rooth replaced the recently deceased, Joseph 
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de Arzueta, as Master Attendant at Ferrol with 80 escudos a month112.  David 
Howell was appointed Master Shipwright at Guarnizo in the port of Santander to 
build four ships contracted to Juan Fernández de Isla y Alvear (1709–1788), a 
powerful merchant who held a number of contracts for provisioning the navy, 
most importantly that for oak from northern Spain113.  Almon Hill was granted a 
monthly 225 escudos as Chief Draughtsman of the Navy and a further 100 
escudos as shipbuilding instructor at the Academy of Guardias Marinas114. 
A la Inglesa Shipbuilding115 
British and Spanish naval construction differed substantially in the middle of the 
eighteenth century.  This applied to dimensions, where British 1745 
Establishment ships tended to be longer than Spanish Gaztañeta116 or Acosta117 
ships, and, more significantly, to their composition, where British ships had 
smaller but more numerous scantlings fitted together using wooden treenails and 
planking in preference to iron bolts and nails118.  Ensenada’s decision to send Juan 
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to London from 1749 to 1750 with a view to modernising naval shipbuilding 
along British lines would, therefore, result in a sizeable modification of Spanish 
shipbuilding practices.  The extent to which Ensenada was aware of this is 
uncertain and he himself frequently exhibited the conservative mindset that 
prevented its wholesale adoption. 
On 11 September 1749, Juan forwarded Ensenada a plan of a 70-gun ship drawn 
by the British Shipwright, Richard Rooth, partly to illustrate the latter’s abilities 
but also as a potential warship design for the new construction programme119.  It 
had a length from the inside of the stern to the inside of the bow of 160 English 
feet, a breadth of 44 feet and a depth in the hold of 21 feet, measurements similar 
to those of the British 1745 Establishment120.  While Ensenada had this plan 
studied by experts in Spain, Juan further clarified that:  
 that plan is entirely similar to the system of warship construction currently 
built in this Kingdom but though very beautiful, even the most perfect thing in the 
world, this does not mean it does not have a few inconveniences which will be 
easy to remedy121.   
Ensenada asked Juan to expand on the modifications he would propose but 
also stated that he had been informed that the ship was considerably longer than 
that traditionally built by the British122.  Juan defended its length saying it was 
inaccurate to describe it as too long but rather that what was meant was that it was 
too large overall.  However, he disagreed because he considered the British to 
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119 AGS Marina 316, Juan to Ensenada, London, 11 September 1749 
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London, 13 October 1749 
122 Ibid., Ensenada to Juan, San Lorenzo, 27 October 1749 
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have resolved an endemic defect in their naval shipbuilding with the 1745 
Establishment, which was that of making ships too small.  Larger ships would 
outclass smaller ships with an equal number of cannon and give the artillery 
greater manoeuvrability.  Though he acknowledged adherents of Gaztañeta would 
find them excessively long, as they did not match his rule that the beam should be 
a third of the length of the keel, Juan considered the overall length of greater 
importance and it was this, the overall length, that dictated the dimensions of the 
ships of most other European navies.  The defects he had encountered with British 
warships were that their gundecks were too high out of the water, they projected 
too far at the bow and stern from the keel and that placing a couple of cannon in 
the captain’s gallery detracted from its beauty123.  Thereafter, Ensenada decided to 
postpone discussions on design until Rooth’s arrival in Ferrol but, as Juan’s 
correspondence indicates, modifications were considered from the start124.   
Once the first batch of British Master Shipwrights, Assistant Shipwrights and 
various artisans duly recruited by Juan arrived in Spain and were alocated to their 
respective Departments.  The three Master Shipwrights (Richard Rooth, Mathew 
Mullins and Edward Bryant) were each asked to build ships demonstrating their 
talents.  Rooth built the 70-gun Fernando and Asia, the frigate Galga and the 
packet boat Marte in Ferrol, Mullins the 70-gun África in La Carraca and Bryant 
the 70-gun Septentrión in Cartagena.  For these, they used much of the timber 
felled since 1748 and cut to Gaztañeta’s measurements which must have affected 
the design of the ships built, though to what extent is unclear.   Certainly new 
guidelines for felling timber were written by Rooth in 1750 to be applied to that 
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felled in La Montaña, the region around Santander, the navy’s main timber-
producing area125.  In September 1750, Ensenada also ordered a stop to the cutting 
of horquillas as these were not used in British construction126. 
Some of the proposed modifications, however, were rejected from the outset, 
generally because they contrasted too greatly with traditional Spanish practices.  
In June 1750, for example, Cosme Alvarez, the Intendant at Ferrol, informed 
Ensenada that he had examined the timber ponds with Rooth127.  The latter 
considered the keel timbers he had observed extremely broad.  They were 
unsuitable because too few trees would have the required dimensions and those 
that did would be too old with too many faults to make good keels.  In his 
opinion, what was required were timbers with a width of 20 inches for a 90-gun 
ship, 18 inches for an 80 and so on.  These would be secured to a robust keelson 
and further strengthened with a false keel, thereby increasing the overall size of 
the keel.  Keel timbers should be made from beech rather than oak as the former 
had a greater consistency and made from joints of 18, 20 or a few more cubits128, 
thus having a greater number of scarphs which practice, in British shipbuilding, 
was considered to strengthen the overall body of the ship.  The same applied to 
the stern- and stem-posts, under which, Rooth noted, the British method used 
deadwood to strengthen the structure.  He also disliked the quality of the planking 
he had examined and suggested purchasing it from Danzig where most of that 
used in the Thames yards was obtained.  His suggestions were turned down by 
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Ensenada, who informed Alvarez that Rooth was to use neither beech nor Danzig 
planking because that from La Montaña was better and more durable. And, 
instead of putting in a false keel, keels should be composed from larger timbers 
with as few joints as possible129. 
Keel composition remained a contentious subject throughout this period of 
shipbuilding.  More importantly, so did timber, especially plank.  Rooth’s was the 
first complaint but he was soon followed by Mullins.    In October 1750, Mullins 
asked if he could purchase Baltic timber to build the África130 and again, in 
August 1751, when he asked to purchase plank because that he had been promised 
from La Montaña had yet to arrive and the plank existent at La Carraca was so  
 damaged so as not to be fitt to saw into plank and were sound pieces even 
to come tomorrow they are not fitt to be used immediately green from the saw 
without laying some time in the salt water or some place to season that they might 
not shrink when used which is what they would infallibly do131.   
Similarly, Bryant protested in 1753 that works would soon be stopped at 
Cartagena because he was not receiving plank from La Montaña with the required 
four-inch thickness132.  On 29 January 1753, Julián de Arriaga, the Intendant at 
Cadiz, forwarded a grievance from La Carraca saying that according to the  
 opinion of the English Constructors, D. Jorge Juan, [Juan] Gerbaut and 
many knowledgeable officers, our oak, the best timber in the world for other 
purposes, is not at all suitable for planking; D. Jorge Juan also telling me that that 
used in building the Asia and Fernando being good was only the result of having 
been able to select the best from the 26 thousand planks that there were there133.   
 But Ensenada insisted that though that from the Baltic was ‘attractive, 
wide, and long, it does not have the strength or durability of ours’ and ordered 
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they use the best planking from La Montaña for shipbuilding and apply the rest to 
other tasks.  He also noted the timber had been prepared according to Rooth’s 
measurements and, therefore, could not be too slender134. 
In February 1752, Rooth, Mullins, Bryant and Almon Hill, a later recruit, were 
called to Madrid to meet with Juan and create what would amount to an 
Establishment in Spanish ship construction, drawing up plans for ships of each 
size and rulings on how they were to be built135.  Spain had followed Gaztañeta’s 
designs earlier in the century and Juan de Acosta’s in Havana so a state-backed 
method of construction did not represent an innovation but instituting it formally 
through a Council of Constructors held in Madrid and then sending out official 
rulings to the Departments not only represented the greater centralisation of the 
navy at this time but also mirrored the British Establishment system136.  This 
Council closed on 5 July 1752 and its rulings on ship construction were 
dispatched to the Intendants of the Naval Departments in October 1752137.  Rooth 
was ordered to build twelve 68-gun ships, Bryant two 68-gun ships and two 
frigates, Mullins two 68-gun ships and five frigates, and Howell four 68-gun 
ships138. 
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The dimensions dictated by this Council differed from those of the British 1745 
Establishment.  The British consul in Cartagena reported in 1753 that these 68-
gun ships were the same as the British 90s and the 58s the same as British 70s139.  
Jordan, in Ferrol, also noted that these 64s and 70s had similar dimensions to the 
British 90s140.  The progress reports in British archives of ships of this 
construction subsequently captured by the British prove these assertions to be 
accurate.  The Aquilón, for example, had a gundeck length from the rabbet of the 
stern to the rabbet of the stem of 175 English feet and 3 inches, making it 15 
English feet and 3 inches longer than the required 1745 Establishment length for a 
70-gun ship.  In fact, its length was between the 178 English feet of an 100-gun 
ship and the 170 of a 90-gun ship141.  Her extreme breadth was 49 English feet 7! 
inches, wider than the required 45 English feet for a 70-gun ship and again 
between the 51 English feet required for a 100-gun ship and the 48 English feet 6 
inches required for a 90-gun ship.  She did, however, differ substantially from 
British 100s and 90s in her height (from the top timberline or upper edge of the 
waist rail above the upper edge of the main keel in midships) which was 37 
English feet and 9 inches, making her only slightly deeper than the 34 English feet 
required for a 70-gun ship and shallower than the 43 English feet 7 inches 
required for a 100-gun ship and the 42 English feet 4 inches required for a 90-gun 
ship.  Her burthen in tuns was 1,880  compared to the 1,414  of a 70-gun 
ship and more like the 2,000 tuns required for a 100-gun ship and the 1,730 tuns 
required for a 90-gun ship.  Her dimensions were similar to other ships of this 
                                                      
Esmeralda, Perla and Dorada; and, in Guarnizo, the ships Soberbio, Arrogante, Poderoso and 
Serio.  The 68-gun ship was the 70-gun ship without the two cannon in the captain’s quarters.  
139 Kew SP94/228, Banks to Holderness, Cartagena, 21 February 1753 
140 Ibid., Jordan to Holdernesse, Coruña, 8 March 1753 
141 Lavery (1998) p.202 
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construction seized by the British, such as the Soberano, Monarca, Diligente and 
Conquistador142. 
The more significant alteration to Spanish shipbuilding instituted at this time, 
however, was in the technique by which these ships were built which followed 
how British warships were constructed143.  The keel, stem- and stern-posts were 
built from a greater number of smaller-sized timber parts in the belief that this 
added greater strength to the spine of the ship in contrast to previous Spanish 
practice which reasoned that more joints weakened the structure.  The floor 
timbers were more compact than in traditional Spanish construction where it was 
felt gaps were needed to provide air circulation.  The ribs of the frame did not 
alter the system of having floor timbers, four futtocks and top timbers but they 
were scarphed differently, using chocks and treenails rather than iron nails.  The 
outside and inside planking was secured using treenails which were inserted in 
previously bored holes and secured with caulking as opposed to fastened with 
iron.  The wales were not scarphed and were also secured using treenails rather 
than iron.  The decks had various types of knees to secure them rather than the 
traditional Spanish waterways and fewer deck beams144.  Thus the construction of 
the hull represented a noticeable alteration to previous Spanish shipbuilding. 
Ensenada intended the British shipwrights to have complete authority on all 
matters of shipbuilding.  He instructed the Intendants that they were not to 
interfere in any matter which could  
                                                      
142 See Appendix 5. 
143 The Yard Officers who subsequently examined these ships in Britain could recognise they had 
been built by a British shipwright though, at least those who examined the Soberano, did not think 
them very good, either in design or in the quality and condition of their materials, Kew 
ADM49/90, Portsmouth Yard Officers to Navy Board, Portsmouth Dock, 10 December 1762. 
144 Waterways – trancaniles – were substantially bigger in Spanish construction and indented with 
the decks.  They played a more significant role in Spanish construction of supporting the decks. 
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 directly or indirectly alter or vary the method of construction which 
Matthew Mullins was to form and wished to follow in the production of ships 
which was to begin in that Department, as the intention of His Majesty was that 
the Constructor entirely direct in general and in all its parts according to, and as he 
considers convenient, not only construction, but also the matter of the upper 
works and the artillery of ships145. 
 Conservative elements, nevertheless, existed locally and could exert 
pressure over the heads of British shipwrights.  An example is the Master Rigger, 
Henry Alexander Hagget’s attempts to alter the system of ship rigging at Ferrol.    
On 6 February 1753, Antonio de Perea, the Intendant at Ferrol, forwarded written 
instructions on the method of rigging ships prepared by Hagget146.  This, Perea 
noted, had been developed from Hagget’s first plan which had made the rigging a 
seventh-part thicker than it now was.  Perea had read Hagget’s original report and, 
certain the rope now made at Sada was of excellent quality, summoned Hagget, 
along with Cosme Alvarez, Thomas Hewett and William Turner (the last two 
standing in for Rooth, who was convalescing) to explain this to Hagget.  The 
latter had refused to alter the guidelines on the grounds that his was the method by 
which ships were rigged in Britain and that the quality of Sada rope had yet to be 
proven to be of excellent quality on the inside.  After much exposition,  
 D. Cosme Alvarez and I set out, in which the others agreed, that 
unless he reduced the whole of the standing rigging by a seventh and the running 
rigging proportionately, it seemed to us that it was unnecessarily weighing the 
ships down, when, with reason, an attempt was being made to lighten the weight 
and remove the idle costs which this useless measure produced.   
 It was only after Perea asked Rooth to reason with Hagget that the 
latter finally agreed to the alterations. 
                                                      
145 AGS Marina 321, Ensenada to Barrero, 29 April 1752, and the same letter was sent to Varas, 
Perea and Navarrete on that date. 
146 AGS Marina 322, Perea to Ensenada, Esteiro, 6 February 1753, and ‘Reglamento de los 
gruesos y largos …’, signed Hagget, 5 February 1753 
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Timber and the methods of seasoning it continued to be a source of protest for the 
British shipwrights147.  In May 1750, Rooth had complained that 
 the planking was very inferior, and all of it being the quality that it was, 
it was not suitable it should be in water because it ate its substance and would 
later cause it to split.  The method of seasoning it was to store it in a warehouse, 
where it could not be reached by either rain water nor the sun148. 
Ensenada replied: 
 Despite Rooth’s opinion that oak planking loses substance in salt water 
and then splits, it seems, that seasoning out of the water it will split more, even if 
it is under cover.  Finally the planking always comes to be under water once a 
ship is built149.   
 But he, nevertheless, asked Alvarez to experiment by storing a few 
planks in the manner recommended by Rooth to examine its effect.  He also asked 
Francisco Barrero y Peláez, the Intendant at Cartagena, and Francisco de Varas y 
Valdés, the Intendant at Cadiz, what the general opinion was in their Departments, 
with an additional request to Varas to ask the Directors of the Guipuzcoan 
Company how they preserved their shipbuilding timber150.  The Directors of the 
Guipuzcoan Company said they had stored their oak timber on mud in Pasajes 
beach where it was covered with salt water during high tide but exposed to the air 
at low tide.  It had become riddled with worm and a large portion unuseable so 
                                                      
147 Timber had to be seasoned to remove the sap which, being a food for fungi and wood parasites, 
would cause the timber to decay prematurely.  Nowadays, most timber is seasoned by being stored 
in a covered, dry environment which kills the sap and dries the timber so that it shrinks becoming 
lighter but stronger and less subject to the elements.  In Spain, timber was felled during winter 
when oaks had the least sap and seasoned using the methods described in this paragraph, which 
resembled those employed by the French navy at that time, see Boudriot (1986) vol.I, p.57.  The 
differences between the British and Spanish methods of seasoning could be accounted for by the 
differences in climate but this is hardly applicable to the north of Spain (where most of the 
shipbuilding timber came from) since the climate there more closely resembles that of Britain than 
that of the south of Spain.  In the following discussion, there also seems to be little differentiation 
between the methods of seasoning timber and those of storing it.  See Lambert (1991), p.110, 118–
123, for an analysis of the preparation and preservation of timber for shipbuilding. 
148 AGS Marina 318, Alvarez to Ensenada, Ferrol, 12 May 1750 
149 Ibid., Ensenada to Alvarez, Aranjuez, 26 May 1750 
150 Ibid., Ensenada to Barrero, Madrid, 15 August 1750, and Ensenada to Varas, Madrid, 17 
August 1750 
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they now imported timber from the Baltic or Holland151.  Barrero replied that ‘oak 
timber was always best stored in the docks, but that they should add sweet water 
to these since with those merely containing sea water, they had experienced that 
some old parts had been found to have been affected by worm’152.  Ciprián 
Autrán, the Master Attendant at La Carraca, replied that having been asked 
whether it was best to store timber in mud, sand or water the best was mud 
‘because in a little time it develops a layer of mire which not only keeps it healthy 
but protects it from worm’153.  On 25 August 1750, Alvarez reported the results of 
his experiments saying the best timber had been found to be that submerged in 
water since 1737 and 1747154.  In the end, the practice of storing timber in water 
or sand regularly covered with salt water was continued.  Joseph Townsend, in his 
account of travels in Spain published in 1791, described visiting Cartagena where 
he observed: 
 masts and timber are floated in water, without the least apprehension of 
their suffering by the worm; because, as they never open their sluices till the water 
is become putrid, the evaporation, proceeding with rapidity, leaves a strong brine, 
in which it is impossible the worm should live; whereas, in the north of Spain, 
where the evaporation is not sufficient for this purpose, they bury their masts in 
sand, and by pins prevent their floating, when they are covered by the tide155.   
British shipbuilding, which relied on an interlocking frame held together through 
scarphing and secured with treenails, relied on timber and plank being thoroughly 
                                                      
151 Ibid., Casas to Ensenada, San Sebastian, 24 August 1750, and Casas to Ensenada, San 
Sebastian, 31 August 1750 forwarding a letter from Felix de Ibarguen on the Compañia de 
Caracas’ method of preserving timber.   
152 Ibid., Autrán to Ensenada, Carraca, 1 September 1750 
153Ibid., Autrán to Ensenada, Carraca, 1 September 1750 
154 Ibid., Alvarez to Ensenada, 25 August 1750 
155 Townsend (1791) vol.III, pp.126–7.  The ‘worm’ in this case was dry rot, a fungal growth that 
feeds on organic matter and breaks down timber causing it to become discoloured, lose its strength 
and up to 80% of its weight.  It needs oxygen and moisture to survive which means that timber 
with less than 20% moisture or totally water-logged is not susceptible, see Lambert (1991) p.118.  
It does not seem that the methods employed in Spain of storing timber on beaches were likely to 
guarantee these conditions. 
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dry and traditional Spanish methods of seasoning timber were not appropriate156.  
Blaise Ollivier, Master Shipwright at Brest in the 1730s, had observed this when 
he travelled to London to examine British shipbuilding in 1737.  He noted in his 
comments on timber storage at Deptford, Woolwich, Chatham, Portsmouth and 
Sheerness that timber was stored, roughly hewn, in the open air.  He had seen a 
large pond for compass timber at Chatham but had been informed it had been 
their practice in the past to leave compass timber immersed for five to six months 
after it had been moulded but that this had been reduced so that today [1737] they 
only immersed it for one to two weeks and often not at all157.  He commented that 
the plank ‘is stacked with great care under cover and seems to be the timber of old 
felling, sawn already long since and very dry’158.  As also the treenails which he 
noted were ‘piled up in storerooms as we do in France; they seemed to me to be 
very dry and mooted a long time ago’159.  Ollivier admired the British method of 
constructing the frame of the ship with treenails saying that they made ‘a saving 
in iron, they render the ship lighter, and the fastening is equally tight’160.  But 
noted that if the French wanted to adopt the British method of planking, they 
could only do this ‘provided that we were to use as the English shipwrights do 
only plank which is completely seasoned, and lay them on frames which are 
equally dry [i.e. already seasoned as frames]’161. 
                                                      
156 In addition, British ships were also built over a longer period of time than the a la inglesa ships 
were being built which allowed the frame to season further after it had been put together.  
Seasoning in frame was a key technique and explains the long building times of major British 
warships in the Royal Dockyards, see Lambert (1991) pp.120–1.   
157 Roberts (1992) p.102 
158 Ibid. p.54 
159 Ibid. p.54 
160 Ibid. pp.65–67 
161 Ibid. pp.70–71.   
 ! (+ 
The practice of building English-style ships with timber seasoned in the usual 
Spanish manner had considerable repercussions on their quality.  On 31 July 
1753, Ensenada asked Julián de Arriaga, Intendant at La Carraca, to arrange a 
congress in Cadiz with the Marquis de la Victoria, Director General of the Navy, 
and Jorge Juan to discuss the discovery of many rotten and ill-fitting timbers in 
the packet boat Marte following a voyage to the Indies162.  At that time, Victoria 
reported their unanimous opinion that the origin of all these faults resulted from 
the poor quality of the treenails which should have been made ‘from the roots of 
the oaks, this being the strongest timber, it not being appropriate that they be 
made from the trunk or the branches’163. 
Complaints about the quality of the ships escalated, however, following 
Ensenada’s dismissal on 21 July 1754, partly because it then became politically 
acceptable to criticise but also because more of these ships were coming off the 
stocks with the same flaws.  Arriaga, now as Secretary of the Navy, frequently 
organised congresses, generally held in Cadiz, to investigate each individual 
complaint.  It is important to note that these varied so it is not necessarily 
advisable to use their frequency quantatively as evidence of Spanish 
dissatisfaction with a la inglesa design164.  In October 1754, a meeting was held 
in Cadiz to discuss the perennial problem of shrinking of ships’ timbers, more 
                                                      
162 AGS Marina 322, Ensenada to Arriaga and Victoria, Madrid, 31 July 1753 
163 Ibid., Victoria to Ensenada, Cadiz, 13 August 1753 
164 See, for example, Merino Navarro (1981) p.348: ‘The new method produced hulls which were 
rounder and a little more stable, with greater consumption of timber and less of iron, with parts 
which were more difficult to find given their dimensions, needing constant repairs, etc.  
Consequence of all this were the continuous ‘councils of constructors’ held during the 50s, always 
attempting to find solutions to the problem’. 
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specifically those of the Aquilón165.  Thus, in this particular case, this did result 
from a question of design but another meeting, held in Ferrol on 18 September 
1754, to discuss altering the location of the netting, the weakness of the shrouds 
and poor quality of the iron fittings and lignum vitae blocks used in rigging the 
four ships built at Guarnizo related to the quality of base materials and not to a la 
inglesa construction166.  It also had the additional purpose of criticising Fernández 
de Isla, who had held the contract to build these ships and who, it was felt, had 
enjoyed excessive control over naval contracts during Ensenada’s time.  Again, 
this conference differed from that held in Esteiro to discuss a large crack that had 
developed on the sternpost of the Vencedor while it was still on the stocks, which 
also had more to do with materials and workmanship than with design.  
Furthermore, Rooth used this opportunity to revalidate his position at the arsenal 
following a period of convalescence which had been rumoured as being a cover 
for his dismissal167.  He noted the fault resulted from the use of inferior quality 
timber by his subordinates, William Turner and Thomas Hewett, who had 
supervised construction during his absence, and found similar faults with the 
Glorioso, Guerrero, Soberano, Magnanimo, Eolo, Héctor, Neptuno, Brillante and 
Gallardo.  It is, therefore, evident that these meetings were called frequently, but 
for multiple reasons and, what is more, they could be affected by political and 
personal motivations, so it is always necessary to examine them critically. 
                                                      
165AGS Marina 323, Juan to Arriaga, Cadiz, 8 October 1754, and Arriaga to Domingo de Medina, 
Barrero, Gerbaut (Arriaga’s replacement as Intendant of Cadiz) and Juan de Isla, Madrid, 15 
October 1754 
166 AGS Marina 324, ‘Dictamen que en la junta celebrada en la Contaduría del Astillero de Esteiro 
… dieron los Comandantes de los quatro navíos, Poderoso, Soberbio, Serio y Arrogante, sobre los 
defectos, que hallaron en ellos …’, Esteiro, 26 September 1754.  
167 Ibid., Rooth’s statement, 26 November 1754, Agustin Salomon’s statement, Graña, 28 
November 1754, and and that of the maestros mayores, Esteiro, 29 November 1754. 
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The most significant shipbuilding congress of 1754 was that held in Cadiz on 9 
October.  It was attended by Victoria, Gerbaut, Juan, Mullins, Autrán and any 
naval officers with experience of commanding a la inglesa ships then in Cadiz.  
These were the Count of Vegaflorida, Francisco de Lastarria, Juan Ignacio 
Zalabarria, Juan Antonio de Colina, Pedro Goicoechea, Pedro de Castejón, 
Bernabé Urcullu and Juan Ponce de León168.  In it, they were instructed to discuss 
a letter written by Juan de Lángara from San Juan de Ulúa complaining his ship, 
the Asia, had destroyed a large proportion of the azogue goods in its hold.  The 
result of: 
 how little the planking was sealed.  When the ship does the slightest 
amount of work these fall out of place as a result of the complete lack of hold the 
treenails have.  They spit out the caulking and take in water.  The same happens 
through the sides as a result of the missing waterways, for which I fear finding all 
the heads of the beams rotten but I do not dare examine them for fear that it is not 
possible to attempt such a costly and unpleasant repair169.   
 They were also to discuss similar problems with the Fernando on its 
voyage to Naples, as well as the África and the frigates, and a letter from Rooth 
absolving himself from blame relating to flaws discovered with the Aquilón, again 
on the principle that he was not in charge of the arsenal at the time she was built. 
At the congress the Marquis de la Victoria asked all those present to submit a 
written statement expressing their opinions.  The most significant contribution 
was that written by Ciprián Autrán, the Master Attendant at La Carraca, who took 
the opportunity to submit a lengthy critique of the new construction style and 
recommended a return to the previous system170.  In his opinion, the proportions 
of the ships were overly long with their timbers and planking too fragile.  The 
                                                      
168 Ibid., ‘Junta de el día 9 de octubre de 1754 celebrada por orden de SM, en el Departamento de 
Marina de Cádiz’ 
169 Ibid., Lángara to Ensenada, Asia next to the Castle of Sn Juan de Ulua, 23 April 1754 
170 Ibid., Autrán to Victoria, Carraca, 24 October 1754 
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rudders were excessively large without contributing to their manoeuvreability and 
endangering their sterns.  The use of treenails he considered a major defect 
suggesting that in future the freeboard should be entirely bolted with iron and a 
mixture of iron and treenails below the waterline.  The stern- and stem- posts were 
weak being constructed from too many timber parts and needed to be secured with 
horquillas.  Only four sets of palmejares were used in the hold and these were 
insufficient171.  Neither were there enough riders to secure the hull.  He 
considered the use of chocks incomprehensible as they only served to weaken the 
extremities of each futtock and reduced the area on which iron nails could be 
bolted.  Wales ought to have been scarphed, not just fixed with treenails.  
Gunports were excessively large, letting in too much water and endangering the 
crew, without adding to the manoeuvreability of the cannon which were 
constricted by the hanging knees to either side of them.  Waterways were better 
than knees for supporting decks.  And, finally, there were insufficient deck beams 
and deck supports, all of which were also too delicate.  He observed that from the 
time that ‘construction had begun in this shipyard I have applied myself, even 
while being separated from this commission, to observing carefully its system, 
and method of putting together its parts’ and he hoped his report would show ‘the 
difference between the strength it has with what it should have’. 
The majority of captains present, namely Urcullu, Goicoechea, Colina, Ponce de 
León and Lastarria as well as the Intendant, Juan Gerbaut, agreed with Autrán’s 
statement opining that faults experienced on the Asia resulted from the ships’ 
                                                      
171These were the strakes next the limbers, the thick stuff at the floor head, the thick stuff at the 
first futtock head and the orlop deck clamp but to save on space they will be referred to here and 
for the rest of the chapter in the Spanish as palmejares. 
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frames and planking not being fastened using iron.  Juan, on the other hand, 
argued that Lángara’s complaints could be reduced to five points172.  These were: 
1. Decks flooded because treenails and caulking were spat out and the 
planking needed to be fastened with iron. 
2. The lack of waterways caused the same to occur with the frames of the 
ship. 
3. The ship had hogged so severely that water on the decks flowed into the 
stern galleries. 
4. The smallness of the scuppers meant there was insufficient outlet for water 
on the decks. 
5.  That the first two failings had also been experienced on Fernando, África 
and the frigates. 
Juan argued that the first, second and fifth points amounted to the same thing 
which was that the decks were taking on excessive water and that what was 
important was to identify the cause, for which there could only be two distinct 
explanations.  The first, that the timbers had dried and shrunk and, the second, 
that the entire frame of the ship was shifting, causing ruptures in the hull.  He said 
the first was undoubtedly happening since planking which had been measured in 
the shipyard as a línea or so thick was now coming to only half an inch and there 
could be no other possible explanation.  Despite what Lángara stated, however, 
Juan did not think the second eventuality was occurring because, if it were, undue 
stress should have been visible at the end of the deck beams, water should have 
been taken on below the waterline and faults should have become greater with 
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time instead of slowing down following their first careen as many captains 
testified.  His answer to Lángara’s third argument was that the first ships built had 
been slightly stern-heavy which would have caused the water to flood into the 
galleries but that this defect had been rectified at the 1752 Council of 
Constructors.  And, as to the scuppers, they were never intended to handle an 
extra-ordinary amount of water. 
Mullins reiterated Juan’s statement emphasising that he and the others had 
frequently petitioned against the use of unseasoned timber173.  He also noted that 
neither the Asia nor the Fernando had received anything but a cursory caulking at 
Carraca and Puntales before their expeditions.  He insisted knees were three times 
stronger than waterways and treenails better than iron bolts as long as they were 
good quality.  He concluded that  
 all warships … built in Britain of the same construction, without 
additional strengthening or security … sail in a more rigorous climate and never 
have cause for similar complaints and the reason is that they are made with dry 
and well seasoned timber especially on the inside and outside from the waterline 
upwards.  Also, they are always careful to wash and moisten these works every 
day and much more which these oak ships need in these climates. 
 Two of the captains agreed with Juan and Mullins.  Salavarria said that in 
his experience of commanding the Fernando and Oriente:  
 I have only experienced in these the decks flooding, not through the pine 
[deck] planking, as these have not given, but through the oak plank, because being 
somewhat green, as they have dried in time, they have shrunk and the sides have 
widened to the greatest degree174.   
 Vegaflorida, judging from his experience of the África, agreed that the 
rudder was too big and that the quarterdeck needed greater strengthening but that 
‘the África’s damages have resulted from the planking having been used straight 
                                                      
173 Ibid., Mullins to Victoria, Carraca, 15 November 1754 
174 Ibid., Salaverria’s statement, Cadiz, 13 October 1754 
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from the dock and it dried out and was renailed in the manner described and these 
repairs should serve as the model for the others’175. 
The Marquis de la Victoria forwarded this collection of statements to Arriaga 
noting his opinion that most of the captains agreed with Autrán and, 
acknowledging the latter’s skill, agreed that the problems that had developed in 
the latest form of construction resulted from ‘the weakness of the structure’176.  A 
report was formed from this, based on Autrán’s report, and forwarded to each 
Naval Department with instructions to summon ‘the Constructor of that shipyard 
and giving him a certified copy, order him, within the exact time of eight days, to 
hand you his report on whether or not it will harm the scantlings and 
measurements of this construction’ to make the proposed amendments177. 
Rooth, Mullins, Bryant and Howell all replied to this report, point by point, 
defending shipbuilding techniques agreed upon in 1752 and arguing that the 
increase in iron and timber being proposed would make ships unseaworthy, not 
only by reducing their sailing abilities but by the damage that would ensue from 
iron’s corrosive qualities178.  They had no objections, however, to such alterations 
as reducing the size of the rudder and gunports, building the small boats in the 
Spanish style and locating the galley in its traditional Spanish place. 
                                                      
175 Ibid., Vegaflorida’s statement, Cadiz, 18 October 1754 
176 Ibid., Victoria’s statement, Cadiz, 1 November 1754 
177 Ibid., Arriaga to Victoria, Madrid, 29 November 1754, Arriaga to Daniel Huoni, Madrid, 27 
November 1754, Arriaga to Spínola, Madrid, 30 November 1754, and Arriaga to Navarrete, 
Madrid, 2 December 1754.  A copy of this could not be found in Simancas but judging from 
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from Autrán’s report to Victoria dated 24 October 1754, AGS Marina 324, with the addition of the 
last point listing examples given by captains at the meeting. 
178 Ibid., Mullins to Victoria, Cadiz, 15 December 1754, Bryant to Spínola, Cartagena, 11 
December 1754, and Howell to Navarrete, Guarnizo, 27 December 1754.  In places where their 
opinions substantially differed or expanded on Rooth’s arguments these have been inserted as 
footnotes in Rooth’s report. 
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Of these reports, Arriaga only forwarded Rooth’s to Victoria, instructing him to 
organise a meeting with Gerbaut and Juan to examine it and put forward 
modifications for future construction179.  But, after meeting on 5 May 1755, 
Victoria confessed they had been unable to reach an agreement and so he returned 
Rooth’s statement with annotations including their differing opinions180.  It is 
worthwhile studying this document in detail because not only does it demonstrate 
the contrast between Spanish shipwrights and their British counterparts but also 
between senior naval administrators, such as Victoria, Juan and Gerbaut.  In it, a 
Spanish translation of Rooth’s original statement has been copied on the right 
with comments made at the meeting inserted in the left margin of each individual 
argument.  The following is a summary of this document with the opinions of the 
meeting included below Rooth’s arguments: 
1. Rooth did not consider the keels too slender stating they were the same 
thickness as British warships and stronger from being made from several 
timber parts rather than from one single piece.  Victoria, Juan and Gerbaut 
concurred that his reasoning was logical and proposed making no 
alterations to the construction of the keel. 
2. The keel was made less broad towards the stern but this did not detract 
from its strength and served to allow water to flow more easily into the 
rudder.  Those at the meeting agreed. 
3. In response to the accusation that the timber parts forming the keel were 
too short Rooth argued they were three times their breadth and as such 
considered ideal.  By scarphing them to the side they were no less 
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streamlined, since these joints were not even visible after tarring, and the 
reason why they were placed in this manner was for each individual part to 
be replacable without having to take the entire keel apart.  All three at the 
meeting agreed with him. 
4. The stempost should not be made bigger so that the planking could be 
secured to it.  Not only did the current system of securing the planking to 
the apron allow an extra six inches for this purpose but he had been 
witness to many Spanish and French warships taking on water here 
because the planking was secured to the lower part of the stempost where 
there was not sufficient room for it.  Victoria, Juan and Gerbaut, 
nevertheless, thought it was better to fasten the planking to the stempost 
but as it would be impossible to find timber parts of the necessary 
dimensions for this they were willing to accept Rooth’s statement. 
5. In response to the critique that floor timbers, futtocks and top timbers were 
excessively fragile, Rooth reasoned they were sufficiently strong to carry 
the weight of the artillery and any increase would only serve to making the 
ships less seaworthy, citing the San Felipe as an example.  Furthermore, 
the floor timbers were considerably more compact than in the previous 
system of construction making the lower part of the hull practically solid.  
He added that ‘with less timber have British ships carried heavier artillery 
without being damaged, cruising in winter in the Bay of Biscay’.  Those at 
the meeting did not think any alterations were required. 
6. He was strongly against the use of iron nails to reinforce the hull, arguing 
a ship’s strength resided in  
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  regular scarphing and the measurements of the timbers and plank, and 
in the good union between these and the timbers, securing those of the 
sides to the inner lining, as well as in the good disposition of placing the 
timbers, at regular distances, so that, not much is left in any part, towards 
which end, in the new construction particular care was taken in the 
establishment made so that each timber had the right length and that their 
extremities were placed where less strength was needed.   
 The hull would hold together even without treenails, but that replacing 
the latter with iron would be extremely harmful.  In his experience of 
careening Spanish and French vessels, he had found the iron in their hulls  
 worn out, as well as the timber and planking which it had touched: 
that the nails were eaten by rust where they had been reached by salt 
water, more or less rusted depending on the amount of time, but always 
with little or no service, sometimes being reduced to wire; so that you 
could pull them out with your fingers: reason enough for the ship to take 
on water.   
 On this point, Victoria, Juan and Gerbaut had very different ideas.  Juan 
adhered to Rooth’s opinion.  Gerbaut considered it necessary to secure the 
hull with a combination of treenails and iron nails below the waterline and 
entirely with iron nails above.  Victoria thought the British method of 
construction so different that he was unsure but considered the ships would 
be no less strong secured with iron than they now were fastened with 
treenails181. 
7. Rooth spoke very strongly against the use of horquillas in shipbuilding182.  
These were made from the fork of a tree where the grain split and as such 
made from the weakest part of the tree and prone to split merely on being 
removed from the timber ponds.  The lack of timber suitable for knees in 
Ferrol had meant that they had used many of these horquillas as knees but 
                                                      
181 The corrosive nature of iron upon timber when combined with saline water is nowadays 
undisputed, see Lambert (1991) p.118. 
182 Howell also disliked horquillas but neither Mullins nor Bryant mentioned them. 
 ! )+ 
that they had broken in no time.  Though Victoria and Juan agreed with 
him, Gerbaut insisted making parts from one timber piece rather than two 
was always to be preferred. 
8. The function served by chocks was to diffuse stress evenly along the 
frame.  Victoria and Juan agreed as did Gerbaut as long as they did not 
interfere with the use of iron nails. 
9. Rooth did not think that the upper and lower cheeks weakened the bow.  
Again, Victoria and Juan agreed with him but Gerbaut felt iron nails 
should be used to secure them. 
10. Wales were better secured with treenails rather than with iron even if the 
latter allowed for them to be scarphed.  Victoria and Juan concurred but 
Gerbaut preferred using iron. 
11. The gunports could be reduced in size without difficulty since their size 
had been decided upon in 1752 purely as a result of naval officers’ 
petitions for their enlargement183.  Victoria, Juan and Gerbaut all agreed. 
12. Rooth disagreed with Autrán’s opinion that the planking was insufficiently 
thick arguing it was at the maximum thickness to take the treenails while 
still being sufficiently strong.  Fastening with iron rather than treenails 
would only create more holes in the long run since nails could not be 
merely reinserted when replaced, instead they would have to be nailed into 
a different area of the plank.  It was agreed at the meeting that the plank 
was sufficiently thick. 
                                                      
183 Neither Mullins nor Bryant considered the gunports excessive with the latter suggesting that it 
only required consulting someone who had been in battle to be made aware of the benefits that 
larger gunports provided. 
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13. In reply to the criticism that there were only four sets of palmejares in the 
hold, Rooth noted  
 the greater proportion of planking or timber in a ship does not 
fortify it unless care is taken to know where it should be placed, and in this 
construction broader pieces have been put into the weakest areas where the 
ship needs greater strengthening.   
 
 Victoria and Juan concurred but Gerbaut insisted these should still 
be indented and secured with iron nails, even if it required reducing the 
number of treenails.  Neither Juan nor Victoria agreed with Gerbaut 
arguing treenails were adequate fasteners for palmejares.   
14. Rooth thought including additional riders would only serve to overburden 
the structure184.  There were no objections to this at the meeting. 
15. The stern was suitably robust and, again, he condemned the use of 
horquillas.  Victoria, Juan and Gerbaut agreed. 
16. The beams were adequate and fastening them with iron would be 
superfluous.  Since they were scarphed together from a number of timber 
parts and had the additional support of an extra knee, they were now 
considerably stronger than they had been in the past.  Once more, those at 
the meeting had no objections. 
17. Beams were deliberately positioned under each cannon and midway 
between each gunport to support key areas, adding any extra would break 
this pattern185.  Victoria and Juan were satisfied and so also was Gerbaut 
on the condition that if there were room for any additional beams these 
                                                      
184 Bryant agreed with Rooth, further elaborating that there were four sets of riders: one by the fore 
hatchway; one just forward of the main mast; one in between these two; and the last just aft of the 
stern hatchway. 
185 Mullins further added that, if beams were any closer, there would be insufficient room for the 
lodging knees. 
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should be included.  Juan countered that that was precisely the point, each 
beam had its place in a predetermined system so there was no room for 
additions. 
18. Deck planking was now better supported with ledges than in the past with 
laths.  Victoria concurred, Gerbaut preferred returning to using laths and 
Juan insisted the two served the same basic function but that ledges were 
superior because they avoided the planking being placed from stern to bow 
and gave the deck more of a curve than laths. 
19. It was true several knees had broken, mainly those made from modified 
horquillas, but they were, nevertheless, better at supporting the weight of 
the decks than waterways which had a tendency to loosen with the 
movement of the ship.  Rooth indicated he did not consider waterways 
poor but they were not feasible as an additional support because their use 
would require altering the location of knees which were currently placed 
to support specific stress points186.  As usual, Victoria was satisfied, 
Gerbaut still preferred adding waterways and Juan countered saying that, 
as Rooth had explained, the two were mutually exclusive. 
20. Rooth saw no inconvenience in adding four sets of tenons to the four 
already existent in the gundeck.  This was unanimously supported. 
21. The same with the upperdeck, quarterdeck and forecastle.  All at the 
meeting agreed while also suggesting adding an extra inch in height to the 
forecastle beams. 
                                                      
186 Mullins, Bryant and Howell emphasised the superiority of knees over waterways to support the 
decks.  Though Mullins conceded they could make the waterways larger, but that they could not 
be indented in the traditional Spanish way as this would interfere with the knees. 
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22. Rooth stated he had already replaced the use of iron with timber knees in 
the galleries in Ferrol but he observed ‘if iron knees are pernicious to the 
freeboard, why would not all the extra timber that is being suggested 
putting into their sides and holds also be’?  Since shipwrights in all three 
Departments had already ceased using iron knees, Victoria, Gerbaut and 
Juan had no further comment. 
23. Here, Rooth countered Autrán’s allegation that the excuse given by the 
British shipwrights –  unseasoned timber being the cause of ships’ hogging 
– was only an attempt to mask the root problem, which was that the ships 
had been shoddily built.  Rooth argued that the cause of hogging was 
neither the unseasoned timber nor poor workmanship but rather that after 
launching the ships, at least those built at Ferrol, had been left for a 
prolonged period of time unfinished and without ballast in tempestuous 
weather with heavy seas.  He explained that without ballast a ship is more 
buoyant at the bow and stern and, if left for a prolonged period of time, as 
these ships had been, the structure of the hull is distorted.  Additionally, 
they had been launched unfinished with their decks and upper planking 
still incomplete which would have further aggravated the situation.  He 
also noted hogging was not caused by the violence with which a ship was 
launched, otherwise it would have been noticeable straight away instead of 
developing gradually over time187.  On this point, Victoria and Juan 
accepted Rooth’s reasoning as did Gerbaut but with the clause that ships 
secured with iron nails would hog less. 
                                                      
187 Mullins argued the ships’ hogging was being caused by the weight of the oak and the loss of 
caulking from the use of green timber.  Bryant noted that the Septentrión had got stuck during her 
launch and had rested half on, half off her supports for eight days before she eventually went into 
the water but that this had not caused her to hog. 
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24. These ships were long and as a result, argued Rooth, they had the 
advantages of speed, a large gundeck, greater stability and a more 
attractive appearance188.  If desired, however, the wales and decks could 
be given a greater breadth.  But Victoria rejected any alteration to their 
current shape, Gerbaut approved Rooth’s suggestion to increase their 
breadth and Juan, pointing out they were already a foot wider than British 
warships, said they could maybe afford to gain four to six inches on their 
decks but, if this were the case, the wales should not be altered. 
25. Rooth argued strongly against the use of iron nails in preference to 
treenails.  He insisted these would soon corrode below the waterline as 
they reacted with salt water and cause the planking to splinter in the 
freeboard189.  At the meeting this caused the greatest amount of debate.   
Victoria thought treenails should continue to be used in the hold but 
replaced with iron nails or bolts above the waterline.  Gerbaut believed 
some treenails should be left below the waterline but none above.  Juan 
argued treenails were still to be preferred below and above the waterline 
but only if their good quality could be assured. 
26. Here, Rooth expressed his opinion that the straightness of the keel did not 
necessarily indicate the level of a ship’s hogging ‘and finally, that the 
manner in which a keel is laid upon the stocks … can prevent the ship 
                                                      
188 Mullins further added the French were building ships, like the Monarque, Entrepide, Septro 
and Magnifique, which had the same length with the same fourteen gunports on the gundeck but 
that they were 2! feet less deep, making them proportionately far longer than Spanish ships. 
189 Howell was in agreement, stating that ‘timber with timber always have a better relationship, 
one with the other, than iron with timber’. 
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from hogging … make a difference to the decks and facilitate drainage, for 
me is an incomprehensible mystery’190.  Those at the meeting agreed. 
27. Rooth also considered the rudders excessively large and had no objection 
to reducing them, especially since the ships were reported to handle well.  
Once more, those at the meeting agreed. 
28. Autrán had suggested building ships’ boats in the previous Spanish 
manner and Rooth had no objections, deeming it merely a question of 
people’s custom and noting that this was already the practice in Ferrol.  
None at the meeting had any further comment as this was already being 
done in all the Naval Departments.   
29. Similarly and with the same reaction from the meeting, there was no 
objection to altering the location of the galley to suit a people’s custom.   
30. This article in the 1754 meeting report had consisted of a condemnation of 
British ships in comparison with Spanish ships based on examples 
described by those at the meeting.  In particular, that given by Colina 
describing two merchant ships, one from Bizcaya and one from Britain, 
which grounded in Laredo beach191.  Whereas the Spanish one managed to 
lift itself off without any difficulties, the British one was wrecked.  Rooth 
pointed out that there could be various causes for this, not least that as this 
vessel was carrying salt cod it was likely to have been built in New 
England where the timber was poor quality192.  But that, nevertheless, 
merchant and naval vessels were different.  The report had also mentioned 
                                                      
190 Mullins, Bryant and Howell also mentioned that the straightness of the keel did not affect 
hogging.  Mullins noted that Rooth had already experimented in Ferrol with laying an arched keel 
knowing that the result would only be misleading. 
191 AGS Marina 324, Colina’s statement from October 1754 congress. 
192 Grafe’s analysis of the salt cod trade in Distant Tyranny (2012), pp.62–9, would support this 
theory.  Mullins also argued the ship carrying salt cod must have been built in New England. 
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the Princesa captured by the British in 1740, to which Rooth added, that, 
when docked in Britain, she had practically to be rebuilt as she was in such 
poor shape.  Furthermore, he noted that Spanish and French ships suffered 
a lot of damage at sea which he had frequently witnessed in Britain as well 
as at Ferrol, most recently in careening the San Felipe. 
In June 1755, Arriaga ordered another meeting between Victoria, Juan and 
Gerbaut to determine modifications to the official system of naval construction 
despite their individual differences over Rooth’s report, they resolved that: 
1. Pilots should have cabins built in the roundhouse193. 
2. Gunports should be smaller.  In ships of 68 guns, they would have 2! 
inches less in breadth and one inch less in height. 
3. An extra tenon should be added to each side of the decks. 
4. Forecastle beams should have an additional inch in height. 
5. The width of the rudder should be reduced by six inches. 
6. Iron nails, not treenails, should be used in the freeboard194. 
Despite the lengthy report resulting from the 9 October 1754 congress, therefore, 
only some amendments were made to the established system195.  The most 
significant of these, as well as the only one which contravened the opinions of the 
British shipwrights, was the decision to use iron in the freeboard.  There were 
several factors which contributed to there being so few amendments, for instance 
that Juan, Gerbaut and Victoria, who all had differing opinions, needed to reach a 
                                                      
193 In the British 1745 Establishment, roundhouses were forbidden. 
194 AGS Marina 325, Arriaga to Victoria, Madrid, 16 June 1755, and Victoria to Arriaga, Cadiz, 15 
July 1755 
195 The modifications were accepted by Arriaga and sent out as orders to the naval departments, 
AGS Marina 324, Arriaga to Gerbaut, Perea, Barrero, Victoria, Spínola and Huoni, Madrid, 26 
July 1755 
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compromise and that making only small adjustments was easier than introducing 
substantial reforms.   Nevertheless, the fact that only such minor amendments 
were made, when the previous year a complete overhaul of the new system was 
being proposed, indicates a level of confidence in a la inglesa shipbuilding. 
Discussion relating to it, however, continued.  On 17 August 1756, Perea queried 
whether the next ship to be built at Ferrol was to continue a la inglesa, stating:  
 Your Excellency knows better than me the various incidents which have 
resulted from this system, not being, as was claimed, cheaper due to the saving 
made in iron, but rather more expensive, nor do these ships seem superior or even 
of equal strength to the others.  The strength these were supposed to have was 
thought to come from the increase in the quantity of timber they have but more 
convincing is the idea that their weakness stems from the lack of iron to hold 
timbers and plank in place196. 
Arriaga merely replied that he was to continue building a 58-gun a-la-
inglesa-designed ship based on the Tridente197. 
In 1757, Francisco de Orozco, Commander General at Ferrol, also reported that he 
and Perea concurred in thinking it most sensible to build the next Ferrol 60-gun 
ship along a la inglesa proportions but fitted in the traditional manner.  This was 
the ‘safest method and would solve the problem of having the workforce 
permanently employed at great cost’198.  Arriaga asked Victoria to discuss the 
letter with Gerbaut and ‘the others’ in Cadiz199, which he did, after requesting a 
clearer account from Orozco of the modifications he was proposing200.  These 
amounted to increasing the amount of iron nails and bolts in the hull, especially in 
the frame of the ship, and adding waterways to replace some of the knees which 
                                                      
196 AGS Marina 326, Perea to Arriaga, Esteiro, 17 August 1756 
197 Ibid., Arriaga to Perea, Madrid, 3 November 1756 
198 AGS Marina 327, Orozco to Arriaga, Ferrol, 1 February 1757.  A la inglesa ships were thought 
to require excessive maintenance repair work. 
199 Ibid., Arriaga to Victoria, Madrid, 8 February 1757 
200 Ibid., Victoria to Arriaga, Cadiz, 7 March 1757 
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were considered overly heavy201.  Victoria replied that the additional 
strengthening Orozco was recommending was superfluous.  He further added that 
these matters had already been contemplated in the 1755 congress ‘from which 
have proceeded the dispositions regarding the possible amendment of what was 
necessary, as has been achieved in this yard with the ships and frigates built after 
it.  I do not think it is necessary to speak further on this point’202.   
On this occasion, Juan also wrote to Arriaga, criticising Orozco’s suggestions and 
emphasising that these questions had been discussed in 1754 and 1755203.  He 
stressed he had been against them then and he remained so now because:  
 in the English method a ship does not have more indentation in the 
palmejares, waterways, planking &c than that of the treenails.   If these treenails 
were removed, the timbers would no longer be held in place from the movement 
that could be occasioned from stern to bow.  Since the nail, which bends easily, 
allows for this sort of movement.  It is my opinion that nails should not be used 
unless nearly all the construction is done in the former method.   Certain parts are 
linked in such a way that the removal of one necessitates the removal of others.   
 He added that the defects Orozco described pertaining to the Asia were 
caused by ‘the timber employed to build her being green and waterlogged’ and 
that Orozco’s examples were insufficient to prove his argument since  
 many more could also be given to support the opposite.  The Septentrión 
made its maiden voyage with 24 and 18 pounder cannon, even though these were 
the incorrect sizes for her, but her officers did not complain, rather quite the 
contrary, and many others have also found the same.  All considered, I think it 
best we adhere to the meeting that was held and what was voted there. 
 Nevertheless, Arriaga, ignoring Victoria and Juan’s opinions, instructed 
Orozco to experiment with the ship then being built at Ferrol by including all the 
reforms Orozco had suggested and using three large iron bolts to fasten each set 
                                                      
201 Ibid., Orozco to Arriaga, Ferrol, 5 April 1757 
202 Ibid., Victoria to Arriaga, Cadiz, 4 May 1757 
203 Ibid., Juan to Victoria, Cadiz, 26 April 1757 
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of futtocks204.  On 31 May 1757, Orozco reported that the ship (the Campeón) 
was too far advanced to include the latter addition but, having conferred with 
Perea and Rooth as instructed, they considered it possible to insert waterways, 
spirketting, beams with dovetail joints and other modifications ‘conducive to the 
greater firmness of the interior of the ships’205. 
The Campeón was the last ship built at Ferrol during Ferdinand’s reign and the 
amendments made to her construction were not later incorporated into the 
construction of ships at other Departments.  Her captain, José de San Vicente later 
commented adversely on her performance:  
 As I have not sailed in another ship of modern construction and the 
qualities of this one contrast so much with what I have heard of these other ships, 
I think that the great difference results from having altered the system or 
proportions of her construction as well as that she is stronger and heavier for 
having been built with iron bolts and nails206. 
 In September 1758, Arriaga enquired of Rooth why the Campeón’s 
qualities differed from the Tridente’s207.  Rooth denied responsibility noting 
William Turner had drawn her plan and this had been approved by the Court.  To 
the best of his knowledge, this is how she had been built but, in relation to the 
‘excessive broadness of her timbers and the excess of nails and bolts in her 
freeboard, put in for greater strength and to avoid hogging, I cannot say from 
whence it comes but maybe from the Assistant Shipwright D. William Turner’208.   
                                                      
204 Ibid., Arriaga to Orozco, Madrid, 18 May 1757 
205 Ibid., Orozco to Arriaga, Ferrol, 31 May 1757 
206 AGS Marina 330, ‘Noticia de las propriedades, buenas y malas, que el capitán de Fragata de la 
Rl Armada Dn Joseph de San Vicente ha notado en el navío de SM nombrado el Campeón en las 
dos salidas a la mar que ha hecho en él’, Ferrol, 30 October 1758.  See Appendix 7, no.13, for a 
fuller summary of his report. 
207 Ibid., Arriaga to Rooth, Madrid, 4 September 1758 
208 Ibid., Rooth to Arriaga, Guarnizo, 18 September 1758 
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Her measurments were forwarded to Gerbaut and Barrero for comparison with 
those, respectively, of the Conquistador and Tridente209.  Their proportions, as 
can be seen in Appendix 6, were very similar which indicates the difference in her 
sailing abilities resulted from the method in which she was built as does her 
captain’s complaints of her qualities. 
Another congress, in 1757, attended by Victoria, Gerbaut, Juan and Mullins in 
Cadiz passed further amendments to the design of 58-gun ships based on the 
Tridente210.  In future, they would: 
1. Reduce the weight of timber in the bow to increase sailing speed.  This 
was considered possible because the Tridente was a smooth sailing and 
stable ship, qualities which would not be affected by this minor 
adjustment. 
2. Increase their height by 9 inches to counter Spanish timber being so heavy 
that the Tridente could reach her intended waterline with only 5,000 
quintals of ballast when, ideally, she required 6 or 7 thousand.  More 
ballast would become possible with this alteration. 
3. Add 18 inches to the gundeck at the stern. 
4. Reduce the size of the hawse holes.  It was hoped that this measure would 
make them better suited to rough seas. 
5. Reduce the size of gunports as decided in 1755. 
6. Reduce the size of the rudder, again as decided in 1755. 
                                                      
209 AGS Marina 328, Arriaga to Gerbaut and Barrero, Madrid, 26 September 1758, Barrero to 
Arriaga, Cartagena, 11 October 1758, and Gerbaut to Arriaga, Cadiz, 9 October 1758. 
210 AGS Marina 327, Arriaga to Victoria, Madrid, 8 February 1757 
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7. Move the last post in the bow on the upper deck slightly back towards the 
stern to free the anchor. 
8. Project the coat of arms at the stern slightly to make it more aesthetically 
pleasing.  The Tridente’s stern being considered a little too flat. 
9. Include the pilots’ two cabins in the roundhouse as agreed in 1755. 
These were approved by the King and Juan was instructed to attend Victoria’s 
house, with Almon Hill, to draw the modified plans211. 
In 1758, Arriaga asked all sea officers with experience of commanding ‘ships or 
frigates of the modern construction’ to report on their qualities212.  These were 
submitted over the course of the next few months but they were neither discussed 
at a congress nor used to modify the established method213. 
On the whole, a la inglesa shipbuilding underwent much scrutiny after the arrival 
of British shipwrights in 1750 and its formal introduction in 1752 before 
eventually being replaced by French-style construction as brought to Spain by 
François Gautier in 1765.   
Ensenada’s Removal from Power on 21 July 1754 
In the study of the modernisation of Spanish naval technology and infrastructure 
during Ferdinand’s reign, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of 
Ensenada’s removal from power on 21 July 1754.  From this date, the central 
government no longer defended the adoption of foreign practices to improve the 
                                                      
211 Ibid., Arriaga to Juan, Madrid, 15 March 1757 
212 AGS Marina 330, Arriaga to Victoria, Orozco and Spínola, Madrid, 18 October 1758 
213 See Appendix 7. 
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domestic product and the result was that many of the ventures initiated under 
Ensenada struggled to survive after July 1754. 
From the beginning of the a la inglesa construction project, state policy had been 
for local authorities to make certain the newly recruited British shipwrights and 
artisans were content.  Ensenada, for example, commanded Alvarez, before their 
arrival, to ensure they were properly ‘housed, well treated and, without doubt, to 
guarantee that any who anger or abuse them are imprisoned so as to be punished 
with due severity and to serve as an example to others’214.   
On the 21 July 1754, with the fall from grace of the Marquis de la Ensenada and 
his replacement by Julián de Arriaga as Minister for the Navy, all this began to 
change dramatically and life for the British shipbuilders began to change for the 
worse.  Privileges, such as having translators or personal boats, were periodically 
removed, opportunities were taken to dismiss those without written contracts and 
Arriaga refused to employ new arrivals.  As early as 14 August 1754, instructions 
were sent out to the Departments for lists of  
English individuals employed in that Naval Department, with a description 
of their positions, salaries and any gratifications they might have; accompanying 
this with any information held there relating to their contracts and giving the 
terms under which they agreed to transfer to Spain215.   
From this date, Intendants were required to provide regular updates on 
these individuals. 
Before Ensenada’s fall from grace and internal exile to Granada there had already 
been indications the British shipwrights were unpopular in Spain.  Keene had 
reported in 1753 that the first ships built by Rooth were found wanting and stories 
                                                      
214 AGS Marina 233, Ensenada to Alvarez, San Lorenzo, 11 November 1749 
215 AGS Marina 235, Arriaga to Juan Domingo de Medina, Madrid, 14 August 1754 
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were circulating that ‘they [the British] were let slip from England with an 
intention to spend the money of Spain in building ships, which should be of no 
service to the Spaniards, nor diservice to Great Britain’216.  As Keene noted, the 
first ships built using the new a la inglesa method were coming into active service 
at this time and being found defective and this caused further resentment against 
the British shipwrights.  Henceforth, even though a la inglesa construction 
continued to be the Spanish navy’s method of shipbuilding, British shipwrights 
were offered little protection by the government and their numbers, substantially 
diminished in 1754, continued to dwindle thereafter as can be seen in Appendices 
3 and 4217. 
Local conditions at each of the arsenals and the characters of the shipwrights 
themselves also affected how a la inglesa construction was received at each of the 
three Departments once the British shipwrights no longer enjoyed the 
government’s protection.  In Ferrol, Rooth had serious clashes with the local 
naval administration, especially the Naval Intendant Antonio de Perea, as well as 
with the workforce at the arsenal making it very difficult for his authority in 
relation to shipbuilding to be respected.  Mathew Mullins’ experience at La 
Carraca was also difficult but for different reasons.  At La Carraca, Mullins had to 
confront an established workforce accustomed to working in the previous 
construction system.  His authority was challenged by the Master Attendant 
Ciprián Autrán, who in 1748 had expected to lead Ensenada’s shipbuilding 
programme.  Autrán consistently rejected the value of foreign technological 
imports using past experience to add weight to his arguments in favour of 
                                                      
216 Kew SP94/144, ff.69–71, Keene to Holdernesse, Madrid, 27 August 1753 
217 In this year alone, nine were definitely discharged and a further six disappeared from the 
records suggesting that they too left the service. 
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adhering to Gaztañeta’s construction system.  In Cartagena, Bryant had the easiest 
time of all the British shipwrights but, unfortunately, he was separated from most 
of the discussion on a la inglesa construction because the dockyard in Cartagena 
itself was not much involved in the project.  Most of the a la inglesa shipbuilding 
had taken place in Ferrol, Rooth was held more accountable since he had 
originally been employed as Director of Naval Construction and Mullins, by 
being based at La Carraca, could be physically present at most of the meetings on 
the subject but Bryant, in Cartagena, was more out on a limb in both respects and 
was not able to participate in the debate to the same extent.  In the development of 
a la inglesa shipbuilding, therefore, it is important to remember that frequently 
the rejection of foreign technologies was very closely linked with the rejection of 
the foreigners themselves, especially in Ferrol and La Carraca. 
The lack of consistent protection by the government for a la inglesa construction, 
like that which existed from 1749 to 1754, for a longer period if not for 
generations meant that it could continue to be rejected as intrinsically foreign.  In 
1760, Mathias de Miranda, then touring Spanish arsenals, examined a copy of 
Rooth’s statement in response to the 9 October 1754 congress report.  On many 
points, he reiterated a preference for the shipbuilding techniques which preceded a 
la inglesa and protested that  
 the Constructor pretends, that because it is him who says it and because 
he is British, his method of construction should be preferred, without further 
examination or basis under which terms it seems to me that he wants to discuss 
the Spanish method (which he calls ancient)218.   
                                                      
218 AGS Marina 330, ‘Parecer de Dn Mathias de Miranda en vista de los descargos que sobre la 
manera de fortificar los navíos de la nueva construcción inglesa ha dado Dn Ricardo Rooth’, 
[1760] 
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 Not only did this author take Rooth’s report out of context and 
misunderstand the use of ‘antiguo’ for ‘ancient’ when it was intended as ‘former’ 
(as previous Spanish construction was described by everyone at the time) but his 
comment indicates a strength of passion and national pride that is not germane to 
the issue.  Additionally, there were petitions such as the ‘Reflections directed at 
undoing the horror with which we proceed in the construction of ships in the 
English method to the detriment of His Majesty, his Royal Treasury and the 
honour of the Spanish nation’ in which the very adoption of foreign methods, in 
this case a la inglesa shipbuilding, was passionately rejected as an offence to 
national feeling219. 
Conclusion 
Ferdinand VI’s reign, therefore, was a dynamic period of naval modernisation.  
To a great extent this is attributable to the Marquis de la Ensenada’s policy of 
looking outward and examining the ideas and developments of Spain’s rivals, 
namely Britain and France.  The primary strategy employed in this process was 
the selection of intelligent men to study foreign practices, among them Jorge Juan 
y Santacilia and Antonio de Ulloa.  Their efforts resulted in the acquisition of an 
enormous quantity of information through the purchase of books, maps, models, 
machines etc. that could be used in the modernising project together with the 
search for experts from other countries.  Juan, in particular, was responsible for 
the recruitment of a large contingent of British artisans to reform Spanish 
shipbuilding and arsenal technology.  This was by no means an easy task and it 
required the Spanish State to take substantial risks – financially, diplomatically 
                                                      
219 Ibid., Juan Antonio de Cortaguera[?], ‘Reflexiones dirigidas a deshazer el horror …’, 
Santander, 26 February 1760  
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and politically.  Nor was it entirely successful.  Although Juan had been asked to 
recruit some of the best master shipwrights in Britain, this was not feasible 
because these men would not have been willing to transfer their allegiance to 
Spain.  Instead, he was fortunate to come across a community in Rotherhithe that 
contained a number of disgruntled, mostly Catholic, shipbuilders, some with 
experience of working in naval yards, who were willing to move to Spain with the 
promise of promotion and higher pay. 
A necessary step in implementing modernisation in this way proved to be the 
integration of these men and their ideas into Spanish arsenals which had pre-
existing shipbuilding traditions.  The level of integration at each of the arsenals 
was different.  At Cadiz, Matthew Mullins faced strong resistance from those who 
had continued and led the previous system of construction such as Ciprián Autrán 
who now found themselves replaced.  And, in Ferrol, Richard Rooth’s personality 
and ambitions even caused a clash between him and the local administration as 
well as the workforce.  
On his return to Spain, Juan was instrumental in driving through reforms, such as 
bringing in new technologies in the arsenals, building dry docks at Ferrol and 
Cartagena, reforming sail and rope production and, most significantly, introducing 
a la inglesa shipbuilding.  This last, which is the one that has been examined in 
most detail in this chapter, was to be a lengthy, on-going process.  As Juan’s 
comments on Rooth’s 70-gun ship plan illustrate, modification of British 
shipbuilding was projected from the beginning and the designs formally accepted 
at the 1752 Council of Constructors were by no means a replica of the British.  
They did, however, introduce British-style ship construction which differed 
substantially from that previously practised in Spain.  Unfortunately, British 
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shipwrights had to adapt to a new type of timber and British methods of seasoning 
were not adopted in Spain.  This was largely responsible for the main flaw a la 
inglesa ships manifested, which was that timbers in their freeboard shrank causing 
the caulking and treenails to fall out and water to flood the decks.  As this was 
being discovered when Ensenada fell from favour and as a la inglesa construction 
and the British shipwrights lost their protection at Court, this flaw was exploited 
by its opponents who advocated a return to the previous system, arguing that this 
defect was the result of poor quality design and incompetent shipwrights.  Despite 
this, a la inglesa shipbuilding survived undergoing incremental changes that 
gradually adapted it to suit its environment, such as the decision to use iron nails 
in the freeboard and increase their height so that a greater amount of ballast could 
be used to counter the weight of Spanish oak though, when these changes were 
too abrasive, as with the Campeón, they were unsuccessful.  This system of 
construction remained in place until 1765 when Gautier arrived in Spain and even 
after.  Thus it was not replaced wholesale and British shipwrights continued to 
work in top positions at the arsenals, among them Ignacio Mullan (Mathew 
Mullins’ son) who was responsible for such ships as the Bahama in the 1770s and 
80s, William Turner as Constructor in Cartagena who was still designing ships for 
the navy in the 1790s and Thomas Bryant (Edward Bryant’s son) who was still 
active in the 1800s220.  Not only did this style of shipbuilding influence the 
development of future construction styles, such as those of Julián Martin de 
Retamosa and José Romero y Fernández de Landa (1735–1807), but future 
shipbuilding also benefited greatly from the technology and infrastructure that had 
been put in place during Ferdinand VI’s reign. 
                                                      
220 Evidence of their continued activity is found in the catalogue of ship plans in the Museo Naval, 
Madrid. 
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Some historians, such as Merino Navarro, have argued that such a radical shift in 
shipbuilding as that occasioned by a la inglesa was detrimental to the 
development of national naval shipbuilding and that technology transfer is not, 
therefore, useful.  This view would be backed by historians such as Cipolla and 
Pritchard who argue that the process of modernisation must needs be slow to be 
effective221.  It would be rather more judicious, however, to conclude that, 
through the observation of foreign practices and the adoption of some of them at 
home, Spain was given the opportunity to catch up with its rivals in terms of 
technology and infrastructure as well as to adopt a system of shipbuilding that, 
even if it was not strictly adhered to in the long run, provided the impetus for 
modernisation in the Spanish navy through discussion and experimentation.  In 
the absence of significant numbers of captured ships, or a sizeable domestic 
shipbuilding industry for large merchant ships this approach was, perhaps, the 
only way in which significant progress could be made in a short period.  
Furthermore, learning from others was, and continued to be, a standard form of 
modernising. 
                                                      
221 See pp.19–20 
 110 




Warship construction was the principal feature of Ensenada’s plan for Spain’s 
expansion as a naval power during Ferdinand VI’s reign.  The rate at which ships 
were built far exceeded that of before or after in the eighteenth century1.  On 
Ferdinand’s accession in 1746, the Spanish navy consisted of 16 battleships2, of 
which only six remained in service when the shipbuilding programme officially 
began in 17523.  Thirteen years later, at the end of Ferdinand’s reign, the Spanish 
navy numbered 49 battleships (48 built during Ferdinand’s reign with five that 
had survived from Philip V’s reign and without four built under Ferdinand which 
did not survive him).  By contrast, 62 battleships had been built before in the 46 
years of Ferdinand’s predecessor, Philip V (1700–46), and 73 were to be built 
after in the reigns of Charles III (1759–88), who built 57 battleships in 29 years, 
and Charles IV (1788–1808), who built 16 ships in 12 years.  Thus, an average of 
1.3 ships were built per year during the reigns of Philip V and Charles IV and 2 
during Charles III’s reign which contrasts with 3.7 built annually under 
Ferdinand’s rule.  In addition, ships produced under Ferdinand reflected European 
trends in naval warfare.  Not only were they generally larger in size than their 
                                                      
1 The figures for the number of Spanish battleships in the eighteenth century are taken from the 
Appendix, ‘Ships of the line of the Spanish Navy (1714–1825)’, pp.164–173, in Harbron (1988), 
prepared by Christian de Saint Hubert. 
2 San Fernando (62), San Francisco Javier (50/2), San Antonio (60), Santa Isabel (80), Hércules 
(60), Príncipe (70), Carmen (64), Leon (70), Galga (56), Real Felipe (112), Constante (64/66), 
Real Familia (60), Europa (64), Asia (64), Nueva España (60), América (64), Esperanza (50), 
Castilla (60), Glorioso (70) and Bizarro (50). 
3 The 70-gun Reina, 64-gun Carmen, Europa, América, the 60-gun Dragón and the 50-gun 
Bizarro. 
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equivalents constructed earlier in the century but, as a whole, more were built of 
higher rates, so, whereas only 10 of the ships built in Philip V’s time had 70 guns 
or more, 35 of those built under Ferdinand VI had that number and the average 
life expectancy of ships increased from an average mean of 12.5 years during 
Philip V’s reign to 31.2 years under Ferdinand.  Furthermore, the practice of 
purchasing ships from others, by which Philip V, for example, had obtained 30 
battleships, was abandoned by Ferdinand.  Hence the demands on Spain’s 
resources for shipbuilding during Ferdinand’s rule were substantially higher than 
they had been in his predecessor’s reign. 
This chapter will examine the manner in which Ferdinand’s government sought to 
administer the Peninsula’s resources with a view to maximising its shipbuilding 
potential.  It will concentrate on three specific resources: shipbuilding manpower, 
which Spain, with a population of 9.7 million4, had to organise effectively; 
timber, a vital resource needed in such copious quantities that Spain, like other 
European naval powers5, struggled to provide a sufficient amount; and hemp, an 
agricultural product which Ensenada’s government energetically sought to 
promote. 
With all of these, a fundamental aspect of Ensenada’s policy was that Spain 
should as far as possible be self-sufficient6.  An ideal undoubtedly motivated not 
                                                      
4 An average estimate of Spain’s population calculated from the findings of Ensenada’s catastro 
by Eiras Roel (1982), p.20, and supported by Carasa Soto (1993), pp.24–5.  An earlier census, 
carried out in 1748 and reported on by Martin Loynaz on 21 May 1749 as a precursor to 
Ensenada’s catastro, gave Spain’s population at the more conservative figure of 7,473,187, see 
[Comisión de Estadística General del Reino] (1862) p.xii.  This latter figure is that given by Salas 
as quoted in pp.195–6. 
5 See Albion (1926) and Bamford (1956) for British and French difficulties, respectively, with 
timber provisioning for their navies. 
6 This includes skilled labour for the arsenals because, although foreign specialists were brought to 
Spain under Ensenada’s instructions, it was with a view to educate and encourage shipbuilding 
professions to Spaniards.  In this, Ensenada ressembled the French seventeenth-century minister, 
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just with the hope of stimulating Spanish agriculture and industry but with an 
awareness that, should Spain become embroiled in a war with either France or 
Britain, its communications to northern Europe and, as a result, its access to 
crucial markets for shipbuilding and fleet maintenance would be interrupted.  
Ensenada, therefore, ignored frequent protests and appeals to replace domestic 
materials with what were perceived as superior foreign equivalents7.  As Bamford 
stated in his analysis of French forest management:  
Self-sufficiency … meant much in terms of economical naval 
administration, but infinitely more in strategic strength, for to the extent that 
domestic resources failed to satisfy naval needs, the strategic position of the fleet 
was weakened and its powers of sustained operation reduced8. 
 
Recruitment of Skilled Labour for the Arsenals 
One of Ensenada’s greatest challenges was the recruitment of skilled labour for 
Spanish arsenals, namely carpenters, caulkers and stonemasons.  Unlike peons 
and day labourers who could be obtained through the employment of army 
regiments and by the use of forced labour made up of convicts, slaves, beggars 
and gypsies9, these professionals had to be recruited by the Crown as volunteers.  
Rarely could a sufficient number of these men be found in the vicinity of the 
arsenals hence recruitment was further complicated by the need to import men 
into the three Naval Departments, particularly those of Ferrol and Cartagena since 
                                                      
Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who argued that ‘It is better to buy French rather than foreign products even 
if the French ones are a little less good and a little more expensive.  There is a double advantage in 
doing so: the State does not lose liquid assets and is not impoverished and on the other hand His 
Majesty’s subjects make a living and develop their skills’, written in 1666 and quoted by Cipolla 
(1965) p.68. 
7 This has been examined in the previous chapter, see pp.72–4. 
8 Bamford (1956) p.95 
9 Papers relating to the employment of north Africans and slaves can be found in AGS Marina 703 
and 704 and convicts and vagrants in AGS Marina 694 and 695.  See Pérez Estévez (1976) for a 
detailed study on the treatment of vagrants in eighteenth-century Spain. 
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they were of comparatively recent origin.  At the time, most ship carpenters, 
caulkers and stonemasons were based in the Basque Provinces10, where a well-
established shipbuilding tradition existed and continued to dominate private 
shipbuilding; in Catalonia, which had long controlled Spain’s Mediterranean 
shipping and been its galley base up until 1733; and in Andalucia, especially in 
the areas surrounding Cadiz and Seville, from where fleets sailed to the Indies. 
A chronological analysis of recruitment in the Basque provinces of Guipuzcoa, 
Bizcaya and Alava between 175011 and 1754 serves to illustrate its development 
during these years, probably in response to Ensenada’s policies for providing the 
workforce.  On the whole, he reasoned that the carrot was a better incentive than 
the stick and that, by offering reasonable, punctual pay and listening to workers’ 
requirements, the Crown would not struggle with recruitment in the long term.  
The example presented by the Basque provinces, in this instance, is unique in that 
Basque skilled labour was generally recruited for Ferrol, the arsenal with the most 
intensive construction of ships (at Esteiro), of Ferrol arsenal itself and of Sada’s 
rope and sail factories, and, as such, the Basque provinces had the greatest 
demands for labour put upon them by the Spanish Crown.   Furthermore, these 
provinces enjoyed traditional rights, or fueros, which had the potential to interfere 
with the Crown’s efforts.  On this point, however, this amounted to Ferdinand 
needing to organise recruitment through local authorities, the Diputación in 
Guipuzcoa and Alava and the Señorio in Bizcaya, and these bodies were obliged 
to assist him.  But Ferdinand was not limited in the number of men he could 
demand from these areas. 
                                                      
10 Guipuzcoa, Bizcaya, Alava and Navarre. 
11 Preparations had begun for the shipbuilding programme in 1748 and some recruitment had 
occurred at this time but dramatically expanded recruitment began in 1750. 
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In 1750, requests for men made to Guipuzcoa’s Diputación by the local naval 
authority, Manuel de las Casas, the naval Ministro at San Sebastian, were largely 
ignored.  Casas had asked the Diputación to present 150 ship carpenters in San 
Sebastian by 6 June and was initially unpertubed at not receiving a reply, thinking 
the region to abound in such men who would be grateful for employment12.  He 
noted that workers had approached him directly asking for more specific 
information on the salaries they could expect and asking for a stipend to fund their 
journey to Ferrol.  Casas had turned down flat the first request as salaries could 
only be assigned once their skills had been tested in the arsenal but forwarded the 
second to Ensenada, who granted each individual an 160-vellon-real advance to 
fund their journey.  Some time after the deadline for the men to present 
themselves at San Sebastian, the 22 June, Casas complained that  
my pleas have had no effect, nor my actions, for neither have the people I 
have requested presented themselves, nor has the Diputación replied to me, justly 
and simply.  I have been waiting up till now not wanting to disturb Your 
Excellency with such disappointments and hoping that this [Diputación] would 
alter its conduct but, seeing as time is passing rapidly and the Diputación has 
neither replied to me, nor given me any indication that they are acting on the 
request, necessity has obliged me to write to Your Excellency to present this 
information to the King so that he can remedy it and take whatever measures are 
necessary13.   
Ensenada wrote to the Diputación expressing Ferdinand’s disappointment 
with them, emphasising that the Diputación ought to be encouraging local men to 
go to Ferrol in light of the good treatment, decent and punctual salaries and travel 
expenses which they were to receive there rather than permitting them to cross the 
border into France for work in Bayonne and Bordeaux14.  As a result, the 
                                                      
12 AGS Marina 234, Manuel de las Casas to Ensenada, San Sebastian, 1 June 1750, and Ensenada 
to Casas, Aranjuez, 8 June 1750 
13 Ibid., Casas to Ensenada, San Sebastian, 22 June 1750 
14 Ibid., Ensenada to Joseph Francisco de Laparza, Diputado General of Guipuzcoa’s Diputación, 
Aranjuez, 29 June 1750 
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Diputación, which denied failing to respond to Casas’ instructions and claimed 
that it had already sent 167 carpenters and 100 volunteers to Ferrol, appointed two 
men, Agustin Joseph de Leizaur and Joseph Gabriel de Izquierdo, to assist 
Casas15.  As has been shown, however, too few volunteers came forward in 1750 
and local authorities proved unwilling to support the local naval official without 
being pushed into doing so by the central government. 
The following year, sustained attempts at recruitment, particularly for 
stonemasons to work on the dock at Ferrol, continued to be fraught and were 
further complicated by numerous incidents of desertion.  In keeping with 
Ensenada’s policies of encouragement rather than force, however, deserters 
received lenient treatment.  When Casas reported he was employing those he had 
apprehended as forced labour on San Sebastian castle, for example, Ensenada 
informed him that he was only to have dispatched volunteers to Ferrol so he was 
to release all deserters once they had paid off their debts to the Crown16.  
Furthermore, the Intendant at Ferrol, Cosme Alvarez, had been instructed to issue 
permits for any who wished to leave work at the arsenal because Ferdinand did 
not wish ‘for them to serve him under threat of violence or duress’17.  In Ferrol, 
stonemasons’ salaries were creating difficulties.  Ensenada wished for men to 
receive more while working in the arsenal than they would have back home but 
workers were claiming they had earned ‘exorbitant wages’ back home and the 
figures they gave did not square with those proposed by the Guipuzcoan 
company, Pedro Lizardi & Co, which held the contract to build the dock.  As a 
                                                      
15 AGS Marina 234, Laparza to Ensenada, Tolosa, 13 July 1750, and Casas to Ensenada, San 
Sebastian, 13 July 1750.  Those already sent had been sent at an indeterminate date before the 
request made by Casas in May and was not, therefore, a response to his request. 
16 Ibid., Casas to Ensenada, San Sebastian, 8 March 1751 
17 Ibid., Ensenada to Casas, Madrid, 15 May 1751 
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result,  Manuel de Echevarría (Casas’ temporary replacement following the 
latter’s death in May 1751) was asked to investigate in order to avoid ‘the 
scandals that up till now these workers have caused here’18 .  In the end, it was 
agreed that they earned between 5–5! vellon reals daily in the Basque provinces 
and that they should, therefore, get between 6–6! vellon reals at Ferrol. 
Ensenada’s insistence on employing volunteer labour also applied to higher-
ranking officials, such as contramaestres19 and foremen, who were generally 
sought out by name, though with varying results.   In 1751, Guipuzcoa was asked 
to send the contramaestre Simon de Echeverría from Pasajes; the contramaestres 
Juan de Lerehundi and Domingo Pablo de Aizpurua and the foremen Domingo de 
Lerehundi, Francisco de Lerehundi and Francisco de Sagarsusu from Orio; the 
foremen Antonio de Arismendi from Urmieta and Gerónimo de Ayalde from 
Usúrbil20.  These men were dispatched with no difficulty.  By contrast, a similar 
request processed by the Intendant at Bilbao, Andrés Maraver, to recruit in 
Bizcaya proved unsuccessful21.  Those he had been asked to employ had resisted 
on the basis that they had their own businesses to administer or that they were 
employed on the merchant ships then building in Olabeaga estuary.  Initially, 
Maraver refused to listen to their arguments and insisted that they be prepared to 
depart for Ferrol within 20 days.  After mentioning this to Ensenada when asking 
what course to follow with two men on the list, Manuel de Zubiría and Lorenzo 
de Aretui, who were already employed by the Crown in the transport of timber 
                                                      
18 Ibid., Echevarria to Ensenada, San Sebastian, 17 May 1751 
19 The position of contramaestre can best be described as a form of senior foreman with greater 
authority than ordinary foremen (capataces) when working in the arsenals, though their duties at 
sea can best be compared to those of a boatswain. 
20 AGS Marina 234, Ensenada to Guipuzcoa’s Diputación, San Lorenzo, 26 October 1751 and 
Guipuzcoa’s Diputación to Ensenada, Tolosa, 2 November 1751 
21 Ibid., Ensenada to Maraver, San Lorenzo, 26 October 1751 
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from La Montaña, Ensenada’s reply was that he was not to divert these two men 
from their current task but, also, that the others were only to go willingly because 
the King desired to make employment in his arsenals attractive22.  Unfortunately, 
only one contramaestre, Juan Bautista de Iruretagoiena, with two of his 
assistansts, volunteered after Maraver read them Ensenada’s letter23. 
The year 1752 proved to be the most difficult year for recruitment from the 
Basque provinces, not just because the number of men required escalated but also 
because these were reticent and local authorities felt resentful at losing their 
skilled workforce.  Guipuzcoa was instructed to provide 500 men to assist Perea’s 
shipbuilding at Esteiro but by May only 12 men had come forward24.  Ensenada 
was forced to plead with the Diputación that resulting from 
the increased production of ships which the King has ordered built at 
Ferrol, there was an essential need for skilled labour …  And His Majesty did not 
doubt that for such a significant end which was of such importance to the State 
and to the Royal Service, you will also attend to it with equal dedication thus 
proving your zeal and devotion.  He expressly orders me to make this clear to you 
so that you exert yourselves in sending all skilled labour possible to Ferrol.  The 
men will not lack good treatment and punctual pay which it is well known they 
enjoy today in that shipyard and that D. Manuel Diego Escovedo25 will pay for the 
voyage.  And, so that I can inform the King, I ask you to tell me how much skilled 
labour you will be able to provide26.   
But the Provincia continued to insist that it would prove impossible to 
recruit 500 arsenal workers and instead argued for the return of Juan Antonio de 
Iguerabide, Carpenter in San Sebastian port since 1744; Feliz de Ibargocen, 
Master Attendant at Fuenterrabia since 1733; and Domingo de Lechundi, 
                                                      
22 Ibid., Maraver to Ensenada, Bilbao, 1 November 1751, Ensenada to Maraver, 9 November 1751, 
and Ensenada to Maraver, 22 November 1751.  The Montaña and Cuatro Villas were what is now 
present day Cantabria, though as the region known as La Montaña extended far beyond 
Cantabria’s current borders and as Cantabria did not exist in the eighteenth century, it is referred to 
in this thesis as the Montaña and the area closer to the coast as Cuatro Villas. 
23 Ibid., Maraver to Ensenada, Bilbao, 29 November 1751 
24 Ibid., Escovedo to Ensenada, San Sebastian, 15 May 1751 
25 The new naval Ministro in San Sebastian 
26 AGS Marina 234, Ensenada to Guipuzcoa’s Diputación, 24 May 1752 
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Contramaestre at Orio, who had taken 50 men with him from that town, as they 
were all vitally needed in Guipuzcoa.  They also refused to send Juan de 
Arizmendi because he was constructing 6 lighters and 12 small boats for 
Ferdinand in Orio27.  Ensenada persevered and, appealing to their loyalty, noted 
that ‘today the need for carpenters and caulkers in that Department is so urgent in 
order for the enlarged construction of ships to continue with determination and 
energy’ that Ferdinand needed them to send all the men who became available 
once the boats being built at Orio were completed as well as any others in the 
Province without employment28.  Yet, by September 1752, only 158 carpenters of 
500 requested could be sent to Ferrol29. 
In June 1752, the Diputación was also asked to find 300 stonemasons and, again, 
they replied as grudgingly as to the previous request describing the few that 
remained as ineligible, being either too elderly or having young families to 
maintain30.  Furthermore, they reported, many stonemasons had returned  
ruined and begging for alms, complaining of the small wage of five vellon 
reals (which they can easily earn here [Guipuzcoa]), the poverty of that region 
[Ferrol] and, more especially, of the lack of wages on festive days when they were 
not permitted to work … for which reason no one has the heart or disposition to 
go to that place31. 
Even though Ensenada reiterated orders to Alvarez in Ferrol to ensure 
stonemasons earned higher wages there than in their own districts and informed 
the Diputación of this instruction, little changed and despite his renewed plea 
emphasising the need to take advantage of the summer months, by August the 
Diputación had only managed to get 160 carpenters and stonemasons to present 
                                                      
27 AGS Marina 234, Manuel de Aguirre to Ensenada, Tolosa, 15 May 1752 
28 Ibid., Ensenada to Guipuzcoa’s Diputación, Aranjuez, 5 June 1752 
29 Ibid., Perea to Ensenada, Esteyro, 12 September 1752 
30 Ibid., Ensenada to Guipuzcoa’s Diputación, Aranjuez 5 June 1752 
31 Ibid., Provincia to Manuel Diego Escovedo, Tolosa, 25 July 1751 
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themselves for vetting in San Sebastian32.  The Diputado General confessed that 
though this figure ‘did not reach even half of my wishes’ everyone available had 
been recruited33.  Only 158 carpenters and 53 stonemasons had been sent to Ferrol 
by the end of August34. 
In Bizcaya, the Síndico General of the Señorio, Juan de Dudagoitia, was entrusted 
with recruitment of all available stonemasons and carpenters in 1752.  He reported 
that 1,500 men were already employed in Ferrol, Guarnizo or the Cantabrian 
Mountains which left about 400 to 500 men of between 25 and 60 years available, 
who had initially been excluded since they had needy families to sustain.  Like 
those from Guipuzcoa, men in Bizcaya had been discouraged by reports on the 
conditions in Ferrol and some had returned complaining that they were ‘treated 
harshly by officials, paid little attention to and, as food was so expensive [in 
Ferrol], their salaries had proven only sufficient for them to struggle through’.  
According to Dudaigoitia, this had ‘introduced into the simple minds of those here 
[Bizcaya] and their wives a fearful panic and suspicion that they will experience 
the same harshness without being able to provide for their children and families, 
exposing them to abject poverty’35.   
In June, Dudagoitia’s recruits had approached him asking him to act as their agent 
and explaining that although they trusted Ensenada a little, because he had 
Bizcayan blood on his maternal side, they had no faith in his subordinates.  They 
themselves petitioned Ensenada on this point, stating:  
                                                      
32 Ibid., Ensenada to Alvarez, Aranjuez, 24 June 1752, Ensenada to Provincia, Aranjuez, 24 June 
1752 and Ensenada to Escovedo, Madrid, 11 July 1752 
33 Ibid., Nicolás de Altuna and Manuel de Aguirre to Ensenada, Azpeitia, 7 August 1752 
34 Ibid., Escovedo to Ensenada, San Sebastian, 21 August 1752 
35 Ibid., Dudagoitia to Ensenada, Elorrio, 16 May 1752 
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We need a person such as the Síndico to look after and speak for us, 
defend us and assist our families, paying in Bilbao what we give from our salaries 
in Ferrol because there being such a large group of Bizcayan carpenters and 
caulkers we cannot be without a person to look after and manage us36. 
In addition to this appeal, they had also learnt that Guipuzcoans received 
160 vellon reals as travel expenses which contrasted with the 40 vellon reals they 
had been promised and asked to be given the same as Guipuzcoans to maintain 
their dignity.  Ensenada was content to satisfy their terms and rejected Maraver’s 
qualms over their abilities noting that the need for carpenters in Ferrol was such 
that Ferdinand wanted ‘not only those who are skilled in all the villages of the 
Señorio but also those that are not absolutely incapable’ because ‘after a few days 
of work in the shipyard, they will be able to apply themselves as well as the 
others’37.  Unfortunately, an unknown event altered Dudagoitia’s standing with 
the local population soon after and, by 7 July 1752, he was pleading with the 
Crown that some ‘bad compatriots’ and ‘worse subjects’ were threatening to burn 
his house with him and his family in it for having committed a contrafuero 
(violation of their privileges) as Síndico General by executing the King’s orders 
and that, by admitting there were 400 carpenters available in Bizcaya, he was a  
bad countryman, deserving of being burnt and hung so that I am reduced, 
with my unhappy family, to waiting for a disastrous event and fatal hour and what 
is worse to having the dishonour of being branded a bad countryman when my 
actions have always been justified and without rebuke.   
He begged Ensenada, ‘with your benign influence, to intervene with His 
Majesty for a decree declaring me a loyal subject and good countryman … and 
                                                      
36 Ibid., Petition from ship carpenters in Portugalete, 27 June 1752 
37 Ibid., Ensenada to Dudagoitia, Aranjuez, 22 May 1752, Maraver to Ensenada, Bilbao, 29 May 
1752 and Ensenada to Maraver, Aranjuez, 19 June 1752 
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imposing penalties on any who said differently’ and, if not, to be transferred out 
of the region38. 
In 1752, finding 300 stonemasons in Bizcaya was also proving difficult despite 
Ensenada’s persistent pleas that it was necessary to make the best of the summer 
season39.  The Señorio argued they had very few stonemasons available since 
most were working in Castile, Aragon and Navarre, where they usually travelled 
after the maize-planting season in spring.  In future, the Señorio recommended, 
recruitment should take place before the spring and workers, especially those with 
families, should be ‘guaranteed permission to return home in winter so that they 
can attend to their finances and direct their families, because, without this, it is 
unlikely that they will dedicate themselves to Royal service from springtime 
without anxiety’40.  In response, Ensenada issued instructions for married, 
Bizcayan stonemasons to be permitted to return home during winter41.  Even so, 
only 159 stonemasons came forward by September42. 
The absence of accurate data on the composition of Spanish society frequently 
meant that recruitment efforts were frustrated when the type of men being looked 
for simply did not exist.  Recruitment in Alava in 1752 is an excellent example of 
this and, in addition, it demonstrates the extra expense and waste of time that this 
could occasion.  On 5 June 1752, Maraver mentioned, in passing, that he had 
                                                      
38 Ibid., Dudagoitia to Ensenada, Bilbao, 7 July 1752 
39 Ibid., Ensenada to Señorio de Bizcaya, Aranjuez, 5 June 1752, and Ensenada to Señorio de 
Bizcaya, Aranjuez, 24 June 1752 
40 Ibid., Señorio de Bizcaya to Ensenada, Bizcaya, 3 July 1752 
41 Ibid., Ensenada to Alvarez, Madrid, 10 July 1752.  This was later extended to most skilled 
workers in the Basque regions, such as Guipuzcoan carpenters and stonemasons in September 
1752, on the condition that they were back at their posts in Ferrol by 1 March, see AGS Marina 
234, Ensenada to Guipuzcoa’s Diputación, Madrid, 11 September 1752 
42 Ibid., Maraver to Ensenada, Bilbao, 18 September 1752 
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heard there were many stonemasons in the neighbouring province of Alava43.  As 
a result, Ensenada issued instructions for 150 of these men to be recruited there44.  
Despite repeated protestations from the Diputado, Antonio de Urbina, that there 
were none, Ensenada persisted, stating that ‘it is common knowledge that in that 
country there are many stonemasons’45 and, later still, that ‘Alava abounds in this 
class of people and at least 300 stonemasons could be taken from there without 
prejudice to the regular works of those villages’46.  Eventually, Urbina mustered 
29 officials and apprentices (all originally from Bizcaya and Guipuzcoa), of 
whom some escaped, leaving a total of 2447.  This remnant was transported under 
custody to Bilbao where they were kept in the local prison before being boarded 
onto a merchantman, whose captain charged an inflated rate of 50 vellon reals per 
man necessary to cover the extra security required to prevent them deserting48.  
The City of Vitoria later petitioned for their return, arguing they were necessary to 
complete Vitoria’s Iglesia Colegial, the project on which they had been occupied 
before they were taken, but the request was refused on the grounds that the 
construction of the arsenal was more pressing49. 
The problems experienced with recruitment up until 1752, particularly in that last 
year, were suddenly to lessen in 1753.  In this year, instructions were issued to the 
Señorio of Bizcaya, the Diputación of Guipuzcoa, Maraver, Escovedo and 
                                                      
43 Ibid., Maraver to Ensenada, Bilbado, 5 June 1752 
44 Ibid., Maraver to Ensenada, Bilbao, 19 June 1752 
45 Ibid., Ensenada to Urbina, Madrid, 24 July 1752 
46 Ibid., Ensenada to Urbina, Madrid, 7 August 1752 
47 Ibid., Urbina to Ensenada, Vitoria, 15 August 1752 
48 Ibid., Maraver to Ensenada, Bilbao, 28 August 1752, Urbina to Ensenada, Vitoria, 29 August 
1752, and Maraver to Ensenada, Bilbao, 4 September 1752 
49 Ibid., Town of Vitoria to Ensenada, Vitoria, 29 August 1752, and Ensenada to Vitoria, 4 
September 1752 
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Manuel de Mollinedo50 to assist the contramaestre being sent from Ferrol, 
Gerónimo de Aizpurua, in recruiting skilled labour on 5 February, demonstrating 
that the government had heeded advice and was organising this activity much 
earlier than in former years when men had only been sought as from May or 
June51.  By 12 February, Escovedo could report that Aizpurua had passed by and 
recruited only 25 men before moving on to Navarre but that he (Escovedo) had 
recruited a total of 501 carpenters, caulkers and stonemasons52.  Ensenada asked 
him to send more, especially once the merchantmen then under construction by 
Francisco Mendinueta had been completed53.  By 26 February 1753, Escovedo 
could report that a further 272 carpenters and caulkers had been recruited from 
Guipuzcoa and another 102 from Navarre54.  On the same day, Mollinedo 
acknowledged Aizpurua’s imminent arrival and noted that in the past seven 
months he had recruited 328 carpenters, caulkers and stonemasons and that he 
was being assisted by the local Corregidor who was putting up posters advertising 
the rise in salaries and the good treatment given to the men in Ferrol55.  On the 
same day, Maraver forwarded a list of 29 men whom he had recruited between 28 
January and 9 February, this figure grew to 85 carpenters and 4 stonemasons by 
26 February, 200 carpenters, among them 58 caulkers, by 15 March and 370 
carpenters and caulkers and 17 stonemasons by the beginning of June56. 
                                                      
50 Ministro de Marina in Bilbao 
51 AGS Marina 235, Ensenada to Bizcaya’s Señorio and Guipuzcoa’s Diputación, Madrid, 5 
February 1753 
52 Ibid., Escovedo to Ensenada, San Sebastian, 12 February 1753 
53 Ibid., Ensenada to Escovedo, Madrid, 19 February 1753 
54 Ibid., Escovedo to Ensenada, San Sebastian, 26 February 1753 
55 Ibid., Mollinedo to Ensenada, Bilbao, 12 February 1753 
56 Ibid., Maraver to Ensenada, Bilbao, 12 February 1753, Maraver to Ensenada, Bilbao, 26 
February 1753, Maraver to Ensenada, Bilbao, 19 March 1753, and Maraver to Ensenada, Bilbao, 4 
June 1753 
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On 21 February 1753, Nicolás de Altana, Guipuzcoa’s Diputado General, noted 
that, following Aizpurua’s arrival in Azpeitia on 31 January, he had instructed the 
villages to provide assistance and that he was content to provide any further aid 
but that he understood ‘the number of skilled workers of all types presenting 
themselves to Aizpurua was very high and without doubt this was the reason why 
the latter was not asking for his help’57.  In this letter, he also forwarded a petition 
from carpenters and stonemasons asking if they could have portions of their 
salaries issued at home to maintain their families.  Almost immediately, Perea was 
instructed to broadcast that workers in Ferrol from the Basque Provinces could 
arrange for some of their salaries to be paid to their families by Escovedo in San 
Sebastian and Mollinedo in Bizcaya58.  On 5 May, Ensenada informed the 
Diputación of this decision, thanking them for their efforts and stating that their 
zeal had given ‘great pleasure to the King’59.  Recruitment in 1753 was, therefore, 
noticeably less problematical than in previous years and this would again be the 
case in 1754 before the change of government transformed the situation in July.  
These altered circumstances can, in part, be explained by the fact that in 1753 
many of the blunders of previous years had been corrected.  Recruitment was now 
begun earlier in the year in order to capitalise on a skilled labour force that had yet 
to be employed elsewhere and, moreover, the men had progressively obtained 
contract conditions that suited them.  Nevertheless, it is also possible to argue that 
Ensenada’s generous policies resulted in a level of confidence in the government 
which allowed for the increase of the workforce. 
                                                      
57 Ibid., Altana to Ensenada, Azpeitia, 21 February 1753 
58 Ibid., Ensenada to Perea, Madrid, 5 May 1753 
59 Ibid., Ensenada to Guipuzcoa’s Diputación, Madrid, 5 May 1753 
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Thus far, only recruitment from the Basque provinces has been considered but it 
is important to reiterate that the situation varied from region to region.  In 
Catalonia, for example, the Intendant at Barcelona, Joseph de Contamina, rarely 
struggled to raise the necessary number of men.  However, he was providing 
workers on a much smaller scale and for an arsenal, Cartagena, that was closer to 
Catalonia in terms of travel than Ferrol was to the Basque Provinces60.  In 
December 1750, for example, he was asked to send 120 ship carpenters and 228 
different types of hemp workers to Cartagena61.  By the end of the month, he 
could report that he was organising transport for 100 ship carpenters, giving them 
a month’s advance on their salary and freight on a ship at the rate of 1 peso each 
and 60 vellon maravedis daily ration62.  He did note that the hemp workers were 
proving more elusive because they were ‘people of their homes and not 
accustomed to leaving them’ and as a result ‘they viewed the idea of leaving their 
country with repugnance’.  By 6 January 1751, nevertheless, he had 21 ship 
carpenters and 151 hemp workers en route and the remaining 77 hemp workers by 
12 January63.  The original order had been completed within a month.  Similar 
instructions were received and met with few difficulties throughout these years, 
including those requiring men being sent to Cadiz and Ferrol, despite the 
increased distance from home that this involved.  When asked at the beginning of 
December 1752 to provide 205 men for the rope and sail factories in Cadiz, 
                                                      
60 Though geographically, Ferrol is not that much further from the Basque Provinces than 
Cartagena is from Barcelona, the distance felt much further since the Bay of Biscay was frequently 
so rough that it was unsailable and the land route along the Cantabrian mountain range with its 
rainy climate was, as an option, not much better. 
61 AGS Marina 234, Ensenada to Contamina, 5 December 1750 
62 Ibid., Contamina to Ensenada, Barcelona, 23 December 1750 
63 Ibid., Contamina to Ensenada, Barcelona, 6 January 1751, and Contamina to Ensenada, 
Barcelona, 12 January 1751 
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Contamina had filled the quota by 20 January 175364.  The only differences being 
that transport costs increased to 2! pesos per man and the men received advances 
of 301 reals and 6 maravedis65.  In 1753, he also sent 100 rope- and sail-workers 
to Ferrol, also completing this task in a little over a month66. 
In Spain, men who followed professions such as carpentry travelled to where 
work was available during the periods of the year when they were not attending to 
their rural interests.  This benefitted the navy, since the arsenals were usually 
some distance from workers’ homes, but meant that these men were frequently 
difficult to locate.  In La Montaña, for example, the Comisario Ordenador de 
Marina, Jacinto Navarrete struggled to report to Ensenada, noting that it was 
‘almost impossible to give this information, because, as the greater part of them 
are from Guipuzcoa and Bizcaya, they come and go at will and it is not easy to 
count them nor to count on them when they are needed’.  However, he trusted that 
they would come forward of their own accord and, since news had spread that 
keels had been laid in Ferrol, several had already ‘come to me asking to be 
transferred to those works and I have already sent a large number there’67.  
Nevertheless, these people were an element that was difficult to control when it 
came to putting together the workforce and, consequently, when shipbuilding 
began in Guarnizo, they caused a problem by preferring to remain there even 
though Navarrete was required to send them to Ferrol.  Navarrete protested that 
‘there is no way of convincing them to go there on good terms for they are set 
upon attending the construction of the four battleships that are to be built in 
                                                      
64 Ibid., Ensenada to Arriaga, Madrid, 8 December 1752 
65 AGS Marina 235, Contamina to Ensenada, Barcelona, 13 January 1753 
66 Ibid., Ensenada to Contamina, 29 September 1753, and Contamina to Ensenada, Barcelona, 3 
November 1753 
67 AGS Marina 234, Navarrete to Ensenada, Santander, 10 July 1750 
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Guarnizo, because it is closer to their homes and the wages are higher than in 
Ferrol’.  Without force, ‘we will not be able to achieve anything in the matter nor 
even with it could I assure anything because of the ease with which they, 
especially the Bizcayans, abandon any work’68. 
The distance that workers were required to travel away from home was another 
obstacle which the government had to overcome and this was managed by 
Ensenada’s usual methods of proffering encouragement rather than by using 
force.  An example of this is provided in the raising of 20 men in Valencia for the 
rope and sail factories in Ferrol.  The Marquis de Malespina, Valencia’s 
Intendant, dispatched these men to Cartagena en route to Ferrol without informing 
them of their destination thinking that they would not go otherwise69.  Ensenada, 
however, wrote to Francisco de Barrero y Peláez, Cartagena’s Intendant, stating:  
It not being convenient that these people go by force or ignorant of their 
destinations, you will tell them where that is and that they are to earn a very good 
wage.  If, among the 20 men, there are some who do not wish to go to Ferrol, you 
will allow them to work in that [Cartagena] factory, replacing them with others 
from it70.   
Eventually, Barrero was able to send 28 men –16 of the original from Valencia 
and a further 12 from Cartagena – on the condition that they be allowed to return 
home after a year if an equal number of men could be found to replace them71. 
The 1750s were a period of great activity in Spain, carpenters, caulkers and 
stonemasons could find employment on many projects.  Examples include the 
construction of the royal palace at Aranjuez, the Canal de Castilla (a canal 
                                                      
68 Ibid., Navarrete to Ensenada, Santander, 18 May 1752 
69 Ibid., Ensenada to Malespina, 14 August 1751, and Barrero to Ensenada, Cartagena, 6 October 
1751 
70 Ibid., Ensenada to Barrero, San Lorenzo, 15 October 1751 
71 Ibid., Barrero to Ensenada, 27 October 1751, and Ensenada to Barrero, San Lorenzo, 3 
November 1751 
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intended to facilitate transport from the centre of Spain to the north begun under 
Antonio de Ulloa’s direction at Medina de Rioseco in Ferdinand’s reign), the 
roads across the Cantabrian Mountains from Burgos to Santander and across the 
Guadarrama mountains and engineering works on the Guadalquivir to make it 
navigable from the mountains of Segura to Seville.  In addition, these men were 
also sought for merchantmen and the fear was that many would seek passage to 
the Indies and remain there72.  In an attempt to control the employment of 
carpenters and caulkers by merchantmen, orders were issued on 27 April 1751 
forbidding merchant captains from accepting a carpenter or caulker on board who 
did not have a written licence recently signed by the local master attendant, from 
offering salaries greater than those set by the master attendant, which could not be 
higher than the salaries offered in the arsenals, from taking on carpenters and 
caulkers as ordinary seamen in ships sailing to the Indies or from allowing 
carpenters and caulkers to serve on ships sailing to the Indies without being 
matriculated and having a signed written licence73.  The fact of the matter, 
however, was that there was little Ensenada could do to prevent competing 
projects from employing men who could be useful at the arsenals except offering 
better terms of service. 
Ferdinand’s policy towards recruitment between 1750 and 1754 was, therefore, to 
encourage skilled men to work at the arsenals by providing incentives which were 
                                                      
72 The  danger of losing skilled men through emigration to America was greatly felt in Spain, 
especially since this was one of the key arguments put forward by arbitrista writers to explain 
Spain’s decline as a European power.  It is possibly best perceived through a section in the 
Ordenanzas de Marina (Vol.I, Tratado 6, Titulo 4 ‘De los Viages á America’, pp.386–418) 
dealing specifically with voyages to the Indies which, through a series of regulations such as not 
allowing even dismissed naval personnel from remaining in the Indies or preventing pay being 
issued until their return to Castile, sought to ensure that all men useful to the navy remained in the 
Peninsula when not in service. 
73 AGS Marina 234, Varas to Ensenada, Cadiz, 27 April 1751 
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gradually worked out over time.  In addition, the government had learnt how to go 
about recruitment.  Instructions were now sent out at the beginning of the year 
when the workforce to be recruited was still at home, the numbers of men 
expected had become more realistic, though these had increased substantially 
from the number of men that were initially considered possible, and less 
experienced workers were also taken on to be trained at the arsenals.  As 
illustrated by the example of the Basque workforce, the development of these 
approaches was gradual and in response to situations as they arose.  The reaction 
to recruitment in different areas of Spain was very different, Catalonia, in contrast 
to the Basque provinces, presented many fewer difficulties.  Nevertheless, the 
central government faced certain challenges which it did much to combat but 
could never completely overcome.  One of these was that the workforce was in 
demand for so many projects, was difficult to quantify and harder to keep by 
force, especially if, as in Guarnizo, one place of employment was perceived as 
more attractive than another.  Another was that permanent employment was not 
feasible because the men came primarily from rural societies and needed to return 
to their homes regularly to attend to their affairs and work their land and these 
were frequently far away from the arsenals74.  Moreover, it is not certain that the 
levels of employment achieved during 1753 and 1754 could have been sustained 
in the long term, especially as conditions in the arsenals could not match what was 
promised.    
The environment in the arsenals, given the size of the workforce and the number 
of men employed from various regions under different contracts, was difficult to 
                                                      
74 This essentially rural nature of Spanish society, even of its skilled workforce, which tended to 
supplement agricultural responsibilities with skilled work, has been described by Domínguez Ortiz 
(1955) pp.73 and 255–97  
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control.  In July 1750, for example, the Guipuzcoan and Navarrese workforce in 
Ferrol rioted and refused to work when they were forbidden to light fires in their 
barracks at the end of the working day, which was the custom in their regions but 
not at Ferrol.  They returned to work reluctantly once the Intendant threatened 
them with severe punishment but ill-feeling persisted and, some time later, 
Alvarez agreed to their lighting fires for half an hour at the end of the working 
day.  He also attended to their other requests, namely that they be attended by a 
doctor outside the hospital since they feared the hospital to be a place where they 
risked death (Alvarez laid this fear to rest by setting aside an unused barracks as 
an infirmary to be visited regularly by the surgeon) and that they be paid in full if 
unwell as a result of a work accident and half pay if as a result of illness (Alvarez 
correctly surmised that he should consult Ensenada on this matter and Ensenada 
rejected the proposal insiting that they only be paid half if hurt in an accident at 
work and a quarter if taken ill)75.  In 1752, Bizcayan workers in Cadiz not only 
petitioned to have their salaries paid in full while unable to work but also to have 
the Crown fund their hospital expenses.  Again, Ensenada insisted they only 
receive half pay for the duration of their absence and that they pay their own 
hospital expenses76. 
These variations in treatment, however, could lead to clashes among the 
workforce.  This was an occurence which regularly created difficulties in Ferrol.  
In 1751, a local Galician priest, Lorenzo del Castillo, complained on behalf of the 
Galician workers in the arsenal that the Oficial del Detalle Jacinto Arostegui was  
                                                      
75 AGS Marina 234, Alvarez to Ensenada, Ferrol, 14 July 1750; AGS Marina 234, Ensenada to 
Alvarez, Madrid, 22 July 1750 
76 AGS Marina 235, Arriaga to Ensenada, Cadiz, 5 September 1752; Ensenada to Arriaga, Madrid, 
12 September 1752 
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as opposed to the Galician nation as he was fond of the Bizcayans.  These 
[Bizcayans] he protected, offering them favourable salaries, giving them half 
salaries, hospital and convalescence [when wounded or sick] but reproaching and 
insulting these [Galicians] with words, punishing them with tasks, giving them 
very small daily wages like those of oxen and cart drivers at the rate of 3 vellon 
reals, and denying them half salaries, hospital and convalescence, making it seem 
as if there are two different laws when the King desires for there to be only one 
and the same for all his subjects77.   
These sorts of complaints were taken seriously and, in this case, Alvarez 
was instructed to investigate the matter secretly though he rejected the charge 
altogether, stating:  
I do not find anything that disagrees with the dispositions I have taken.  As 
to the wages earned by the Bizcayans, it is very true that they are somewhat 
higher than those earned by the locals, but also different are their abilities and 
occupations, for there are hardly any [Galicians] that can be described as ship 
carpenters and those classified as joiners have abilities that only extend to the 
rudimentary and are so lacking in skill that they are not deserving of greater 
privileges78. 
The arsenals were expanding at such a rate and facing such a significant 
influx of people, in particular those of Ferrol and Cartagena, that problems with 
lack of housing, food shortages and increased prices became commonplace.  
Alvarez was forced to arrange for the proveedor of the army in Ferrol to provide 
sufficient beds for those working in the arsenals in 1750.  The following year, he 
struggled to find cattle to purchase in the surrounding villages to feed the 
workforce, not only were they very scarce but what was being offered was ‘so 
wasted that it can barely cope with a cart’ though circumstances were such that he 
thought he would have to accept it anyway79.  Meanwhile, the workforce returning 
to the Basque Provinces complained that prices were so inflated that they could 
scarcely sustain themselves, let alone their families80.  In Cartagena, Barrero 
                                                      
77 AGS Marina 234, Lorenzo del Castillo to Ensenada, Heda, 28 February 1751 
78 Ibid., Alvarez to Ensenada, Ferrol, 23 March 1751 
79 Ibid., Alvarez to Ensenada, Ferrol 23 March 1751 
80 See p.118 
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asked if he could turn out anyone not necessary to the arsenal so that he could 
house the large number of homeless people he was responsible for, even while 
using the Real as accommodation and with the Governor of the town making 
every effort to lodge Crown employees with all possible efficiency.  Barrero noted 
that many were becoming anxious and asking to return home because they could 
not find accommodation81.  Similarly, Juan Joseph de Palafox, charged with 
removing non-natives from Cartagena and providing housing for the Crown’s 
employees, described his difficulties, stating that six to eight employees were 
being lodged per house, many with their entire families and he was struggling to 
house officers.  Of these, he still had to find homes for two captains and several 
subordinates from the militia corps; the Commander of Naval Infantry in 
Cartagena, Francisco Saraus, who had also been lodging the squadron’s Ministro, 
Francisco de la Peña as a guest, but who had had to vacate his residence for a 
Contaduría employee, Joseph de la Espada; one Teniente, Manuel Bedoza, had 
been lodging with his father-in-law but could not afford to do so much longer; the 
headteacher of the Academia de Pilotos; the Artillery Commander, Francisco 
Gutierrez, whom he had hoped to house in the residence left vacant by Fernando 
Araziel but which had been purchased by a merchant wishing to use it as his own 
residence.  Thus, he stated: 
I cannot find means to attend to all these just requests that are being made 
without reducing the number of merchants whose houses can be used to 
accomodate officers … for this town has increased muchly in inhabitants and it 
has become impossible to further the construction of houses for all is employed in 
building the arsenal82. 
                                                      
81 AGS Marina 234, Barrero to Ensenada, Cartagena, 28 June 1752 
82 Ibid., Palafox to Ensenada, Cartagena, 19 July 1752 
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In these circumstances, discipline was difficult to maintain.  This was 
particularly noticeable in Ferrol, where poor relations between Basque and 
Galician employees exarcebated the situation.  As a result, the Crown was forced 
to take stern measures, though these were rarely as stringent as the Ordenanzas de 
Marina demanded83.  In 1750, Ferrol was struggling to prevent desertion and 
those who were caught were punished as a warning to others.  When Francisco 
Garate, Ignacio Larregui and Juan de Usurralde were apprehended, for example, 
they were sent to Cadiz in shackles to be punished to ‘serve as a lesson to the 
others’84.  The same happened soon after with another five Bizcayans who were 
condemned to two months forced labour in shackles at La Carraca ‘so that this 
will set an example to others and so that desertion from that Department [Ferrol] 
can be contained’85.  At the end of November, however, matters were little 
improved and, under Ferdinand’s instructions, Alvarez gathered  
Joseph de Arzueta and all the shipbuilding contramaestres from Bizcaya 
and Guipuzcoa in Esteiro, and read them the order from Your Excellency 
[Ensenada] to desist from spreading dissension among the workforce, for they 
will answer for it to His Majesty with their heads86.   
The situation remained tense and in 1753, several Bizcayan workers rioted 
following a brawl with some of their Galician colleagues87.  Twenty-three men 
                                                      
83 Punishments for desertion and insurbodination as listed in the 1748 Ordenanzas de Marina (for 
men serving at sea but similar to those for men working in the arsenals, vol.I, trat.5, tit.1, pp.222–
40) varied between the death sentence, forced labour in one of the North African forts, forced 
labour in the galleys (though, when this corps was abolished in 1748, this was converted into 
forced labour at either the arsenals or the Almadén mines) and forced labour in the arsenals, either 
with or without shackles, and usually for about ten years.  Lesser infractions could be punished 
with corporal punishment delivered directly by an officer or through passing through the lines. 
84 AGS Marina 234, Alvarez to Ensenada, Ferrol, 25 August 1750 
85 Ibid., Varas to Ensenada, Cadiz, 8 September 1750 
86 Ibid., Alvarez to Ensenada, Ferrol, 24 November 1750 
87 According to a petitioner, Juan de Otaegui, who was not necessarily involved in the riot but who 
was arrested later when he caused a disturbance as the Bizcayans were being taken to the docks, it 
was the result of an argument with the Galician workforce, AGS Marina 235, Petition to Ensenada 
from Juan de Otaegui, Cadiz, 15 January 1754. 
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were sentenced to three years presidio in Ceuta88.  Despite numerous petitions on 
their behalf, including that of the Diputado General of Guipuzcoa, Miguel de 
Alzaga, in 1754, it was only when their wives pleaded for their release from Ceuta 
in 1756 because of the ‘misery to which their families had been reduced’, that, 
and almost at the end of their sentences,  they were pardoned89. 
Thus, the size of the naval enterprise which had begun in 1748 stretched naval 
infrastructure to the maximum, making it difficult to integrate the men it required 
into the arsenals and the towns in which these were located, with the result that 
there were housing and food shortages, prices escalated making wages 
insufficient, and tensions existed that exploded into behaviour requiring 
disciplinary measures.  It is unlikely that this situation could have been 
maintained for very long but, in the end, it was the politics at Court which brought 
it to an end.  Julián de Arriaga, who replaced Ensenada as Ferdinand’s Naval 
Secretary in July 1754, immediately trimmed down the shipbuilding programme 
and dismissed much of the workforce.  In Cadiz, Gerbaut reported dismissing 65 
caulkers and 40 peons on 6 August 1754; 124 men, following the launch of the 
Industria, on 12 August 1754; 6 sawyers, 3 sculptors, 2 blockmakers, 2 
blacksmiths, 29 peons along with their foreman, and 18 men working the punts on 
20 August 1754, and a further 32 joiners, 20 blacksmiths and 49 peons on 3 
September 175490.  A total of 372 workers, therefore, were sent away from La 
Carraca during the summer of 1754.  Meanwhile in Ferrol, Domingo de Medina 
noted having dismissed 193 skilled workers on 4 September 1754; 684 men on 17 
                                                      
88 Presidio entailed a period of forced labour in one of Spain’s less-desirable overseas garrisons, 
for instance Ceuta. 
89 AGS Marina 235, Alzaga to Ensenada, Azpeitia, 17 June 1754 
90 Ibid., Gerbaut to Arriaga, Carraca, 6 August 1754, Gerbaut to Arriaga, Carraca, 20 August 1754, 
and Gerbaut to Arriaga, Carraca, 3 September 1754 
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September; 188 men on 29 October; a further 112 men on 10 December, after the 
launch of the Magnanimo; and 176 men on 4 March 1755 after the launch of the 
Glorioso91.  A total of at least 1,353 men.  The situation in Cartagena varied from 
that of the other two peninsular arsenals because, here, Barrero resisted these 
measures.  He was informed, however, that Ferdinand had  
decided that in that shipyard the shipbuilding workforce be reduced by a 
third by the end of the current month.  This is to be arranged delicately in advance 
in order for you to be aware of who are the most useless and, therefore, due for 
dismissal … you should also ensure that this reduction does not make the work on 
the most advanced ship take longer and delay its launch92.   
Barrero suggested that, as the workforce was employed in finishing the 
Terrible and Atlante, on building boats for cleaning the port and on the frigates 
Esmeralda, Perla and Dorada, it was therefore  
more convenient not to make changes to the workforce until all this has 
been done and only the three frigates are left to complete, since the number of 
men working on these will dictate the fixed number of men that are to be 
employed in the arsenal93.   
Arriaga rejected Barrero’s proposal and the Intendant was forced to 
comply94.  Further reductions were made after the launch of the Terrible, but even 
this proved insufficient and Arriaga demanded an explanation as to why more 
men were employed in Cartagena on three frigates than were employed on four at 
La Carraca95.  Barrero, backed by a statement from the Master Shipwright, 
Edward Bryant, explained that Cartagena’s workforce was much less skilled and 
                                                      
91 Ibid., Arriaga to Domingo de Medina, 4 September 1754, Domingo de Medina to Arriaga, 
Esteiro, 17 September 1754, Domingo de Medina to Arriaga, Esteiro, 29 October 1754, Domingo 
de Medina to Arriaga, Esteiro, 10 December 1754, Perea to Arriaga, Esteiro, 4 February 1755, 
Arriaga to Perea, Madrid, 19 February 1755, and Perea to Arriaga, Esteiro, 4 March 1755 
92 Ibid., Arriaga to Barrero, Madrid, 21 September 1754 
93 Ibid., Barrero to Arriaga, Cartagena, 2 October 1754 
94 Ibid., Barrero to Arriaga, Cartagena, 16 October 1754 
95 Ibid., Barrero to Arriaga, Cartagena, 20 November 1754, and Arriaga to Barrero, Madrid, 27 
November 1754 
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thus more numerous96.  Bryant described the situation, noting that he had six 
apprentices which were guaranteed to him by contract, 24 sawyers using a total of 
8 three-man saws whereas in Cadiz 22 men used two-man saws and 50 joiners, 
most earning 9 vellon reals daily wages (that they were on daily wages rather than 
monthly salaries indicated that they were less skilled) while in Cadiz they had 48 
ship carpenters on monthly salaries who  
have served apprenticeships and worked their entire lives on ships in that 
profession which is why they are experts whereas those I have here are not and I 
am certain that those who have worked their entire lives on ships can do double 
the work than those who have not had this experience97.   
But, again, Arriaga insisted on reducing the workforce further and ordered 
Barrero to recall Bryant in order to ‘inform him of the King’s intentions and to 
stick to a total of 12,000 reals per month on wages’98.  Barrero attempted to 
increase the reduced salary budget but was refused99. 
Forest Management and Timber Provisioning for the Navy 
This analysis does not attempt a comprehensive study of Spanish forest 
management during these years but rather an examination of the methods by 
which the Spanish State sought to organise its forests, its naval timber 
provisioning and its arsenals in order to capitalise on an already depleted but vital 
resource. 
Cardinal in creating a system whereby the State had accurate information on its 
naval forests, control over local populations charged with maintaining them and 
procedures for replenishing stocks was the Ordenanza para la Conservación y 
                                                      
96 Ibid., Barrero to Arriaga, Cartagena, 1 January 1755 
97 Ibid., Bryant to Barrero, Cartagena, 24 December 1754 
98 Ibid., Arriaga to Barrero, Madrid, 18 January 1755 
99 Ibid., Barrero to Arriaga, Cartagena, 29 January 1755 
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Aumento de los Montes de Marina (Law for the Conservation and Expansion of 
Naval Forests) issued on 31 January 1748100.  This decree, consisting of 79 
articles, established the legislative framework for the systematic management of 
Spanish naval forests for the remainder of the eighteenth century, much as the 
1669 Ordnance des eaux et forêsts had done in France101.  Naval forests were 
those sufficiently close to Spain’s coasts and navigable rivers for the conveyance 
of timber to beaches convenient for transportation to the arsenals.  Their 
management and function differed substantially from Spain’s other forests which 
were to be governed by the Real Ordenanza para el Aumento y Conservación de 
Montes y Plantíos (Royal Law for the Expansion and Conservation of Forests and 
Nurseries) issued later in the year on 7 December 1748, with an amendment on 12 
December102. 
Naval forests were placed under the jurisdiction of the naval Intendants at each of 
the three Departments.  After the law’s publication, these officials were to instruct 
their respective Ministros de Marina to arrange inspections and compile surveys, 
with the assistance of local civilian authorities, registering the landowners, type of 
land (whether common pasture or royal enclosures, etc.), size, location, number of 
                                                      
100 Novísima Recopilación (1805–7), vol.III, bk.VII, pp.254–65 
101 This law created the legislative backbone of Spanish naval forest management for the 
remainder of the century, although there were subsequent modifications.  During the reign of 
Ferdinand VI, for example, this included amendments issued on 28 June 1749 and 1 September 
1749, which protected Guipuzcoa’s jurisdiction over its forests by stipulating that naval Ministros 
had to request permission from Guipúzcoa’s Diputación before executing their orders (Novísima 
Recopilación (1805–7), vol.III, bk.VII, pp.270–4 and 274–5), and on 18 May 1751, which 
eliminated the positions of Subdelegados de Montes and transferred their responsiblities to local 
authorities (Novísima Recopilación (1805–7), vol.III, bk.VII, pp.265–68).  It is noteworthy that 
future amendments, such as those issued during Charles IV’s rule, reduced the role of local 
authorities and promoted that of naval officials on the grounds that localities had repeatedly 
abused their positions in relation to forest management (Novísima Recopilación (1805–7), vol.III, 
bk.VII, pp.275–7, ‘Método y reglas que han de observarse en los Montes sugetos al conocimiento 
de Marina’, 31 December 1800, and 277–8, ‘Privativo conocimiento de los Tribunales de Marina 
en todo lo económico, gubernativo y contencioso de los Montes de sus tres Departamentos’, 
Aranjuez, 1 May 1802).  See Bamford (1956), pp.18–21, for the French legislation. 
102 Novísima Recopilación (1805–7), vol.III, bk.VII, pp.238–5 and 245–6. 
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trees arranged by species, quality and age.  This included a review of available, 
uncultivated land – its size, quality, distance from the coast, accessibility (whether 
real or potential) and species of trees likely to prosper in its soil.  Local justices 
were to provide detailed information on their inhabitants in order to determine the 
planting demands which could be made of each with none, except poor widows 
with children under the age of 18, being exempt.  These reports would be kept by 
the Ministros and revised yearly, listing newly planted trees and, either in these or 
in separate books, the number of trees felled, by whom, when and with what 
permits.  This information was to be obtained from local justices, who were also 
obliged to keep their own records to present at inspections.  Ministros were to 
forward annual reports to the Department’s Intendants and their accounts office.  
From these, Intendants would compile their own yearly reports to send to the 
King via his Navy Secretary.  Regular inspections, arranged at least biannually by 
Ministros but which could also be ordered by Intendants at any time, would 
ensure their accuracy.  Thus, at least in theory, a system existed through which the 
King could obtain detailed information on his naval forests and ensure its 
accuracy through the various checks and balances that this legislation created. 
The law also addressed the need for the future conservation of Spanish naval 
forests and made it the responsibility of the King’s subjects by ordering that each 
inhabitant plant three or more trees annually in their region103.  Within this, local 
justices would distribute planting duties more practically by ordering those with 
greater capability to plant more trees than those with less.  Each locality was to 
create a nursery in which acorns could be planted and the legislation specified the 
manner in which this was to be done by the inhabitants, ordering, for example, 
                                                      
103 Again, only poor widows with children under the age of 18 were exempt. 
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that the land be worked from September, planted in January and manured yearly.  
After three years or when the saplings had reached a certain size, they would be 
transplanted to the forests, between mid-December and mid-February, with the 
most promising being planted closest to the loading points for the arsenals.  
Again, the precise manner in which this was to be carried out by the inhabitants 
was specified in the legislation.  All of this was to be supervised by shipbuilding 
officials dispatched by the Ministros. 
Various incentives were employed in order to convince the King’s subjects to care 
for the forests.  In areas classified as naval forests, all trees potentially suitable for 
shipbuilding were the property of the Crown, irrespective of whether they were 
planted on Crown, common or private land, but, since not all parts of a tree were 
likely to be required for shipbuilding, any surplus was to be given to local 
inhabitants and offcuts in common or ownerless areas were to be distributed to 
families in keeping with their size and their daily consumption.  After this, any 
remainders were to be sold to those needing charcoal, with contract-holders for 
the production of artillery, munitions, nails and other items for the navy taking 
preference.  In these sales, villages could charge the prices they wished although 
Intendants could moderate them, while ensuring villages earned a profit, if they 
were likely to make the Crown’s naval contracts more costly.  Profits were to be 
invested in planting new trees and improving transport.  Other surplus, such as 
acorns and leaves, was to be distributed for free.  In addition to these profits, the 
King’s subjects would be paid one real per cubic cubit of oak104 taken by the navy 
or those with naval shipbuilding contracts and double the amount by those 
building private ships.  The Crown and naval contractors would pay four vellon 
                                                      
104 The size being determined as that when it left the area to be transported to the coast. 
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reals per cubic cubit and private individuals double the amount for trees of other 
species.  Local inhabitants would also be granted permits by the Intendants for 
felling any timber necessary for building or house repairs.  These petitions, 
however, would only be granted after careful scrutiny, for trees in areas furthest 
from loading points and on the condition that the petitioners planted three extra 
trees for each that they felled in addition to those it was their normal yearly 
responsibility to plant.  Private landowners could not fell trees on their land if they 
had been marked as suitable for shipbuilding by an inspector unless they were 
granted permits – which would only happen if they agreed to plant new nurseries.  
The export of timber to other countries (no matter what species or quality) was 
forbidden without express permission from the King.  Contractors, whether 
producing gunpowder, artillery or any other product for the navy, would need 
valid licences in order to fell timber in naval forests.  Infractions of the law, which 
included the failure by inhabitants to prepare nurseries, plant trees, prevent them 
losing their bark, not looking after their forests, preventing fires or not putting 
them out quickly enough, failing to carry out an inspector’s instructions and 
felling without a permit, would be punished with severe financial penalties which 
would be imposed on the local authorities themselves if they failed to uncover the 
culprits. 
The Ordenanza de Montes concluded with the distribution of areas among the 
Departments along with the particular needs of each area in relation to the forestry 
and transport developments each required.  The forests of Galicia, Asturias, 
Cantabria (La Montaña) and the Basque Provinces belonged to Ferrol; those of 
Andalucia and some of Granada belonged to Cadiz; and those of Catalonia, 
Valencia, Murcia and the rest of Granada belonged to Cartagena.  During 
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Ferdinand’s rule, this distribution was, on the whole, applied, though certain 
areas, such as that of La Montaña, provided a greater proportion of the timber for 
Ensenada’s shipbuilding programme, including much of the planking for Cadiz 
and Cartagena. 
All domestic timber provided for the navy during these years was organised by 
the State, except for that from La Montaña where much of Spain’s shipbuilding 
timber had previously been obtained and continued to be so during Ferdinand’s 
reign.  In La Montaña, the timber contract was held by Juan Fernández de Isla y 
Alvear (1709–1788) from 1748.  Isla’s control over naval provisioning during 
these years was extensive since he had contracts for providing timber, iron fittings 
and even ships to the navy.  The existence of one single large contractor prevented 
much of the chaos numerous contractors with small contracts occasioned in 
France, as described by Pritchard in his study of Louis XV’s navy, but suffered 
the same weakness noted by Bamford in relation to men such as Babau de la 
Chaussade in France, in that ‘powerful though contractors might be for a few 
years, their prominence as naval contractors sometimes waned quickly, as with 
the demise of a ministerial patron’105.  After Ensenada’s removal from power in 
1754, Isla also lost much of his status, being deprived of his contracts and 
eventually being imprisoned for corruption from 1760 to 1766106.  In 1748, 
however, Isla was contracted to provide the timber for 12 battleships at the rate of 
138 vellon reals for each piece of timber, 30 vellon reals lumbering charge and 82 
vellon reals for transport to the coast, a total of 250 vellon reals per piece.  The 
                                                      
105 Pritchard (1987) pp.163–4 and Bamford (1956) p.34 
106 Maiso González (1990) p.224.  According to this biographer, Isla’s imprisonment was 
orchestrated by his rival in Cantabria, the Marquis de Villa Castel, owner of the artillery factories 
at Liérganes and La Cavada. 
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contract was renewed the following year with an order for the timber necessary 
for 24 battleships at the increased rate of 191! reals per piece but with the same 
30 and 82 reals lumbering and transport charges.  On 19 December 1750, the 
contract was renewed again but with altered terms so that he was now to provide 
replacement timber for 44 battleships at an overall rate of 34 vellon reals per cubic 
cubit of timber.  The same terms were applied to further contracts for timber for 
six frigates signed on 19 December 1750 and for timber for nine frigates signed 
on 14 October 1751.  Isla and the region of La Montaña, therefore, provided the 
greatest proportion of timber for Ensenada’s shipbuilding programme.  Thus the 
Crown transferred to Isla many of the challenges of organising a complex, labour-
intensive operation which it would have most likely struggled to arrange on its 
own while at the same time administering other areas of the shipbuilding 
enterprise. 
By entrusting one individual with such great authority, however, the Crown was 
forfeiting careful attention to timber conservation in favour of the more immediate 
exploitation of resources, especially since Isla’s incentive was to present the 
timber in the arsenals on time.  As a result, complaints from the arsenals 
abounded.  On 16 April 1749, for example, the Comisario Ordenador in 
Santander, Jacinto Navarrete, was warned that a noticeable proportion of timber 
delivered on the San Antonio pink at Ferrol from Isla’s contract was rotten and 
would have to be replaced107.  In this and subsequent years, numerous protests 
emanated from the arsenals over broken, rotten, worm-eaten or, one of the most 
common complaints, excessively small timbers.  This last observation, in 
particular, deserves attention because it has been described as the foremost cause 
                                                      
107 AGS Marina 317, Ensenada to Navarrete, 27 April 1749 
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for the area’s deforestation and historians, such as Isla’s biographer, have blamed 
the British shipwrights described in chapter three for this, arguing that they ‘not 
only failed to solve the problem by creating a stable and convincing ship design, 
but also caused, through their hesitation, lack of communication and lack of 
control, significant damage to the forests of Cantabria’108.  There is an element of 
truth to this in that these timber contracts were issued between 1748 and 1751 and 
yet the final designs for the ships were not established until 1752.  Meanwhile, the 
British Master Shipwrights – Rooth, Mullins and Bryant – had each been tasked 
with building ships to demonstrate their skills and these ships were not the same 
as those that had been built before in the time of Gaztañeta or the same as each 
other’s or the same as the final 1752 designs.  Furthermore, since timbers were cut 
to size in the forests in order to save on transport cost, many timber parts had to 
be discarded at the arsenals because they were not suitable for the new designs.  
Nevertheless, this fails to explain the fact that most of the protests that came from 
the arsenals were not that timber parts were not large enough but rather that too 
many smaller parts were being sent.  A review of the planking existent in Ferrol 
arsenal in 1752, for example, revealed that though they had a surplus of much of 
the smaller planking, such as that of between 6 and 6! inches thick where they 
had a surplus of 3,750 pieces, they lacked 327 of 1,000 requested of 8 to 8! 
inches thick, 329 of the 500 9 to 9! requested and 164 of the 500 10 to 10!109.  
Despite Isla being sent this report and asked to rectify the situation, complaints 
persisted up until at least 1758110.  This situation was most likely occasioned by 
                                                      
108 Maiso González (1990) p.264 
109 See Appendix 8. 
110 AGS Marina 320, Ensenada to Navarrete, 16 October 1752, and AGS Marina 329, Perea to 
Arriaga, Esteiro, 7 November 1758 
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the fact that many of the larger trees needed for compass timber had disappeared 
from the forests by this date111 and, also, since payment was per cubic cubit 
delivered and it was considerably less expensive to transport more small timbers 
than fewer large timbers, Isla probably took the more economically attractive 
option112.  Factors such as these in combination with the sheer volume of the 
building programme, led to the near exhaustion of La Montaña’s forests at this 
time.  On 19 November 1757, Arriaga informed the Intendants that, as a result of 
the  
excessive number of trees cut down in these last nine years in La Montaña 
and Asturias for the timbers and planking of 54 battleships of 70 and 100 guns, 
additional and replacement timbers for 44 of these battleships, 16 frigates, eight 
pinks, one packet boat, 30 launches and many other small vessels; for treenails 
and [shipbuilding] cradles, buildings and slipways … for Guarnizo shipyard and 
for various other uses in the construction of Ferrol arsenal,  
there were insufficient trees for new fellings and the trees that existed were 
all more than 12 leagues from the coast for compass timbers and 16 leagues for 
planking timber.  In future, therefore, Arriaga laid down that arsenals were to 
attempt to survive without recourse to Santander by using timbers existent at the 
arsenals and surveying their surrounding forests with a view to maximising local 
resources113. 
Ensenada’s ideal of self-sufficiency in timber was never achieved during 
Ferdinand’s reign.  Like both France and Britain, Spain imported timber from its 
                                                      
111 As Albion notes, oaks were at their maximum potential for felling between 80 and 120 years 
old, at which time they had a diameter of between 15 and 18 English inches and after which they 
were more subceptible to decay, larger compass timbers, however, frequently required diameters 
of 20 inches making the oaks about 150 years old, see Albion (1926) p.99, not only would larger 
timbers be more difficult to source in Spanish forests because they took longer to grow than 
smaller timbers but also because they were more subject to infection and decay. 
112 This is further supported by the fact that numerous large timbers were found in the forests after 
Isla was replaced, see Maiso González (1990) p.265 
113 AGS Marina 327, Arriaga to Barrero, Gerbaut and Perea, Madrid, 19 November 1757.  
Santander was the capital of the Montaña region. 
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American empire and from the Baltic.  Cedar, mahogany and guayacan was 
regularly shipped across the Atlantic from Havana by the Intendant, Lorenzo de 
Montalvo, as can be seen from in Table 9.1 in the appendices.  The provision of 
Baltic timber, mainly masts and pine planking, was carried out by the Dutch 
merchants, Daniel and Jan Gildemeester, and their agent in Spain, Eugenio de 
Mena114.  Again, Table 9.2 lists purchases made by Ferdinand from these 
merchants.  In addition, Spain purchased a substantial quantity of timber from 
Naples between 1748 and 1752, mainly for the arsenal at Cartagena115.  Spain’s 
reliance on these resources meant that during a period of war it would struggle to 
continue shipments from America and that Britain, which had a firmer, longer-
established relationship with Baltic markets in addition to sea control of the 
Channel, would prevent Spain’s access to this source in wartime116.   The size of 
the shipbuilding programme made stockpiling of American, Baltic or domestic 
supplies impossible as the timber was usually needed as soon as it was ready for 
use and, frequently, even before. 
Another facet of the new management of Spanish timber resources was the 
reorganisation of timber storage at the arsenals and the attempt made to keep 
                                                      
114 Daniel Gildemeester (1717–93) was the Dutch consul to the Portuguese Court and director of 
the Dutch factory in Lisbon.  His residence in Lisbon is now the National Museum of Art and he 
was responsible for the construction of his summer residence in Sintra, Seteais Palace.  His 
brother, Jan (1744–99), a celebrated art collector of Dutch paintings, lived in Amsterdam where he 
gathered an impressive collection of art.  Between them the two brothers ran a powerful 
commercial empire and sold and transported a large proportion of naval stores to the Spanish 
navy. 
115 AGS Marina 315, ‘Expediente’ on the subject; AGS Marina 320, Ibarrola to Ensenada, Naples, 
17 January 1752, on arranging timber transport to Barcelona; AGS Marina 320, Madariaga to 
Ensenada, Naples, 29 May 1752, announcing his return to Spain having completed his 
commission. 
116 See Albion (1926) pp.139–99 and Bamford (1956) pp.135–57 for France’s similar difficulties, 
in which the author concludes: ‘The pre-eminence was sustained by the vigour and skill of the 
merchants and supported by British foreign and commercial policy.  The French navy was 
necessarily at a disadvantage, being forced to buy through foreign commissioners, often 
Englishmen engaged in buying for the British navy’, p.157. 
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accurate inventories of materials available.  Instructions were issued and executed 
swiftly in Ferrol and Cartagena but delays in La Carraca demonstrate what 
Ensenada hoped to achieve.  In October 1751, Varas y Valdés, Cadiz’s Intendant, 
was asked, in conjunction with instructions to set aside and organise the timber 
for four 70-gun ships, to begin the ‘separation of all unused shipbuilding timber in 
the arsenal, very carefully examining the channels where it has been deposited … 
so that the exact timber in them and in the arsenals and for what ships it can be 
used can be known with precision’.  In addition, Stennard, the British sawyer 
surveying Andalucia, was instructed to do the same with that already felled in the 
forests117.  By March 1752, however, it seemed that Cadiz had failed to comply 
and Ensenada wrote to Gerbaut saying it was obvious that  
in the arsenals of La Carraca neither has an account of the timber for 
shipbuilding conducted to it been kept, nor is there any formal knowledge of what 
timber exists in its docks.  The disorder which currently exists, with such 
prejudice to the service of the King, results from the fact that, in La Carraca, 
timber is not taken in and stored according to its shape, name and measurements 
but by its classification as mast, curve or straight.  Despite repeated orders to 
separate out the timber over the past two years, nothing has been done.  Since the 
type and quantity of the timber at present in the ponds is unknown, as is also the 
purposes for which it can be used, there is a lack of basic information as to what is 
required from the forests for the construction of four 80-gun and eight 70-gun 
ships, which the King still desires should be constructed in that Department.   On 
this subject, many reams have been written but with the misfortune that nothing of 
what has been said has been understood or desired to be understood118.   
After this, there was a systematic organisation of Cadiz’s timber in the ensuing 
months so that by July, Varas could report that there were 5,852 pieces of oak and 
168 of beech at La Carraca119.  By October, the new Intendant, Julián de Arriaga, 
                                                      
117 AGS Marina 319, Ensenada to Varas, 25 October 1751 
118 AGS Marina 320, Ensenada to Gerbaut, Madrid, 28 March 1752 
119 Ibid., Varas to Ensenada, Cadiz, 18 July 1752 
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could send a map pinpointing their storage location in the Department’s arsenal, 
beaches and ponds120.   
Despite attempts at self-sufficiency and improved organisation, by the end of 
Ferdinand’s reign the Spanish navy was struggling to find sufficient timber to 
maintain its enlarged fleet and Ensenada’s ideals on the matter were being largely 
abandoned.  In Cartagena, for example, Barrero asked permission to purchase a 
shipment of oak planking that had arrived on a Swedish ship, Palas, Captain 
Roberto Stumak, saying that  
this planking being noticeably missing for the work going on here, it 
would be convenient to purchase it, not only for this reason, but also because the 
constructor and Maestros Mayores assure me … that it is of the most select 
quality, worked without any defects, and that each one hundred of these are worth 
200 of those from Santander121.   
Arriaga had no objections, though he stipulated that this planking should not 
exceed Isla’s prices by more than a third and that it be properly measured in order 
to prevent overspending122. 
The Development of Peninsular Hemp Production 
Hemp was cultivated in Spain before 1748, though generally in small amounts 
and not for the navy, which had usually imported that required for rope, sailcloth 
and oakum from northern Europe.  During Ferdinand’s reign and in accordance 
with Ensenada’s ideas, its production in Spain was fostered with the hope of 
ending dependence on Baltic imports.  Simultaneously, State-run factories for the 
                                                      
120 Ibid., Arriaga to Ensenada, Cadiz, 10 October 1752.   San Agustín pond: 2,995; Large pond: 
2,597; Small pond: 378; Opposite the large pond: 860; Opposite the shipyard: 868; (Masting-
)engine beach: 1,104; Large pond beach: 1,244; Being prepared opposite the shipyard: 624; Puerto 
Real beach: 152.  Total: 10,822 timber pieces in la Carraca. 
121 AGS Marina 328, Barrero to Arriaga, Cartagena, 22 November 1758 
122 Ibid., Arriaga to Barrero, 25 November 1758 
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production of rope and sailcloth were founded at each of the arsenals to obviate 
reliance on private contractors and experiments, such as that of planting Riga 
hemp seed in Spain and Cuba, sought to improve the quality of Spanish resources.  
The size of the shipbuilding programme, however, was such that, in attempting 
self-sufficiency, what was also required was a major expansion of domestic hemp 
production.   
The first obstacle encountered in this effort was the inability to evaluate the 
quantities needed.  In Cadiz, Varas had been asked to establish the rope factory at 
Real del Puente in such a fashion that with one hundred employees it could 
produce the rope for one 70-gun ship in the ensuing year123.  But this had to be 
postponed after the Dutch Master Ropemaker who had been recruited to manage it 
refused to work with the existing technology124.  At Sada, in Ferrol Department, 
Spain was developing its largest rope- and sail-making facilities but they were yet 
to be fully active.  Here, Perea discovered that it was impossible to make  
 a formal calculation of its potential output because the experiences of other 
places could not be used to form a judgement of what it might be possible to make 
here, both because rope, like canvas, is now produced differently and in such a 
manner that it takes longer and because, in contrast to other factories of this 
nature, here yarn is spun on the whole by women using a spindle and distaff and 
rarely the wheel. 
 And, as to the purchase of hemp,  
 I have not assigned a quantity and neither do I believe did D. Cosme 
Alvarez, for, as Your Excellency knows, the Kingdoms of Aragon and Navarre 
are not capable of producing in two years the quantities needed for fitting out 12 
70-gun battleships.  This will need at least 46,000 quintals of good rope, without 
waste, excluding that which is to be used in making canvas, so that each, making 
reasonable adjustments, will require at least 240,000 arrobas [60,000 quintals] of 
                                                      
123 AGS Marina 320, Ensenada to Varas, Aranjuez, 9 May 1752 
124 Ibid., Varas to Ensenada, Cadiz, 11 July 1752 and Ensenada to Varas, Madrid, 18 July 1752 
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hemp, assuming that that required for caulking, lint and third-grade rope of the 
type that is only used in the arsenals and on small boats has been excluded125. 
 Ignoring Perea’s assessment, Ensenada insisted that 38,000 quintals of 
raw hemp (3,167 quintals per ship) would be sufficient because in Cartagena only 
2,000 quintals of rope had been employed in making that for the 70-gun 
Septentrión126.  A report sent to him on 6 May 1752 had, in fact, stated that this 
ship had required 1,947 quintals and 31! pounds of rope (1,942.59! tarred, 4.72 
white)127.  The Director of the factory that had produced this rope, Juan Buxo, 
reported that, with his 122 employees working the ten existing wheels, they could 
produce 4,390 quintals of tarred rope annually using 10,998 quintals of raw 
hemp128.  Cartagena’s annual output of rope, therefore, was roughly sufficient for 
two and a half ships, each requiring about 4,400 quintals of the raw product, 
which exceeds considerably that proposed by Ensenada for Ferrol. 
In addition, the Director of Cartagena’s sailcloth factory, Carlos Sanz y Vincent, 
reported that with his 24 looms they could produce 23,232 varas of mainsail in 22 
of its looms (sufficient for 3! 70-gun ships a year) and 1,056 varas of topsail and 
fine canvas on each of the remaining two looms (insufficient for even one ship).  
This required an annual quantity of 2,304 arrobas (576 quintals) of raw hemp129.  
According to the reports of the directors of the rope and sailcloth factories, 
therefore, Cartagena needed a total of 13,302 quintals of hemp annually130.  When 
                                                      
125 Ibid., Perea to Ensenada, Esteiro, 9 May 1752 
126 Ibid., Ensenada to Perea, Aranjuez, 23 May 1752 
127 AGS Marina 321, ‘Resumen de la jarcia de que se compone el aparejo pendiente y respectos 
del navío el Septentrión con expresión de sus menas y peso’, Cartagena, 6 May 1752, [unsigned]. 
128 AGS Marina 320, ‘Digo yo Dn Juan Buxo, Director y Maestro Maior de esta Rl Fábrica de 
jarcia …’, Cartagena, 6 May 1752, Juan Buxo 
129 Ibid., Barrero to Ensenada, Cartagena, 10 May 1752, and ‘Relación de los telares que tiene 
existentes la Real Fábrica de lonas en este año de 1752’, Cartagena, 6 May 1752, Carlos Sanz y 
Vincent 
130 When Barrero forwarded these reports, he presented a different quantity of raw hemp required, 
stating that they needed 42,304 arrobas (10,576 quintals) yearly. 
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Barrero forwarded these reports to Ensenada, he noted that, since the creation of 
these factories two years earlier, they had only ever received between 28,000 and 
30,000 arrobas (7,000–7,500 quintals) per year.  But he was uncertain whether 
that year they would even be able to reach these sums since their agent in 
Valencia was struggling with his purchases as most hemp was being requisitioned 
for Sada131.   
The construction programme begun that year ordered 12 battleships to be built at 
Ferrol, four at Guarnizo, two at Cadiz and two at Cartagena, along with five 
frigates at Cadiz and three at Cartagena132.  In order to make a rough calculation 
of the quantity of hemp needed to make the rope for these ships, excluding 
altogether that needed for sailcloth and without factoring in variables such as 
production methods which meant that different factories required different 
quantities of the raw product and that the various rates of ships and frigates 
employed different quantities of rope, it is possible to calculate from Barrero’s 
report on the Septentrión’s rope and Buxo’s report on annual production that 
roughly 4,400 quintals of raw hemp were required for each ship.    If 28 ships 
were being built over the next two years then this amounted to 123,200 quintals, 
or 61,600 quintals annually133. 
In 1750, Ensenada had carried out a survey of domestic production by asking 
various administrators for details of what was grown in their area134.  Appendix 
                                                      
131 AGS Marina 320, Barrero to Ensenada, Cartagena, 10 May 1752.  In response, Barrero was 
instructed to increase the number of looms to 50. 
132 AGS Marina 321, ‘Nombres para los navíos y fragatas que se construyen en los Departamentos 
y en Guarnizo’, [15 July 1752] 
133 This calculation also excludes any estimates of that which would be needed for repairs or other 
functions. 
134 AGS Marina 318, Ensenada to Varas, Contamina, Malespina, Fresnada, Barrero, Aviles and 
Gages, Aranjuez, 29 June 1750. 
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10 illustrates his findings and suggests that Spain had an annual production of 
125,367! quintals of first- and second-grade hemp (third-grade hemp was not to 
be employed on ships except as oakum).  The navy would need half this amount 
for the rope on newly built ships alone, in addition it would need substantially 
more for sailcloth, repairs and other uses, and it would have to compete with local 
industry to get it.  It is obvious from this that domestic production would need to 
grow. 
In the hope of achieving this, Ensenada sought to promote its production by 
protecting hemp farmers, traders and other industries that also used the raw 
product.  When a provincial mayor, Nicolás Joseph Nieto de Lindoso (in Alfaro, 
Navarre), for example, issued a proclamation forbidding the sale of high grade 
hemp for more than 20 vellon reals an arroba and lower grade hemp for more 
than 18 vellon reals, Ensenada asked him to revoke it immediately135.  Instead,  
by leaving vendors and buyers at liberty to adjust prices among 
themselves, even when the hemp is for the service of the Royal Navy, farmers 
will be encouraged to foster this resource’s abundance because of the profit that it 
will be possible to make from it.  It will then become more convenient to purchase 
it, while taxing it will only lead to its scarcity136. 
In Aragon, complaints arose over the methods employed by the naval officer in 
charge of purchasing hemp, Matheo del Collado, and culminated in a protest held 
by the guilds of shoemakers and ropemakers in the central square of Calatayud.  
On the night of this protest, the mayor’s house was subject to an arson attack and 
these guilds were suspected though no culprits were apprehended.  Lucas 
Fernando Patiño, Marquis de Castelar, Governor and Captain General of Aragon 
was asked to investigate and found the population’s grievances to be just because 
                                                      
135 AGS Marina 319, Nieto de Lindoso to Ensenada, Alfaro, 22 April 1751 
136 Ibid., Ensenada to Nieto de Lindoso, Aranjuez, 28 April 1751 
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there was a ‘lack of observance of His Majesty’s orders, which dictate that only 
hemp surplus to the region’s needs be purchased for the Royal Navy and at 
current, regional prices’.  Collado, however, was requisitioning it in excess and ‘at 
prices which are either a give-away or very low’137.  Ensenada reprimanded 
Collado, re-sending him his instructions and stating that  
the wish of the King is that villages be allowed to keep the hemp they need 
for their own purposes, so that the lack of it does not impoverish them in such a 
way that they are harmed by it.  Taking this into consideration you are to purchase 
the remainder which you find of suitable quality, paying promptly and at current 
regional prices, for His Majesty does not wish for harvesters to experience losses 
in its sale, nor to hear the outcries which Corregidores and Mayors are reporting 
because you have not adhered to these terms138.   
Collado denied these charges and his orders were renewed in 1752 for the 
purchase of 6,000 quintals but he was, nonetheless, removed from his post by at 
least 23 May139.   
Despite its promise of long-term benefit, this policy did not always please 
Ensenada.  In 1753, a report on hemp purchases in Granada at prices between 38 
and 52 vellon reals an arroba caused Ensenada to complain that these  
exceed by more than half those paid and being paid for hemp in Valencia, 
Catalonia and Aragon, as well as those of first grade produce from Riga, without 
that from Granada having the advantage of quality over that from Valencia or 
Riga nor being equal to that from Barcelona140.   
The Crown’s commitment to this principle of liberality also complicated 
its ability to budget.  In January 1754, for example, the Marquis of Malespina 
                                                      
137 Ibid., Castelar to Ensenada, Zaragoza, 30 November 1751 
138 Ibid., Ensenada to Collado, Madrid, 23 November 1751 
139 Ibid., Collado to Ensenada, Calatayud, 8 December 1751, and AGS Marina 320, ‘Expediente’ 
on ‘Ordenes cometiendo al Intendente de Aragón la compra de cáñamos de aquel Reino para 
Ferrol de que estaba encargado el Teniente de Navío Dn Matheo del Collado’, 23 May 1752 
140 AGS Marina 322, Arriaga to Ensenada, Cadiz, 20 November 1753, sending ‘Estado que por 
menor manifiesta los precios y arrovas de cáñamo, que se an comprado de quenta de la Rl 
Hacienda, en las Vegas de Granada, y Loxa, por D. Vizente de Sta. Maria …’ Signed, Santa 
María, Granada, 13 November 1753, and Ensenada to Arriaga, 26 November 1753 
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reported that only 17,000 arrobas (4,250 quintals) of the 8,000 quintals requested 
from Valencia for Cartagena had been purchased thus far but that the remainder 
would be ready to sell within a month if the Crown could advance a further 150 to 
160,000 vellon reals to complete the order, the 960,000 vellon reals originally 
provided for this purpose having already been spent141. 
Once Arriaga became Navy Minister in July 1754, there were no dramatic 
alterations to the original policy on the treatment accorded producers.  
Suggestions that prices be more carefully controlled, such as that made by Juan 
Gerbaut, Arriaga’s replacement as Naval Intendant at La Carraca, in 1756, who 
complained that the unwarranted rise in the price of Catalonian hemp resulted 
from its sale abroad by greedy producers, were turned down142.  In this particular 
case, Arriaga argued that the cost of enforcing such a check on prices was too 
high and ultimately not in the King’s interests since it was detrimental to his 
subjects143.  He did, however, ask Contamina to investigate whether such a rise 
had, in fact, taken place but the latter only confirmed that there had been a 
moderate increase in prices because large proportions of hemp were then being 
purchased to issue new uniforms to the army and that year there had been a very 
poor harvest144.  When the Mayors of Benimaclet, Campanar, Zuzfa [?] and 
Patraix (all now districts of the town of Valencia) petitioned for the repeat of an 
order of 16 September 1752 granting them permission to sell hemp at 30 vellon 
reals an arroba and exemption from paying the alcabala (the common sales tax), 
in order to survive the particularly poor harvest of 1756, Arriaga promised no 
                                                      
141 AGS Marina 323, Malespina to Ensenada, Valencia, 16 January 1754 
142 AGS Marina 326, Gerbaut to Arriaga, Cadiz, 16 March 1756 
143 Ibid., Arriaga to Gerbaut, Madrid, 30 March 1756 
144 Ibid., Arriaga to Contamina, Madrid, 30 March 1756, and Contamina to Arriaga, Barcelona, 1 
May 1756 
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specific assistance but assured them that ‘at no time has it been the King’s wish to 
oblige his subjects to sell their fruits for less than their value’145.  However, in 
contrast to the time of Ensenada when extra-budgetary expenses had been granted 
for hemp purchasing so as to ensure that farmers could sell it at the prices they 
wished and the navy could still afford to make purchases, Arriaga instructed that  
in the case there should still be hemp needed, you must be careful to 
obtain the best quality [produce] in the knowledge that it is to be paid for without 
fail from the monthly budget granted that Department, without expecting 
extraordinary aid, for it is under this premise that expense estimates have been 
formulated146. 
Bad harvests, as suggested above, were a perennial danger for hemp producers, 
making it difficult for the navy to rely on domestic product.  Intendants generally 
refused to predict the following year’s harvest as, if these were bad, they could 
then find themselves incapable of meeting their quotas.  In 1753, Contamina was 
forced to confess that some of the hemp he had sent to Cadiz had been purchased 
abroad because he had been unable to produce the required 14,000 quintals from 
the yield in Catalonia147.  He was admonished by Ensenada, who explained that 
the reason ‘hemp was, and is, ordered to be purchased in Catalonia is to encourage 
the farming of this crop’ as ‘it will always be necessary in large quantities for the 
provision of the navy’148.  The situation was not always bleak, however, and, in 
good years, regions could not only meet their targets with ease but could also save 
on expenses.  For instance, in Valencia in 1751 Contamina completed the 
                                                      
145 Ibid., Petition from the Mayors of Benimaclet, Campanar, Zuzfa [?] and Patraix, [n.d, n.p], 
annotated by Arriaga, 6 March 1756 
146 AGS Marina 323, Arriaga to Barrero, Madrid, 14 December 1754 
147 AGS Marina 322, Ensenada to Contamina, 6 February 1753 and Contamina to Ensenada, 10 
March 1753 
148 Ibid., Ensenada to Contamina, 17 March 1753 
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purchase of four thousand quintals of hemp for Cadiz at a total cost of 318,495 
vellon reals leaving him with a surplus 73,034 reals and 14 maravedis149. 
The decision to rely on domestic produce also brought to the forefront the 
question of quality.  The ultimate arbiters of this were the arsenals who would be 
liable if the end product of rope and sailcloth was found to be defective.  The 
practice of sending Navarrese hemp to Ferrol, for example, was abandoned in 
1750 after Alvarez complained about the excess levels of waste it contained150.  
Intendants often proved reluctant to admit domestic produce into their arsenals but 
the frequent lack of clarity in these situations meant the Crown could not always 
ascertain the true facts of the situation.  In July 1750, Alvarez found fault with the 
hemp sent from Cadiz, saying that though the bales appeared clean on the outside 
they were rotten on the inside151.  The official who had sent them from Cadiz, 
Nicolás Carlos Colón, refused to accept this was the case and so Alvarez was 
forced to admit the cargo, though he persisted in his complaints with future 
shipments152.  Colón, in turn, regularly criticised that sent him from Catalonia.  In 
1751, for example, he noted that of 4,000 quintals sent by Contamina, only 1,500 
could be used in sailmaking.  Contamina reacted in exactly the same way as 
Colón had done to Alvarez’s accusations153. 
By the end of Ferdinand’s reign, the concept of providing hemp for the navy from 
the domestic yield had been largely abandoned.  In 1760, Perea, who was at that 
point negotiating a contract for the purchase of hemp from Riga, made an analysis 
                                                      
149 AGS Marina 319, Contamina to Ensenada, Barcelona, 24 April 1751 
150 AGS Marina 320, Perea to Ensenada, Esteiro, 16 May 1752 
151 AGS Marina 318, Alvarez to Ensenada, [Ferrol], 14 July 1750 
152 Ibid., Varas to Ensenada, Cadiz, 28 July 1750.  A shipment of 101 quintals, 20 pounds brought 
on board the merchantman, Rosa de Viterbo, Master Juan Lledo, for example, was rejected by 
Alvarez in full, see AGS Marina 318, Alvarez to Ensenada, Ferrol, 25 August 1750.   
153 AGS Marina 319, Contamina to Ensenada, Barcelona, 20 April 1751 
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of Ferrol’s purchasing of the national product earlier in the 1750s.  In it, he noted 
that a quintal of first grade hemp could be purchased from Russia at 127 vellon 
reals.  At this price, it would not only produce waste of only 5! pounds but this 
would also be deducted from the eventual cost.  Alternatively, they could also 
have purchased first, second and third grade hemp from Russia at a cheaper rate 
of 125 vellon reals a quintal and this would include 7! pounds of waste per 
quintal which would not then be deducted from the overall cost.  If they had 
purchased from Aragon, however, they would have had to pay at least 160 vellon 
reals per quintal from which the extremely high level of wastage of 13  pounds 
per quintal would not be deducted.  Purchases from Castile and Navarre went 
along similar lines but they produced even greater wastage.  Furthermore, the 
negotiation of purchases from Spain always entailed many more complications, 
which meant that the ‘practice of ordering hemp from the North was preferred’154. 
Conclusion 
The size and speed of Ferdinand’s shipuilding programme placed a heavy burden 
on Spanish resources, especially with such emphasis falling on the concept of 
self-sufficiency in its early years.  This was particularly evident in the three areas 
of manpower, timber provisioning and hemp production. 
In the matter of manpower, skilled workers were often not available locally and 
generally had to be brought in from other regions, mainly the Basque provinces 
and Catalonia, to the arsenals of Ferrol and Cartagena.  Not only were there too 
few men available but they also preferred employment elsewhere.  Gradually, 
however, matters improved thanks to the government’s insistence that employees 
                                                      
154 AGS Marina 329, Report by Perea on Sada, Esteiro, 25 March 1760 
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be paid well and fairly managed.  With time the contractual terms of employment, 
which were negotiated over the years, began to be taken seriously.  In addition, 
the government modified its methods of recruitment to capitalise on labour by 
taking such measures as the signing up of men in January and February rather 
than May or June and also taking on less qualified individuals with the aim of 
training them in situ.  These two factors facilitated the employment of skilled 
labour in both 1753 and 1754, though which of the two was of greater import 
would be difficult to determine.  Despite this, certain obstacles existed that 
prevented the Spanish navy from benefiting fully from its skilled labour 
resources.  Primary among these was the largely rural nature of its society which 
meant that men had to be permitted to return home during certain periods of the 
year or they would refuse to take on the work.  This was further complicated by 
the travelling distances that this often entailed.  Furthermore, the cost of 
maintaining these conditions in addition to the basic expense entailed in importing 
labour from outside the arsenals was very costly to the Crown.  Moreover, the size 
of the project had also caused such a sudden increase in the populations of Ferrol 
and Cartagena that it resulted in housing and food shortages.  The inflated prices 
and cramped conditions that ensued made discipline difficult to maintain and 
resulted in high levels of desertion. 
Timber provisioning, too, was a problem and several modifications had to be 
made to the manner in which it was organised.  There were two aspects to this, 
firstly forest management and secondly the system of storage at the arsenals.  In 
the matter of naval forests new legislation had to be introduced to perfect their 
management though this was not carried out with great success.  If the legislation 
had been rigorously enforced then the government would have had accurate data 
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on its timber resources, local populations would have carried out reforestation and 
the authorities would have had the ability to supervise its use so as to prevent 
abuses.  Evidence, however, suggests that this was not the case as, for example, 
little control seems to have been exerted over Isla’s lumbering activities.  Instead, 
it seems that by 1759 Spain’s timber reserves were reaching near exhaustion, 
especially in La Montaña, where traditionally it was at its most abundant.  
Whether or not the legislation had been enforced, the idea of self-sufficiency in 
this case would never have been of much value.  Oak trees require between 80 and 
120 years to mature so the fruit of any new planting would not have been 
available for decades and, in the meantime, Spain’s existing reserves were 
noticeably depleted, frequently with a great deal of wastage, even at a time when 
Spain had access to American and Baltic markets and could have imported timber.  
In this instance, the merits of self-sufficiency, namely the development of the 
infrastructure and institutional knowledge necessary to the handling of the timber 
reserves was not incompatible with combining the use of domestic reserves with 
the purchase of foreign produce155.  Much more successful, however, were the 
modifications made to the system of timber storage at the arsenals which, along 
with the creation of detailed inventories, allowed each of the Departments to plan 
its needs much more accurately. 
Finally, hemp production in Spain at the beginning of Ensenada’s programme was 
at too low a level to provide for the country and the navy’s needs.  The strategic 
benefits of stimulating Spanish hemp production rather than importing were 
approached in the same way as timber production was.  To foment hemp 
                                                      
155 In the same manner, for example, as the British attempted to rebuild domestic supplies by using 
foreign timber in the 1780s and 1790s, see Lambert (1991) pp.110–2. 
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cultivation, the Crown followed a policy of protecting its farmers and markets 
while presenting them with the navy as a permanent client.  It was hoped that this 
encouragement to hemp farmers would make the product more abundant and 
provide a cheaper, better-quality alternative to Baltic hemp in the long term.  The 
immediate result, however, was a more expensive product of lesser quality which 
could not escape the fluctuating prices imposed by the weather which influenced 
the quality of the harvests.  In the past, it had mainly been the Crown that dictated 
prices and it is possible that if this new, more generous policy had been pursued 
for longer, prices would eventually have gone down, influenced by the greater 
quantity of hemp available.  At the very least, practice in harvesting, preparing 
and transporting it would have created a better-quality product.  Thus, where a 
product existed that had a faster growth period than, say, oak trees, the concept of 
self-sufficiency was still viable but even so it clashed with the navy’s obligation 
to produce large quantities of rope and sail within a short period. 
The ambitious and extensive nature of Ensenada’s shipbuilding programme, 
therefore, put a substantial strain on all Spain’s resources.  Experimentation with 
‘Enlightenment’ concepts for the maximisation of domestic resources between 
1748 and 1754 had only varying levels of success.  One common factor in all 
three examples presented here – manpower, timber and hemp – was the 
transformation that came about with the change of government in July 1754.  
From this date, shipbuilding was reduced, the arsenals faced major reductions to 
their workforce and domestic resources no longer enjoyed the protection of the 
State if a cheaper, foreign alternative was at hand.  A main underlying theme in 
any description of Arriaga’s management of Ferdinand’s navy was economy.  
Unlike Ensenada, Arriaga had little control over his own budget and costly reform 
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projects had to be abandoned.  These pendular swings between periods of great 
interest and investment in the navy followed by other periods of lack of interest 
and austerity was a recurring feature of Spanish naval policy throughout the 
eighteenth century and a major impediment to organic and sustained development.  
Naval infrastructure is costly and complex, it needs longterm, sustained funding 
and consistent levels of demand to develop the manpower and supporting 
suppliers that render it self-sufficient and effective. 
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CHAPTER 5.  The Ordenanzas de Marina (1748) and 
Manning the Fleet 
 
Introduction 
The significant increase in the number of ships in the Spanish navy during 
Ferdinand’s reign required a proportionate rise in the number of naval officers and 
seamen needed to make the fleet seaworthy.  In speaking about the British navy in 
The Wooden World, Rodger observes that there ‘was no difficulty in waging war 
at sea which caused the Navy so much anguish as manning.  In almost every 
aspect of wartime operations, the problem of finding and keeping men was the 
first obstacle to be met, and the last to be overcome’1.  This was equally true for 
the Spanish navy.  In facing this challenge, however, Ferdinand did not attempt 
any revolutionary reforms but rather aimed at improving and expanding the 
existing organisation.  The Ordenanzas de Su Magestad para el Govierno Militar, 
Político y Económico de Su Armada Naval (Ordenanzas de Marina), published in 
1748, condensed previous rulings into this two volume work and established the 
code by which the naval service was to be organised2.  It dictated the structure and 
formation of the fleet, its squadrons and ships, outlining each person’s duties on 
land and at sea, the judicial code and its processes, and the government of its 
Pilot, Marine, Artillery and Guardias Marinas Corps.  And, as Ferdinand stated in 
                                                      
1 Rodger (1986) p.145 
2 It is important to emphasise the significance of this work because it has so frequently been 
dismissed as merely a Spanish imitation of the French Ordenances issued under Colbert.  Indeed, 
the Spanish were heavily influenced by the manner in which the French administered their navy 
and the Ordenanzas reflect this but they are also a statement of the manner in which the Spanish 
navy functioned.  Furthermore, they were only ‘revolutionary’ within Spain in that they provided 
one single code which all had to follow but what they dictated was a reflection of the existing 
régime rather than its absolute transformation.  
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the foreword, it was to be followed ‘infallibly’ and ‘without any deviation’3.  All 
senior officers were obliged to have copies and were required to educate their 
subordinates in them so that none was ignorant of the law.  Here, the navy created 
by this code will be analysed along with two of its most essential systems of 
enrolment – the Company of Guardias Marinas established for the recruitment 
and education of officers and the matrícula de mar, a register of men connected to 
the sea which the government could call upon to man its fleets. 
The Structure of the Spanish Navy 
The principal command structure discussed in previous chapters when examining 
shipbuilding and resources dealt with the administration of matters on dry land 
where the Intendants were at the top of each Department – Cadiz, Ferrol and 
Cartagena – and reported to the King via the Secretary of the Navy.  All subjects 
relating to the seagoing navy, its ships, officers and men came under a separate 
but parallel administration which, after the King, had the Director General of the 
Navy at its apex4. 
From 1750 to 1772, this post was held by the naval officer Juan José Navarro 
Viana y Búfalo, first Marquis de la Victoria.  Victoria’s rise to this position was 
preceded by a career of a little over forty years in the service of Spain.  He had 
begun his career as a soldier in the army, serving in Italy during the War of 
Spanish Succession, in the attack on Oran in 1708 and in the fighting in Spain 
                                                      
3 Ordenanzas (1748), vol. I, pp.1–2 
4 In the Ordenanzas (1748), vol.I, trat.1, tit.1, art.1, p.2, this was actually the Almirante General.  
This was a nominal post created in 1737 for the Infante Philip who had since departed for Italy to 
govern his own Kingdom, leaving this appointment vacant.  It was officially cancelled in October 
1748, see AGS Marina 768, ff.50–1, for the decree extinguishing the position of Almirante 
General and f.52 for instruction transferring right of appointments from the Infante Almirante to 
the King. 
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after 1709 before then transferring to the navy as marine infantry.  He then served 
on Gaztañeta’s fleet in Sardinia and Sicily during the War of the Quadruple 
Alliance and in the capture of Oran in 1732, gradually rising through the ranks of 
the navy until, in 1744, he was in command of the Spanish fleet that fought the 
British squadron commanded by Admiral Mathews at the Battle of Toulon5.  After 
winning what the Spanish perceived as a victory, he was rewarded with the title of 
Marquis de la Victoria.  He was in command of the Cartagena squadron for the 
remainder of the War of Austrian Succession until, on 28 February 1750, he was 
promoted Director General of the Navy6.   
As Director General, he had overall command of the seagoing navy under the 
King as well as the direction of Cadiz Department7.  The other two, Ferrol and 
Cartagena, were run by Comandantes Generales8 who were subordinate to 
Victoria but also reported directly to the King.  During Ferdinand’s reign, these 
posts were occupied by a number of naval officers but they were held most 
consistently by Francisco de Orozco9, who was in charge of Ferrol from 1755 to 
                                                      
5 Rodger (2004) p.243 
6 AGS Marina 768, f.105, Ensenada to Victoria, Madrid, 28 February 1750: ‘The Director General 
of the Navy, the Count of Bena, having died, the King has decided that Your Excellency should 
transfer to Cadiz with the command of that Department and in consequence to what is instructed in 
article 33 of the second tratado, first titulo of the Ordenanzas de Marina, you should take charge 
of the Direction General of the Navy, putting into execution that which is instructed in them for its 
better regime and discipline’. 
7 See Ordenanzas (1748), vol.I, trat.2, tit.1, pp.3–14 for a description of the Director General’s 
role.  To assist him, Victoria was also provided with a secretary and a Junta, see Ordenanzas 
(1748) vol.1, trat.2, tit.1, art.44 and 27, pp.11, 12.  The officers appointed to Victoria’s Junta in 
June 1750 were Joseph Soriano, the Count of Vegaflorida, Joaquín Manuel de Villena (future 
Marquis del Real Tesoro) and Francisco del Postigo, see AGS Marina 768, f.113, Ensenada to 
Victoria, 9 June 1750. 
8 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.I, trat.2, tit.2, pp.15–28 
9 Paula Pavía (1873), vol.III, pp.59–62.  This collected biography of notable Spanish naval officers 
is not only dated but also probably frequently inaccurate.  Baudot Monroy, for example, in her 
biography of Julián de Arriaga found that she had to revise much of Paula Pavía’s entry on this 
officer, see Baudot Monroy (2012) p.26.  The dearth of published information on the Spanish 
naval officer class, however, means that, for the moment, Paula Pavía’s work remains the only 
source of biographical data on many of the naval officers described in this and subsequent 
chapters. 
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1760, and by Juan Benito Spínola y Moro, 1st Marquis Spínola10, who was 
intermittently in charge of Cartagena from 1753 to 1761.  Like Victoria, both 
officers had long active careers in the navy dating back to the fleet dispatched to 
Sardinia in 1717.   
Under the Director General was the Mayor General, a post occupied by a naval 
administrator, Joachin de Aguirre, throughout this time.  He was responsible for 
the physical transmission of orders, relations with the army, record keeping, 
liaising with foreign ships in Spanish ports and updating and disseminating the 
1748 Ordenanzas (which he had compiled and published).  The Mayor General 
was required to reside in the same Department as the Director General, while his 
subordinates, the Ayudantes Mayores Generales, each with one assistant, would 
carry out these tasks in each of the other two Departments11. 
These men, along with all the squadron commanders, captains and lieutenants in 
the navy, encompassed the Estado General (or senior command) of this service12.  
The ranks which these officers could attain were, in ascending order, Alférez de 
Fragata, Alférez de Navío, Teniente de Fragata, Teniente de Navío, Capitán de 
Fragata, Capitán de Navío, Jefe de Escuadra, Teniente General and Capitán 
General, with Capitán General the equivalent of Admiral of the Fleet in the 
British navy and Teniente de Fragata equal to a Lieutenant13. 
                                                      
10 Ibid., vol.III, pp.537–41 
11 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.I, trat.2, tit.3, pp.28–45 
12 Ibid., vol.I, trat.2, tit.4, pp.46–65, ‘Del Comandante de Esquadra’; tit.5, pp.65–90. ‘Del Capitán 
Comandante de un navío o embarcación’; tit.6, pp.90–102, ‘De los Oficiales Subalternos’. 
13 Ibid., vol.I, trat.3, tit.1, art.1, pp.103–4.  Ranks were divided into ‘de fragata’ and ‘de navío’.  
This was merely an indication of rank rather than a differentiation of the commands they could 
hold, thus a Capitán de Fragata could command a battleship and a Capitán de Navío could be in 
charge of a frigate.  Mühlmann (1975), p.318, notes that in 1758 there was 1 Director General, 5 
Tenientes Generales, 33 Capitanes de Navío, 54 Capitanes de Fragata, 132 Tenientes de Navío, 
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Appointments to commissions for all naval officers were assigned according to 
the Escala (Ranking).  This list of officers was arranged by rank and seniority 
(determined by the date in which their contract was formalised) and, in principle, 
they took turns in commissions in accordance with this list.  Department 
Commanders were responsible for maintaining the Escala in their area and 
officers were expected to present themselves with their patents to the Commander 
as soon as they were assigned to a Department14.  Once an officer had carried out 
what was classified as one campaign he would have completed his turn and his 
name would revert to the end of the list.  Within this scheme, there was some 
flexibility, for both the King and the Department Commanders could appoint an 
officer they thought particularly suitable for a task from outside the list15.  As the 
number of senior officers, especially within the ranks of Tenientes Generales and 
Gefes de Esquadra, was not very great, many of these officers saw almost 
constant service during these years.  Blas de la Barreda16, for example, had 
command of a squadron in the Mediterranean from 1752 to 1755, except for brief 
spell in 1753 when he fell ill, before then transferring to the Havana squadron 
where he remained until 1761.  Other officers include Luis de Córdoba17, Daniel 
Huoni18, Agustin de Idiázquez19, Francisco de Lastarría20, Francisco de Rojas y 
                                                      
57 Tenientes de Fragata, 100 Aferezes de Navío and 116 Alferezes de Fragata.  A total of 504 
men in the Spanish officer class.   
14 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.I, trat.2, tit.2, art.24–28, p. 
15 Ibid., vol.I, trat.2, tit.2, art.27, p.24 
16 Paula Pavía (1873), vol.I, pp.121–6 
17 Ibid., vol.I, pp.333–5 
18 Ibid., vol.II, pp.199–201 
19 Ibid., vol.II, pp.297–9 
20 Ibid., vol.IV, pp.173–5 
 166 
Recaño21, Francisco Javier Tilly y Paredes22 and Alonso de la Rosa Labassor, 
Count of Vegaflorida23. 
The remainder of the crews, in addition to the squadron commanders, captains and 
lieutenants who formed the senior command, were composed of the petty officers, 
usually including a master pilot and his subordinates; the contramaestre 
(boatswain), who had a second contramaestre and two guardianes to assist him; 
the carpenters and caulkers (there were usually two of each per ship); the 
armourer; the sailmaker; the lamp-lighter (farolero); the cook; and the diver24.  
These men were selected for the ship by a Department’s Master Attendant.  Also, 
enjoying privileged status among the ship’s complement were the masters and 
crews of the launches and small boats.  On the whole, these were picked by the 
captain from the most able sailors.  Below them were the seamen, these were 
divided into three classes: sailors (able seamen), apprentices (or grumetes, young 
men of between 18 and 20 sometimes with some sea experience) and pages (boys 
of between 12 and 17)25.  These men comprised the gente de mar (or sailors) on 
board a ship and formed about half of its complement.  The remainder was made 
up of the marine infantry and artillery which were each separate bodies within the 
navy. 
The Batallones de Infantería de Marina were divided into eight battalions, each 
composed of six companies.  Each Company had a total of 122 men, consisting of 
the Company’s Captain, a lieutenant, an alférez, one first sergeant, five ordinary 
                                                      
21 Ibid., vol.I, pp.263–5 
22 Ibid., vol.I, pp.225–33 
23 Ibid., vol.III, pp.839–46 
24 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.I, trat.4, tit.2–5, pp.174–211 
25 See Phillips (2007), pp.80–1, for descriptions of each of these types of sailors. 
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sergeants, 12 squadron colonels, three drummers and 98 soldiers26.  On the whole, 
one complete Company was expected to serve on a battleship as its garrison, 
though smaller ships, such as frigates and xabeques could only support smaller 
contingents27.  The Battalions were governed by their own Estado Mayor 
consisting of the Commander-in-Chief, who was based in the Corps’ main base 
(Cadiz) and answered directly to the Director General28, and two subordinate 
commanders who represented him in Ferrol and Cartagena29.  In addition and also 
distributed among the three Departments, there were three battalion inspectors 
(responsible for supervising the well-being of the troops and thus responsible to 
the Director General of the Navy rather than the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Corps) and three sergeant majors30 (responsible for discipline, training and the 
economic management of the Corps).  The Battalions’ musicians, consisting of 
four drummers and eight musicians, were also included in the Estado Mayor31.  
The size of this force, excluding the senior command, was 5,856 men.  
Recruitment for this Corps was the direct responsibility of Company Captains, 
who, like Captains in the Army were responsible for the 109 men in their 
                                                      
26 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.II, trat.8, tit.1, art.1, 12, pp.99–100, 103 
27 Ibid., vol.II, trat.8, tit.14, pp.287–304, on the duties of the tropa on board warships. 
28 From 1756, this post belonged ‘acting’ to Gutierre de Hevia, future Marquis del Real 
Transporte, and permanently from 1759, see Paula Pavía (1873), vol.III, pp.285–98.  His career 
provides an interesting example of the juxtaposed nature of service in the Navy and service in the 
Marine Infantry.  Having entered the Navy as a Guardia Marina in 1720, he was promoted 
through the ranks of the navy, being made Alférez de Fragata in 1726, Alférez de Navío in 1727, 
Teniente de Fragata in 1733, Teniente de Navío also in 1733 and Capitán de Navío in 1747.  At 
the same time, he was appointed Teniente of the 2nd Company of the 4th Battalion in 1729, Captain 
of the 3rd Company of the 2nd Battalion in 1733, and Captain of the 5th Company of the 2nd 
Battalion in 1737.  On board ships, he generally served in the marine garrison which was not an 
impediment to his gaining the sea command of the Havana squadron in 1751 and again, most 
famously, in 1761. 
29 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.II, trat.8, tit.1, art.4, p.100, and the whole of tit. 2, pp. 108–22, on the 
duties of the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate commanders 
30 Ibid., vol.II, trat.8, tit.1, art.5, p.101, also tit.3, pp.123–39, on the duties of the Inspector and 
Sub-Inspectors, and art.6, p.101, also tit.4, pp.139–58, on the duties of the Sergeant Majors and 
their Assistants. 
31 Ibid., vol.II, trat.8, tit.1, art.9, p.102 
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Company and answerable if they failed to maintain their numbers32.  Soldiers 
joining the Corps had to commit to eight years’ service though this could be 
reduced to five or six in times of emergency, they had to be subjects of the King 
of Spain (by contrast foreigners were welcome in the mariner contingent of the 
navy), Roman Catholic and between the ages of 18 and 45 though drummer boys 
could be as young as 1433. 
Similar to the Battalions as a separate body within the navy were the Brigadas de 
Artillería de Marina.  This gunnery corps consisted of 1,000 men divided into 
eight brigades, excluding the senior command.  Each Brigade was made up of 125 
men and consisted of eight sergeants (condestables), eight first corporals (cabos), 
eight second corporals, a drummer and 100 artillerymen.  The men were divided 
into three classes – 12 bombadiers, 44 gunners and 44 assistants (ayudantes)34.  
The general rule was that there should be one gunner per four guns on each of the 
King’s ships but, in practice, the numbers varied35.  The Brigades were governed 
by the Comisario General, again answerable directly to the Director General of 
the Navy, based at the Department in which the Corps had its headquarters 
(Cadiz) and represented by Comisarios Provinciales in the other two 
Departments36.  They were assisted by two first Comisarios Ordinarios and four 
second Comisarios Ordinarios, bomb- and fire-ship officers, storekeepers, their 
assistants and master gunsmiths37.  Recruitment was arranged in the same way as 
that of the Battalions and artillerymen also required many of the same 
                                                      
32 Ibid., vol.II, trat.8, tit.7, art.1, 3, and tit.8, pp.183–4, 184, 198–216, on the funds which Captains 
were granted to ensure their Companies were complete, dressed and armed. 
33 Ibid., vol.II, trat.8, tit.9, art.5–10 
34 Ibid., vol.II, trat.9, tit.2, art.1 and 3 
35 Ibid., vol.II, trat.9, tit.9, art.1, p.412 
36 From 1749 to 1763, the post of Comisario General was occupied by José Manuel de Villena, 
Marquis del Real Tesoro, see Paula Pavía (1873), vol.III, pp.273–4 
37 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.II, trat.9, tit.1, pp.326–36 
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characteristics as the infantry though in addition they also had to pass a physical 
examination by a surgeon confirming them to be at least 5’2 feet tall, robust, and 
without handicap such as shortness of sight, heart problems or other physical 
defect38.   
Both bodies, the Infantry Battalions and the Artillery Brigades, were trained in 
military manoeuvres so that when on land they could be incorporated into the 
army’s infantry and artillery regiments.  The Ordenanzas ruled, for example, that: 
 The Corps of Marine Battalions will be considered, in whatever place it is 
located, as a regular body of Spanish Infantry; and as such, it will alternate [tasks] 
with those [regiments] of the Army … occupying the place that applies to it in 
line with its seniority which dates from the year 1737 after the Regiment of the 
Crown39. 
The equipment of the Marine Infantry was the same as that of the Army 
Infantry and the Artillery Brigades were trained as much in the use of land 
artillery as of naval gunnery40.  On board ships both bodies, though the Infantry in 
particular, stood apart from the Gente de Mar.  Though Marines could be called 
upon in emergencies to man the pumps or assist in changing the sails, officers 
were not to: 
 abuse this in order to employ them without urgency in those tasks which, 
being rightfully those of the mariners, can be carried out by these alone; neither 
will they try to make a soldier function as a mariner, rather in all the tasks in 
which he assists, he will be treated with the distinction which corresponds to the 
different practice of his profession41. 
The regular role of the Marine Infantry when forming the garrison of a 
ship, however, was to keep the watch (divided into three sections), maintain 
                                                      
38 Ibid., vol.II, trat.9, tit.4, pp.357–66, on the Commanders’ duties to keep the Brigades complete 
and funds they are to be given for the purpose, and tit.2, art.7, pp.339–40. 
39 Ibid., vol.II, trat.8, tit.1, art.3, p.100 
40 Ibid., vol.II, trat.9, tit.7, pp.385–402, on the theoretical and practical teaching for the Brigades, 
more specifically articles 30–33. 
41 Ibid., vol.II, trat.8, tit.14, art.27, p.298 
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discipline, guard prisoners, inspect vessels coming alongside, supervise the 
distribution of rations, assist and supervise any loading or unloading of water, 
victuals or provisions, and, during combat, provide the musket-fire42.  On ships, 
they would occupy the lower deck on three deckers and from the powder-room 
bulkhead to the mainmast of the gundeck on two deckers, form their own messes 
(from which the Gente de Mar were barred) and clean their own berths43.  On 
land, marine infantry was employed in guarding arsenals, reinforcing local 
garrisons or as companies within the army44. 
Similarly, the regular duties of Brigade Artillerymen serving on board a ship were 
to load and unload the cannon and munitions, join the Marine Infantry as part of 
the watch but with special concern for the protection of munitions (particularly 
the gunpowder room), join with the Infantry on expeditions off the ship, replace 
the Marines when these were insufficient (for which reason they were also to be 
trained in musketry) and, during battle, direct the gun crews45.  Even though 
Artillerymen were preferably to be picked from Gente de Mar46, therefore, their 
role on board battleships was very different from that of the seamen. 
The appointment to sea campaigns of both the Infantry Battalions and the 
Artillery Brigades was determined using an escala in a fashion similar to the 
manner in which the appointments of naval officers were arranged47.  As not all 
campaigns were considered equal, however, three rotas existed which separated 
service in the Indies from service at sea in European waters and from service on 
                                                      
42 Ibid., vol.II, trat.8, tit.14, pp.287–303, on the service of the tropa on board ships. 
43 Ibid., vol.II, trat.8, tit.14,  art.38, pp.302–3, and vol.I, trat.3, tit.5, art.20 and 22, pp.156, 157 
44 Ibid., vol.II, trat.8, tit.15, pp.304–15, on the duties of the tropa ashore. 
45 Ibid., vol.II, trat.9, tit.9, pp.412–25, on the duties of the artillery brigades on warships. 
46 Ibid., vol.II, trat.9, tit.2, art.9, p.340 
47 Ibid., vol.II, trat.8, tit.13, ‘De las escalas para las salidas de las Compañias’ and trat.9, tit.8, art.2 
and tit.9, art.2–3, pp.269–86, 403, 413 
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land.  Infantry and Artillery Companies would be on all three lists and even if, for 
example, they had just completed a campaign in European waters and their turn 
came up on the Indies list, they would have to complete this as well.  If they came 
to the top of two lists at the same time then they would carry out whichever 
campaign came up first and the Company behind them on the other list would 
take their turn. 
Examples of the average composition of crews, including the proportions of these 
that were formed by the Marine Infantry and Artillery, are shown in Table 11.1 in 
the appendices.  On the whole, the number of sailors on board amounted to just 
under half the crew, the Marines were the most numerous after these and then the 
Artillery.  If we compare these figures to the muster of the San José, which sailed 
from Cadiz in 1704 with 64 pieces of bronze artillery, as described in The 
Treasure of the San José, the sailor to soldier ratio had not altered significantly 
since the beginning of the eighteenth century48.  On the whole, the number of men 
that formed Spanish crews did not differ substantially from that of British crews49.  
It seems that large Spanish ships such as the San Felipe had fewer men than their 
British equivalents and smaller vessels, such as the frigates and xabeques, carried 
more men than British frigates and sloops.   
These examples, however, are only representative and ships’ musters varied 
significantly.  In waiting for a favourable wind to sail from Cadiz Bay, for 
example, Francisco de Orozco’s flagship the 70-gun Infante reported having a 
crew of 611 on 9 March 1754, three days later this had been reduced to 585 and 
                                                      
48 See Appendix 11, Table 11.2 
49 See Appendix 11, Table 11.3 
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when she sailed on 5 July 1754, she only had 508 men on board50.  This could 
have been the result of desertion or quite simply that men came to the end of their 
term or were transferred to other ships in the meantime.  Numbers also differed 
from ship to ship, even when, as in the following example, ships had the same 
rating, design and Master Shipwright.  The Aquilón and the Oriente sailed from 
Ferrol on 26 April 1754 with crews of 534 and 556 respectively51.  More of a 
difference was visible in smaller vessels, such as the xabeques, because they 
varied substantially in design and size.  Larger xabeques, such as the Cazador, 
Volante and Galgo had crews of about 250 men, while smaller ones, such as the 
Mallorquin and Valenciano, had crews of only between 100 and 120 men52.  
Furthermore, these figures provide examples of real ship complements rather than 
desired ship complements (as established by a decree of 1788) which were 
generally more numerous53. 
                                                      
50 AGS Marina 439, ‘Estado de las tripulaciones y guarniciones de que está dotada la esquadra del 
mando del Jefe D. Francisco de Orozco, según revista que le passe en cinco del presente mes a 
saber’, on board the Infante at anchor in Cadiz, 9 March 1754, ‘Estado en que oy día de la fha se 
halla el navío de 70 cañones el Infante pronto a hazer vela de esta Bahía, a el primer favorable 
tiempo’, Pedro Castejón, Cadiz, 12 March 1754, ‘Relación de los oficiales mayores, y demás 
individuos con que salieron de este Puerto tripulados y guarnecidos los vaxeles de la esquadra del 
Jefe D. Francisco de Orozco en cinco del corriente mes’, Cartagena, 10 July 1754, Manuel de la 
Riva. 
51 Ibid., ‘Estado en que sale de este Puerto el navío el Aquilón, mandado por el Capitán de Navío 
D. Francisco Lastarria en 26 de abril de 1754’ and ‘Estado en que sale a navegar el navío el 
Oriente, mandado por el Capitán de Navío D. Juan Ignacio Salaverria en 26 de Abril de 1754’. 
52 AGS Marina 438, ‘Estado que comprehende las tripulaciones y guarniciones que se hallaron 
efectivas en los vaxeles y javeques de que se compone la esquadra del mando del Jefe D. Pedro 
Messía de la Cerda en revista executada a sus bordos desde 27 hasta 30 de noviembre de 1750 por 
el Ministro y Contador de ella’, San Felipe, anchored in Cartagena Bay, 10 December 1750, AGS 
Marina 439, ‘Relación de los oficiales mayores, y demás individuos con que salieron de este 
Puerto tripulados y guarnecidos los vaxeles de la esquadra del Jefe D. Francisco de Orozco en 
cinco del corriente mes’, Cartagena, 10 July 1754, Manuel de la Riva, and ‘Relación de los 
oficiales mayores, y demás individuos con que salieron de este Puerto tripulados y guarnecidos los 
vaxeles de la esquadra del Jefe D. Francisco de Orozco en cinco del corriente mes’, Cartagena, 10 
July 1754, Manuel de la Riva. 
53 Mühlmann (1975), pp.123–6, gives a detailed list of the official ship complements taken from 
the Reglamento General de las Guarniciones, y Tripulaciones, con que ha resuelto el Rey se 
armen en adelante los buques de su Real Armada, tanto en tiempo de paz como de guerra, con 
proporción a sus portes y calibres de la artillería, que montan, San Lorenzo, 1788.  This dictated 
that ships with 112 guns have a total complement of 848 men, those with 94 guns 802 men, 80 
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In spite of the fact that these figures are only approximate, it is possible to form an 
idea of the number of men that Ensenada would most likely have needed to man 
the navy of 60 battleships and 60 frigates plus smaller vessels he proposed 
building54.  If the mean average of battleship musters was the same as that of the 
three battleships shown here, the San Felipe, Aquilón and América, which was 
563, then 33,780 men would have been necessary to man the battleships.  And, if 
that of the smaller vessels, like the Liebre and Jupiter, was 197 then a further 
11,820 men would also have been required.  So, in order to raise 45,618 men for 
the navy the systems of recruitment, the Company of Guardias Marinas for 
officers and the matrícula de mar for the seamen, would obviously have had to be 
much expanded and improved. 
The Company of Guardias Marinas and its Development during 
Ferdinand’s Reign 
The Company of Guardias Marinas was the principal route down which young 
noblemen could enter the navy during the reign of Ferdinand VI.  As such it 
received a lot of attention during these years in the hope of maximising Spanish 
officer potential. This was attempted through such measures as improving its 
leadership, increasing its intake and reforming the curriculum at its Academy. 
José Patiño had established the Company of Guardias Marinas in 1717.  It was 
based solely in Cadiz until branches of it were also opened in Ferrol and 
Cartagena in 1776.  Young officers who attended it, in particular the socially 
privileged, frequently preceded attendance there with a spell of service in the 
                                                      
guns 642, 74 guns 510, 68–70 guns 477, 64 guns 453, 58–60 guns 425, 50–54 guns 373, 44 guns 
299, 40 guns 289, 34 guns 282, 26–30 guns 221, 18 guns 128.  Xabeques with 34 guns were to 
have 299 men, 30–32 guns 280, 26–28 guns 250, 18 guns 188 and 16–20 guns 134. 
54 See p.28 
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Order of Malta’s galley fleet in the Mediterranean so that they would already have 
had some sea experience by the time they came to the Academy55. 
One of the earliest reforms made to the Company during Ferdinand’s rule was to 
replace the existing leadership with higher status individuals.  This was designed 
to reflect the increased prestige of the corps.  Jorge Juan y Santacilia, whose 
importance has already been discussed, replaced Pedro de Urrutía as Captain of 
the Company on 13 November 175156.  Appointed with him were Antonio de 
Ulloa as Teniente (Juan’s deputy) of the Company, like Juan another significant 
choice, and Lucas García as Alférez.  At the Academy, Pedro Manuel Cedillo, 
Director since 1728, was replaced by Louis Godin, a former member of the elite 
French Academy of Sciences and nominal leader of the geodesic expedition to 
South America in which Juan and Ulloa had also participated57.  Godin was not 
the only foreigner appointed to teach at the Academy at this time, Almon Hill, a 
British shipwright, became teacher of naval construction on 5 July 1752 and two 
Frenchmen, J. Perinat and Francois Thuiller, became fencing and drawing masters 
respectively in 175358. 
During Ferdinand’s reign, the Company remained structurally unchanged from 
the way it had been at the date of its foundation.  The higher management 
consisted of the Captain (Juan), the Teniente (Ulloa) and the Alférez (Garcia), as 
well as two assistants.  Below them were a chaplain, four musicians and two 
drummers.  The main body of the Company, which accounted for the 150 men 
                                                      
55 See p.210, fn.36, for an example of naval officers who had preceded joining the Company with 
service in Malta’s galleys. 
56 AGS Marina 83, ‘Expediente’ on Empleos en Guardias Marinas, 13 September 1751 
57 Ibid., Joseph Marin to Ensenada, 27 January 1750 
58 AGS Marina 83, ‘Expediente’ on Hill’s appointment, 5 July 1752 and ‘Expediente’ on their 
appointment in ‘Empleos en Guardias Marinas’ and Thuiller to Jaime Masones de Lima y 
Sotomayor, Cadiz, 11 December 1753. 
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allowed for in the Ordenanzas, included four Brigadiers, eight Sub-Brigadiers and 
138 cadets59.  In 1752, Juan set about convincing Ensenada to enlarge this 
number.  He reasoned that the education of Guardias Marinas lasted seven years 
and, as a result, only a seventh of them would graduate annually.  Of the total of 
150 men, about ten would have to be discounted as about this number were likely 
to leave the service.  From the total of 140 men, therefore, 20 were likely to 
graduate yearly.  Juan assumed that Ensenada’s proposed navy would require an 
officer corps of about 1,000 men.  Annual losses would reduce these by about 
three per cent as a result of fatalities and a further one per cent would retire.   If 
the officer corps was likely to be reduced by 4 per cent on an annual basis then 40 
Guardias Marinas would need to graduate every year to replace losses.  He 
concluded: ‘Sir, if His Majesty wishes to keep the navy on the footing that is 
aimed for, it is necessary, therefore, to augment the number of Guardias Marinas 
to at least 300’60.  Ensenada granted Juan permission for this expansion noting 
that he should be informed once that figure reached 200 but also asking that it be 
done ‘without making it public, instead keeping it quiet’ and each cadet admitted 
over the 150 prescribed in the Ordenanzas should be notified that the King had 
made a special exception in admitting him61.  The reason for Ensenada’s desire to 
keep the Company’s expansion quiet remains unclear but perhaps it tied in with 
his wish to keep Spain’s naval growth secret from other European powers for as 
long as possible.  In the end, however, his worries were irrelevant as such an 
increase in the number of cadets proved difficult to implement and by 1754 only 
                                                      
59 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.II, trat.7, tit.1, art.1, pp.1–2; The senior officers were already graduated 
from the Academy and the chaplain and musicians were seperate appointments. 
60 AGS Marina 83, Juan to Ensenada, Madrid, 10 March 1752 
61 See p.24 for Ensenada’s desire for secrecy. 
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between 15 and 20 extra cadets had been admitted62.  This was largely the result 
of a lack of interest among the nobility which valued traditional feudal definitions 
of status, such as ownership of land and possession of titles, above careers in what 
was perceived as the lesser military service which held less promise of material 
rewards.   
The criteria for joining the Guardias Marinas required each candidate to present 
certificates, issued by the local authorities where they lived, confirming the 
nobility of their parents and grandparents as well as guaranteeing the honorability 
of their family63.  Potential cadets had to be between the ages of 14 and 18 
(though in exceptional circumstances they could be as young as 12 and as old as 
20), literate, physically suitable and approved under examination by the Captain 
of the Company64.  Among those who were eligible, preference would be given to 
the sons of naval and military officers, to boys with distinguished noble 
backgrounds and to those who had attended the Academy prior to applying and 
who showed some talent65.  Once they had obtained their commissions, only the 
King had the power to remove them66. 
After their admission, cadets would have to reside in the Company’s barracks 
from which they could not then be absent without a permit and, like other officers 
in the navy, they were strictly forbidden to get married without the King’s 
permission67.  Brigadiers and Sub-Brigadiers would earn 15 vellon escudos a 
month, cadets would get 12 escudos, drummers 12 escudos and musicians 42 
                                                      
62 Lafuente and Sellés (1988) p.88 
63 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.II, trat.7, tit.2, art.6, pp.15–6 
64 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.2, art.5, 10, 11, p.15, 17, 17–8 
65 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.2, art.7 and 13, pp.16, 18 
66 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.2, art.22, p.21 
67 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.4, art.1 and 4, 22 and 25, pp.33, 34, 40, 41 
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escudos.  Each would have 8 maravedis per escudo witheld to contribute to their 
pensions, receive one and a half rations daily and 3 escudos a month would be 
given on their behalf to the gran masa, a fund set aside to purchase uniforms and 
arms68.  Organised into four brigades, their day would begin with mass, followed 
by attendance at the Academy and the parade ground for the remainder of the 
day69.   
At the Academy, cadets were expected to follow a strict curriculum but this varied 
substantially during the first half of the eighteenth century.  Its development over 
these years reflects the varying attitudes to the education naval officers were 
expected to follow.  Patiño’s founding document for the Company, the 
Instrucción sobre diferentes puntos, que se han de observar en el Cuerpo de la 
Marina de España; y ha de tener fuerza de Ordenanzas, hasta que su Magestad 
mande publicar las que inviolablemente deberán practicarse (1717)70, is set out 
in the first timetable in Appendix 12.  This curriculum was to be taught over the 
course of two semesters, the first from October to March with lessons from 
Monday to Saturday from 7 to 12 in the mornings and 2 to 5 in the afternoons and 
the second from April to September with lessons from Monday to Saturday from 
6 to 11 in the morning and from 3 to 6 in the afternoon.  Since Guardias Marinas 
were expected to complete the course alongside their naval service duties, this, 
therefore, represented a very demanding curriculum with a wide breadth of 
subjects.  It seems, however, that it was never fully introduced and it failed to 
make its mark as an elite institution in the wider world, especially after it was 
attended unsatisfactorily by 22 Russian naval officers sent by Peter the Great in 
                                                      
68 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.3, art.1, 4, 12, 18, p.21–2, 22, 25, 27 
69 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.4, art.8, 16, 18 and 19, pp.35, 38, 38 and 39 
70 AGS Marina 3003.  Also Lafuente y Sellés (1988) p.56 
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1717 who left before completing the course71.  In 1735, a new syllabus addressed 
the need to combine education with active naval service by reducing the amount 
of study time from seven hours daily to two (10–12 a.m. during the winter 
semester and 9–11 a.m. during the summer semester) and reducing the variety of 
the subject matter at the Academy72.    
In 1748, however, yet another revised syllabus was published in the Ordenanzas 
de Marina which again increased the amount of lesson time as well as the breadth 
of subject matter which cadets were expected to master73.  In order to capitalise on 
their time in the Academy, their practical experience and duties as naval officers 
were reduced and modified.  Instead of functioning as naval officers while at the 
Academy in order to gain practical experience, the King would periodically make 
one or two of his frigates available to the Company so that about 20 of the most 
talented Guardias Marinas could be put on board, generally commanded by either 
the Teniente or the Alférez of the Company, to practise all types of naval 
operations, such as piloting, manoeuvering the ship, handling the guns and 
climbing aloft74.  Those who showed talent in shipbuilding would be taken by the 
teacher to the arsenals to assist with the work there and, similarly, those who had 
shown skill with artillery would be taken to practise gunnery with the artillery 
brigades on their parade ground75.  When the Department was carrying out naval 
evolutions or exercises, the most talented students from the Company would also 
be required to attend76.  Only once cadets had sufficiently advanced in their 
                                                      
71 Blanca Carlier (1991) pp.11–44 
72 See Timetable 2 in Appendix 12. 
73 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.II, trat.7, tit.6, pp.51–72, ‘De los exercicios de la Academia’.  Lafuente 
and Sellés (1988) pp.78–9.  See Timetable 3, Appendix 12. 
74 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.II, trat.7, tit.6, art.44–53, pp.67–70 
75 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.6, art.54–55, 56–7, pp.70–1, 71–2 
76 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.6, art.58, p.72 
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studies so that they could afford some time away from the Academy would they 
be permitted to serve on campaigns as junior officers on the King’s warships but 
their education would be continued on board with a focus on nautical instruments 
and they would be examined on their return77. 
The post of first mathematics teacher would usually be filled by the Director of 
the Academy78.  He would be supported by two additional mathematics teachers 
as well as artillery, shipbuilding, naval evolutions, fortification and drawing, 
fencing, dancing, and foreign languages instructors79.  In the morning session, 
cadets would be divided into three classes.  The third being attended only by the 
most talented who would be taught advanced subjects directly by the Director80.  
In the afternoon, those in the first mathematics class would learn drawing and 
fortification, the second would learn artillery and the third shipbuilding81.  After 
this, they would divide into their four brigades and alternate in learning foreign 
languages, dance, fencing or military manoeuvres on the parade ground82. 
Though the Director had overall control of the curriculum and teaching methods, 
as a general rule lessons would be taught by dictation83.  It is interesting though 
that Juan sought to improve resources, noting that ‘many things had not been put 
into practice by his predecessors for lack of facilities for them’.  Now, 
 the language teacher needs a library, the shipbuilding and manoeuvres 
teachers need suitable shipmodels, the artillery teacher needs a cannon with all its 
gear and munitions and the Director needs a complete set of instruments.  All of 
                                                      
77 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.8, art.2, 12, 34, 39–40, pp.82, 86, 95–6, 97–8.  Their standing on the ships 
was above the troops and sailors, including sergeants and oficiales de mar but subordinate to all 
the oficiales de guerra. 
78 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.5, art.1, p.42 
79 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.5, art.3 and 4, p.43 
80 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.6, art.12 to 15, pp.55–6 
81 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.6, art.26, p.60 
82 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.6, art.34, p.63 
83 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.6, art.18, 37, pp.57, 64 
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this, with Your Excellency’s protection and instruction, I hope to put in place 
once I have gone to Cadiz, where the books and instruments that I brought from 
Britain and France are already waiting so that with the making of ship and gun 
models all that is necessary will be complete84.  
In addition, students would have access to teachers after hours and 
talented students could use the library at any time85.  Lessons were not to be 
interrupted for any reason and guards would be posted at each classroom to ensure 
discipline86.  Students were asked to respect the authority of the teachers and 
teachers were asked to respect the nobility and status of their students87. 
To incentivise and control students, exams would be held each month, of which 
the most important was that held at the end of the year88.  Students who excelled 
in this would be picked to take part in a further exam, called the Conclusiones, 
which would take place before the Director General of the Navy and from which a 
variety of prizes could be won89.  Each topic would take 2! hours, the winner of 
the first one, which was on theoretical and practical navigation, would be 
appointed an Alférez de Fragata90, the second and third topics would be on 
shipbuilding and manoeuvres respectively and the prize for each of these would 
be an extra escudo added to their salary for the remainder of their time in the 
Company91.  The prize for artillery would be an engraved short sword valued at 
four or five doubloons, that for drawing and military fortification would be a 
mathematical case or some instrument and if there were any that excelled in 
advanced mechanics, astronomy and geometry, they would be given a collection 
                                                      
84 AGS Marina 83, Juan to Ensenada, Madrid, 26 March 1752 
85 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.II, trat.7, tit.6, art.21–2, p.58 
86 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.6, art.51, 53, pp.69, 70 
87 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.6, art.20, p.58 
88 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.7, art.2–3, p.73 
89 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.7, art.3–7, pp.73–5 
90 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.7, art.8, p.75 
91 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.7, art.9, p.75 
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of works written by the most celebrated authors on those subjects92. Once students 
were sufficiently advanced, they would be put forward for officer posts by their 
Captain and examined by the Director General of the Navy to ensure they were of 
the right quality93. 
All this demonstrates, therefore, that many attempts were made during the reign 
of Ferdinand VI to improve the Company of Guardias Marinas and its Academy.  
Those in charge were replaced by higher status individuals, such as Juan, Ulloa 
and Godin, efforts were made to expand the number of cadets so as to 
accommodate the increased number of officers that would be required for an 
enlarged navy and various reforms were made to the education of cadets. 
The Matrícula de Mar and its Effectiveness 
The matrícula de mar was a register of men with professions connected to the sea 
who could be called upon for naval service by the Crown94.  It had been 
introduced as a system of recruitment in 1717 by Ensenada’s predecessor, José 
Patiño, who had most likely been inspired by the French equivalent founded by 
Colbert in 1668.  After its establishment in Spain, it was substantially reorganised 
in 1726 to be in line with the newly-established Naval Departments, and in 1737 
legislation, commonly referred to as the ‘Ordenanza del Infante Almirante’95, was 
                                                      
92 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.7, art.10, p.76 
93 Ibid., vol.II, trat.7, tit.7, art.22–3, pp.80–1 
94 Ships were not crewed by registered men alone, volunteers were also taken on.  For this, Spain 
sought to attract foreigners into the service, as Ensenada wrote on 28 April 1749 this was ‘one of 
the most essential matters in the Service’, that of attracting ‘the greatest number of foreign seamen 
possible, to serve, especially in the warships that are and are to be fitted out, because in this way 
our own national registered seamen will not be so encumbered’, AGS Marina 768, ff.79–80, 
Ensenada to Varas, Freyre, Barrero and Contamina, Aranjuez, 28 April 1749.  Volunteers, 
however, were not to exceed a third of the crew.  As Arriaga later insisted this was because a 
higher proportion would be detrimental to the training of matriculated men, see AGS Marina 439, 
Arriaga to Barrero, Madrid, 7 September 1754. 
95 See Salas (1870), pp.167–74, for a full transcription of the ‘Ordenanza del Infante Almirante’. 
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issued outlining its parameters.  These were reissued, with few modifications, 
during Ferdinand’s reign in the Ordenanzas de Marina in 174896.  And further 
legislation published in 1751 in the form of the Ordenanza para el régimen y 
fomento de la marinería matrículada que debe servir en su Armada Naval refined 
the manner in which the register functioned. 
In theory, all candidates would register themselves on a list kept by each locality’s 
Ministro de Marina.  These would be divided into four groups, or quadrillas, and 
every year all the men in the quadrilla whose turn it was would remain within 
their province ready to serve their King and at an easy distance to the port in 
which they were matriculated.  If they were called upon to do so, then this would 
be for no more than a year, beginning with the day they left their homes (which 
was also the start date of their pay) and ending with the day they returned to them.  
This relatively short period of service was expected to benefit the Crown by 
ensuring that the men would comply willingly whereas they would probably be 
unwilling to serve for a longer period since their essentially rural origins required, 
like their equivalents working in the arsenals, their presence at home with a 
certain amount of regularity.  In addition, brief but regular bouts at sea were 
expected to increase the overall abilities of those on the register.   
Many incentives were offered to encourage men to matriculate.  Firstly, all 
professions relating to the sea or navigation, such as fishing, loading and 
unloading vessels, or service at sea on merchantmen or coastal craft, were 
forbidden to anyone who was not registered97.  As a result, neither could men who 
                                                      
96 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.I, trat.4, tit.6, pp.211–21, ‘De las exempciones que ha de gozar la gente 
que se matrícule para servicio de la Armada’. 
97 Ibid., vol.I, trat.4, tit.6, art.1–5, 7, pp.211–3 
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were not matriculated be enlisted in the workers’ guilds of any of these 
professions.  Those who signed up were also freed from certain civic 
responsibilities, such as military service (sorteo de quintas and levas de gente), 
the housing of officers and soldiers, and certain financial dues, such as bagajes, 
depósitos, tutelas and mayordomías98.  In addition, they were placed under naval 
rather than civilian jurisdiction which was considered more lenient than that of the 
civilian courts and offered them greater protection against their neighbours99.  
Lastly, those who were registered would be eligible for a pension once they had 
either reached the age of 60 or completed 30 years service without ever being 
suspected of desertion100.   
The 1751 Ordenanza de Matrícula also ruled that inspections of each 
Department’s register should be carried out regularly.  One such was carried out 
in 1754, giving us a tentative idea of the number of men available to the navy 
under the matrícula.  At this time, each Department was assigned a Ministro de 
Inspector – Francisco Nuñez Ibáñez for Cartagena, Francisco Pasqual y Sedano 
for Ferrol and Fernando Bustillo for Cadiz101.  They were instructed, as Nuñez 
Ibáñez’s orders demonstrate, to ascertain the accuracy of the register with the 
assistance of officials from the Department and a surgeon able to ascertain the 
physical condition of the men102. 
In Cartagena, Nuñez Ibáñez discovered, that the Department had a total of 4,594 
seamen available, most of whom were of average ability, and 421 maestranza 
                                                      
98 Ibid., vol.I, trat.4, tit.6, art.6, 9, 10, pp.213, 214, 215 
99 Ibid., vol.I, trat.4, tit.6, art.11, p.215 
100 Ibid., vol.I, trat.4, tit.6, art.23–26, pp.219–20 
101 Their reports were compiled with much variation which is the reason why the following tables 
are set out separately rather than compiled into one. 
102 AGS Marina 300, Ensenada to Nuñez Ibáñez, Buen Retiro, 9 March 1754 
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(skilled workers, such as carpenters and caulkers, who could be employed in both 
the arsenals and on ships)103.  The 5,012 sailors and 391 maestranza reported by 
Placido de Leyba to be available in Catalonia and Tortosa can be added to this 
figure as well since this region also came under the remit of Cartagena104.  Thus, 
Cartagena’s register consisted of 9,606 sailors and 812 maestranza.  In Ferrol, 
Pasqual y Sedano reported that in the seven provinces that comprised Ferrol 
Department – Pontevedra, Corunna, Ferrol, Viveiro, Aviles, Rivadesella and 
Santander – there were a total of 8,810 sailors and 526 maestranza available, in 
addition to a substantial number of retired men105.  The results of Bustillo’s 
inspection of the register of Cadiz were delayed until 1756, possibly as a result of 
the falling out which he had with the Marquis of Casinas who felt that Bustillo 
had failed to respect his senior status106.  In them, however, he revealed that in the 
ports of Cadiz, Malaga, San Lucar de Barrameda, Ayamonte, Seville, Tarifa, 
Almeria, Motril and Xerez de la Frontera the Department had 7,452 men on the 
rolls, of which 4,506 were available, and 3,822 men were absent.  Of the latter, 
only the 1,135 employed by the navy, 1,110 on private vessels and 443 absent 
with licence and known location could be accounted for.  In total, therefore, Cadiz 
was found to have 10,140 sailors107 and 763 maestranza available in 1756108. 
                                                      
103 See Appendix 13, Table 13.1. 
104 See Appendix 13, Table 13.2.  The area which Nuñez Ibáñez had to cover was probably too 
extensive, especially as he had to sail to Mallorca and Ibiza, so Placido de Leyba was asked to 
report on Catalonia’s register instead.  His papers are, nevertheless, included with Nuñez Ibáñez’s 
in AGS Marina 300.  
105 See Appendix 13, Table 13.3. 
106 Proceedings for this case can be found in AGS Marina 300, ‘Expediente’ on Cadiz’s inspection, 
1756. 
107 This figure excludes those who were absent and could not be accounted for because other 
Inspectors also excluded these from their final figures. 
108 See Appendix 13, Table 13.4. 
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In the mid-1750s, therefore, there were 28,556 matriculated sailors and 2,101 
matriculated maestranza available to the navy109.  If these were broken down into 
quadrillas, this left an annual total of 7,139 sailors and 525 maestranza.  Spain, of 
course, was at peace during the 1750s so only a small proportion of men were 
required to man the fleets and, in times of war, more than one quadrilla could be 
called upon at one time but this figure, nevertheless, still fell far short of the 
earlier estimate of 45,618 men necessary to man 60 battleships and 60 smaller 
vessels.  More specifically, this total of 28,556 sailors most likely reflected the 
size of the Spanish shipping industry because all those involved in this were 
required by law to be registered110.  In Mahan’s opinion, this is what provided a 
country with ‘staying power’ or a ‘reserve force’ in war at sea111.  It was certainly 
what permitted Britain, despite its small population, to muster 81,929 men for its 
navy in 1762, the year in which war was declared on Spain112.  The fact that Spain 
could not compete with these figures put it at a grave disadvantage to its European 
rivals because, as Sir Charles Napier emphasised in the nineteenth century when 
                                                      
109 There are no documents or mention of the matrículas of the Basque Provinces in the section 
relating to this inspection in AGS Marina 300.  This suggests that either they had special privileges 
and were, therefore, not subject to inspection (which could happen not just because of their fueros 
but because well-established shipping industries there, such as the Caracas Company, might have 
had priority) or because the Ministros de Marina, Manuel Diego y Escovedo and Manuel de 
Mollinedo, who had been sent the Ordenanza de Matrícula in February 1751 (AGS Marina 768, 
Ensenada to Freyre, Madrid, 9 February 1751), took much longer in carrying out the inspection 
and these documents are, therefore, in the files of later years. 
110 This correlation between the number of registered men and the size of the Spanish shipping 
industry is still valid despite the fact that some men would have been protected from registering as 
a result of corruption or other reasons. 
111 Mahan (1987) pp.45–6.  Mahan, too, perceived shipping as one of Spain’s weaknesses, stating: 
‘It has already been pointed out how weak, from a military point of view, Spain was from this 
decay of her shipping.  Her wealth being in small bulk on a few ships, following more or less 
regular routes, was easily seized by an enemy, and the sinews of war paralyzed’, p.51. 
112 Rodger (1986), Appendix XI, ‘Manpower, p.369.  Rodger’s figures taken from Lloyd British 
Seamen, pp.287–8, from Kew ADM7/567. 
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advocating the better treatment of sailors, it was ultimately men rather than ships 
that made a navy113. 
The organisation of recruitment through the matrícula de mar contained many 
intrinsic flaws.  The register, as previously mentioned, offered those who signed 
up certain protections and civic privileges.  These, however, were frequently 
insufficient.  In the Asturian town of Avilés, for example, the Ministro de Marina, 
Joseph de Colosia, reported that a substantial number of sailors, mostly in the port 
towns of Luanco, Vega and Lastres, were now describing themselves as traders in 
order to avoid the register.  In the hope of enforcing the Ordenanzas, he was not 
allowing them to form their usual guilds and preventing both them and their sons 
from going on board ships or attempting any fishing in the hope that they would 
be forced to register 114.   
But, even when registered, men remained unwilling to serve in the navy.  In 1750, 
Varas issued a list of the names of those from the matrícula necessary to complete 
the crews of the San Felipe and Nueva España only to discover that instead of 
presenting themselves for duty, they all attempted to flee and he was compelled to 
use force on them115.  Similarly, after Mesía de la Cerda’s Mediterranean 
squadron was obliged to land 204 sick men in Alicante, Catalonia was asked to 
muster 50 gunners, 80 sailors and 70 grumetes to replace them116.  Most of those 
from the first quadrilla were already on active service so the necessary 
replacements were picked by lottery from the second quadrilla but this caused 
such resentment that during the night after a list of their names had been issued, a 
                                                      
113 Napier (1851) pp.9–12 
114 AGS Marina 259, Colosia to Ensenada, Aviles, 22 April 1750 
115 Ibid., Varas to Ensenada, Cadiz, 28 April 1750 
116 Ibid., Francisco López to Ensenada, Reyna in Rada de Alicante, 7 February 1752, and Ensenada 
to Contamina, Aranjuez, 22 May 1752 
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group of men went on the rampage in the fields and orchards of Villa de la Selva.  
They burnt and destroyed a large proportion of hemp, fruit and vegetables.  
Though they had principally focused on those belonging to the Subdelegado de 
Marina, the Bailiff and the Regidores, they also caused a great deal of damage to 
the town and, as Francisco de Amezarri, the Ministro de Marina, reported, word 
on the street was that ‘registered men were going around boasting that this was 
nothing and that much worse was still to be seen’ 117.  Contamina was forced to 
arrange for an infantry company based in Gerona to round them up and deliver 
them to the Reyna, where they were to serve without pay until they had made up 
the damage they had caused118.  If men were unwilling to present themselves, this 
was also costly and time-consuming for naval authorities.  In Ayamonte, on the 
border with Portugal, the local Ministro complained that registered men and their 
guilds had no qualms in abusing the ‘benign and gentle’ treatment they received 
and that for the recruitment of a mere 53 men for the América and Dragón he had 
been forced to summon and enlist registered men three times before he had a 
sufficient number to send119.  Furthermore, these particular men had no difficulty 
slipping over the border into Portugal when they wished to escape service. 
This last example illustrates another of the reasons why the matrícula was so 
difficult to enforce.  When naval service became inconvenient to matriculated 
men, they could disappear into Portugal, into inland Spain, into the army (despite 
being expressly banned by the Crown, this still occurred) or onto foreign ships.  
Though, in fairness, the register made it much more difficult for these men to 
return home and thus acted as a deterrent.   In 1751, for example, the Subdelegado 
                                                      
117 Ibid., Francisco de Amezarri to Contamina, Rosas, 1 June 1752 
118 Ibid., Contamina to Ensenada, Barcelona, 1 June 1752 
119 Ibid., Joseph Sánchez Barziela to Varas, Ayamonte, 23 September 1750 
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de Marina in Moguer, Manuel Leconte, reported that several deserters had 
approached him because they wished to return home but feared the reprisals 
threatened in the Ordenanzas120.  As a result, they were willing to serve in the 
navy in exchange for a pardon.  This was granted by Ensenada who wrote to 
Freyre (Ferrol), Barrero (Cartagena), Arias (Mallorca) and Contamina (Catalonia) 
instructing them to print posters offering pardons to any registered men who had 
deserted or escaped service if they returned to their homes within the next six 
months121. 
Another of the difficulties with the matrícula was the resentment it generated 
amongst the coastal authorities and inhabitants against the navy and matriculated 
men as a result of the privileges that the latter were granted.  This was 
understandable in light of the rigour with which these were upheld.  In 1751, for 
example, Lorenzo Raga and Diego Assins, farmers from Cantarroja, petitioned to 
be allowed to continue to fish occasionally with a line in a local sweet-water pond 
without being classified as fishermen and, thus, having to matriculate because 
they had ‘never gone to sea for the purpose of fishing, or for any navigation 
whatsover’.  They were excused signing up to the register but told ‘Not to fish 
because the Ordenanza forbids it to any who are not matriculated mariners’122.  
Furthermore, the Crown tended to side with registered men in disputes.  This 
position is made evident in a letter written by Ensenada to the Mayor of Gualchos 
after the latter attempted to stop matriculated men from fishing at night on Castell 
de Ferro beach in Granada.  Ensenada noted that it was understood the greatest 
harmony did not exist between royal authority as executed by the Mayor and the 
                                                      
120 Ibid., Varas to Ensenada, Cadiz, 23 March 1751 
121 Ibid., Ensenada to Freyre, Barrero, Arias and Contamina, 30 May 1751 
122 AGS Marina 259, Petition of Lorenzo Raga and Diego Assins, [processed 30 June 1751] 
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naval representatives despite repeated orders to the contrary.  He reprimanded the 
Mayor noting that this lack of accord was causing grave damage to the Crown 
because it was ‘important to it to advance the expansion and conservation of the 
Gente de Mar by all possible means’.  He also transmitted the King’s order that 
the Mayor was to inform his subordinates ‘never to disturb the registered Gente de 
Mar in carrying out their profesions in line with the rulings of the Ordenanza de 
Matrícula’123.  In the town of Viveiro in Galicia, local authorities were chastised 
and told to re-house a local naval Ministro after they had expelled him from his 
lodgings following his ruling that matriculated men in that town were being 
overtaxed with dues that were not their responsibility to pay and insisted on their 
reduction124.  And, in Tarragona, civilian authorities were reprimanded after they 
prevented matriculated men from occupying their usual spot in the annual Danza 
of the town125. 
Matriculated men, however, were themselves regularly responsible for abuses and 
forced the Crown into taking disciplinary action.  Following a complaint made by 
the town of Carril (Galicia) in 1752, the Gente de Mar had to be prevented from 
interfering in the economic and political management of the town under threat that 
if they continued to do so they would be arrested and tried by civilian courts 
without the navy or the Ordenanza de Matrícula being of any assistance to 
them126.  The government was also forced to intervene on the side of the civilian 
authorities when the registered men in the Catalan town of Mataró refused to 
                                                      
123 Ibid., Ensenada to Carlos Macarti, San Lorenzo, 5 November 1751 
124 Ibid., Perea to Ensenada, Esteiro, 20 June 1752 
125 AGS Marina 260, Contamina to Ensenada, Barcelona, 28 April 1753 
126 AGS Marina 259, Perea to Ensenada, Esteiro, 14 March 1752 
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return the town’s weights (used to measure imported grain), incorrectly claiming 
they had a right to keep them127.   
These tensions were bound to and did errupt into outbreaks of violence.  When 
Contamina granted the matriculated mariners’ guild in Villaseca sole rights to any 
loading or unloading work in that port in accordance with the Ordenanzas, for 
example, the local population responded angrily, declaring themselves sworn 
enemies of this guild.  And, having committed various excesses against its 
members, they had then attempted to persuade them to give up these rights by the 
use of ‘bribes, tricks and threats’.  When this failed, they became even angrier and 
insulted members of the guild both ‘verbally and physically, calling them enemies 
of their country and issuing threats against them’128.  They forced the guild to flee 
with their families to Reus, a town about a league distant from Villaseca.  In 
Murcia, a group of registered men travelling by river from Cartagena to Madrid in 
six galleys became embroiled in a disturbance at Espinardo.  The men travelling 
in the first three galleys had been heckled by a group of workers digging by the 
river and the two groups had got into a fight.  By the time the last three galleys 
reached the place the situation had got out of hand and exploded with the result 
that the workers  
 casting stones at the sailors had forced them to escape on foot, each one 
looking for a form of protecting himself as best he could.  This was observed by 
the naval officer [Juan Boch], who did the right thing by taking out his sword with 
a view to silencing his own people and in which he succeeded, getting them to 
return to the galleys even though he himself had been wounded in the head by a 
blow from a cordillon or a hoe.  Observing that the men of the place had by then 
rioted and set out with guns, spades, hatchets, sickles and other small arms, he set 
off to find one of the two incumbent mayors to contain the uprising.  Not only did 
the one he encountered not do so but he actually joined in and he was on the point 
                                                      
127 AGS Marina 260, Petition from the Ayuntamiento of Mataró, 6 April 1754 
128 AGS Marina 259, Contamina to Ensenada, Barcelona, 27 May 1752 
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of sounding the alarm to encourage more people to join in when the second, more 
prudent mayor arrived and quietened a situation in which many sailors had 
already been wounded129.   
Another riot also broke out in Puentedeheume when a woman, wife of a 
matriculated man, had been roughly handled and prevented from taking one of the 
fish from her market stall home for dinner by some soldiers.  Her husband and 
several other registered men had joined in her defence and a fight between the 
soldiers and the men had resulted.  The most significant information to be 
gathered from this incident, however, was that it was perceived by the regional 
naval Ministro as being typical of ‘the hate which local justices have for this fuero 
[the register]’130.  All these confrontations reveal the resentment, sometimes 
hatred, caused by the privileges the matrícula de mar granted men in Spain’s 
coastal regions.  These emotions were felt not just by the inhabitants but by the 
civilian authorities too and they frequently errupted into violence.  Regional naval 
administrators, very much aware of the resentment towards them, were forced to 
mediate. 
The privileges of the matrícula de mar, however, were not felt sufficient, 
apparently, to overcome ingrained cultural distate for a life at sea.  This compelled 
Ensenada to waiver the legislation in order to encourage the profession of sailor.  
In 1752, for example, unregistered men were granted permission to serve on Juan 
de Isla’s planned trading expedition to Campeche without matriculating.  
Ensenada hoped that this would facilitate the employment of untrained youths, 
lured by the promise of Indies wealth, who would then grow accustomed to life at 
                                                      
129 AGS Marina 260, ‘Noticia de lo acaecido el dia 7 de abril corriente en la Villa de Espinardo 
entre sus vecinos y la Gente de Mar que venia de Cartagena al Real Sitio de Aranjuez’, Joseph 
Salillas, [1753] 
130 Ibid., Domingo de Medina to Ensenada, Esteiro, 23 July 1754 
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sea and matriculate on their return131.  For exactly the same reasons, Juan de Isla 
and Eugenio de Mena (agent of the Gildemeester brothers in Spain) were 
permitted to employ unregistered men on vessels used for the transport of naval 
stores132. 
One of the supposed merits of the matrícula system was that all Spanish sailors, 
including those from the merchant marine, would gain experience on navy 
warships and, thus, be trained in naval service.  Thus it was thought that the 
Spanish navy would not suffer many of the difficulties encountered by navies that 
employed methods of compulsory recruitment, such as pressing.  Captains, 
nevertheless, regularly complained about the ineptitude of their crews.  In 1753, 
for example, Joseph de Rojas, Captain of the San Felipe, complained that his 
crew, which consisted of 563 men, was ‘useless, most of them being very 
youthful, raised in the rivers in the practice of fishing, ignorant of how to handle 
themselves on the deck of a ship, manoeuvre one or climb a spar’133.  Desertion 
also remained a perennial problem.  The punishment for this, which was 
technically classified as being found more than two leagues away from your ship 
without a licence, as published in the Ordenanzas stipulated offenders be tried by 
Council of War [equivalent to a court martial] and receive the death penalty if 
found guilty.  In order to prevent the seafaring population being reduced, 
however, men convicted for desertion would throw dice and only the third who 
threw the lowest numbers would be executed134.  As levels of desertion tended to 
be so high, however, even this was difficult to impose and led to complaints such 
                                                      
131 AGS Marina 259, Ensenada to Navarrete, Aranjuez, 13 May 1752 
132 Ibid., Ensenada to Perea, Madrid, 26 January 1752 
133 AGS Marina 438, Rojas to Ensenada, San Felipe, 20 February 1753 
134 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.I, trat.5, tit.3, art.50 and tit.4, art.48–53, pp.281–2, 303–5 
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as that by Julián de Espinal, the Ministro on Juan de Lángara’s Havana squadron, 
who argued that the particularly elevated levels of desertion experienced on the 
Asia, Fuerte and San Antonio resulted from the fact that deserters who had been 
apprehended were not being punished but merely returned to their posts as if 
nothing had happened135.  Meanwhile, at times when a large proportion of the 
fleet was armed, as in 1758, men still had to be forced into the Service.  As 
Burrington Goldsworthy, the British consul in Cadiz, reported to De Cosne in 
Madrid, ‘A press was made again last night at Cadiz; as there was also here 
[Puerto Santa Maria], where it is said they got 117 people, who are confined for 
security in the publick prison as those at Cadiz are in St Catherine’s Castle’136.  
These men were not necessarily considered very skilled despite the matrícula.  De 
Cosne, for example, reported on the arrival of three ships in Cadiz Bay saying that  
they had not sufficient sailors on board to govern them, for want of which 
they had lost three sails in their passage, as their equipages consisted mostly in 
landmen; and the officers were obliged to go aloft themselves …  The chief 
difficulty will be the manning of the squadron with good sailors, which does not 
seem easy to be done: they have been obliged to press for this service the common 
people of all sorts, from all parts of the country137.   
The matrícula did not, therefore, eliminate problems such as desertion or 
ensure a skilled group from which men could be selected for service. 
It also proved a very costly system to organise.  Men called to service were paid 
from the day they left their homes and men who had completed their term were 
paid up to the day they returned to them, which meant that the navy was often 
                                                      
135 AGS Marina 403, Espinal to Arriaga, Havana, 28 March 1755 
136 Kew SP94/157, ff.119–20, ‘Extract of a letter from Mr Goldsworthy to Lieut. Col. De Cosne’, 
Port St Mary’s, 8 March 1758. 
137 Ibid., ff.207–9, De Cosne to Pitt, Aranjuez, 29 May 1758 
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paying double138.  Furthermore, in order to be taken onto ships when called to 
service, men were either sent directly at the Crown’s expense to the Department 
capital to await their ship or they waited in their local port, also at the Crown’s 
expense, and ships would cruise the coasts stopping at each location, gradually 
turning over their crews.  Even considering the fact that active Spanish warships 
tended to put into port regularly, much extra time must have been spent on this 
activity.  This is even more the case when we consider how insistent the 
government was that men should not be compelled to work beyond their term of 
contract and, since men were taken on at different times, their terms also ended at 
different times thus further increasing the amount of time ships spent turning over 
their men139. 
As Arriaga commented to Ensenada, noting that men were on average only 
serving on ships for about six months,  
this method that has been thought up to foment the Gente de Mar so that 
all learn rapidly on the job and with the idea that they will be attracted by the 
softness of short campaigns appears to me to provide little benefit to them and 
much expense for the Royal Treasury.   
But Ensenada was unmoved and replied that in future Arriaga should take 
better advantage of the periods when ships were in port for repairs to change the 
crews.  He noted that this system was the only viable way of  ‘fomenting and 
habilitating seamanship’ and that it explained, along with the punctuality of pay, 
the reason why they had already experienced a rise in this class of person as well 
                                                      
138 In addition to pay, on 16 June 1750, Ensenada also ruled that every man be given twelve 
quartos (1! reals) (eight if they were a page) daily as a succor from the day ‘in which they leave 
their place of residence until that in which they reach the port, town or place where they have been 
called to’ and a daily ration instead if they were being transported by the navy, see AGS Marina 
768, ff.132–3, Ensenada to Victoria, Aranjuez, 16 June 1750. 
139 See p.204 for an example of the extra time and expense which this system caused de la Cerda’s 
Mediterranean squadron in 1751. 
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as why there was so little sickness or desertion in Spain’s fleets.  As he argued 
‘the advantages of this are so useful to the King’s Service and to the good of the 
State that any additional expense to the Royal Treasury incurred in the turnover of 
seamen was well returned’140.  When Arriaga took over Ensenada’s position as 
Secretary for the Navy, there is no indication that there was a substantial alteration 
to the organisation of the matrícula. 
The system of creating a register of seamen, nevertheless, functioned reasonably 
effectively and did succeed in providing the greater part of crews on Spanish 
warships.  It did, however, have numerous failings in that the measures it offered 
to attract men were frequently insufficient to convince them to enlist or, having 
done so, to make them comply with the naval service aspect of their contract or to 
prevent them from deserting.  In addition, the privileges which were offered to 
registered men did much to antagonise coastal populations and to disrupt relations 
between them and the navy.  Finally, it did little to obviate the fact that Spain’s 
seagoing population was too small to meet the manning requirements of the 
proposed naval expansion. 
Conclusion 
In his study of the matrícula de mar, the Capitán de Fragata Javier de Salas 
described the most significant flaw he found with Ensenada’s policies was one of 
over-ambition.  How could Spain, with a population in 1749 of 7,473,187 souls, 
provide the 186,500 men required for the army and the 69,000 individuals 
required to man 70 ships and 65 frigates (excluding additional men required for 
                                                      
140 AGS Marina 260, Arriaga to Ensenada, Cadiz, 30 October 1753, Ensenada’s reply on verso, 
dated 5 November 1753 
 196 
all lesser craft) and still have young, able men free to attend to Spain’s industry, 
commerce and agriculture?141   In his opinion, this simply was not feasible and he 
concluded that if ‘we had limited ourselves to proportionate forces and those in 
power had not broken time and again the rules of the matrícula … our fleets 
would have had the very most honourable, expert and punctilious crews’142. 
Salas’ verdict of over ambition is, to a certain extent, very true since the nature 
and size of Spain’s population was unlikely to have been able consistently to 
sustain a large wartime fleet for a long period of time143.  This problem, however, 
was in many ways exacerbated by the organisation of the Spanish navy and the 
methods of recruitment laid down by the Ordenanzas.  The latter established a 
very rigid system in that, for example, any legislative adjustment to the length of 
service matriculated men were expected to carry out would have been cause for 
provocation as men knew the rights granted them by the Ordenanzas and would 
have been unlikely to cooperate if these were modified to their personal detriment.  
As a result, the government had little choice but to ignore their terms in times of 
emergency.  In addition, they consolidated the greatly stratified nature of naval 
crews which divided men very specifically into sailors, soldiers and artillerymen 
on board ships.  This division, especially the privileged status given to soldiers 
and artillerymen, was more characteristic of warfare in the previous centuries 
when ships acted as army transports rather than gun platforms and boarding 
                                                      
141 Salas (1870) pp.197–8.  The population figures he uses are those of a 1748 census, see p.111, 
fn.4, though the origins of those he puts forward for Ensenada’s army and navy are not specified.  
In my calculations, I have used the number of ships given by Ensenada in his 1751 Representation 
to Ferdinand, see Rodríguez Villa (1878) pp.113–42, and from these calculated crew numbers 
from the averages of real ship complements which are more conservative than planned crew 
numbers. 
142 Salas (1870) pp.302–3 
143 See, for example, the difficulties in manning Reggio’s enlarged squadron in 1758 for only a 
brief stint at sea, pp.233–5. 
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tactics were preferred to reducing the enemy by means of heavy broadsides.  
These tactics were possible in amphibious operations but were ineffective against 
British battleships whose gunnery prevented traditional boarding tactics being 
employed against them.  That each man could only perform specific tasks rather 
than carry out all the chores on a ship also reduced the effectiveness of Spanish 
manpower by increasing the number of men required, a significant hindrance 
when attempting an ambitious expansion programme. 
As a form of recruitment, however, the matrícula de mar nonetheless provided a 
solution to many of Spain’s troubles.  It provided the Crown with vaguely 
accurate data on the number of men it could call upon to man its fleets and it 
provided a system whereby these men would gain experience by making them 
serve regularly in the navy but not for such lengthy periods as to make the service 
unacceptable to them.  Even so, the number of men available to the Crown, as 
revealed by the 1754 inspection, was still too small to man a large fleet.  It also 
pointed to a deeper cause of Spain’s inability to provide an efficient navy to 
combat the British since, if the number of registered seamen reflected the size of 
the Spanish shipping industry at the time, this industry was clearly not large 
enough.  Spain, then, was at a great disadvantage vis-à-vis Britain which did have 
a very large reserve of seamen and France which had at least double the 
population of Spain.  Neither did the methods of the matrícula allow for the 
creation of skilled and experienced crews.  These took many years to form, not 
just in terms of the functions of being a sailor but also in that of building the 
camaraderie, sense of belonging to the ship and its officers and the teamwork 
which this entailed.  Guaranteeing maximum terms of a year in service at a given 
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time, along with the fast turnover of crews which this involved, prevented this 
development. 
During Ferdinand’s reign, the changes made to the Guardias Marinas Company 
also had a number of advantages.  The change in leadership raised the prestige of 
the institution making it more attractive to nobles considering a career in the navy.  
So also, did the reform of the curriculum at the Acedemy establishing its status as 
an elite institution.  Unfortunately, the attempted expansion proved ineffective not 
because these improvements were inadequate but because few nobles sought a 
career in the navy.  As to evaluating its success in producing good quality naval 
officers, this is very difficult to determine.  The Academy’s syllabus covered 
much of the knowledge which was vital to the formation of good naval officers, 
not least in the etiquette and social skills that it provided them with and which 
they needed as representatives of the King at sea.  It did, however, make them 
largely land-based for seven of their most formative years so they would have 
missed out on much of the practical experience of life at sea.  This, however, takes 
us to the perennial debate over what makes a better naval officer – learning or 
experience?  This can only really be examined through the study of the navy at 
work and the actions of naval officers in carrying out Spanish naval strategy.   
This will be considered in the following chapter. 
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The years following the signature of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 up to 
the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War in 1763 permit us to examine what was 
required of the Spanish navy.  During these years, the fleet was employed in what 
were perceived as its routine operations, such as the convoy and transport of 
bullion, men and materials, as well as the protection of Spanish coasts from the 
depredations of Barbary privateers.  The navy was also expected to safeguard 
Spanish neutrality after the outbreak of hostilities between France and Britain in 
17551.  The manner in which this latter was to be achieved lay both in the 
diplomatic sphere, in the sense that an expanded fleet was thought to increase 
Spanish influence in the arena of European politics, and in a more practical 
fashion by having its warships protect Spanish interests at sea.  Lastly, the navy 
was used to defend the Spanish empire following the outbreak of war with Britain 
in 1762.  Though this period, after 1759, does not correspond to Ferdinand VI’s 
reign the Spanish navy of those years was still in many respects, because of the 
changes brought about in his reign, Ferdinand’s navy.  Thus, by studying the 
success of the navy in the execution of these various operations it will enable us to 
develop a greater understanding of the relationship between the central 
government and the navy at sea, the attitudes of both government and naval 
                                                      
1 After violence broke out in the Ohio Valley during 1754, both France and Britain sent 
expeditions across the Atlantic in 1755 and war broke out in 1756, see Harding (1995) p.127. 
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officers to the use of naval strength and the value of sea power as understood in 
Spain. 
The Routine Operations of the Navy 
In the mid eighteenth century, the Spanish monarch’s empire was vast and far-
flung.  Its overseas territories extended as far as South and Central America, the 
Philippines, Azores, Canaries and Balearics.  In addition it had footholds in North 
Africa, namely Ceuta and Oran, and dependencies within Europe, such as the 
Italian states of Naples, Piacenza, Parma and Guastalla which were governed by 
Ferdinand VI’s half-brothers, Charles and Philip.  Moreover, the size of 
peninsular Spain with a landmass three times the size of Britain and a topography 
and climate that made land-based travel difficult meant that transport by sea, 
rather than overland, remained the most efficient form of travelling between 
towns and cities located on its coasts.  Sea communications were, therefore, of 
vital importance to the Spanish monarchy and the safeguarding of key areas on 
these routes, principally the waters around the Peninsula’s coasts, the routes to 
America as far as the Azores and the Canaries and the seas in the West Indies was 
the principal duty of its navy.  During Ferdinand’s reign, the disposition of the 
fleet consisted of a squadron in the Caribbean with its main base at Havana, 
another cruising in the Atlantic between Cape St Vincent and Cape Finisterre and 
a third in the Mediterranean with its base at Cartagena.  More ships were 
generally active in the West Indies squadron than in those of the Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean where squadrons tended to have only one or two capital battleships 
attached during peacetime.  The remainder of the fleet was generally laid in 
ordinary in Spain’s arsenals of Ferrol, Cartagena and La Carraca, but a constant 
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rotation of ships meant that these were commissioned and de-commissioned on a 
regular basis. 
The organisation of Spain’s active navy was managed by the Naval Secretary at 
Court – until 1754 the Marquis de la Ensenada and Julián de Arriaga thereafter.  
This firmly centralised administration was designed to respond rapidly to 
demands in a unified fashion, thereby avoiding the potential clashes which could 
result from having fleet dispositions being decided separately at each of the naval 
bases.  An example of the manner in which it functioned is demonstrated by 
Ensenada’s reaction to news from the Spanish ambassador in Portugal of Barbary 
privateers entering the Atlantic in 1752.  This obliged Ensenada to re-arrange the 
distribution of the whole fleet to protect Atlantic shipping and, more importantly, 
the Fuerte, an azogue ship2 transporting a substantial sum of bullion from 
Cartagena de Indias, which was expected to sail at the end of May3.  At that time, 
the 60-gun ships Dragón and América were en route from Cadiz to Ferrol where 
they were to be laid in ordinary so that their crews could be transferred to the 
newly launched 70-gun ships Asia and Fernando.  In Ferrol, the frigate Galga and 
the packet boat Marte were ready to sail for Cartagena while the Asia and the 
Fernando were still fitting out for a voyage across the Atlantic.  In Cartagena, the 
70-gun ships Tigre and Septentrión and four xabeques (Galgo, Cazador, Liebre 
and Volante) were ready for sea.  The Septentrión and the xabeques, along with 
the Marte and Galga (once these arrived from Ferrol), were going to be sent to 
America, leaving the Tigre, the 70-gun Reyna (once her repairs were concluded) 
and another four xabeques (Ibicenco, Mallorquin, Valenciano and Catalan) to 
                                                      
2 These ships carried mercury for the American silver mines and returned to Spain with cargoes of 
bullion. 
3 AGS Marina 438, ‘Resolución’ taken on 14 April 1752, signed Ensenada. 
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cruise in the Mediterranean.  With Algerine privateers in the Atlantic, however, 
this arrangement would not provide sufficient protection for the incoming azogue.  
Ensenada, therefore, modified the planned fleet dispositions to allow the Tigre 
and Septentrión to cruise in the Atlantic until the end of May and then return to 
Cartagena, the packet boat Marte and the frigate Galga to remain in Ferrol until 
they could be convoyed by the Fernando (70) and Asia (70) as far as the Straits en 
route to Cartagena, the xabeques to remain in the Mediterranean and be joined by 
the Reyna once her repairs were complete.  He also instructed that any ship 
arriving from Havana in Cadiz should be sent to cruise in the Atlantic without 
delay.  In this manner, the azogue-ship Fuerte, the packet boat Marte and the 
frigate Galga would be protected from the Algerines, cruising would continue in 
the Mediterranean and there would be sufficient time for fitting out the ships at 
Ferrol.  The only inconvenience was that the Septentrión, Galga, Marte and four 
xabeques set to cruise in the West Indies that summer would be delayed from 
taking up their station until the end of June. 
The assumption underlying the existence of a separate Mediterranean and Atlantic 
squadron is that each remained in their respective geographical arena but, in fact, 
this was not the case and the two frequently overlapped.  Furthermore, though 
these were cruising squadrons tasked with patrolling Spanish coasts and seas they 
were more or less permanently employed in simultaneously executing other 
assignments for the Crown, such as transporting crown or church officials and 
convoying troops or shipping.  The extent to which this was the case can be seen 
by following the routine activity of the Mediterranean squadron from 1750 to 
1752 when it was under Pedro Mesía de la Cerda’s command.  At the end of 
March 1750, Ensenada gave orders for the 70-gun ships San Felipe and Nueva 
 203 
España to fit out in Ferrol and soon after, on 3 April, their command was given to 
Mesía de la Cerda4.  Once fitted out they were sailed down to Cadiz by the 
Capitán de Navío, Francisco de Lastarría, where Cerda took command of them on 
2 May5.  In mid-June, Cerda convoyed a group of register ships out into the 
Atlantic, including eight destined for Veracruz, two for Buenos Aires, four for 
Cartagena de Indias, one for Havana and four for Ferrol6.  He returned at the end 
of June bringing back one of the vessels, the Christo de la Columna, which had 
been found to be too heavily laden to complete the journey across the Atlantic7.  
Cerda then sailed on 19 July with a convoy of fifteen troop transports for the 
garrison in Ceuta continuing his journey on to Cartagena where he arrived on 28 
July8.  From here, he transported troops to Barcelona and Mallorca and collected 
four recently-purchased xabeques, which he delivered to Cartagena having tested 
their sailing qualities en route9.  In September, he returned to Cadiz with a convoy 
of merchantmen, the San Fernando and the Aurora frigate10.  At this point, 
Ensenada became irritated by the time the squadron wasted on a refit and 
pressured the Director General, the Marquis de la Victoria, and the Intendant, 
Varas y Valdés, to get it to sea as soon as possible since there were numerous 
reports that ‘North Africans are cruising with their xabeques and frigates not only 
in the Mediterranean but also in the Atlantic with great risk to our shipping’11.  
                                                      
4 Ibid., Instructions to Commanders General and Intendants of Ferrol and Cartagena Departments, 
25 and 28 March 1750 
5 Ibid., Cerda to Ensenada, Cadiz, 5 May 1750 
6 Ibid., Francisco López to Ensenada, San Felipe, 16 June 1750 
7 Ibid., Victoria to Ensenada, Cadiz, 29 June 1750 
8 Ibid., Victoria to Ensenada, Cadiz, 13 July 1750, Victoria to Ensenada, Cadiz, 20 July 1750, and 
Cerda to Ensenada, Cartagena, 29 July 1750 
9 Ibid., Cerda to Ensenada, Barcelona, 15 August 1750, Barrero to Ensenada, Cartagena, 19 
August 1750, and Cerda to Ensenada, San Felipe anchored in Cartagena, 16 September 1750 
10 Ibid., Barrero to Ensenada, Cartagena, 30 September 1750, Liaño to Ensenada, Cartagena, 30 
September 1750, and Ordeñana to Ensenada, Cadiz, 5 October 1750 
11 Ibid., Ensenada to Victoria and Varas, 27 October 1750 
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Cerda sailed on 18 November 1750 having replaced the Nueva España with the 
70-gun Reyna, a change which had been ordered by Ensenada the previous 
April12.  In Cartagena, the squadron’s Ministro, Pedro Antonio de Ordeñana, 
collected 116,755 vellon reals and 4 maravedis to pay the crews up the end of 
December before sailing to Barcelona, without the xabeques, to transport the 
Bishop of Mallorca to Palma13.  By February 1751, the squadron was back in 
Cartagena where the Master Shipwright, Edward Bryant, reported that the San 
Felipe needed either twenty days repairs to make her seaworthy for the next four 
or five months or a major careen14.  Ensenada preferred the first option and 
ordered that, in the meantime, Cerda cruise with just the Reyna and the four 
xabeques until the San Felipe was ready to rejoin them, which it did on 15 March 
175115.  The squadron remained at sea until it was hit by a storm off Malaga 
causing some damage to the xabeques which then required a few days’ repairs16.  
In May, Ensenada ordered that the crews be turned over.  This would require 
Cerda to put into Alicante, Barcelona and Mallorca once the local naval 
authorities had gathered the necessary men but first he sailed to Cadiz to return 
some registered men to Andalucia17.  By mid-July, 335 men were on a daily 
allowance in Barcelona awaiting Cerda’s arrival, first, however, he had to deliver 
60,000 vellon reals to Mallorca to exchange for vellón provincial and it was only 
                                                      
12 Ibid., Victoria to Ensenada, Cadiz, 23 November 1750 and Ensenada to Varas, 27 April 1750 
13 Ibid., Barrero to Ensenada, Cartagena, 9 December 1750, Ordeñana to Ensenada, San Felipe in 
Barcelona, 18 December 1750, and Contamina to Ensenada, Barcelona, 19 December 1750 
14 Ibid., Cerda to Ensenada, Cartagena, 10 February 1751 
15 Ibid., Liaño to Ensenada, Cartagena, 24 February 1751 and Ensenada to Liaño, 27 February 
1751 
16 Ibid., Liaño to Ensenada, Cartagena, 17 March 1751, Cerda to Ensenada, Cartagena, 20 April 
1751, Barrero to Ensenada, Cartagena, 21 April 1751, and Liaño to Ensenada, Cartagena, 28 April 
1751 
17 Ibid., Ensenada to Barrero, Aranjuez, 4 May 1751, Liaño to Ensenada, Cartagena, 26 May 1751, 
Victoria to Ensenada, Cadiz, 5 July 175,1 and Victoria to Ensenada, Cadiz, 19 July 1751 
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in October 1751 that he finally arrived in Barcelona to collect these men18.  At 
this time, he also boarded the Royal Regiment of Artillery on to his ships to take 
to Cadiz19.  As previously mentioned the 70-gun San Felipe was in need of a great 
repair and Cerda renewed his petition on the subject in November.  Ensenada 
decided that the 70-gun Tigre, then in ordinary in Ferrol, should be fitted out as a 
replacement and Felix Celdran was instructed to sail the San Felipe to Ferrol to 
transfer the crews20.  Cerda continued cruising with the Reyna and xabeques for a 
few months but in January 1752 it was decided that the Reyna, too, should be 
disarmed so her crew could be used to test the sailing qualities of the 70-gun 
Septentrión under Isidoro del Postigo’s command21.  Cerda disembarked in 
February and command of the Mediterranean squadron was transferred to the 
Capitán de Navío Blas de Barreda22.  Barreda sailed on 11 March 1752 with the 
Septentrión (620 men) and the Tigre (639 men)23.  During the 1750s, the testing 
of new ships’ sailing qualities became a regular feature in the instructions given to 
captains.  In order to report on the qualities of the Septentrión, Postigo took with 
him the Teniente de Navío Pedro Goycoechea with instructions to put him on land 
after fifteen days so that Goycoecha could then report to Ensenada in person24.  
                                                      
18 Ibid., Ensenada to Cerda, 7 August 1751, and Contamina to Ensenada, Barcelona, 13 July 1751.  
Provincial money was gold and silver coin deliberately issued lighter and baser to prevent its 
exportation and intended for circulation as subsidiary coin in peninsular Spain, see Hamilton 
(1944) p.22. 
19 AGS Marina 438, Cerda to Ensenada, Barcelona, 13 October 1751 and Contamina to Ensenada, 
Barcelona, 14 October 1751 
20 Ibid., ‘Expediente’ on replacement of San Felipe with Tigre, dated 9 November 1751, and 
Ensenada to Commander General and Intendant at Ferrol, 9 November 1751.  Unfortunately, 
Celdran died on his arrival in Ferrol and had to be replaced by Francisco Tilly y Paredes, Marquis 
de Casa-Tilly, AGS Marina 438, Perea to Ensenada, Sada, 29 December 1751, Perea to Ensenada, 
Sada, 29 December 1751, and Alvarez to Ensenada, Ferrol, 6 January 1752. 
21 Ibid., Ensenada to Liaño, with copy to Barrero, Madrid, 19 January 1752 
22 AGS Marina 438, Cerda to Ensenada, Reyna in Alicante, 8 February 1752 and Paula Pavía 
(1873), vol. I, pp. 121–26 
23 Ibid., Liaño to Ensenada, Cartagena, 15 March 1752 and Barrero to Ensenada, Cartagena, 15 
March 1752 
24 Ibid., Ensenada to Liaño, Madrid, 19 January 1752 
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The qualities which were under observation in this and other sailing trials were 
the ships’ resilience and stability at sea, the strength of their hulls in holding their 
masts, rigging and guns and, that which was given the greatest attention, their 
speed sailing at various points of the wind and under different sails25. 
As the study of Cerda’s squadron reveals, battleships active in patrolling Spanish 
coasts and seas were also permanently employed in other routine tasks but, on 
occasion, it was also necessary to fit out ships for particular missions, generally 
those in which they were required outside Spanish waters.  At the end of 1753, for 
example, Juan Benito Erasún was given command of the 60-gun América and 
Esmeralda frigate for the collection of a wheat convoy from Naples.  
Commissions such as this were common for Spanish naval officers and ships, 
especially after the creation of the Giro which required the regular delivery of 
Crown funds to European ports, a task which could not be entrusted to unarmed 
vessels. 
These, then, were the ordinary duties of the Spanish navy and where it was 
principally employed both in peacetime and when Spain was at war, though these 
operations were considerably curtailed in periods of hostilities.  The dispersed 
nature of Spain’s overseas territories together with the difficulties of travel within 
the Peninsula made communication by sea vital to the Crown’s interests and 
evidence shows that, on the whole, this area of its responsibilities was 
successfully organised and administered. 
                                                      
25 AGS Marina 725, ‘Propriedades experimentados en el Septentrión’, signed by Barreda and 
Goycoechea and forwarded by Liaño to Ensenada, Cartagena, 8 April 1752.  See AGS Marina 725 
for a collection of reports such as this analysing the properties of various ships launched during the 
1750s. 
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The Defence of Spain’s Coasts and Commerce from Barbary 
Privateering 
The principal reason why Spanish squadrons had permanently to patrol the 
Peninsula’s coasts was the need to counter the depredations of Barbary privateers.  
Though Ferdinand VI felt that Spain was at peace from 1748 onwards, it, in fact, 
remained in a state of conflict with the Barbary States of Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers 
and Morocco throughout his reign. 
Whereas Spain remained resolutely inimical to the Barbary States, many 
European powers had signed and were signing neutrality treaties with them26.  
Britain, France and the Netherlands had made agreements in the seventeenth 
century while Austria signed treaties with them between 1725 and 1726, Sweden 
between 1729 and 1763, Denmark between 1747 and 1753 and Tuscany between 
1748 and 174927.  The Spanish Crown not only refused to do the same but also 
considered such neutrality agreements as hostile acts since, on the whole, freedom 
from Barbary privateers was purchased with war munitions which were then used 
against the Spanish.  As a result, various measures were taken by the Spanish 
Crown during the 1750s against those who made such agreements.  On 19 
October 1751, for example, Ferdinand VI issued a decree prohibiting his subjects 
and dominions from trading with the City of Hamburg, its inhabitants and subjects 
following Hamburg’s signature of a treaty with the Regency of Algiers28.  It was 
to come into force following fifty days of the decree being published after which 
no ships, subjects or property belonging to Hamburg were to be admitted into 
Spanish ports and all Hamburg agents, consuls and subjects were to have left 
                                                      
26 Until 1767 when Jorge Juan y Santacilia, as Charles III’s representative, negotiated a treaty with 
Morocco, see Valverde (2012) pp.198–204. 
27 See Muller (2010) pp.195–6, Anderson and Voth (1997) p.4 and Panzac (2005) pp.25–41 
28 AGS Marina 769, Royal Decree, San Lorenzo, 19 October 1751 
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Spain within three months.  On this occasion, as in similar such situations, naval 
officers were instructed to inspect all Hamburg ships so that ‘should you find any 
type of war provisions and munitions, you will take these [materials] onto your 
own ship and leave the rest of the cargo and the vessel at liberty’29.  Another duty 
required of the Spanish navy, therefore, was to inspect the ships of nations that 
made agreements with Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers or Morocco.  In the case of 
Hamburg, Ferdinand’s orders were revoked on 2 July 1752 because, as the decree 
claimed, Ferdinand had decided to drop these measures against Hamburg after 
persistent representations from the city state and because he considered his 
displeasure to have been successfully communicated30.  In August 1753, relations 
were again broken off with another northern European state as a protest against 
neutrality treaties, this time Denmark which had recently signed an agreement 
with Morocco.  On this occasion, Ferdinand protested that the Danes had the 
audacity to take advantage of their welcome in Spanish ports to use these as 
stopping places en route to selling war materials to North Africa.  Even more 
insulting was that the Danes had agreed to return all North Africans that found 
their way onto Danish ships to their homes even if these were slaves escaped from 
the Spanish31.  This was particularly galling to Spain because a key aspect of the 
conflict between Spain and North Africa concerned the capture, enslavement and 
exchange of men32.  Sweden, which had signed neutrality treaties earlier in the 
century, was already subject to inspection and seizure of cargo by Spanish 
warships and after this date, so also, was Danish shipping.  In the conflict against 
                                                      
29 AGS Marina 438, Alvarez to Garganta, Ferrol, 14 April 1752 
30 AGS Marina 769, Agustín de Ordeñana to Victoria, Madrid, 5 July 1752 and Ensenada to 
Victoria, Madrid, 24 July 1752 
31 Ibid., Decree sent to the Councils of Castille, War, Indies, and Finance, Buen Retiro, 26 August 
1753 
32 See Barrio Gozalo (2006) pp.79–182 for an analysis of this exchange in the eighteenth century. 
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the Barbary States, Spain not only pursued retaliatory measures against those who 
signed treaties with them but also sought to strengthen friendships with those that 
were also in conflict with the North Africans.  On 1 March 1752, for example, 
Ensenada informed the naval Intendants that following a petition from the 
Venetian ambassador Ferdinand had decided that there should be good relations 
between his subjects and those of Venice.  For this reason, Spanish and Venetian 
ships were to assist each other at sea and work together against privateers33. 
Spain’s war against the Barbary States was largely a religious conflict and was 
perceived as a continuation of the Reconquest though there were other, more 
material considerations such as the safeguarding of Spanish coasts and shipping 
and the protection of its footholds in North Africa – Ceuta and Oran.  As a result, 
the funds collected from the cruzada, a tax granted to the Kings of Spain by the 
Papacy in the seventeenth century for funding the war against non-Christians, 
were delivered to the Naval Department of Cartagena from 1748 after Ferdinand 
decided that all the present and future forces of this Department were to be 
employed in the ‘offensive and defensive war against the infidel’34.  Another 
indicator of the predominantly religious nature of the conflict is the close 
relationship between Spain and the Order of Malta35.  During the eighteenth 
century, for example, it was quite common for young noblemen from 
distinguished families aspiring to make a career in the their country’s navy to join 
the Order first and complete a period of service in Malta’s galleys, galleys which 
                                                      
33 AGS Marina 769, Ensenada to Barrero, Varas, Perea and Contamina, Madrid, 1 March 1752 
34 AGS Marina 768, Order to Obispo Comisario General de Cruzada, Retiro, 16 December 1748.  
The cruzada was a tax (consisting of the bula de cruzada, subsidio and excusado) granted to the 
Kings of Spain by the Papacy in the seventeenth century to be collected in Spain and its revenue 
used to fight the infidel.  The tax was administered by the Consejo de Cruzada until 1750 when 
Ferdinand VI replaced it with the Dirección y Contaduría General de las Tres Gracias de 
Cruzada, Subsidio y Excusado and with the Comisaria General de Cruzada in 1754. 
35 See Garcia Garralón (2012) pp.210–52 for a detailed analysis of the relationship. 
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were primarily deployed against Barbary privateers in the Mediterranean36.  
Furthermore, Spain and Malta provided each other with assistance whenever 
necessary.  Hence, Spain sent Malta a Master Shipwright, Pedro Boyer, in 1752 to 
teach xabeque construction to the Order’s shipwrights and the Order sent Spain 
Maltese sailors to counter a shortage of men in Spain in 175837. 
Barbary privateers were beginning to be almost endemically active in Spanish 
waters, both in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic, and they did much damage 
to its coasts, commerce and fishing fleets.  The main naval force deployed by the 
Crown against them was the xabeque squadron based at Cartagena38.  To a great 
extent, its composition and organisation were being developed and established 
during the 1750s after the Spanish galley squadron was scrapped by the Crown in 
1748 and galleys were replaced by xabeques as the most dominant small-vessel 
squadron in the navy39.  In 1749, the Mediterranean squadron, commanded by 
Julián de Arriaga, consisted of the 64-gun América, later to be joined by the 64-
gun Constante, and four xabeques40.  The latter were not owned by the navy but 
                                                      
36 Such as Blas de Barreda (Bailiff Grand Cross in the Order), Juan Ponce de León (Knight), José 
Manuel de Villena, Marquis de Real Tesoro (Knight), Andrés Reggio y Brachiforte (Bailiff Grand 
Cross), Pedro Mesía de la Cerda, Marquis de Vega de Armijo (Bailiff Grand Cross), Jorge Juan y 
Santacilia (Knight). 
37 AGS Marina 234, Petition from Joseph de Dueñas, Malta, 27 December 1751, forwarded to 
Ensenada by Francisco de Frias Haro, Madrid, 23 February 1752, and Ensenada to Barrero, 
Aranjuez, 9 June 1752, and AGS Marina 440, ‘Expediente’ on Maltese seamen, included Arriaga 
to Contamina, Madrid, 5 August 1758, and Barrero to Arriaga, Cartagena, 19 July 1758 
38 Privateering by private individuals was also encouraged by the Crown to counter the activities 
of the North African states, see Barrio Gozalo (2006) pp.47–67. 
39 AGS Marina 315, ‘Proyecto de reforma de la esquadra, sus oficiales, y demás dependientes de 
ella’, Buen Retiro, 28 November 1748 
40 See Baudot Monroy (2012) pp.237–71 for a detailed account of Arriaga’s campaign and a 
planned bombardment of Algiers.  According to Baudot Monroy, the bombardment was cancelled 
(or rather postponed for the following year but never executed) for various reasons.  Arriaga was 
reticent to execute the mission because there were as yet no accurate plans of Algiers, the element 
of surprise had been lost and the Spanish squadron was outnumbered by that of Algiers which 
consisted of four frigates and ten xabeques.  In addition, the bombardment had been ordered by 
Ensenada without Ferdinand’s knowledge or consent and a complaint from the French government 
about it was threatening to bring it to Ferdinand’s attention.  During Arriaga’s campaign, Antonio 
Barceló commanded the xabeques.  With the support of the Crown, this officer made his career in 
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by private individuals in Mallorca and rented to the navy.  Their contract, 
originally negotiated in 1748, had to be extended every two months in 174941.  
Their garrisons (in this case the complement of soldiers on board ships) was not 
composed of marines until 1749 but of Mallorca’s army infantry pickets.  Arriaga, 
however, successfully petitioned for their replacement with marine infantry from 
Cartagena. 
In the following campaigning seasons, from 1750 to 1752, the xabeques formed 
part of Pedro Mesía de la Cerda’s squadron.  These xabeques, however, were no 
longer those rented from Mallorca but four new ones – the Liebre, Galgo, 
Cazador and Volante – built in Cartagena42.  These were sent to the West Indies 
in 1752 and replaced by another four new vessels purchased in Mallorca – the 
Mallorquin, Valenciano, Ibicenco and Catalan43.  The Ibicenco and Catalan were 
decommissioned in 1753 and the Mallorquin and Valenciano in 1754 after a 
council of naval officers in Cartagena ruled that they were no longer fit for duty, 
even with lighter guns and fewer men, and they were sold in 175644.  In 1753, the 
Aventurero (30) and the Gitano (14), built in Cartagena arsenal by the navy’s 
Master Shipwright, Edward Bryant, entered service45.  The Gitano, however, was 
found not to be very serviceable and returned to port after only a short time at 
                                                      
combating Barbary privateering both from within the navy and as an independent privateer, see 
Codina Bonet (2010) for his biography. 
41 AGS Marina 438, Barrero to Ensenada, Cartagena, 26 February 1749 and Ensenada to Arriaga, 
Madrid, 15 May 1750.  See Baudot Monroy (2012) pp.242–4 for details of the terms. 
42 AGS Marina 438, Barrero to Ensenada, Cartagena, 19 August 1750, and AGS Marina 326, 
Ensenada to Barrero, Madrid, 13 July 1753 mentions their construction in Cartagena in 1750. 
43 AGS Marina 321, ‘Expediente’, 12 February to 31 May 1752 
44 AGS Marina 438, Orozco to Ensenada, Cartagena, 28 March 1753, AGS Marina 439, Arriaga to 
Barrero, Madrid, 7 September 1754, and Arriaga to Spínola, Madrid, 5 October 1754 and AGS 
Marina 326, ‘Expediente’ on the sale, 10 April 1756 
45 AGS Marina 438, Ensenada to Spínola and Barrero, Madrid, 24 April 1753, and AGS Marina 
321, Barrero to Ensenada, Cartagena, 13 June 1752.  Both were launched 12 May 1753. 
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sea46.  It was used again briefly in 1754 but, when the xabeque commander, 
Joseph Flon, asked for it to be added to his squadron in 1755, Arriaga refused 
noting that it was known ‘to be useless for which reason it was excluded’ from 
service47.  Two additional xabeques were added to the squadron at the same time 
as the Aventurero and Gitano – the Garzota and Gávilan.  Both were former 
dispatch vessels that had sailed regularly between Oran and the Peninsula48.   In 
1754, a further four xabeques – Catalan, Ibicenco, Vigilante and Cuerbo Marino 
– were commissioned to be built in Mallorca by the Shipwright Miguel Avella 
and the Assistant Shipwrights Juan Real and Bartolomé Lluy and these were 
added to the service between 1754 and 175649.  As this brief summary illustrates, 
xabeques were only built for a few years’ service and there was a very fast 
turnover of these vessels in the navy. 
The battleships and xabeques in the Mediterranean had sailed as one division up 
until 1753 when it was divided into two.  Thereafter one sailed under the orders of 
the overall commander of the Mediterranean squadron, Francisco de Orozco, and 
the other under his subordinate, Blas de Barreda who was replaced by Albaro 
Cabreros in September 175350.  Since several new vessels were entering the 
service during the summer, the formation of the two divisions was not fully 
settled until September.  Then, however, Orozco sailed with the flagship the 70-
gun Tigre, the new frigates Perla and Dorada and the xabeques Mallorquin and 
                                                      
46 AGS Marina 438, Spínola to Ensenada, Cartagena, 13 June 1753 
47 AGS Marina 439, Flon to Spínola, Aventurero at anchor in Cartagena, 22 April 1755 and 
Arriaga to Spínola, Madrid, 26 April 1755 
48 AGS Marina 438, Ensenada to Spínola, 25 August 1753, Spínola to Ensenada, Cartagena, 26 
September 1753 and AGS Marina 322, ‘Expediente’, 1753 
49 AGS Marina 439, Arriaga to Barrero, Madrid, 7 September 1754, and AGS Marina 326, 
‘Expediente’.  Catalan launched 29 August 1754, Ibicenco launched 13 August 1754, Vigilante 
launched 23 June 1756 and Cuerbo Marino launched 8 July 1756. 
50 AGS Marina 438, Ensenada to Spínola, Madrid, 8 September 1753 
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Valenciano51.  And Cabreros, as Barreda’s replacement, sailed with the 70-gun 
Reyna, the frigate Esmeralda and the xabeques Aventurero, Garrota and 
Gávilan52.  These two divisions remained unchanged until the end of 1754, except 
for the Tigre and the Reyna which were replaced by the 70-gun ships Infante and 
Galicia in February 175453.  On 14 December 1754, Arriaga instructed that, in the 
following year’s campaign, the Tridente, under Isidoro Garcia del Postigo’s 
command, sail with the Aventurero, Ibicenco and Catalan.  He was to be joined 
by the Terrible, commanded by Francisco Cumplido, as soon as possible.  And:  
once these two ships are united they should not feel themselves bound to 
keep alongside the xabeques during severe weather but rather these two ships 
should cruise along the coast from Cape St Martin to Malaga without losing the 
protection of the ports of this coast on occasions when they are necessary as a 
result of inclement weather or superior forces and should let themselves be seen in 
front of the Port of Cartagena every thirty days54.   
These orders set the pattern for the organisation of the Mediterranean 
squadron during the remainder of Ferdinand’s reign.  From this date, instead of 
two divisions both including ships and xabeques, there was one division 
consisting of ships and frigates and another consisting just of xabeques.  In 1755 
the first division, commanded by Francisco de Cumplido, consisted of the 
Terrible, Tridente and frigate Juno and the second, of just the xabeques, 
commanded by the Teniente de Navío Joseph Flon, captain of the 30-gun 
                                                      
51 Ibid., Spínola to Ensenada, Cartagena, 17 October 1753 
52 Ibid., Spínola to Ensenada, Cartagena, 17 October 1753 
53 Ibid., Arriaga to Ensenada, Cadiz, 30 October 1753, Ensenada to Victoria and Arriaga, 5 
November 1753,  Victoria to Ensenada, Cadiz, 7 January 1754, Ensenada to Victoria, Madrid, 9 
February 1754, Arriaga to Ensenada, Cadiz, 19 February 1754 and Spínola to Ensenada, 
Cartagena, 24 April 1754 
54 AGS Marina 439, Arriaga to Spínola with copy to Barrero, Madrid, 14 December 1754 
 214 
Aventurero55.  At the end of 1755, Flon was replaced by another Teniente de 
Navío, Diego de Argote56. 
There were several encounters with Barbary privateers during these years.  One of 
the most notable was that between Flon’s squadron, consisting of the Aventurero, 
Catalan, Garzota, Ibicenco and Gávilan, and three Algerine corsairs on 16 April 
1755 off Villajoyosa57.  Flon defeated the Algerines freeing two captive 
Spaniards, twelve captive Dutchmen and seizing a total of 492 men (367 healthy 
and 120 wounded North Africans, three renegades and two North African ship 
captains or masters)58.  In the action, only 62 Spaniards were wounded and four 
killed59.  Arriaga congratulated Flon, noting that the news had given the King  
the greatest pleasure and satisfaction and He asks me to convey this to you 
and that this service will occupy the place in His Royal Mind which it justly 
deserves; and the same with regard to the other officers to whom, in the name of 
His Majesty, you will convey his gracious gratitude.  And, not doubting that your 
conduct and valour will remain the same in the continuation of your commission, 
you can be sure that you will be treated as corresponds to the honours you have 
acquired in the past as well as on this particular occasion60.   
There is no indication of what happened with the enemy vessel or vessels 
but presumably it or they were destroyed since there is no mention of them.  
Arriaga instructed that the Algerine commander, called Chimusa, be kept ‘with 
great security but without being confined to prison’, that special care be taken of 
the wounded, that the Spanish crews (excepting the senior officers and the 
Guardias Marinas) be given an extra month’s pay and that the marine infantry on 
                                                      
55 Ibid., ‘Expediente’ on 1755 Mediterranean squadron 
56 Ibid., Arriaga to Spínola, Madrid, 13 December 1755 
57 Ibid., Flon to Arriaga, Alicante, 17 April 1755 
58 Ibid., ‘Estado del total de captivos argelinos que de heridas y sanos vienen en la esquadra de 
chaveques con la expresión de arraezes, renegados, captivos españoles y olandeses’, [Flon, 17 
April 1755] 
59 Ibid., ‘Relazión de el total de muertos y heridos que en el combate, han tenido la esquadra de 
chaveques’, [Flon, 17 April 1755] 
60 Ibid., Arriaga to Flon, Madrid, 22 April 1755 
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the vessels be turned over (graduada).  Flon was promoted to Capitán de Navío 
and rewarded with two slaves whom he could select from those taken in the 
action.  The other officers and Guardias Marinas in the squadron were each 
rewarded with one slave also to be chosen from among those captured61. 
On 23 April 1755, Flon was given fresh instructions to return to sea after reports 
circulated of five privateers being active in the Mediterranean.  These instructions 
specified that he was to cruise near the Balearic Islands until 20 May where it was 
expected the enemy would sail.  Since he was outnumbered, however, Flon was to 
be careful with his squadron by keeping close to the coasts and anchorages where 
he could hide at night or if he were to find the five enemy xabeques grouped 
together.  If the latter occurred then he was to see if he could increase his force by 
recruiting additional men and vessels to confront the enemy from a position of 
superiority but, on no account, was he to deviate from his orders even if there 
were the potential for greater success or to permit his forces to separate62.  Flon, 
emboldened by his recent success, reported on the ferocity of the privateers and 
noted that since Spain’s naval forces alone acted as a break on the ‘audacity’ of 
Barbary corsairs he thought it was necessary to increase his forces, in both men 
and vessels, to safeguard Spain’s honour63.  Arriaga agreed to increase the number 
of men but refused to give Flon any more vessels because there were none that 
was suitable64.  Flon reacted to this by pointing out that Arriaga must well know 
‘that all manoeuvres to flee before the enemy will further stimulate their daring 
and tarnishes the person in command’, that it would be almost impossible to 
                                                      
61 Ibid., Arriaga to Barrero, Madrid, 23 April 1755 
62 Ibid., Arriaga to Flon, Madrid, 23 April 1755 
63 Ibid., Flon to Spínola, Aventurero at anchor in Cartagena, 22 April 1755 
64 Ibid., Arriaga to Spínola, Madrid, 26 April 1755 
 216 
reinforce his forces in the Balearics on such short notice and that from the 
calculations made of those recovered, drowned or killed in his previous action it 
was possible to deduce that the enemy had had more than 1,100 men in their 
squadron – the Cavallo Blanco, one of the Algerines’ smallest ships, having had 
340 men in contrast to the 279 men on his ship, the 30-gun Aventurero, which was 
the largest in his squadron.  He also complained about the quality of the small 
arms weapons on his vessels which he argued needed to be replaced65.  Arriaga 
noted that he had agreed to increase the size of Flon’s crews and that new 
weapons would be provided but reiterated his original orders and added that Flon, 
being reassured that the King had ‘as much faith in your courage as in your 
conduct’, was to avoid exposing his forces unnecessarily and to keep in mind that 
‘squadrons do not refuse to sail with four to six ships even when they are aware 
that there are squadrons of eight, ten or twelve ships at sea’66.  Despite Arriaga’s 
promise of more men, however, when instructed to supply them Barrero reported 
that it would be very difficult not only because the xabeques were insufficiently 
large to carry all the necessary victuals but also because accommodating so many 
men in such cramped conditions would lead to sickness and disease.  As a result 
no additional men were added to the usual complements and when they sailed in 
May the Aventurero had 247 men, the Gávilan 209, the Garzota 247, the Ibicenco 
249 and the Catalan 25367.  Soon after, Spínola and Barrero were asked to discuss 
the matter with Flon and to propose the reduction of these numbers even further, 
                                                      
65 Ibid., Flon to Arriaga, Aventurero at anchor in Cartagena, 28 April 1755 
66 Ibid., Arriaga to Flon, Madrid, 3 May 1755 
67 Ibid., Barrero to Arriaga, Cartagena, 6 May 1755 and ‘Estado de la tripulación que existía a 
bordo de los cinco javeques de SM que abajo se expresaran en tres de mayo de este año y lo 
reemplazado en quatro de él de la que estaba en el depósito del navío el Rl y en el nombrado el 
Infante’, signed Manuel de Riva, Cartagena, 5 May 1755 
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presumably for the same reasons – unless it was because there were insufficient 
men available68. 
At the end of Ferdinand’s reign, Spain’s fight against the Barbary States was 
ongoing and the principal force employed in this was the navy, particularly the 
Mediterranean squadron with its division of xabeques.  This force had developed 
significantly during the 1750s having become a larger and more established 
division of the Mediterranean squadron.  This meant that the navy was in a better 
situation to respond rapidly to the threat of privateers by having more vessels 
capable of being at sea more consistently and for a longer period.  This allowed 
Spanish squadrons to have greater chances of success in their encounters with 
privateers as well as in enforcing the Spanish monarchy’s rulings with regard to 
those countries that signed neutrality treaties with the Barbary States.  The 
strategy employed against privateers and dictated by the central government, 
however, remained somewhat cautious and vessels and squadrons were not 
expected to challenge equal or larger forces, they were to remain together at all 
times and they were first and foremost to ensure the safety of their vessels by 
remaining close to the safe havens of Spanish coasts and anchorages. 
The Strategic and Active use of the Navy within the Concept of 
Armed Neutrality 
The strategy followed by Spain during Ferdinand’s reign in negotiating its 
European relations was that of armed neutrality as described by Ensenada in his 
Representations.  Spain, he noted, was subject to being permanently challenged 
by its greatest European rivals, France and Britain, because both sought universal 
commercial dominion and Spain’s commerce with its territories in America was 
                                                      
68 Ibid., Arriaga to Spínola and Barrero, Madrid, 28 June 1755 
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what most interested them69.  Fortunately, France and Britain would always be in 
conflict with one another which meant that if Spain had the navy, army and 
money which Ensenada proposed both would be very interested in an alliance 
with Spain.  This being so, Spain could become the arbiter of peace between these 
two powers70.  It followed, therefore, that the navy was crucial because it was the 
force which France would be most desperate to add to its own and an eventuality 
which Britain would be most eager to prevent from happening since a combined 
Franco-Spanish fleet ‘would deprive the British of that dominion of the sea which 
they have aquired’71.  The implications of this were that the navy would merely 
have to exist at the necessary strength, judged quantitatively by number of ships, 
in order for it to be an effective diplomatic tool with which Spain could achieve 
its foreign policy objectives without resorting to war.  These objectives can be 
briefly summarised as being the protection of Spain’s sea communications with its 
overseas territories, especially in the Americas, preventing Austria from regaining 
its influence in the Italian peninsula, and eventually regaining Gibraltar and 
Minorca from the British72.  For the strategy to be successful, however, it was 
absolutely vital that Spain maintain its neutrality and not be inadvertently pushed 
into war.  This was partially because the King, Ferdinand VI, was adamant that he 
would not involve Spain in another conflict but, more importantly, because France 
and Britain would only persist in courting a Spanish alliance and not resort to 
more aggressive tactics if it remained neutral.  There is no doubt that Spain had 
sufficient naval and military strength to alter the balance of power in a conflict 
                                                      
69 Rodríguez Villa (1878) p.120   
70 Ibid. p.120 
71 Ibid. p.62 
72 Ensenada explained these in his ‘Idea de lo que parece preciso en el día para la dirección de lo 
que corresponde a Estado y se halla pendiente.  1746’, Rodríguez Villa (1878) pp.31–42. 
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between France and Britain.  This had been seen in the previous war in which 
Britain had struggled to impose itself successfully at sea on France and Spain 
together and, as Jeremy Black has argued, it was dangerous for the British navy to 
view the challenge of achieving naval mastery simply in terms of dealing with 
France without also considering Spain73.  Since France and Britain both sought an 
alliance with Spain following the descent into renewed war between them in 
1754, Ferdinand VI’s strategy was, to some extent, successful74. 
As early as 1750, France had reacted to Spanish naval expansion by proposing an 
alliance75.  Then, France’s Naval Minister Antoine-Louis Rouillé had written to 
Ensenada suggesting that they each test the willingness of their respective 
monarchs to form an alliance76.  Ensenada turned down Rouillé’s offer, 
simultanously denying that Spain had any plans for major naval expansion.  Since 
Ferdinand barely had six ships of the line, Ensenada explained, all they were 
doing was trying to build sufficient to put one or two decent squadrons in the 
water.  Ensenada described this as a very long-term project for which reason he 
turned down Rouillé’s offer and suggested that they each concentrate on 
improving their respective naval power and then, maybe, ‘in time, we will talk 
again with a view to proposing Your Excellency’s project to Our Masters since it 
is most just and the very most convenient course of action for both Crowns whose 
union, despite their differences, will be eternal’77.  It is revealing that when 
Benjamin Keene, the British ambassador in Madrid, tried to ascertain the truth 
                                                      
73 Black (1991) p.254 
74 See Dull (2005) pp.12–9 for the descent into war between Britain and France. 
75 France’s interest in an alliance with Spain was not motivated by the idea of combined naval 
forces alone, there was also the desire to have greater access to the Spanish empire, see Christelow 
(1941) pp.515–37. 
76 AGS Marina 712, f.353, Rouillé to Ensenada, Versailles, 14 June 1750 
77 Ibid., ff.351–52, Ensenada to Rouillé, Retiro, 6 July 1750 
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behind a rumour that a combined Spanish and French fleet was being considered, 
Ensenada mentioned Rouillé’s proposal in a dismissive manner.  He told Keene 
that ‘the French were constantly soliciting’ a combined force and that Rouillé  
(whom he did not seem to esteem much) had some time ago began a 
correspondence with him, upon the means of augmenting and bringing to 
perfection the Marine of both these kingdoms … but that he had excused himself 
from any further intercourse, by answering Rouillé’s letters in a cold and civil 
way, and by telling him, that his own projects were so unripe and so much in their 
infancy that they could not furnish materials to keep up such a correspondence78.   
As these quotations demonstrate, Ensenada was attempting to appease 
both sides, without making any promises to either but his response to Rouillé was 
not as cold as he implied to Keene and the French continued to pursue an alliance 
in subsequent years.  In order to achieve this, François-Marie de Villers-la-Faye, 
Baron de Vaulgrenant (1699–1774), the French ambassador in Spain since 1749, 
whom Ensenada disliked, was replaced by the more talented Emmanuel Félicité 
de Durfort, Duke de Duras in 1752, with some success79.  Similarly, in 1760, 
Duras’ successor, Henri-Joseph Bouchard d’Espardès, Marquis de Aubeterre, was 
replaced by Pierre-Paul, Marquis d’Ossun, on Charles III’s request in order to 
please the Spanish King80.  Throughout the decade, it was assumed in Spain that 
France was desperate for an alliance.  In relation to the French attack on Minorca, 
for example, Keene reported that ‘When the news of the departure of the French 
fleet arrived here the Catholic King said, they will be offering that island to me’81.  
Even today, historians take this as a given.  In Josep Juan Vidal and Enrique 
Martínez Ruiz’s work Política Interior y Exterior de los Borbones published in 
2001, for example, the authors note that: ‘France captured Minorca from the 
                                                      
78 Kew SP94/140, ff.24–6, Keene to Holdernesse, Madrid, 20 August 1751 
79 Kew SP94/139, ff.64–71, Keene to Bedford, Madrid, 20 February 1751 
80 Dull (2005) pp.65, 154 
81 Cited by Téllez Alarcia (2006), p.80, from Kew SP94/151. 
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British in June to offer it to Spain in exchange for its abandoning its neutrality and 
entering the war on its side against Britain’82.  Spain’s assumption that France was 
in critical need of an alliance and that it would do anything, even capturing 
Minorca on Spain’s behalf to obtain it, was to prove harmful to Spain in the long-
run.  France also clearly had other strategic objectives in seizing the island, 
namely the removal of a privateering base which caused much damage to its 
shipping, and the wish for an alliance with Spain did not override all else, given 
that France would have been unlikely to sign the Treaty of Versailles on 1 May 
1756 with Spain’s rival in Italy, Austria, if such were the case83.  Meanwhile, the 
blanket of neutrality and its apparent success disguised Spain’s increasingly 
vulnerable position.  The Treaty of Madrid signed on 5 October 1750 between 
Spain and Britain in which Britain surrendered its claim to the Asiento in 
exchange for £100,000, may have temporarily eased Anglo-Spanish relations but 
it did not settle the fundamental differences between the two in the West Indies as 
to what constituted legitimate trade on the side of the British and what lawful 
guardacosta activities on the side of the Spanish84.  Towards the end of the 1750s, 
these tensions were resurfacing but France, exhausted by war, was gradually 
coming round to a desire for peace with Britain.  If France and Britain were to 
reach a peace settlement without Spain ever having provided France with any 
assistance, there would be little to prevent Britain attacking Spain unimpeded.  As 
                                                      
82 Vidal and Martínez Ruiz (2001) p.241 
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84 See Pares (1963) pp.517–55 for an account of these disputes and Baudot Monroy (2012) 
pp.323–70 for a description of the consultative Junta composed of Sebastián de Eslava, Julián de 
Arriaga and Francisco Fernández de Molinillo which advised more aggressive measures to defend 
the West Indies empire.  The key topics which it was to discuss were the French occupation of 
Darién, the removal of the British from Honduras and an increase of pressure on Dutch 
contraband.  As a result of this Junta, more rigourous legislation for guardacosta activity was 
published in 1754 (Ordenanzas de Corso), it was decided to have a greater naval presence off 
Honduras Bay and Juan de Isla y Alvear was given the rights to the sale of logwood from 
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a result, Spain began courting an alliance with France from the beginning of 1761 
but, despite this, Louis XV still invited Britain to attend a peace conference at 
Augsburg along with the rulers of Sweden, Saxony, Russia and Austria and 
included a proposal for separate Franco-British preliminary discussions85.  In 
response to Spanish overtures, Louis XV’s chief minister, Étienne-François, Duke 
of Choiseul (1719–1785), simultaneously suggested in vague terms an offensive 
and defensive alliance to the Spanish ambassador at Versailles, Pablo Gerónimo 
Grimaldi y Pallavicini, Marquis de Grimaldi (c.1720–1789).  Choiseul, however, 
rejected outright a draft proposal sent by Wall which did not offer any Spanish 
commitment to France until after the war and expected the French to make British 
satisfaction of Spanish grievances part of France’s own peace negotiations and to 
transfer Minorca to Spain.  At the peace negotiations in London, the French 
envoy, François de Bussy, was instructed not to trust the Spanish ambassador, 
Joaquín Pignatelli de Aragón y Moncayo, Count of Fuentes, and to ensure that 
negotiations with Spain remained subordinate to achieving peace with Britain.  In 
the end, Spain was forced into accepting far less favourable terms than it had 
originally desired when it signed the third Family Compact on 15 August 1761 
and, in a Secret Convention, it also agreed to enter the conflict on the side of 
France on 1 May 1762 if France and Britain had not made peace by then86.  
France also did not fully commit to the alliance until Anglo-French negotiations 
had stalled87.  The idea then that France would comply with all Spanish terms in 
light of its urgent need for an alliance and that this would become even more the 
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case when leveraged by increased Spanish naval strength was only valid when 
Britain and France were at war and, even then, only within limits. 
During Ferdinand’s reign, Britain, in her turn, also sought to form a coalition with 
Spain but the latter’s navy represented a less significant feature in the negotiations 
than it did with France.  The British government perceived the development of the 
Spanish navy as being targeted against them which was an accurate assumption 
since in the theory of armed neutrality the idea was that the navy could either be 
or not be combined with the French fleet against Britain.  Keene, for example, 
describing Ensenada’s naval project as ‘an extravagant scheme’, noted that it 
could only be used for a ‘disservice against their real friends [Britain]’88.  
Ensenada was conscious of how it was perceived by the British and, therefore, 
rarely elaborated on his plans for the navy to the British ambassador whom, 
however, he did update on his army reforms so as to convince the British that 
measures were also being taken against France89.  Spanish naval expansion was 
watched with interest by the British government which asked to be kept informed 
of any developments by its envoys.  Keene’s observations, backed by those of 
British consuls in Spanish ports, could only have served to allay any fears.  At the 
beginning, Keene was dismissive of Ensenada’s plans, commenting: ‘I observe so 
many projects here invented and begun with warmth, then cool and dwindle away 
to next to nothing that perhaps this may prove one of them’90.  He became even 
more so as the project progressed and as his dislike of Ensenada increased with 
the result that his observations focused on reports circulating at Ferdinand’s Court 
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90 Ibid., ff.227–31, Keene to Bedford, Antigola, 21 June 1751 
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of the project’s excessive expense and ultimate futility.  Keene himself noted that, 
as with earlier such projects, warships were built to distract the British navy from 
the West Indies but that these ships were never intended ‘to go out of their ports, 
or run the risk of engaging with us’91.  Hence, Keene did not feel threatened by 
Spanish naval expansion and his involvement in Ensenada’s downfall was more 
immediately the result of his personal rancour against Ensenada and of this 
minister’s increasingly aggressive policies in the West Indies and growing 
closeness to the French ambassador, the Duke de Duras92.  On 19 July 1754, 
Keene provided the leading conspirators against Ensenada, the Duke of Huéscar 
and Ricardo Wall, with a letter demonstrating Ensenada’s involvement in an 
attack planned on the British settlement in Campeche Bay93.  This angered 
Ferdinand VI to such an extent when Huéscar and Wall showed it to him on 20 
July that Ensenada was removed from all his posts the following day and exiled 
from Court to Granada there to reside under house arrest94.  Some months after 
this, Keene informed Sir Thomas Robinson, in an often quoted letter, that 
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missions of the upper Uruguay River from being ousted by the Portuguese as a result of the Luso-
Spanish Treaty signed in 1750 had already incurred Ferdinand’s displeasure. 
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Ensenada’s shipbuilding had been cancelled95.  As a result, it has frequently been 
assumed that the threat of Spanish naval expansion was what caused Keene to 
intervene in Court politics96.  There is not enough evidence, however, to support 
this, especially considering Keene’s earlier dismissive comments on the Spanish 
navy.  Moreover, Keene did not mention the abandonment of naval expansion as 
one of the benefits of Ensenada’s removal previously, either in his communication 
of 21 July 1754 reporting the coup or in his letters of 31 July 1754 in which he 
described the event97.  Another indication that this was not Keene’s objective is 
provided by his attitude to the in-coming Naval Minister, Julián de Arriaga.  
Keene noted that he had been initially concerned by the selection of Arriaga 
because he did not know him and Arriaga was thought to be one of Ensenada’s 
men but ‘as he was only to be Minister of the Marine’ and did not also have 
control of the Treasury it did not matter to him whether he was in or out of the 
ministry.  This changed, however, when Wall resigned the Secretaryship of the 
Indies and joined it to that of the Navy because immediately ‘he, Arriaga, is 
become of more importance to the publick; and bears some nearer relation to the 
most critical points between Great Britain & Spain’98.  Spanish naval expansion 
alone did not, therefore, make the British government more willing to attend to 
Spanish interests and the idea that it was the cause behind Ensenada’s removal 
does not fit with the evidence. 
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This policy of armed neutrality was not as successful a diplomatic tool as had 
originally been projected by Ensenada and it did not make Spain ‘the arbiter’ 
between France and Britain, let alone the whole of Europe.  Worse, it gave Spain 
a false sense of security.  The dramatic growth of the navy as described in 
previous chapters contributed to making an alliance with Spain seem more 
attractive to France but not to the extent that Ensenada hoped and it achieved little 
in Spain’s negotiations with Britain. 
This diplomatic manoeuvre alone, however, was not the sole objective in building 
a larger navy.  It was also expected that this force would play an active role in 
securing Spain’s neutrality by providing it with a fleet capable of defending its 
interests against the depredations of its French and British neighbours.  This had 
to be achieved in such a manner as to demonstrate the respectability of the 
Spanish navy as an armed force but without provoking these powers into action 
against it.  This balance was tested by the Spanish navy from 1754 onwards when 
relations between France and Britain worsened until 1761 when Spain finally 
abandoned its neutrality by signing the third Family Compact. 
Spain’s initial reaction to a conflict between France and Britain was to increase its 
number of active battleships.  This was first set in operation in the West Indies in 
1755 where Blas de Barreda was given command of the Havana squadron, 
consisting of the ships Infante (70), Asia (70), Dragón (60), Fuerte (60) and 
Bizarra (50) and the frigates Flecha (22) and Flora (36), and ordered to monitor 
the activities of French and British squadrons sent to North America but without 
dispersing his squadron.  These orders noted that although the King had 
determined not to become involved in the conflict and that the causes for 
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aggression between France and Britain were irrelevant to Spain, Ferdinand 
wanted Barreda  
to watch for the safety of his dominions but also for the sovereignty of his 
seas, which permitted foreigners to navigate in them for the purpose of reaching 
their colonies only and it would be a breach of his legitimate sovereignty if these 
two nations sent their squadrons or privateers into them to carry out hostile acts 
against each other.   
Barreda was to ensure that the same laws be followed in Ferdinand’s seas 
in the West Indies as were observed in neutral ports.  He was to accomplish this, 
however, taking care not to provoke France or Britain in any way which could 
result in war for Spain99. 
In European waters, meanwhile, Pedro Stuart y Portugal was given command of 
the Mediterranean squadron in 1756.  As a result of Anglo-French hostilities, this 
was enlarged from an average of two capital ships to the Triunfante (70 guns), 
Vencedor (68), Héctor (68) and Soberano (70).  The squadron’s main objective 
remained the interception and destruction of Barbary privateers and the protection 
of national trade but, from this date, French and British privateers who abused 
their commissions were also included in the remit.  He was to maintain all due 
formality with any British and French squadrons he encountered but, where 
possible, he was to ensure the Spanish flag was shown the greater respect.  What 
was meant by this was that it was the general custom for warships to launch their 
boats to greet and identify themselves to the warships belonging to the nation in 
whose waters they were sailing.  As a result, the Spanish expected that British and 
French warships would launch their boats when in Spanish coastal waters but both 
nations did not always observe this courtesy, in the case of Britain somewhat 
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more cavalierly, especially when their squadrons were commanded by higher-
ranking flag officers.  In order to counteract this, Stuart was instructed to preserve 
Spanish honour by remaining at a distance from higher-ranking foreign squadrons 
and only sending one of his smaller ships nearer them to launch their boat.  In this 
manner, the commander of Spain’s Mediterranean squadron would not be put into 
a situation where he was shown to have lesser honours in his own waters than a 
foreign commander.  As to the assistance he could provide vessels fleeing from 
French and British warships, he was to follow the general rule that a fortress, 
albeit a floating one, would provide protection to any vessel which came within 
cannon shot but he was not to seek to provide assistance.  In order to keep his 
ships safe, Stuart was to keep to Spanish coasts and ports, only sailing when the 
weather was favourable or when reports of privateers required it100.   His orders 
were further fine-tuned following reports that the French fleet had sailed from 
Toulon and there was the possibility of an Anglo-French encounter.  If this 
happened, Stuart was to remain out of sight to avoid being in the position of being 
asked to provide assistance by either side so, ‘in order to avoid these 
embarrassments, you will anchor in His Majesty’s ports when it is certain that the 
other two are in the proximity and in a state to fight’101. 
The emphasis on maintaining neutrality and defending national interests without 
provoking a conflict is evident in the instructions given to Barreda and Stuart.  
These instructions, however, made it very difficult for Spanish naval officers to 
impose any such sovereignty in what were, after all, Spanish waters because they 
had no authority to act against foreign warships that failed to obey the rules.  This 
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was particularly the case with British warships which were deployed in large 
numbers in areas of interest to them, such as the Straits of Gibraltar, and where 
the British navy was tasked with observing and monitoring what was happening at 
sea.  The difficulties that this entailed were made manifest by the voyage of the 
frigates Esmeralda and Palas, commanded by the Capitán de Navío Agustin de 
Idiázquez, from Cartagena to Ferrol between 8 and 16 November 1756102.  
Idiázquez described his journey from Cartagena, through the Straits of Gibraltar, 
past Cadiz, along the Portuguese coast before sailing into Ferrol complaining of 
his repeated encounters with British battleships en route.  They had encountered 
the first one off the coast of Malaga on 10 November.  It had hailed him by firing 
a shot over his frigate but the Spanish captain had sought to ignore this and 
continue sailing.  After the shot was repeated, however, Idiázquez allowed the 
ship to come alongside and when it extended its British flag he extended his 
Spanish flag.  The British ship then asked Idiázquez to launch his boat which the 
Spanish captain refused to do adding that his frigates belonged to the King of 
Spain but the British ship repeated the request ‘with much emphasis’ and 
Idiázquez was forced to reiterate his refusal adding that the British captain  
should not be ignorant of the fact that no Spanish warship launched its 
boat, nor should be asked to.  None of this was sufficient for he persevered in his 
unfounded pretension so that in the end I simply told him that I did not want to 
and that he should launch his and send it to me.   
Sensing the Spanish captain’s resolution, the British launched their own 
boat and one of their officers came on board the Palas.  Idiázquez demanded to 
know  
                                                      
102 Ibid., Arriaga to Barrero, Madrid, 10 April 1756, Spínola to Arriaga, Cartagena, 10 November 
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for what reasons, having been assured that they were warships belonging 
to the King of Spain, had his captain pretended with such determination that he 
[Idiázquez] should launch his boat and for what reason had he fired two loaded 
shots over my masts?  In answer to the first, he [the British officer] only said that 
they were not sure whether they were Spanish or French and, to the second, that 
as they were at war with that nation they had persuaded themselves that they were 
ships belonging to that country; he asked for the names of the frigates, their 
captains, and rate, and having noted it all down he told me his captain was called 
Captain Codrington103 and the ship, the 60-gun Kingston and that they were 
employed in cruising between the Straits and Malaga.   
After this, the frigates continued their voyage but within half an hour they 
came across another British 60-gun battleship, which also extended its flag and 
hailed the frigates by firing a shot over them.  It came alongside between the two 
of them and asked the Esmeralda to launch its boat even though the British 
officers knew that she was not the commanding frigate.  After the Esmeralda’s 
officers pretended not to understand the request, the British ship launched its boat 
sending an officer to the Esmeralda.  Once the frigates had identified themselves 
they were allowed to continue sailing.  On 12 November, sailing off Cape St 
Vincent, they came across the 60-gun Princess Louisa, under the command of 
Captain Atkinson104, who identified himself to them and asked Idiázquez to 
identify himself too.  On 14 November, Idiázquez himself extended his flag and 
fired a shot at a 60-gun battleship which identified itself as being British and they 
continued sailing without further formalities.  As a result, Idiázquez sought 
confirmation from Arriaga that his conduct had been appropriate and  
assuring Your Excellency that in all this my only object has been to serve 
the King better, having persuaded myself that it was unseemly to adhere to the 
wishes of the British by launching my boat.  On this point I would think it very 
convenient for Your Excellency to issue a fixed instruction so that with its literal 
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observation commanders can avoid acting wrongly and so that the honour of the 
national flag is preserved105. 
After Idiázquez’s voyage, command of the Palas was transferred to Marquis 
González who was deployed for regular cruising in the Atlantic.  The debate over 
his instructions demonstrates Spanish reluctance to antagonise.  González was 
ordered to sail in Ferrol’s waters to protect Spanish shipping ‘so that British and 
French privateers do not interrupt nor molest His Majesty’s subjects trading in 
these seas’.  The fourth paragraph of González’s instructions had originally stated 
that if they came across Spanish vessels which had been taken as prizes they 
should take possession of these and return them to a Spanish port.  The fifth 
paragraph, that:  
Similarly, if you should come across a privateer that has taken a vessel 
with materials which are the property of Spaniards, you will have them delivered 
either by that very privateer or by its prize to one of the King’s ports where its 
rightful owner will be decided106.   
On seeing this, Arriaga asked Orozco to rephrase the instructions, 
eliminating paragraph five altogether and adding to the end of the previous 
paragraph that, if the prize had been taken by a battleship, force should not be 
used on any account.  Only verbal protests could be made.  Furthermore, even 
with privateers, González was to act cautiously and never challenge those of 
superior strength107.   
Spanish naval officers were, therefore, unable to enforce a form of active 
neutrality in which Spain could exercise effective control over its own seas.  In 
the West Indies, Barreda was instructed to protect Ferdinand’s sovereignty.  This 
sovereignty was supposed to mean that foreign squadrons and ships could only 
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enter those seas with permission from the King of Spain and with the sole purpose 
of travelling to their own colonies and, since Spain was neutral, its waters were to 
be treated by others in the same way as neutral ports.  To achieve this, however, 
Barreda was to act prudently, only taking action against privateers and not 
antagonising the British or French.  Similarly, in the Mediterranean, Stuart, with 
the same objective of demonstrating the King’s sovereignty over his 
Mediterranean waters, was to patrol those seas but without exposing his ships to 
inclement weather unnecessarily, keeping his distance from any British and 
French fleets that might be manoeuvering towards battle and ensuring the Spanish 
flag’s predominance by remaining at a distance from superior foreign forces in 
order to avoid launching his boat to greet them.  Any idea that this represented 
real seapower does not bear investigation especially when superiority was only 
achieved by the use of subterfuges such as those adopted by the Esmeralda when 
it pretended not to understand the foreign battleship’s instructions so as to avoid 
appearing inferior.  The British navy represented a significant threat to the 
Spanish throughout this period of neutrality not only because the British 
equivalent of guerre de course was frequently carried out by British warships 
themselves but because British warships were deployed in sizeable numbers about 
the Peninsula’s coasts and, as Idiázquez’s experience demonstrated, they were not 
overly concerned about Spanish sensibilities.  In 1758, the Spanish realisation that 
they needed to command greater respect at sea was recognised and in ensuing 
years one large squadron alone was deployed off Cadiz during the summer.  This 
was also in response to the re-introduction of the flota system which had been 
abandoned during Ensenada’s time in favour of register ships and azogues.  The 
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first flota commanded by Joaquin de Villena was due to arrive in August 1758 
from Jalapa108. 
For the Spanish navy to handle the safe homecoming of this newly resurrected 
flota the principal difficulty that had to be overcome was how to achieve the 
manning of a sufficiently large fleet.  In Cartagena, for example, Spínola and 
Barrero were asked to fit out the 70-gun ships Triumfante, Soberano, Vencedor 
and Septentrión and the 28-gun frigates Astrea and Juno109.  Barrero forwarded a 
table of the men available and men required from the register for such a large 
armament which is shown in Table 14.1 in the appendices.  Since this left a total 
of 2,167 sailors to be recruited from the register of seamen, Barrero divided the 
numbers of men to be called for from each region of the Department in the 
manner shown in Table 14.2. 
By June, the full squadron of 16 battleships and six frigates (with crews as shown 
in Appendix 15) were nearly ready and the Cartagena and Ferrol squadrons were 
soon to sail to Cadiz.  Overall command had been given to Andrés Reggio with 
the Count of Vegaflorida as his second110. 
The fitting out of this squadron was closely observed by the British.  At the end of 
February and beginning of March, Joseph Jordan, Burrington Goldsworthy, James 
Banks and Lieutenant-Colonel Ruvigny de Cosne, British consuls in Corunna, 
Cadiz, Cartagena and Madrid respectively, reported on the Departments having 
received orders to fit out a large proportion of their fleets and to repair their 
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coastal defences111.  From London, Pitt asked De Cosne to continue ‘in diligently 
observing the progress of all naval armaments in the ports of Spain and in 
transmitting from time to time, the earliest and most exact accounts of the 
same’112.  British assessments of the armament, however, could only have served 
to dispel British worries over the potential of the Spanish navy, especially since 
the British had identified the enormous struggle involved in manning such a fleet.  
At the beginning of May, Goldsworthy reported that the ships at Cadiz were 
almost ready  
but they will certainly find it difficult to man them by what I am told, even 
after their own way of doing it, tho they press almost all the common people they 
meet with, and even bring them out of the country; scarcely a boatman either here 
or at Cadiz escapes them who is able to pull a rope113.   
De Cosne, who had reported that the xabeques had been disarmed in order 
to man the Cartagena squadron, reported on 12 June on the posting of a notice in 
Alicante for the recruitment of sailors for the xabeques which could not find 
sufficient men to return to sea and which showed ‘the alarm the Algerine 
armament has given and the want the Spaniards are in of sailors to man those 
xabeques; and before that can be done, the Algerines are likely to have time to 
make great spoils & return home with them’114.  And, on 19 June, he reported that 
Goldsworthy had described the Spanish ships as being ‘most miserably mann’d, 
that they want at least one third of their complements & that he believes he may 
                                                      
111 Kew SP94/157, ff.97–8, Jordan to Pitt, Corunna, 4 March 1758, ff.119–20, ‘Extract of a letter 
from Mr Goldsworthy to Lieut. Col. De Cosne’, Port St Mary, 8 March 1758, and ff.89–90, 
‘Extract of a letter from Mr Banks to De Cosne’, Cartagena, 22 February 1758, and ff.87–8, De 
Cosne to Pitt, Madrid, 27 February 1758. 
112 Ibid., ff.107–9, Pitt to De Cosne, Whitehall, 31 March 1758 
113 Ibid., f.192, Goldsworthy to De Cosne, Port St Mary, 3 May 1758 
114 Ibid., ff.257–8, De Cosne to Pitt, Aranjuez, 12 June 1758 
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say that not one tenth of those are seasoned’115.  Observers also felt that the effort 
was unsustainable.  Jordan, reporting from Corunna, stated that  
tis said by some great men here that Admiral Reggio (who was to have 
had the command of the Grand Squadron) don’t go out, but that most of the large 
ships will be laid up and their men discharged, the King finding the charge too 
great, and the service they can do him inadequate116.   
Jordan’s report was inaccurate, since this ‘Grand Squadron’ did sail, not 
only in 1758 but also in 1759 and 1760.  Its difficulties with recruitment, 
however, did reduce its effectiveness not just because the ships were poorly 
manned but also because they were obvious to Spain’s rivals and reduced its 
power to intimidate. 
Victoria was sent Reggio’s sealed orders at the end of May with the instruction 
that Reggio only open them once at sea.  They instructed him to sail off Cape St 
Vincent and Cape Santa Maria with the object of protecting shipping and making 
the King’s flag and coasts be respected as they should be, for despite the 
perfect harmony that exists (and that His Majesty wishes for Your Excellency to 
observe) with the two Crowns of France and Britain, experience has taught us that 
despite the wishes of their sovereigns, their privateers have committed 
excesses117.   
Reggio was given permission to deploy his ships as he wished in order to 
discourage primarily Barbary privateers but also French and British ones from 
lingering around Spanish coasts118.  His squadron was complete and sailing off the 
Cadiz coast by the end of June.   
During the time this squadron was at sea, however, the difficulties in enforcing 
Spanish sovereignty on its seas persisted for precisely the same reasons that had 
                                                      
115 Ibid., ff.289–90, De Cosne to Pitt, Aranjuez, 19 June 1758 
116 Ibid., ff.299–300, Jordan to Pitt, Corunna, 30 June 1758 
117 AGS Marina 440, Arriaga to Victoria, Aranjuez, 25 May 1758 
118 Ibid., Arriaga to Reggio, Aranjuez, 25 May 1758 
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earlier handicapped Spanish officers in command of smaller squadrons or single 
ships.  Vegaflorida, captain of the 68-gun Aquiles which was deployed directly in 
front of Cadiz Bay, for example, reported on 24 June that since the previous day a 
British 64-gun battleship had closed on him to observe his movements and was 
‘examining and chasing all the vessels that passed by it’.  This seemed to be 
pushing matters insultingly too far to Vegaflorida especially since this was 
happening  
within sight of this Port [Cadiz], of the whole coast and of this squadron 
which they have not respected as they should for yesterday afternoon they 
inspected and visited, within a shot and a half of this ship, a Spanish packet boat 
that, with an extended flag, they saw me inspect shortly before.   
Vegaflorida complained directly to Victoria noting that  
the above-mentioned ships and frigates have established themselves in 
these places and that every day they will act the same because I do not have orders 
to stop warships unless they insult any vessel that goes near them within cannon 
shot of one of ours119.   
Victoria forwarded Vegaflorida’s complaint to Arriaga, adding that he had 
told Vegaflorida to stick to Reggio’s original instructions but that he agreed that 
the matter required greater consideration120.  But Arriaga merely approved 
Victoria’s advice to Vegaflorida and did not comment further. 
On 18 July, Arriaga forwarded Reggio secret instructions which included the 
sailing directions for the in-coming flota commanded by José Manuel de Villena 
so that Vegaflorida could sail with the 68-gun ships Aquiles, Brillante, Neptuno 
and Poderoso to Cape St Vincent to meet it121.  In the end it was Idiázquez that 
first met Villena’s flota off Cape St Vincent and they sailed together for Cadiz, en 
route meeting Reggio who also joined the escort, accompanying the flota until it 
                                                      
119 Ibid., Vegaflorida to Victoria, Aquiles, 24 June 1758 
120 Ibid., Victoria to Arriaga, Cadiz, 28 June 1758 
121 Ibid., Arriaga to Reggio, Madrid, 18 July 1758 
 237 
entered Cadiz Bay on 4 August 1758122.  After this the fleet was disbanded, 
Reggio was instructed to send the Ferrol and Cartagena divisions back to their 
respective arsenals to disarm on 11 August 1758123 and Reggio, himself, was 
ordered back to Cadiz in September124.  Over the winter, only two ships and two 
frigates were to cruise in the Atlantic125. 
As previously noted, this system of arming large squadrons for brief periods 
during the summer was repeated in ensuing years.  In 1759 and 1760 these were 
again commanded by Andrés Reggio and, in 1761, by Villena.  Despite the 
difficulties with manning, therefore, it was still perceived as an effective way of 
demonstrating Spain’s naval capability and for efficiently carrying out routine 
operations, such as the protection of the incoming flotas.  Even so, its 
effectiveness was undermined by the usual difficulty that naval officers had no 
authority to act against the principal aggressors, British warships. 
Within the context of armed neutrality, the Spanish navy, therefore, possessed 
very little active seapower.  The existence of an enlarged Spanish fleet, however, 
did mean that, even if its ships remained in Spanish ports, they could act as a 
fleet-in-being which France and particularly Britain was forced to react to.  
France, for example, had to offer better terms for an alliance and Britain had to set 
aside additional ships to supervise Spanish ports.  There was no way, however, 
that a fleet-in-being could have achieved all Spain’s objectives vis-à-vis France 
and Britain, either diplomatically or through active intervention. 
                                                      
122 Ibid., Reggio to Arriaga, Cadiz, 4 August 1758 
123 Ibid., Arriaga to Reggio, Madrid, 11 August 1758 
124 Ibid., Arriaga to Reggio, Madrid, 26 September 1758 
125 Ibid., Arriaga to Reggio, Madrid, 26 September 1758 and Arriaga to Orozco, Madrid, 6 
September 1758 
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War with Britain and the Defence of Havana 
On 4 January 1762, Britain declared war on Spain and, though Ferdinand had died 
in 1759 it was essentially the Fernandine navy that, for the first time, was pitted in 
conflict against another European power.  Clearly this conflict does not lie within 
the strict remit of this study since it occurred during Charles III’s reign yet, 
despite the three year gap, the actions of the Spanish navy, more specifically those 
of the West Indies squadron during the British siege and capture of Havana, are a 
particularly illuminating example of the mindset of Ferdinand VI’s navy with 
regard to naval power and its value. 
Up till then the Spanish fleet’s most recent naval battle with a European rival had 
occurred in 1748 when Andrés Reggio’s squadron had been defeated by Admiral 
Knowles off the coast of Cuba126.  The significance of this action as a potential 
prelude to an attack on Havana was well understood in Spain.  After the War of 
Jenkins’ Ear, Ensenada wrote to the Spanish ambassador in London, Ricardo 
Wall, stating that it would be beneficial to have regular updates on the ‘manner of 
thinking of the British towards our America in times of peace and in those of war’ 
so that the Spanish Crown could be ready to react.  Wall was first tasked with 
uncovering whether, in a future conflict, the British would attempt to take Havana 
or Cuba, it being ‘the principal key to America’127.  Havana was of great strategic 
importance to the Spanish Crown.  Not only was it a crucial choke point in 
communications between Spain and its American empire but it was also the 
                                                      
126 Rodger (2004) p.253.  It is significant that in 1749 Ensenada asked Wall to discover whether 
the British thought that Reggio had fought courageously and for as long a duration as he could 
have done before abandoning the flagship Conquistador.  Wall replied following a weekend spent 
in the Duke of Newcastle’s country house with Ligonier and Albermarle saying that nothing more 
could have been done to save the Conquistador, see AGS Marina 401, Ensenada to Wall, 8 April 
1749, Wall to Ensenada, London, 29 May 1749. 
127 AGS Marina 401, Ensenada to Wall, Madrid, 8 April 1749 
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location of Spain’s principal naval base in those seas and the place from which the 
Spanish were best able to observe the British in Jamaica.  Its loss in a war would 
represent a very serious blow to the Crown and most likely force Spain into peace 
negotiations.  For this reason, a British attack on this location was not to come as 
a surprise.  Only two days after the declaration of war, the British government 
agreed to an amphibious attack on Havana planned by the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, George Anson.  Two months after that a large landing force 
commanded by Lieutenant-General the Earl of Albemarle and a fleet of nineteen 
battleships commanded by Sir George Pocock was ready to sail.  After collecting 
the troops and ships at Jamaica which had previously been used in the capture of 
Martinique, the expedition surprised the Spanish in Havana by sailing straight 
through the dangerous and poorly-mapped Old Bahama Channel and effecting a 
landing at Cojimar Bay on 7 June128.  On the night of 8 June, the Spanish 
abandoned La Cabaña fort, which overlooked the city and the entrance channel to 
its bay, to the British and, in an often-criticised move, Albemarle’s forces set 
about besieging the Morro Castle, ‘the only strong point of the defences’129, 
instead of attacking the city directly.  The Morro’s defenders, commanded by the 
naval officer, Luis Vicente de Velasco, resisted the besiegers until 30 July when 
the castle was forced to surrender after its walls were breached.  After this, 
                                                      
128 As Marley demonstrated, there were various indications and warnings that this expedition was 
directed against Havana and it was inexcusable that its commanders were surprised by the attack, 
see Marley (1992) pp.293–305 and (1994) pp.403–417.  Pocock’s fleet consisted of the ships 
Namur (90, flag), Cambridge (80), Culloden (74), Dragon (74), Dublin (74), Temeraire (74), 
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had slightly more than 14,000 officers and men.  In addition, there were 3,000 hired sailors 
working on 160 transports, victuallers, ordinance ships and hospital ships.  Albermarle’s force 
amounted to 12,000 men.  See Marley (2008) pp.435–6 and Syrett (1970) pp.138–9. 
129 Rodger (2004) p.286 
 240 
Havana was left largely defenceless and it capitulated to the British on 12 August 
1762.  Despite Albemarle’s questionable decision to launch the attack on Morro 
Castle, the British expedition was an effectively planned and fairly well-executed 
amphibious operation.  Yet the expedition’s success had much to do with the poor 
organisation of Havana’s defence by its military and naval commanders, one of 
the most prominent amongst them Gutierre de Hevia, the Marquis del Real 
Transporte130, commander of the Havana squadron131. 
Most historians have agreed that Spanish forces were so outnumbered that success 
would have been unlikely, some even exaggerating the odds against the Spanish.  
Kuethe, for example, argues that only a ‘miracle could have saved Havana’ as ‘the 
British enjoyed overwhelming superiority’ having a fleet ‘which numbered over 
two hundred warships and transports, carried an invasion force of fourteen 
thousand or more men, plus thousands of marines’ and the Spanish ‘could muster 
only a small army composed of Spanish regulars, the fixed garrison, and an 
untrained militia and supported by a fleet of eighteen battleships, four of them 
temporarily out of commission’132.  Though the Spanish were outnumbered and 
probably, even more so than the numbers would imply, as the Spanish sailors and 
soldiers were most likely not of the same quality as the British, Kuethe’s 
description is deceptive because in describing the British fleet as numbering 200 
warships and transports and the Spanish fleet as 14 effective warships, he fails to 
add that only 22 of the British fleet were battleships and likely to be used in 
action.  If he wishes to do a numerical comparison including the transports then, 
                                                      
130 Paula Pavía (1873), vol.III, pp.285–98 
131 See Corbett (1992) pp.246–84, Dull (2005) p.223, Fernández Duro (1895–1903) vol.VII, 
pp.39–82, Guiteras (1932), Hart (1931), Kuethe (1986) pp.15–23, McNeill (1985) pp.103–4, 
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132 Kuethe (1986) p.16 
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in fairness, he should also include the numerous smaller naval vessels, merchant 
vessels and armed vessels belonging to trading companies which were also in 
Havana Bay and employed, according to the diaries published in Rodríguez 
(1963), in the defence of Havana.  The odds of just the battleships were still 
against the Spanish but, if these had ventured out of port, and joined with the 
other Spanish warships which were in the vicinity the odds were not so great that 
they did not have a fighting chance.  Generally historians also agree that the 
Spanish defence of Havana was poorly led, though, on the whole, it is the 
Governor of Havana, Juan del Prado, who is held principally responsible133.  The 
exception is McNeill who, juxtaposing Louisbourg in 1745 and Havana in 1762, 
sought to demonstrate that whereas the Spanish in the West Indies could rely on 
their fortifications and the West Indies climate to defeat the enemy, the French in 
Louisbourg could not.  As a result, he concludes that either ‘Spanish leadership 
displayed gross incompetence, as most writers believe, or the Spanish relied on 
yellow fever to come to their aid in the weeks it would take the British to drag 
cannon up La Cabaña, mount them, and destroy the Morro’.  Since yellow fever 
did manifest itself following the fall of Havana and 4,708 men died from disease, 
McNeill concludes that the capture of Havana was nothing but a Pyrrhic victory 
and ‘a fluke’ in which its defenders ‘had every right to expect the same results as 
at Cartagena, Santiago de Cuba, and elsewhere’134.  Other than the fact that 
McNeill completely ignores the strategic value of Havana’s capture for the British 
which forced Spain into peace negotiations and eventually also forced it to cede 
Florida for the return of Havana, there is no indication, either in Juan del Prado’s 
                                                      
133 See, for example, Guiteras (1932) p.51 and Kuethe (1986) p.21. 
134 McNeill (1985) pp.103–4 
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diary135, or in the proceedings of the Junta de Guerra which followed136 that the 
Spanish commanders were deliberately holding out for yellow fever to take its toll 
on the British. 
The inhabitants of Havana knew they were at war with Britain in February 1762 
when a Spanish packet boat was seized as a prize by the British squadron based in 
Jamaica.  A Junta de Generales (Council of Generals), consisting of Havana’s 
senior military and naval officers,  was then formed to consider and carry out the 
defence of Spain’s territories in the West Indies.  This Junta was composed of 
four individuals – its president, as a result of being the highest-ranking officer 
then in Havana, being José Manso Velasco, first Count of Superunda137 and 
former Viceroy of Peru.  The other three were Diego Tabares138, former Governor 
of Cartagena de Indias, Juan del Prado139, then Governor of Havana, and 
Transporte, commander of the fleet and the most senior naval officer in Havana.  
At their first meeting, on 27 February 1762, these officers considered the potential 
measures which could be taken to ensure the safety of the West Indies.  All 
seemed to feel an attack on Havana by the British as less likely than one on 
Florida.  Transporte also reported on the condition of the fleet, noting that the 
careen of the Vencedor was nearly complete but that the Reyna would need a 
further six to seven months for which reason he proposed that the Reyna’s men be 
transferred to the newly-launched 60-gun ship San Genaro.  His suggestions were 
                                                      
135 Printed in Rodríguez (1963) pp.65–126. 
136 AGI Santo Domingo 1579 
137 José Manso Velasco, 1st Count of Superunda (1688–1767), former Governor of Chile from 
1737 to 1744 and Viceroy of Peru from 1745 to 1761, was present in Havana en route to Spain 
having been granted retirement.  He was President of the Junta de Generales because he was the 
highest-ranking military officer then in Havana. 
138 Diego Tabares Ahumada y Barrio, Governor of Cartagena de Indias from 1753 to 1761.  Like 
Superunda, he too was in Havana at the time en route to Spain and was included in the Junta de 
Generales as a result of his military rank. 
139 Juan de Prado Mayera Portocarrero y Luna (1716–c.1770) 
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approved by the Junta and by the Crown once it received Transporte’s report on 
13 August 1762, ironically the day following Havana’s capitulation140.  There was 
no idea at this time, however, of getting the fleet to sea in anticipation of a British 
attack on the West Indies.  The French naval officer, Captain Duchilleau, reported 
that when he visited Havana between 4 and 10 April to deliver dispatches from 
Admiral de Blénac to Prado proposing Franco-Spanish co-operation, Transporte’s 
fleet was ‘unprepared to put to sea, many of the ships not even having their yards 
crossed.  The official state of war had not yet been promulgated with the city, nor 
were the land forces on anything more than a peacetime footing’141. 
In subsequent months, Transporte’s reports reveal his pessimism over the state of 
his squadron142.  On 6 March, he wrote to Arriaga noting that it had left Cadiz in 
1761 short-handed and that persistent illness and desertion had depleted their 
numbers further so that it only had enough men to handle the ships but 
insufficient to fight a battle with ‘the honour and credit corresponding to the 
forces of the King, the nation and those in command’143.  As he explained, the 
general rule was that in order to maintain an army (Transporte’s choice of word) 
up to its full complement it was necessary to replace a third of its men annually to 
cover losses.  This figure, Transporte reasoned, was even greater in the West 
Indies where additional damage was caused by inclement weather and where the 
                                                      
140 AGS Marina 406, account of the Junta de Generales’ meeting held on 27 February 1762 
forwarded by Transporte to Arriaga, Tigre, Havana, 1 March 1762 and Arriaga to Transporte, San 
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141 Marley (1992) p.299 
142 This contrasts with Prado’s satisfaction with the state of Havana’s defences following orders of 
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143 AGS Marina 406, Transporte to Arriaga, Tigre, Havana, 6 March 1762 
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only potential recruits were no better than vagrants.  Furthermore, nor could they 
expect any volunteers and, though he did not doubt that Prado would  
assist me with all the men he could gather in this place if the squadron 
should need to sail, in the same way as he was attempting to fill all the posts of 
the town, castles and batteries, they will not be the most suitable and they will be 
missed in the defence of the town.   
Transporte’s ships, excepting the Tridente, Vencedor and Reyna, were 
‘rigged, anchored and watered.  I have not loaded the victuals so that they are not 
destroyed by the incalculable number of rats and cockroaches on board before the 
King’s instructions to sail arrive’.  The San Genaro was still being fitted out and 
there were also many repairs needed to other ships but work progressed slowly at 
the arsenal as a result of the lack of workmen.  Included in Transporte’s dispatch 
was also a table giving details of the squadron’s then ship complements which is 
shown in Appendix 16.  With this, Transporte concluded, Charles, informed of the 
squadron’s condition, could decide what it should do and, thus, Transporte felt he 
fulfilled his ‘obligations, honour and conscience’. 
In addition to giving an accurate idea of his pessimism, these reports also 
highlight Transporte’s lack of initiative, not only because his argument that he 
could do very little with 6,107 men seems unconvincing but also because the 
conditional phrasing of all his letters suggests that he did not really think he 
would have to sail.  For instance, his letters only state that if he was obliged to sail 
then Prado would provide extra men and if the King ordered him to sail he would 
victual the ships.  Furthermore, even though he knew how extended his lines of 
communication were with the Court, he still behaved as if he expected specific 
instruction from the King as to how to proceed.  The inadequacy of this thinking 
was demonstrated by the fact that Arriaga was not able to respond to this letter on 
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Transporte’s shortage of men of 6 March until 2 September, nearly six months 
after it had been written and nearly a month following the fall of Havana.  Also, 
as conditions in Havana were not fully understood in Madrid, all Arriaga could 
advise was that ‘His Majesty is sure that Your zeal and that of the Governor will 
take advantage of everything within the bounds of possibility, mutually assisting 
each other, in the same way as has been done in the past’144. 
When the British arrived at the beginning of June, however, this squadron was 
still in Havana Bay and made no move to get out before the British blocked the 
entrance.  Instead, between 8 and 12 June, three Spanish battleships, the Neptuno 
(70 guns, Captain Pedro Bermúdez), the Asia (70 guns, Captain Francisco 
Garganta) and the Europa (60 guns, Captain Joseph San Vicente) were scuttled to 
block the entrance to the Bay.  This entrance was through a long, narrow channel 
with the Morro and Cabaña forts on one side and the town’s defences on the 
other.  Ships had to enter it in single file and it was so treacherous that even 
experienced sailors such as Juan Benito de Erasún had damaged the 68-gun 
Monarca when sailing through it in January 1762.  On this occasion, Erasún had 
reported that  
the extreme narrowness of the channel is not suitable for ships of such 
large size because, even though in its middle there is sufficient water, a miracle is 
almost necessary to traverse it because all it takes is a momentary lapse of 
concentration in the handling of the ship for it to beach as happens all too often on 
reaching the Morro145.   
With these natural and man-made defences, a British squadron would have 
been unlikely to attempt to push through.  As a result of this measure the Spanish 
squadron was locked inside Havana Bay and the British, very aware of this 
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145 Ibid., Erasún to Arriaga, Cuba, 31 January 1762 
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unexpected advantage, were left undisputed masters of the surrounding waters.  
On 10 June, Hervey wrote to Pocock noting that ‘as the enemy has sunk their 
ships and moored their chain, there is a certainty of their not coming out’ and, on 
12 June, Pocock ordered four ships of the line to continue cruising but ordered the 
rest to anchor off the Chorrera river where they could water easily and assist the 
army’s operations on land if needed146.  Thereafter, the occasional appearance of a 
Spanish warship could be easily handled.  On 2 June, for example, the 22-gun 
Thetis (Captain Joseph Porlier) and a packet boat were seized147.  This action had 
the advantageous result for the British that they obtained accurate data on the 
ships inside the Bay148.  Soon after, the 24-gun frigate Venganza and the 18-gun 
packet boat Marte which were cruising to protect Spanish shipping were chased 
away by the Defiance and the Hampton Court149.   
In the meantime the squadron inside Havana Bay achieved very little.  Keppel’s 
account of events reads, the ‘Admiral and another large ship bemuse themselves 
with firing in the woods at random, by which means they now and then kill or 
wound somebody’150.  The destruction of Spanish battleships had troubled the 
British, Keppel writing that ‘It pains me to think that they are demolishing their 
fine ships so fast’ and, when considering the possibility of sending a captured 
Spanish merchant into Havana with a flag of truce, Keppel suggested that it would 
‘not be amiss to let the Dons know that the destruction of any of their ships etc. 
not made use of in defence will oblige you to treat them in a manner you do not 
                                                      
146 Syrett (1970) pp.177–8, no.252, Hervey to Pocock, Dragon, Thursday [10 June 1762], and 
pp.237–41, no.405, Pocock to Clevland, Namur off Chorrera River, [14 July 1762]  
147 See Nowell (1987) p.60 for an account of the action. 
148 Syrett (1970), pp.237–41, no.405, Pocock to Clevland, Namur off Chorrera River, [14 July 
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149 Ibid., pp.237–41, no 405, Pocock to Clevland, Namur off Chorrera River, [14 July 1762]. 
150 Ibid., pp.187–8, no.276, Keppel to Pocock, Valiant, Cojimar, 12 June [1762] 
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wish and is much against your nature’151.  No further Spanish warships were 
destroyed, however, and when Havana surrendered on 12 August 1762, the entire 
Spanish squadron consisting of the 70-gun Tigre (Transporte and Juan Ignacio 
Madariaga flag captain), 70-gun Reyna (Luis de Velasco, who died in the 
storming of the Morro), the 68-gun Soberano (Juan del Postigo), the 70-gun 
Infante (Francisco de Medina), the 68-gun Aquilón (Marquis González, also died 
in defence of the Morro), the 60-gun América (Juan Antonio de la Colina), the 60-
gun Conquistador (Pedro Castejón), the 60-gun San Genaro (a new ship and so 
without a captain) and the San Antonio (in the same predicament as the San 
Genaro) were surrendered intact while the British also salvaged all they could get 
from the three ships scuttled in the entrance to the harbour152.   
On his arrival in Cadiz in October 1762, where he and the other military and naval 
officers were delivered by British warships, Transporte forwarded his journal to 
Arriaga explaining the actions he had taken both in relation to his command and 
in the defence of the city.  He noted that a ‘special harmony’ had existed between 
the military and naval authorities to prevent the enemy from taking Havana easily.  
‘There was nothing left I could have done’, he noted, as he had attended 
personally to all that required doing.  He was present at all the Junta de 
Generales’s meetings, he visited the port and other parts to supervise operations 
and encourage his men, he had provided the city with gunpowder and all nature of 
supplies in addition to 750 marine infantry and their officers under the commands 
of the Capitán de Navío Pedro Castejón and Frigate Captain Juan Ignacio Ponce 
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152 Kew CO117/1/134, ‘A List of the Ships of War that were in the Harbour of the Havana under 
the command of the Marquis del Real Transporte, Commodores and Commander-in-Chief of all 
His Majesty’s Ships in America and surrendered with the city the 12th August 1762’. 
 248 
de León.  Furthermore, he had ‘achieved that the rigorous, glorious and extended 
defence of the Morro should have been carried out principally by officers of the 
navy, their crews and garrisons as well as by their constables and gunners’.  Many 
of these, such as Luis Vicente de Velasco and the Marquis Gonzalez, had died 
most courageously and honourably in a way that elicited the admiration of the 
enemy.  The British in the Cabaña had been attacked ‘with incessant fire’ by the 
ships Tigre (70), Infante (70), Aquilón (68), Soberano (68) and Conquistador 
(68).  The América (60), San Genaro (60) and the ship belonging to the Royal 
Philippine Company, the Asunción had been placed nearer the port under Juan 
Antonio de la Colina’s command, to protect the shipyard and the entrances to the 
town from that side.  As Transporte saw it, he had been forced to surrender the 
ships Tigre, América, Infante, Soberano, Aquilón, Conquistador, San Genaro, 
Reyna and the unarmed San Antonio but he had saved, by sending out warnings to 
Veracruz, the Tridente (68) and frigates Aguila (22) and Flora (36), the two ships 
Castilla (60) and Vencedor (68) which had been sent to Tortuga to await those 
from Veracruz, and the Arrogante (68) which had been sent to Tortuga from 
Jaqua.  He made no mention of the scuttled ships153.   
This letter suggests the Marquis thought the naval defence of Havana had been 
well-managed though to what extent this was truly how he perceived it or 
whether, realising the need to redeem his reputation, he was attempting to present 
himself in the best light possible.  In Spain, however, a royal order was issued on 
23 February 1763 for the formation of a joint military and naval council to 
                                                      
153 Paula Pavía (1970), vol.III, pp.285–98, includes a full transcription of this letter to Arriaga, 
dated Cadiz, 31 October 1762 
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examine the actions of those who had been involved in the defence of Havana154.   
The panel convened to do so was led by Pedro Pablo Abarza de Bolea, Count of 
Aranda155, and included the naval officers Marquis de Cevallos, the Count of 
Vegaflorida and Jorge Juan y Santacilia and the military officers, the mariscales 
de campo Marquis de Siply, Diego Manrique and the Duke of Granada de Ega156.  
Those examined by this Council were principally the men who had made up the 
Junta de Generales – Prado, Transporte, Superunda and Tabares – who had been 
charged with Havana’s defence.  A number of subordinate officers were also 
examined, including the naval officer the Capitán de Navío Juan Antonio de la 
Colina157.  The hearings were begun in 1763 and concluded in 1765 during which 
time there were several delays caused by the unusual nature of a joint military and 
naval trial and by poor relations between those involved, especially between the 
Fiscal (equivalent to a prosecutor or Crown attorney), Manuel de Craywinckal, an 
army captain in the Walloon Guards, and the people on the judging panel158.  
In terms of a study of the Spanish navy, the most revealing part of the trial was 
that pertaining to the Marquis del Real Transporte, who was placed under house 
arrest on 27 July 1763 and charged on seven counts by the Fiscal159.  The first 
                                                      
154 Morón García (1994) p.22 
155 Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea, 10th Count of Aranda (1718–1798), army officer, diplomat and 
politician.  In 1763, he was Captain General of Valencia, a post to which he had been appointed 
that year after commanding Charles III’s army on the border with Portugal in 1762. 
156 Morón García (1994) p.22.  Ignacio de Idiázquez y Aznárez Garro, 3rd Duke of Granada de Ega 
(1713–1769).   
157 Only one charge was brought against Colina, that of being one of those that had voted in favour 
of closing the entrance to the port.  He was pardoned, however, since it was the principal members 
of the Junta de Generales that had pushed this measure through.  Instead, he was awarded 
promotion to Jefe de Escuadra on 10 February 1765 and, when Havana was made into a 
Comandancia General in 1766, he was appointed its first Commander General, see AGI Santo 
Domingo 1579, ‘Voto para el Capitán de Navío D. Juan Antonio de la Colina’, ff.[14], Paula Pavía 
(1873), vol.I, pp.399–406 and Morón García (1994) p.23. 
158 See Morón García (1994) pp.31–4 for a description of these difficulties. 
159 AGI Santo Domingo 1579, ‘Voto para el Jefe de Escuadra en la Havana, Marqués de Real 
Transporte’, [1763–5], [1]f.  The trial was organised in a similar manner to a Council of War 
(court martial) as described in the Ordenanzas de Marina (vol.I, trat.5, tit.3, pp.262–86) even 
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charge was that he had failed to inform the King that Havana was in such a poor 
state of defence, that he did not pressure the Governor and those at the Junta de 
Generales sufficiently in order to improve these defences, that he did not survey 
the surrounding coastline and that he did not inform the Court that their dispatches 
had been seized by the British160.  The Fiscal argued that he was guilty of the first 
two parts of this charge because he had been sent out to Havana a year earlier 
arriving in June 1761 having already been warned that Spain might enter the 
conflict on the side of France.  If nothing else, therefore, he had at least had time 
to warn the Crown of Havana’s vulnerability.  In his statement of defence, 
Transporte argued that he had not received specific instructions to do this, neither 
was he entitled to take matters into his own hands without the King’s permission, 
nor was a British attack expected for certain, nor could he divert himself from his 
necessary attentions to the fleet.  All these mitigating excuses were rejected by the 
prosecutor on the grounds that the reason why he had not been given specific 
instructions was because these tasks were routine and listed as such in the 
Ordenanzas de Marina, that he should have taken more initiative and that, as 
commander of the navy in those parts, he should have been concentrating on the 
‘higher objectives’ of his command rather than in busying himself in minor duties 
which he should have entrusted to subordinate officers.  He was also found guilty 
of having failed to survey the surrounding coasts with the result that the Spanish 
were unaware that it was possible to anchor a squadron in Cojimar Bay.  Such a 
survey, according to the Fiscal, was to have been carried out by Transporte in 
                                                      
though, according to Morón García there were certain modifications to accommodate its naval and 
military components.  The prosecutor brought his case against Transporte on each particular 
charge, having had access to a written statement of defence by Transporte.  Both sides then had the 
opportunity to comment before the prosecutor submitted his final conclusions.  Each judge in the 
Junta then submitted a written statement with their verdict and proposed sentence.  These papers 
can be found in AGI Santo Domingo 1579.  Morón García (1994) p.24. 
160 AGI Santo Domingo 1579, ‘Jucio sobre el Cargo 1ro’, [1763–5], [12]ff. 
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accordance with the Ordenanzas de Marina. Transporte claimed ignorance of this 
and noted that everyone assumed it was only possible for small boats to anchor 
there because the shore was very rocky and the surf violent.  Articles in the 
Ordenanzas did, in fact, specify that naval commanders were expected to survey 
surrounding coasts but only when they anchored in unfamiliar ports which 
Havana was not, so, on these grounds, Transporte could be partially 
exonorated161.  As to failing to inform the King that his dispatches had been 
seized, Transporte was found particularly culpable since it had been his 
responsibility to find vessels to send to Spain with dispatches.  Transporte 
defended himself by claiming that there had been no suitable vessels available. 
The second charge brought against him was that of scuttling three battleships in 
the channel entrance to the Bay a decision which had occasioned the greatest loss 
to the fleet162.  In his statement of defence, Transporte acknowledged that the 
nature of the channel and its defences would have made it very difficult to breach.  
Furthermore, the original plan, which was considered as by far the best option by 
Craywinckal, seemed to have been to anchor three 70-gun ships at the mouth to 
the Bay, another three behind these and a further three behind those.  At some 
point between 7 and 8 June, however, Transporte decided that because of the 
‘numerous, powerful and decisive indications’ that the British were about to 
breach this channel if the wind were to become favourable, it had become 
necessary to scuttle the three ships.  The organisation of the attack, as Transporte 
foresaw it, would have taken the form of another landing on the other side of 
Havana from Cojimar Bay (where the British were already established) and so 
                                                      
161 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.I, trat.2, tit.5, art.22, 41, pp.72, 78 
162 AGI Santo Domingo 1579, ‘Juicio sobre el Cargo 2do’, [1763–5], [12]ff. 
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encircle the city.  Simultaneously, the British would attempt to push through the 
channel and seize the port.  This would be done with three naval divisions, the 
first would keep the Morro’s guns busy and the second those of San Salvador de 
la Punta, the fort opposite the Morro on the other side of the channel, while the 
third would force its way through the channel unopposed.  As the prosecutor 
established, however, Transporte was mistaken because there were no indications 
that such an attack was planned by the British.  Even if there had been, the British 
would have had to wait for the wind direction to change and, even then, they 
would still have had to overcome the defences along the channel, the boom which 
had been secured across it and three battleships which could have been anchored 
at the channel’s end with their broadsides facing the enemy.   
Transporte also argued that the decision to scuttle the ships had been unanimous 
among those attending the Junta and that it had become necessary as a result of 
the decision to abandon La Cabaña fort.  Again, the Fiscal pointed out that it was 
Transporte’s responsibility alone to act as was best for the squadron making him 
more culpable than others at the Junta and that the decision to abandon the 
Cabaña was not, in fact, taken until the night of 8 June while that of sinking the 
ships was made earlier that day.  In addition, the investigation revealed that the 
decision was not quite as unanimous as Transporte had initially argued.  Captains 
San Vicente and Garganta, who considered the measure precipitate, had 
approached Transporte after the meeting proposing that the ships be anchored 
instead, that they were willing to have these commands and have them ready for 
scuttling if this became imperative.  This had been dismissed by Transporte who 
‘turning to the Governor said “Look at what these gentlemen come out with” and 
told the governor “To that you pay no attention but just execute what was decided 
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at the meeting”’163.  In his first statement of defence, Transporte had denied there 
was any opposition to his decision but in his second he agreed that there had been 
some resistance from San Vicente and Garganta but only because ‘its being their 
houses [ie. their ships] which it had been decided should be sunk’164.  At this 
point, Transporte stated that the guns of the city’s defences were aimed only at the 
entrance to the channel and did not cover anywhere else which explained why the 
ships had had to be scuttled rather than anchored.  In addition to wondering why 
Transporte had not mentioned this earlier, Craywinckal added that Pedro 
Castejón, the naval officer in command of the city’s defences in that area, Baltasar 
Ricaud165, the Engineer-in-Chief at Havana, and José Crell166, the Artillery 
Commander, all stated that the guns did traverse the channel in various directions 
and that it would have been sufficient for the ships to have been anchored. 
Transporte then put forward the idea that the land defences were in such need of 
men, guns and supplies that it was vital to provide those from these ships but, if 
that were the case, the Fiscal retorted, why had Transporte scuttled them ‘without 
unloading them nor removing the artillery nor salvaging many things’167.  He 
further added that the number of men needed on land could not have been as great 
as Transporte implied because, in the end, many had remained on their ships in a 
state of inaction for the duration of the attack. 
The prosecutor concluded that Transporte was essentially guilty because his 
scuttling of the ships, as the examination of the circumstances had revealed, 
                                                      
163 Ibid., ‘Juicio sobre el Cargo 2do’, f.8 
164 Ibid., ‘Juicio sobre el Cargo 2do’, f.[9] 
165 Baltasar Ricaud de Tirgale had replaced his brother, Francisco, as Engineer-in-Chief of Havana 
after the latter’s death on 11 September 1761, see Morón García (1994) p.23, fn.18. 
166 See Morón García (1994) p.23 
167 AGI Santo Domingo 1579, ‘Juicio sobre el Cargo 2do’, f.[3] 
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showed that there was neither urgency nor need for such an action, that Transporte 
had been instrumental in pushing the measure through against the advice of 
subordinate officers and that, even then, it had not been properly carried out thus 
causing a substantial and unnecessary loss to Crown property.  Moreover, this 
measure had given the British a great advantage both psycholocially and 
physically since their fleet had been able to assist their military forces unopposed.  
In the Fiscal’s opinion, Transporte’s greatest failing, however, was that 
throughout the attack he abandoned himself to defeatism and perceived the British 
as all powerful and competent whilst considering his own forces feeble and 
ineffectual and foreseeing ‘a certainty of laurels for the enemy and disgrace for 
us’168. 
The third charge brought against Transporte was that he, with the other senior 
officers that formed the Junta de Generales, had decided to abandon the fort of La 
Cabaña ahead of time169.  Since its abandonment was largely a military decision, 
however, Transporte was not as guilty as the others on this point.  Yet, 
considering the fort’s vital significance in protecting the channel that led to the 
port and the fleet, Transporte should have disputed the decision more vigorously 
instead of pushing Colina into signing his agreement after the latter protested 
against it.  Furthermore, Transporte had only visited La Cabaña once since his 
arrival in Havana in June 1761 which was viewed by the prosecutor as 
exceedingly lax since it was a naval commander’s duty to ensure that the defences 
of the port in which his ships were anchored were satisfactory. 
                                                      
168 Ibid., ‘Juicio sobre el Cargo 2do’, f.[11] 
169 Ibid., ‘Juicio sobre el Cargo 3ro’, [1763–5], [7]ff. 
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In the fourth charge brought against him, Transporte was accused of a general 
lack of diligence in the management of operations170.  As mentioned above, he 
had only visited La Cabaña fort once since his arrival in Havana and the same was 
the case with the Morro Castle, a dereliction which was seen as even more 
negligent because this was being defended by his own men.  Before and during 
the siege, Transporte had failed to reconnoitre the area and its defences, all the 
time seeming reluctant to leave the citadel where he claimed that his supervision 
was vital.  Not only had he failed to give adequate support to his men, therefore, 
but the scanty, second-hand information he possessed had consequently not been 
sufficient to permit him to make informed decisions at the Junta de Generales.  
Overall, the prosecutor thought that Transporte should have exercised greater and 
more detailed judgement and that his actions rather than being merely careless 
could be considered as positively negligent. 
In answer to the fifth charge, which accused Transporte of agreeing to capitulate 
rashly and without first attempting an evacuation, he defended himself noting that 
he had acted correctly and followed due process171.  Not only did the prosecutor 
question Transporte’s justification but he asserted that Transporte’s: 
self-satisfaction merited public condemnation in order to avoid, by making 
the court’s disapprobation clearly manifest, that his responses should not become 
imprinted in the minds of the irresolute with similar ways of thinking with the 
result that they exaggerate their own obstacles and exalt the enemy as 
invulnerable thus causing future misfortunes and tragedies172. 
The sixth charge related to Transporte’s failure to ensure the fleet was scuttled 
and destroyed before the British took the city173.  In this, he was held more 
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responsible than the other senior officers that formed the Junta de Generales 
because, once again, as the naval commander the responsibility fell squarely on 
his shoulders.  Moreover, the failure to destroy the fleet was a violation of specific 
instructions for this to be done in the Ordenanzas de Marina174.  Transporte 
defended his decision arguing that in the same way that  
the governor of a citadel should not distress the fortifications that 
contribute to its defence before capitulating without, then, exposing himself to the 
crude possibility that his capitulation will be rejected, so also was it the case that 
in similar circumstances he [Transporte] could not burn the ships without 
incurring this obvious danger, since ships are floating and movable fortresses that 
the King had there to protect the city and the port175.   
This indicates that the warning Keppel proposed transmitting to the 
Spanish at the beginning of the siege about the destruction of the fleet might have 
been delivered.  Transporte also argued, incorrectly, that the articles in the 
Ordenanzas relating to this only applied to ships at sea and not to anchored 
squadrons.  The Fiscal countered that the fate of the squadron had been tied to 
that of the city from the date in which the entrance to the bay had been blocked 
and that Transporte should have been thinking about what measures to take in this 
eventuality from then on.  Instead, his actions had been ambiguous and confused.  
The Ordenanzas also required that Transporte convene his officers to discuss this 
measure.   Juan Valcárcel, the squadron’s Mayor, however, revealed in his 
interview that Transporte had repeatedly failed to follow due procedure in relation 
to this, a fact which was corroborated by the statements of the Captain de la 
Colina and the Havana’s Comisario Ordenador, Lorenzo de Montalvo176.  On 30 
July when the Morro was taken and Havana was considered lost, it was Colina 
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175 AGI Santo Domingo 1579, ‘Juicio sobre el Cargo 6to’, f.[10] 
176 See AGI Santo Doming 1579, ‘Juicio sobre el Cargo 6to’, f.[9]. 
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who had approached Transporte proposing that a meeting be held to discuss the 
fate of the fleet.  Transporte ignored Colina’s suggestion but Valcárcel, who 
overheard the conversation, brought it to Montalvo’s attention.  The latter 
convened the meeting with the principal members of the Junta de Generales – 
Prado, Transporte, Tabares and Superunda – as well as Valcárcel, Colina and 
himself.  In Montalvo’s house where the meeting was about to be held, Colina 
hinted to Transporte, again in front of Valcárcel, that it would be suitable for the 
other naval captains to be present.  Once more, Transporte dismissed Colina’s 
suggestion but Valcárcel took it to Montalvo who summoned the others.  With 
regard to this meeting, Transporte was later asked if he had made clear to the non-
naval officers present that the Ordenanzas required him to destroy the fleet to 
which he replied that he could not recall if he had, in fact, done so.  Even so, no 
final decision was made then, which some captains such as San Vicente 
considered strange, but by a subsequent meeting held the following day in which 
it was decided to capitulate following a brief bombardment, Transporte seemed to 
have made up his mind to surrender the fleet with the city.  Reports on this, 
however, appear muddled and inconclusive.  In direct contradiction with his 
earlier statements, Transporte asserted that he had intended to scuttle the fleet but 
was keeping it secret to prevent the British hearing of it.  Valcárcel stated that 
captains had been ordered as far back as 9 June to have their ships ready for 
scuttling but presumably the final signal for this measure to be executed did not 
materialise177.  In the end, the fleet was surrendered intact on 12 August. 
                                                      
177 That this instruction to have ships ready for scuttling was issued on 9 June 1762 is corroborated 
by the diaries of Juan de Castro and Juan del Prado published in Rodríguez (1963) pp.48, 75. 
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The seventh and final charge brought against Transporte related to the surrender 
of both Crown and merchant funds to the British178.  He was responsible as a 
member of the Junta de Generales for failing to take measures for the evacuation 
of 607,053 pesos belonging to the Crown and 711,845, the property of private 
individuals.  In his defence, he argued that he had not lost any of the funds 
belonging to the navy but he was still held responsible for the loss of 200,000 
pesos (3,011,765 vellon reals) belonging to Cartagena and Araya which he had 
been expected to deliver.  As a result, the Fiscal found him just as culpable as 
Prado. 
The Fiscal concluded that Transporte was guilty on all counts but that there was 
no indication that his actions were the result of ‘malice, cowardliness or some 
other, selfish motive’179.  Among the naval officers who were judges on the 
Council of War, Jorge Juan y Santacilia agreed that it was ‘understood that the 
actions of Transporte and the others was not the result of fraud, malice or selfish 
ends but nonetheless they are still clearly responsible and sanctions should 
apply’180.  Juan considered Transporte guilty because he had been one of the most 
important members of the Junta de Generales which, in Juan’s view, had brought 
about the precipitate capitulation of both the city and the fleet to the British.  
Furthermore, as a naval officer Transporte had defied many of the articles in the 
Ordenanzas de Marina181.  The punishment for failing to obey these articles 
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ranged from dismissal, suspension or exile to convict labour depending on the 
magnitude of the failing for which reason Juan judged that Transporte should 
suffer the same sentence as the Governor, that of lifelong suspension from 
employment, ten years’ exile from Court and repayment of financial losses182.  
His opinion contrasted sharply with that of the other two naval officers appointed 
as judges, the Count of Vegaflorida and Marquis de Cevallos, who agreed that 
Transporte had erred in not advising the Governor on the repairs required to 
Havana’s expenses, blocking the entrance to the Bay and failing to scuttle the 
fleet, but thought that Transporte  
as head of the squadron, contributed more than the rest to the glorious and 
lengthy defence of Havana by having provided the governor with all possible 
assistance while at the same time demonstrating his zeal and vigour in responding 
to contingencies as they arose.  His meritorious and extensive career in the Navy 
and his having distinguished and proven himself in it through his honour, conduct, 
capacity and intelligence would lead one to conclude that the mistakes he had 
made on this occasion were involuntary and resulted from a lapse of judgement.  
It was not possible to prove for certain that they were the direct or clear cause for 
the loss of the town and the squadron, or that it was his fault183. 
Vegaflorida went on to propose that Transporte be promoted, that the time 
he had spent under arrest be judged as the equivalent to exile and that he should 
be absolved without this incident damaging his future career.  The Marquis de 
Cevallos agreed with him184.  The army officers the Count of Aranda, Diego 
Manrique and Marquis de Siply voted for Transporte to be sentenced to death and 
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for the repayment of financial losses, while the Duke of Granada only voted for 
suspension of employment and the repayment of financial losses185. 
Of the others, Prado was charged with disobedience from the date of his arrival in 
Havana, the failure to prepare for war despite repeated warnings of a potential 
British attack and instructions from the King, voting for the closure of the Bay on 
8 June, the precipitate abandonment of La Cabaña fort, the failure to attack the 
British at the mouth of the Chorrera river, the failure to destroy the Morro before 
it fell into enemy hands, agreeing to the fleet not being destroyed and not 
evacuating Crown and merchant funds186.  Aranda, Manrique and Siply voted for 
the death sentence and the repayment of financial losses, Juan and Granada for 
imprisonment, dismissal, exile and financial losses, Vegaflorida for suspension 
and financial losses, Cevallos for absolution and for Prado to be rewarded.  As 
President of the Junta de Generales, the Count of Superunda was charged with 
not attending to the repair of Havana’s defences, voting to block the port with 
sunken ships, agreeing to the withdrawal from the Cabaña fort, failing to promote 
any expedition for the protection of the city or the Morro, opposing the evacuation 
of the city, agreeing to surrendering the squadron intact and failing to protect 
Crown and merchant funds187.  The charges against Diego Tabares were similar 
except the first one which stated that he had failed to promote the repair of the 
city’s defences at the meeting on 27 February 1762.  Aranda, Manrique, Juan and 
Siply all voted for their dismissal and the repayment of financial losses to the 
Crown and to the merchants, Granada voted for a rebuke and the repayment of 
financial losses, and Vegaflorida and Cevallos for absolution. 
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In light of the puzzlingly wide differences between sentences voted for by the 
judges in the Council of War, the King ordered a new council to be formed on 16 
February 1765.  This was composed of the Court and Treasury officials, Diego 
Rodríguez Campomanes, Francisco Carrasco de la Torre and Francisco José de la 
Infanta.  Once these had deliberated the findings of the previous Council of War 
they issued the final sentences on 4 March 1765188.  These sentenced the Marquis 
de Real Transporte to permanent loss of employment, exile at a distance of at least 
40 leagues from the Court for ten years, and repair of financial losses caused to 
merchants and to the Royal Treasury.  Prado, Superunda and Tabares all received 
the same sentence189. 
Despite this, Transporte and all the others who had been sentenced were pardoned 
within the year even though their negligence had resulted in the loss of Florida for 
Spain190.  Transporte continued his career in the navy, being re-instated on 25 
March 1765 as Chief of the Marine Infantry Battalions, and was later rewarded 
with the Grand Cross in the Royal and Distinguished Order of Charles III.  He 
died on 28 February 1772 having inherited from the Marquis de la Victoria the 
highest position in the Spanish navy, that of Director General, on 1 February 
1772.  Prado retired to his brother the Marquis de Villel’s estate but was granted a 
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secret pension by the King, Superunda died soon after having had his salaries and 
honours restored and Tabares returned to service after he too was reinstated191.   
Thus the study of Transporte’s command of the Havana squadron during the 1762 
siege and its subsequent investigation is invaluable in analysing some features of 
Ferdinand’s Spanish naval leadership and in understanding how the use of the 
navy had been developed.  In this, it is important to emphasise that Transporte 
showed a number of personal failings, such as lack of critical judgement, a 
marked absence of drive and initiative, the adoption of a defeatist attitude and the 
failure to listen to or respect the opinions of his subordinate officers and it would 
be grossly unfair to attribute these failings to the Spanish officer class as a whole.  
Transporte’s personality flaws, however, were detrimental to the potential for 
success in war, where, as Clausewitz has reasoned, much of the action is 
surrounded with an uncertainty which commanders have to counter with an 
exceptional level of intellect and courage192.  The fact that Transporte was in 
command and was even restored to command despite his conviction put Spain at a 
grave disadvantage with regard to the European power that was most actively 
challenging Spain in its overseas dominions, the British.  By contrast, British 
attitudes to command were far more rigorous, only a few years earlier, on 14 
March 1757, Vice-Admiral the Hon. John Byng had been executed on his own 
quarterdeck for acting too diffidently in failing to push for a decisive victory 
against La Galissonière’s French squadron off Minorca in 1756193.  This event, as 
Rodger argued, showed British naval officers that ‘even the most powerful 
political friends might not save an officer who had failed to fight’ and ‘reinforced 
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a culture of aggressive determination which set British officers apart from their 
foreign contemporaries, and which in time gave them a steadily mounting 
psychological ascendancy’194.  If this was the intended effect that Byng’s 
execution had on British naval officers, then, correspondingly, what effect would 
the failure to punish Transporte have had on Spanish naval officers? 
Though it may be argued that Transporte’s defeatist attitude was a personal rather 
than institutional failing, the examination of what were perceived as naval 
successes in earlier years suggests otherwise.  In 1741, for example, Cartagena de 
Indias was courageously and successfully defended under the command of the 
naval officer Blas de Lezo from British attack between 4 March and 9 April.  
There is no doubt that the town resisted the attack heroically but this defence was 
carried out on land and the entire Spanish squadron, consisting of the flagship 
Galicia (70), San Felipe (70), África (64), San Carlos (66), Conquistador (62) 
and Dragón (64), was merely scuttled in the entrance to the harbour to prevent the 
British fleet entering it195.  Transporte was in Cartagena de Indias at this time and 
it is probable that this measure influenced his decision to sink the Neptuno, Asia 
and Europa in the entrance to Havana Bay in 1762.  An actual naval battle which 
was perceived as a Spanish victory was the Battle of Toulon or Cape Sicie in 
February 1744 where a combined Franco-Spanish fleet, commanded by Vice-
Admiral Claude Court de la Bruyère on the French side and Jefe de Escuadra 
Juan José Navarro on the Spanish side sailed from Toulon on 8 February to 
confront Admiral Mathews’ British squadron.  As they approached each other, 
                                                      
194 Ibid. p.272 
195 See Nowell (1962) pp.477–501 for an account of the Spanish defence of Cartagena de Indias; 
Harbron (1988) pp.165–7, for data on the ships and Harding (1991) pp.83–122, Rodger (2004) 
pp.237–501 and Robertson (1919) pp.62–71 for details of the British expedition. 
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both sides ended up finding their squadrons so divided that in the end the fighting 
on 11 November was carried out by Navarro’s ships and Mathews’ van division.  
The result was a partial action which ended when the French tacked threatening to 
cut Mathews off.  As a result, the British abandoned the only prize taken, the 
Poder and, after a general stand-off the following day, the Franco-Spanish 
squadron retired to Cartagena and Mathews to Mahon for repairs.  As Rodger 
noted, for the British, the battle ‘was a frustration rather than a disaster’ but for 
the Spanish of the time it was written up as a victory although the Spanish naval 
officer and historian, Fernández Duro, later pointed out that ‘resisting is not 
winning’196.  The Spanish fleet had confronted a British squadron, been 
responsible for most of the fighting and had not been defeated.  As a result, the 
Spanish commander, Juan José Navarro, was promoted to Teniente General and 
rewarded with the title of Marquis de la Victoria.  This reception of the action in 
Spain undoubtedly had certain propaganda functions in that any success, however 
small, was worth highlighing in order to keep support going for a costly and 
lengthy conflict but it made evident how relatively modest the Spanish navy’s 
expectations were when facing a British fleet.  In this action, although the Spanish 
only lost one ship, the Poder, and 608 men, it did not take or sink any British 
warships, and the only strategic benefit which resulted was that a convoy was able 
to provision the army in Italy while Mathews’ squadron was being repaired in 
Mahon.  As Rodger stated in relation to the French navy, though adding that it 
was also applicable to the Spanish,  
French officers generally sailed under orders which defined battle as the 
exception, to be risked only in particular and unusual circumstances when the 
objects of the operation could not otherwise be attained.  As a result they tended 
                                                      
196 Rodger (2004) p.243 and Fernández Duro (1900) vol.VI, pp.209–305. 
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to be psychologically unprepared to take opportunities of victory when they 
offered197. 
Following through this train of thought, the defence of Havana by Transporte’s 
squadron revealed a lack of comprehension for the potential uses of naval strength 
in war.  Transporte’s fleet was outnumbered by Pocock’s squadron and this, in 
combination with the poor condition of the Spanish crews, made a Spanish victory 
in a naval battle unlikely though not impossible since there were other Spanish 
warships in the vicinity which could have joined Transporte198.  The potential to 
have advanced information of an attack by deploying warships as lookouts, to 
threaten the British expedition merely by being at sea in a location unknown to 
the enemy and to frustrate the British by interfering with their operations at 
opportune moments were all features typical of naval power which were 
unexploited by the Spanish fleet, as they had been in Cartagena de Indias in 1741, 
in favour of using battleships as movable fortresses from within the city’s 
defences.  Though this latter tactic is less high-risk and not as demanding on 
resources it limits the value of naval power considerably, giving some truth to 
Carvajal’s assessment that naval power brought few benefits and these at great 
expense.  If to this lacklustre thinking we add the poor level of Transporte’s 
leadership which, as the outcome of the reactions to the defence of Havana clearly 
seems to indicate, was institutionally tolerated, the value of Spain’s naval strength 
in a war between Spain and a European rival was reduced even further. 
 
                                                      
197 Rodger (2004) pp.272, 273 
198 At Cartagena de Indias, Luis de Córdoba y Córdoba’s squadron consisted of the Serio (70), 
Dichoso (70), Firme (70), Flecha (22), Volante (18), Galgo (18) and Nuestra Señora del Rosario 
(20).  In Santiago de Cuba, Juan Benito de Erasún had the Monarca (70), Arrogante (70), Galicia 
(70), Palas (44) and the brig Cazador, see Marley (1994) p.413 
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Conclusion 
Ferdinand’s Spanish navy during the 1750s was, therefore, most successful only 
in its routine operations though in times of war it found these more difficult to 
carry out.  This role was perceived as the most significant of the navy’s activities 
and its officers, imbued with this, tended to view these tasks as their principal 
duties.  As Rodger states, this doctrine ‘made a good deal of sense for navies 
mainly designed to defend colonies and trade’ and the ability of a small naval 
power to effect a brief period of local seapower in order to fulfil a particular task, 
such as getting a convoy out into the Atlantic, could do much to frustrate an 
enemy199.  This has been demonstrated by Harding while analysing Mathews’ 
irritation at being unable to prevent French and Spanish convoys from sailing in 
the Mediterranean during the War of Austrian Succession200. 
Since Spain was one of Europe’s dominant Catholic powers and adjacent to 
hostile North African states, its navy had to be permanently prepared to counter 
the depredations of Barbary privateers.  The evolution of the xabeque squadron 
during these years demonstrates that the navy was able to respond to external 
requirements.  Whether it could have had a greater impact on the privateers by 
instilling a more aggressive and less cautious attitude in its naval officers is 
debatable but it is undoubtedly the case that commanders such as Joseph Flon, 
restrained by orders to ensure the safety of their vessels above all else, felt 
incapable of challenging the daring of Barbary privateers. 
                                                      
199 Rodger (2004) p.273 
200 Harding (1999) pp.190–3 
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Similar limitations were imposed on naval officers charged with asserting their 
authority over Spanish waters and preventing French and British abuses once 
these two powers were at war with one another.  In addition, the punctiliousness 
required to preserve Spanish neutrality allowed its European rivals to operate 
unimpeded in Spanish seas and officers such as Vegaflorida were forced to watch 
as British warships patrolled Spanish waters and harrassed Spanish shipping.  
This, along with the comparitively small size of its navy in relation to the British, 
even taking into account the shipbuilding burst of the 1750s, meant that the 
Spanish navy could not enforce the neutrality of its seas or intimidate its rivals, 
not even by joining the ships of Ferrol, Cadiz and Cartagena into one large 
squadron. 
Naval expansion also only had a limited influence upon the diplomatic negotiation 
of Spanish European relations.  The danger which a combined Franco-Spanish 
fleet presented to Britain had more of an effect on France than it did on Britain 
though both countries, for this and other reasons, sought an alliance with Spain 
during the 1750s.  This situation could last as long as France and Britain were at 
odds but, if these countries signed a peace settlement, then it was likely that the 
disagreement between Spain and Britain over their respective interests in the West 
Indies would re-surface.  If this happened, Spain needed France as an ally which 
meant that the Spanish Crown could not afford to alienate Louis XV too 
categorically.  Moreover, an enlarged Spanish navy was still inadequate as a way 
by which to make France abandon all its other interests in favour of a Franco-
Spanish alliance or to dissuade Britain from challenging Spain at sea. 
Naval officers also rarely seemed to consider their commands in terms of sea 
power.  Sea power, in this sense, being as Sir Herbert Richmond described it that 
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‘form of national strength which enables its possesor to send his armies and 
commerce across those stretches of sea and ocean which lie between his country 
or the countries of his allies, and those territories to which he needs access in war; 
and to prevent his enemy from doing the same’201.  Although more interested in 
the formalities of which warship should launch its boat first, this is what 
Idiázquez witnessed in sailing between Cartagena and Ferrol when he encountered 
a line of British warships keeping station, making observations and acting 
aggresively against those who failed to co-operate.  This system of control of the 
seas was not practised by the Spanish navy, not even by its cruising squadrons 
since these did not keep station as such but were generally employed in carrying 
out tasks for the Crown, and squadrons were specifically instructed to stick 
together which prevented them from operating under looser formations which 
would have allowed for greater observation.  In war, Transporte’s command of the 
West Indies squadron in the defence of Havana has also revealed how limited 
Spanish expectations of sea power were.  The case subsequently brought against 
the naval commander, though it acknowledged his personal failings, failed to 
address his failure to exert any sea control.  Furthermore, his capacity and 
integrity as a naval commander were never questioned and some officers 
continued to believe that his handling of the fleet was effective.  In the end, he 
was not punished at all and his future career was not marred by what in the British 
navy would have been considered as gross incompetence.  This lack of rigour in 
the qualities demanded of the navy’s officers resulted in the creation of an officer 
class where excessive cautiousness and inaction could be regarded as virtues and 
duly rewarded. 
                                                      
201 Richmond (1946) p.ix 
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There was no real attempt during Ferdinand’s reign to reform these characteristics 
of the Spanish seagoing navy because, on the whole, even intelligent and 
conscientious men such as Ensenada judged naval strength in terms of the number 
of ships available.  Even then, Ensenada failed to realise the need to build larger 
ships of the line like the British were doing and instead chose to focus on building 
58- and 68-gun battleships with gun batteries which would have been unlikely to 
challenge its rivals in battle.  This is what led Jan Glete to comment that as the 
Spanish navy had ‘qualitative rather than quantitative problems … it would have 
seemed more appropriate to spend money on reforms and training rather than on 
even more ships’202.  But even beyond a qualitative improvement, however, what 
the Spanish navy required was a paradigm shift in outlook as to the nature of sea 
power if it were to become a force equal to the task of effectively challenging its 
European rivals at sea.  The shift, it would appear, never took place during 
Ferdinand’s time. 
                                                      
202 Glete (1993), vol. I, p.277 
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CHAPTER 7.  Financing the Navy and Political Opinion 
at Court 
 
Naval historians have frequently commented on the substantial capital investment 
which a navy requires and how vital it is that this investment be consistent.  
Lambert, for example, in discussing different styles of naval administration, notes 
that the basic requirement was ‘sustained political and financial support, with 
informed political decision-making’1.  While Glete has commented on the 
importance of having a coherent naval doctrine, which he describes as ‘the 
relationship between the military and political goals of the state’ that established 
‘the way to fight the war, the characteristics of the matériel used and the 
recruitment and training of the personnel’2.   As he stated:  
It is important that ships should be built with a clear idea of the type of 
war they are intended to fight.  A coherent, long-term shipbuilding program must 
be based on a clearly articulated set of priorities with well defined tasks for every 
type of warship built.  The personnel must form its naval as well as its mercantile 
policy with a view to how the navy’s manpower demand could be coordinated 
with the mercantile marine’s need for sailors.  Finally, naval bases must be 
developed to support the fleet in accordance with the strategic doctrine3.   
In addition, only with consistent financial backing can a navy retain its 
skilled labour, maintain its ships, remain up-to-date with modern technologies, 
keep its provisioning systems operative, have trained and experienced officers and 
crews and have a base of institutional knowledge which would allow the navy to 
function efficiently.  
                                                      
1 Lambert (2000) p.24 
2 Glete (1993) vol.I, p.19 
3 Ibid., vol.I, p.19 
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There is as yet little published information on the financing of the Spanish navy in 
the eighteenth century and this aspect of Ferdinand VI’s reign still requires a more 
thorough examination of primary sources.  In the following analysis, however, it 
has been possible to study some aspects of this and of the nature of the political 
backing which the navy received4. 
The amounts that Ensenada proposed spending on the navy in his Representations 
to the King varied but his most detailed financial plan and the one that will serve 
as a reference in this study was the one he submitted to the King in 1751.  In it, 
Ensenada put forward a six-year plan during which he estimated that Crown 
revenue generated within the Peninsula would amount to an annual 26,707,649 
vellon escudos (267,076,490 vellon reals)5.   
There are few published studies working from primary sources on Ferdinand’s 
Treasury which make it difficult to analyse whether Ensenada’s expectations were 
accurate.  The most extensive research on ordinary revenue within the Peninsula 
has been carried out by the economic historian, Miguel Artola.  His figures are 
shown in Appendix 17 in which Crown revenue is shown to fall short of 
Ensenada’s expectations but Artola’s figures are not entirely comprehensive (in 
that the revenue from salt, stamped paper, the lottery and the rentas eclesiásticas, 
are not always given) so it is not necessarily the case that Ensenada’s predictions 
were inaccurate.  Appendix 18, also compiled from Artola’s figures, shows 
Crown revenue gained from the rentas provinciales in the years 1714, 1722, 1749 
                                                      
4 There is more complete information on Charles III’s finances and the management of his military 
and naval spending than there is on either Ferdinand VI or Philip V, see Barbier and Klein (1981) 
and (1985).   
5 Rodríguez Villa (1878) pp.113–41, ‘Representación, Madrid, 1751’. 
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and 1787 demonstrating that this increased over the course of the century, most 
dramatically between 1749 and 17876. 
Of the 26,707,649 vellon escudos which he predicted as the Crown’s annual 
revenue within the Peninsula, Ensenada proposed spending 15 million (150 
million vellon reals) on the army, five million on the navy (50 million vellon 
reals) and the remaining 6,707,647 (67,076,470 vellon reals) on the Court and 
palace expenses.  After this period, Ensenada expected that Ferdinand’s annual 
revenue would have risen substantially as a result of his financial reforms7 and the 
Peninsula’s increased industrial output so that from then on an annual 19 million 
vellon escudos (190 million vellon reals) could be spent on the army, six million 
(60 million vellon reals) on the navy and nine million (90 million vellon reals) on 
the Court.  This referred to the Crown’s income from within the Peninsula only 
and thus related to that generated from the Crown’s taxes consisting of the rentas 
provinciales (taxes such as those voted by the Court, the tercias reales, the 
alcabalas with the additional cientos, the millones and others) which were paid by 
Castilians only and the rentas generales (taxes put on specific items) which, along 
with the tobacco tax, were paid throughout the Peninsula.  Indies revenue, which 
Ensenada thought in the future might exceed twelve million escudos, should be 
                                                      
6 Further detailed studies on the Spanish Monarchy’s revenue during the eighteenth century are 
those by TePaske and Klein on the Spanish American Royal Treasuries, (1982) and (1986).  These 
are very detailed on the incomes of the Treasuries of Chile, Peru and Mexico but they do not 
specify the sums sent to Spain yearly or those spent on the navy in Guayaquil, Veracruz and 
Havana.  TePaske (1983) states that 16,123,480 pesos (equivalent to 400,007 kilograms of silver) 
were transmitted to Spain between 1751 and 1760 (a figure which excludes that sent from Peru 
because, according to TePaske, there were no remissions from Peru to Castile listed in the 
accounts during these years) p. 442.  There are a few other economic histories that cover 
Ferdinand’s reign such as Angulo Teja (2002), who examines the rentas provinciales but only 
provides figures for the province of Toledo, and Hamilton (1947) and Grafe (2012) who in their 
studies of Spanish prices and markets do not analyse Crown income.  The figures provided by 
Artola on Crown revenue within the Peninsula and TePaske and Klein in the Americas remain the 
most suitable in the context of this study. 
7 See pp.30–1, fn.16, for a description of Ensenada’s financial reforms.  
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spent half on redeeming juros and alcabalas and half on building a reserve fund 
of 30 million pesos to be used in the case of war8. 
An analysis of naval expenditure in 1751, the same year in which Ensenada 
submitted this plan, suggests, however, that either intentionally but without 
informing a volatile Ferdinand or unintentionally not realising the expense which 
such a navy would generate, Ensenada was already spending in excess of the 
proposed five million escudos on the navy.  At this time, an annual consignación 
(or budget) was generally arranged at the end of the preceding year when 
instructions were sent to the Tesorero Mayor, which during the 1750s alternated 
yearly between Nicolás de Francia and Manuel Antonio de Orcasitas.  The central 
Treasury was then responsible for issuing funds to local Naval Treasuries and 
officials.  Along with the Treasuries of each of the Departments, the recipients 
usually included the naval officials Manuel de las Casas y la Quadra (Naval 
Intendant at San Sebastian), Manuel de Mollinedo (Comisario Ordenador in 
Bilbao), Jacinto Navarrete (Comisario Ordenador in Santander) and Joseph de 
Contamina (Naval Intendant in Barcelona).  Regular payments were also budgeted 
for Ambrosio Agustín Garro who held the navy’s victualling contract from at least 
1749 to 1754, Eugenio de Mena, merchant and agent of the Dutch merchants, 
Daniel and Jan Gildemeester, for the provision and transport of masts, hemp and 
timber and Juan de Isla y Alvear who held a number of naval contracts including 
those for shipbuilding at Guarnizo, for felling and transport of timber from La 
Montaña and for the manufacture of iron fittings.  The funds budgeted for the 
Department Treasuries were generally divided into two types – ordinary and 
extraordinary.  The first was to be used for the routine operations of the 
                                                      
8 See González Enciso (2003) pp.26–31 for a more detailed description of these taxes. 
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Department and its squadron and the second for temporary payments, such as the 
construction of the arsenals.  Ensenada sent Orcasitas instructions relating to the 
1751 budget between 25 and 26 November 1750.  In them, he set out planned 
naval expenditure for the following year as indicated in the table below. 
Table 1: The planned naval budget for 17519 





Cadiz 672,000 (paid monthly in 56,000 
vellon escudo instalments) 
350,000 1,022,000 
(10,220,000) 
Ferrol 360,000 (paid monthly in 30,000 
vellon escudo instalments) 
450,000 810,000 
(8,100,000) 
Cartagena 266,400 + 
180,000 (paid monthly in 22,200 
(25 Nov) and 15,000 (26 Nov) 

















420,000 (paid monthly in 35,000 






99,996 (paid monthly in 8,333 
vellon escudo instalments) 
 99,996 
(999,960) 
Total: 3,518,396 (35,183,960) 
 
This total of 3,518,396 vellon escudos was below Ensenada’s proposed annual 
spending of five million but additional payments made during the course of the 
year raised this figure substantially.  In the following list, the amounts which 
Ensenada instructed Nicolás de Francia to issue to Naval Treasuries and officials 
are described.  These are as follows10: 
                                                      
9 AGS Marina 768, ff.136–41, ‘Consignación ordinaria y extraordinaria para los tres 
Departamentos en el año de 1751’. 
10 In the following lists, the assigned sums are given in the currency in which the original 
document gave them but with conversions to vellon reals and escudos next to them if these are not 
the currencies in which they were expressed originally. 
 275 
• 26,000 pesos (391,529 vellon reals and 41 maravedis, 39,153 vellon 
escudos) to Barcelona ordered on 15 January 175111. 
• 362,698 vellon reals and 27 maravedis (36,270 vellon escudos) to Cadiz 
ordered on 2 February12. 
• 6,000,000 vellon reals (600,000 vellon escudos) to Navarrete in Santander 
on 13 February13. 
• 450,000 vellon reals (45,000 vellon escudos) to Cartagena on 4 March.  
Initially, this sum was to be discounted from Cartagena’s planned budget 
in the last two months of the year but this instruction was subsequently 
cancelled14. 
• 341,660 vellon reals and 19 maravedis (34,166 vellon escudos) to Cadiz 
on 10 March which were to be transferred by Bentura de Ocio Salazar, 
Administrator of the Cadiz Customs House, to the Naval Treasury in 
Cadiz15. 
• 400,000 vellon reals (40,000 vellon escudos) to Cartagena on 22 March16. 
• 50,000 vellon escudos (500,000 vellon reals) to Navarrete in Santander on 
5 April17. 
• 576,000 vellon reals (57,600 vellon escudos) to Cartagena on 29 April18. 
• 2,296,627 vellon reals and 6 maravedis (229,663 vellon escudos) to Cadiz 
on 3 May from Ocio Salazar19. 
                                                      
11 AGS Marina 769, f.3, Ensenada to Francia, Buen Retiro, 15 January 1751 
12 Ibid., f.3, Ensenada to Francia, Buen Retiro, 2 February 1751 
13 Ibid., ff.4–5, Ensenada to Francia, Buen Retiro, 13 February 1751 
14 Ibid., f.5, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 4 March 1751, and  
15 Ibid., ff.15–6, Ensenada to Francia, Madrid, 10 March 1751 
16 Ibid., ff.10–11, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 22 March 1751 
17 Ibid., f.15, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 5 April 1751 
18 Ibid., f.17, Ensenada to Francia, Aranjuez, 29 April 1751 
19 Ibid., f.18, Ensenada to Francia, Aranjuez, 3 May 1751 
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• 419,137 vellon reals and 18 maravedis (41,914 vellon escudos) to Cadiz 
on 17 May from Ocio Salazar20. 
• 3,000,000 vellon reals (300,000 vellon escudos) to Cartagena on 29 
June21. 
• 1,288,315 vellon reals (128,831 vellon escudos) to Cadiz on 12 July22. 
• 360,000 vellon reals (36,000 vellon escudos) to Cadiz on 12 July23. 
• 3,000,000 vellon reals (300,000 vellon escudos) to Cartagena on 20 July24. 
• 28,000 pesos (421,647 vellon reals and 42,165 vellon escudos) to 
Cartagena on 14 August25. 
• 14,000 pesos (210,823 vellon reals and 21,082 vellon escudos) to 
Cartagena on 16 August26. 
• 245,992 vellon reals (24,599 vellon escudos) to Cadiz from Ocio Salazar 
on 6 September to pay Nicolás Berroa, a merchant, for the purchase of 
provisions which were sent to Ferrol27. 
• 700,000 vellon reals (70,000 vellon escudos) to Cartagena on 11 
September28. 
• 4,000,000 vellon reals (400,000 vellon escudos) to Ferrol on 21 
September29. 
• 70,000 pesos (1,054,118 vellon reals and 105,412 vellon escudos) to 
Mollinedo in Bilbao on 16 October30. 
                                                      
20 Ibid., f.23, Ensenada to Francia, Aranjuez, 17 May 1751 
21 Ibid., ff.26–7, Ensenada to Francia, Aranjuez, 29 June 1751 
22 Ibid., f.27, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 12 July 1751 
23 Ibid., f.29, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 12 July 1751 
24 Ibid., f.32, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 20 July 1751 
25 Ibid., ff.37–8, Ensenada to Francia, Madrid, 14 August 1751 
26 Ibid., f.38, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 16 August 1751 
27 Ibid., f.39, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 6 September 1751 
28 Ibid., ff.44–5, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 11 September 1751 
29 Ibid., ff.49–50, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 21 September 1751 
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This amounted to an additional 2,601,855 vellon escudos thus raising naval 
expenditure in 1751 to 6,120,251 vellon escudos, exceeding Ensenada’s proposed 
5,000,000-vellon-escudo budget by 1,120,251 vellon escudos.  Additional sums, 
totalling 1,328,484 vellon escudos, which were intended to be charged back to the 
local Naval Treasuries and subtracted from their regular budgets, were also issued 
by the treasurer.  These included: 
• 135,000 vellon reals (13,500 vellon escudos) to Contamina in Barcelona 
which was charged to Cartagena31. 
• 945,000 vellon reals (94,500 vellon escudos) to Contamina to pay for 
timber provided by Mena which was also charged to Cartagena32. 
• 1,500,000 vellon reals (150,000 vellon escudos) to Navarrete in Santander 
which was charged to Ferrol33. 
• 86,633 vellon reals and 22 maravedis (8,663 vellon escudos) to Contamina 
in Barcelona which was charged to Cartagena34. 
• 1,200,000 vellon reals (120,000 vellon escudos) to Martin Joseph de 
Machinena in Navarre (280,000 vellon reals) and Matheo del Collado in 
Aragon (920,000 vellon reals) for the purchase of hemp which was 
charged to Ferrol35. 
• 39,000 pesos (587,294 vellon reals and 58,729 vellon escudos) to 
Contamina in Barcelona which was charged to Cartagena36. 
                                                      
30 Ibid., f.50, Ensenada to Francia, San Lorenzo, 16 October 1751 
31 Ibid., f.17, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 19 April 1751 
32 Ibid., f.24 Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 19 April 1751 
33 Ibid., f.26, Ensenada to Francia, Aranjuez, 26 June 1751 
34 Ibid., f.31, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 16 July 1751 
35 Ibid., f.37, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 11 August 1751 
36 Ibid., f.38, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 28 August 1751 
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• 6,000,000 vellon reals (600,000 vellon escudos) to Navarrete in Santander 
(half of this sum was for Juan de Isla y Alvear) which was charged to 
Ferrol37. 
• 2,700,000 vellon reals (270,000 vellon escudos) to Mena, of which 
1,500,000 were to be charged to Ferrol Department and the remainder to 
Cadiz38. 
• 130,919 vellon reals and 7 maravedis (13,092 vellon escudos) to 
Contamina in Barcelona which was charged to Cartagena. 
There were also a number of miscellaneous payments which logically came under 
the remit of the navy but which were paid directly by the central Treasury.  These 
ranged from the salaries of officers employed in irregular activities to experiments 
for the improvement of naval technology.  Some of those which were issued in 
1751 are as follows: 
• Antonio de Ulloa’s salary during his travels in Europe.  Three months of 
his salary and gratificación de mesa for him and the Guardias Marinas 
accompanying him amounted to 40,540 vellon reals and 26 maravedis 
(4,054 vellon escudos).  This would amount to an annual payout for 
Ulloa’s salary of 162,163 vellon reals and 2 maravedis.  A later order also 
instructed Ferdinand’s treasurer in the Netherlands to provide Ulloa with 
any further funds Ulloa required39.   
• By 1751 Jorge Juan y Santacilia had returned from his mission to London 
but it seemed that parts of his salary remained unpaid as, on 23 March, 
                                                      
37 Ibid., ff.47–8, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 13 September 1751 
38 Ibid., ff.56–7, Ensenada to Francia, San Lorenzo, 25 October 1751 
39 Ibid., f.30, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 8 July 1751 and ff. 32–3, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 
26 July 1751 
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Ensenada ordered Francia to bring Juan’s salary of a monthly 8,100 vellon 
reals (810 vellon escudos) during this period up to date.  His two assistants 
on the mission, Joseph Solano and Pedro de Mora, were to have been 
receiving 50 vellon escudos (500 vellon reals) from 2 November 1749 to 
13 August 1750 and 25 vellon escudos (250 vellon reals) from 14 August 
1750 onwards40.  As of 1 August 1750, Juan was to be receiving a monthly 
income of 6,000 vellon reals (600 vellon escudos) as a naval officer and, 
as of 2 November 1750, a further 200 vellon escudos (2,000 vellon reals) 
as Teniente of the Company of Guardias Marinas41. 
• In 1751, the French astronomer, Louis Godin, was employed as the new 
Director of the Academy of Guardias Marinas and he was paid an extra 
sum of 160,000 vellon reals (16,000 vellon escudos) to fund his journey 
from South America to Cadiz42. 
• Two Frenchmen, M. Pedro Darsini and M. Latour, were given 6,000,000 
vellon reals (600,000 vellon escudos) to experiment with the purification 
of rock salt for the better preservation of ships’ hulls from worm43. 
• The Dutch consul in Alicante, Gaspar Vernet, had to be re-imbursed a sum 
of 4,230 vellon reals (423 vellon escudos) which he had spent on the 
upkeep of six Dutch sailors who had been imprisoned in Alicante44. 
• The Capitán de Navío Juan de Lángara was issued 45,000 vellon reals 
(4,500 vellon escudos) in Lisbon to pay off his squadron’s expenses before 
returning to Cadiz45. 
                                                      
40 Ibid., f.10, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 20 March 1751 
41 Ibid., f.9, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 20 March 1751.  Juan was not appointed Captain of the 
Company until 13 September 1751, see Lafuente and Sellés (1988) p.86. 
42 AGS Marina 769, f.56, Ensenada to Francia, San Lorenzo, 21 October 1751 
43 Ibid., f.2, Ensenada to Francia, Buen Retiro, 4 January 1751 
44 Ibid., f.2, Ensenada to Francia, Buen Retiro, 16 January 1751 
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• The Mayor General of the navy, Joaquín de Aguirre, who had compiled 
and published the Ordenanzas de Marina in 1748 was given an instalment 
of 15,000 vellon reals (1,500 vellon escudos) for the cost of printing and 
publishing these46.  These instalments were issued regularly from 1749 to 
1752 until, on 9 January 1753, Ensenada instructed Orcasitas to issue the 
outstanding 34,057 vellon reals (3,406 vellon escudos) of the total of 
139,057 vellon reals (13,906 vellon escudos) which it had cost to publish 
them47. 
• A number of students from the Royal College of Naval Surgeons in Cadiz 
were sent to Leyden and Paris in 1751 to study medicine and to purchase 
instruments48.  Among these men were included the surgeons from the 
Royal Hospital in Madrid Joseph Fernández, and his assistant, Raphael de 
Flores, who were given a monthly 12,000 vellon reals (1,200 vellon 
escudos) and 80 vellon escudos (800 vellon reals) respectively.  The 
Treasurer was instructed not only to provide them with their salaries but 
also with any further amounts required for the purchase of instruments49. 
                                                      
45 Ibid., f.15, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 26 March 1751 
46 Ibid., f.23, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 14 April 1751 
47 See AGS Marina 768 and 769 for regular payments of 15,000 vellon reals made to Aguirre and 
AGS Marina 769, ff.148–9, Ensenada to Orcasitas, Retiro, 9 January 1753, for Aguirre’s last 
payment. 
48 See Astrain Gallart (1996) pp.104–23 for a history of this institution.  The Royal College of 
Naval Surgeons was established in the Royal Naval Hospital, Cadiz, in 1748 with Pedro Virgili 
(1699–1776) as its director.  Virgili assisted Jorge Juan y Santacilia to form the Asamblea 
Amistosa Literaria, a society gathered every Thursday in Juan y Santacilia’s house in Cadiz to 
discuss scientific subjects in a similar manner as in the Royal Society in London and the Royal 
Academy of Sciences in Paris.  In October 1752, another two surgeons one from the navy, Agustin 
de Lacomba, and another from the Seminario in Cadiz were sent to join them to specialise in eye 
diseases and hernias.  In 1754, Lacomba was replaced in Paris by Pedro Balmaña.  See AGS 
Marina 769, ff.132–3, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 10 October 1752, and f.191, Ensenada to 
Francia, Retiro, 5 January 1754.   
49 AGS Marina 769, ff.48–9, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 15 September 1751, f.49, Ensenada to 
Francia, San Lorenzo, 10 October 1751 and ff.65–6, Ensenada to Francia, Retiro, 27 December 
1751 
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The various examples included in the preceding lists show that the planned annual 
budgets did not necessarily represent annual naval expenditure and that this, at 
least in 1751, exceeded the budget considerably.  Furthermore, this only 
represents the navy’s expenses in Europe  but the cost of running the navy in 
America was also considerable, principally in the navy’s main base in the West 
Indies, Havana50.  Here, the navy was funded with money made available by the 
Viceroy of New Spain, Juan Francisco de Güemes y Orcasitas, first Count of 
Revillagigedo from 1746 to 1755 and Agustín de Ahumada y Villalón, Marquis of 
Las Amarillas from 1755 to 1760.  Funds were regularly sent from Veracruz, 
usually on battleships belonging to the West Indies squadron, as shown in the 
table below. 
Table 2: Money delivered to Havana’s Naval Treasury from Veracruz51 
Date Amount (vellon 
reals) 
Delivered by 
1749 1,723,600 (172,360 
vellon escudos) 
Bizarra frigate (Capt. Salaberría) 
1750 1,520,000 (152,000 
vellon escudos) 
Reyna (Capt. Gomera) in January and Fuerte (Capt. 
Spinosa) in October 
1752 728,000 (72,800 
vellon escudos) 
N.S. de los Dolores in March, Bizarra (Capt. 
Valcárcel) in July and Castilla and Europa (Capt. 
Gutierre de Hevia) in December 
1753 734,064 (73,406 Vizarra (Valcarcel) in April and Europa (Idiázquez) in 
                                                      
50 The other area where there was the most naval spending in the West Indies was Veracruz.  As an 
indication of naval expenditure there, 60,108 vellon reales, 13 maravedis were spent in 1754, 
1,240,974 vellon reales, 7 maravedis in 1755, 834,089 vellon reals, 5 maravedis in 1756 and 
684,405 vellon reals in 1757, see AGS Marina 404, ‘Extracto del caudal gastado para subsistencia 
de Guarda Costas de Tierra Firme y otras embarcaciones de SM que an venido a este Puerto’, 
Cartagena de Indias, 1 September 1757. 
51 Compiled from AGI Contaduría 1168, ‘Cuenta del caudal de fábrica de bajeles en la Habana 
dada por D. Juan Thomas de la Barrera Sotomayor, contador, y D. Diego Peñalver, thesorero, 
tomada por dhos [debidos] Segueyra y Gelabert, 1748 á 1750’, signed by Barrera Sotomayor and 
Peñalver Angulo, Havana, 6 January 1750, ‘Cuenta del caudal de fabrica de navíos, construcción 
de muelle, máquina, almacenes, oficina de marina, y compra de madera todo en la Habana, dada 
por D. Juan Thomas de la Barrera Sotomayor, contador, D. Diego Peñalver Angulo, thesorero, y 
D. Antonio Rivero, factor supernumerario, tomada por D. Jorge Antonio Gelabert, 1750 á 1753’, 
signed Barrera Sotomayor and Peñalver Angulo, Havana, 3 February 1754, ‘Cuenta del caudal 
destinado a fábrica de navíos en la Habana dada por D. Juan Thomas de la Barrera Sotomayor, 
contador, D. Diego Peñalver Angulo, thesorero, y D. Antonio Rivero, oficial real supernumerario, 
tomada por los dhos contadores de cuentas, Gelabert y Manzano, con los autos y informe de la 
Contaduría del Consejo en 1759 y 1764, 1754 á 1757’, signed Gelabert and Manzano, Havana, 28 
September 1758. 
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vellon escudos) December 
1755 169,352 (16,935 
vellon escudos) 
Asia and Fuerte (Lángara) in Jan 
1756 143,040  (14,304 
vellon escudos) 
Asia and Fuerte (Lángara) in Jan 
1757 653,730 (65,373 
vellon escudos) 
Flecha and Flora (Velasco) in Feb 
Total: 5,671,786 vellon reals (567,179 vellon escudos) 
 
As this money had to be shipped into Cuba, Havana’s Naval Treasury was 
sometimes short of funds but on these occasions, as shown below, it was possible 
for the arsenal to borrow from others. 
Table 3: Money borrowed by Havana’s Treasury in anticipation of the arrival of 
funds from Veracruz52 







Borrowed to begin work on the 
dock and masting engine 
48,000 (4,800 
vellon escudos) 
31 Jan 1752 The Bolsa de 
Depósitos 





25 Feb 1752 The Bolsa de 
Depósitos 
Ibid. 48,000 (4,800 
vellon escudos) 
18 Nov 1757 Bolsa de 
Depositos 





Total: 268,000 (26,800 vellon escudos) 
 
It was general policy that the arsenal assist local inhabitants and merchants with 
materials it could spare and, as a result, some extra sums were also obtained in 
                                                      
52 Compiled from AGI Contaduría 1168, ‘Cuenta del caudal de fábrica de bajeles en la Habana 
dada por D. Juan Thomas de la Barrera Sotomayor, contador, y D. Diego Peñalver, thesorero, 
tomada por dhos [debidos] Segueyra y Gelabert, 1748 á 1750’, signed by Barrera Sotomayor and 
Peñalver Angulo, Havana, 6 January 1750, ‘Cuenta del caudal de fabrica de navíos, construcción 
de muelle, máquina, almacenes, oficina de marina, y compra de madera todo en la Habana, dada 
por D. Juan Thomas de la Barrera Sotomayor, contador, D. Diego Peñalver Angulo, thesorero, y 
D. Antonio Rivero, factor supernumerario, tomada por D. Jorge Antonio Gelabert, 1750 á 1753’, 
signed Barrera Sotomayor and Peñalver Angulo, Havana, 3 February 1754, ‘Cuenta del caudal 
destinado a fábrica de navíos en la Habana dada por D. Juan Thomas de la Barrera Sotomayor, 
contador, D. Diego Peñalver Angulo, thesorero, y D. Antonio Rivero, oficial real supernumerario, 
tomada por los dhos contadores de cuentas, Gelabert y Manzano, con los autos y informe de la 
Contaduría del Consejo en 1759 y 1764, 1754 á 1757’, signed Gelabert and Manzano, Havana, 28 
September 1758. 
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this fashion.  Joseph de Ayala Matamoros, a local merchant, for example, 
purchased two small bronze cannon for 1,000 vellon reals and a British vessel 
taken by Reggio’s squadron was sold to another local, Ilario de Aranda, for 4,325 
vellon reals. 
One of the arsenal’s greatest expenses was shipbuilding.  From 28 January 1748 
to 11 May 1753 the Naval Treasury issued a total of 3,000,000 vellon reales 
(300,000 vellon escudos) to the Royal Havana Company for the construction of 
battleships, a contract which this company had owned since 4 June 174153.  In 
accepting the contract as a necessary prerequisite to the tobacco concessions the 
Company had underestimated the cost of shipbuilding and was nearly destroyed 
by it so from 1745 onwards it sought a way out.  On 23 June 1749 it was finally 
permitted to opt out of the contract in exchange for giving Ferdinand 60 shares in 
the Company valued at 30,000 pesos and on the condition that it completed all the 
ships that had already had been begun54.  After this no one else was willing to take 
on a similar contract and shipbuilding ceased until 1756, after which it was 
administered directly by the State.  The following table outlines the Havana 
arsenal’s annual spending, showing the reduction in expenses after 1753 when 
payments to the Royal Havana Company ended and the increase in expenditure 
after 1756 when shipbuilding was re-introduced at the arsenal. 
 
                                                      
53 Infante (70), Galicia (70), Princesa (70), Fénix (80), Rayo (80), Tigre (74), Vencedor (70), 
África (70), Conquistador (60), Invencible (70), Reyna (70), Dragón (64). 
54 See Garate Ojanguren (1994), Serrano Alvarez (2008) pp.94–123 and Serrano Alvarez (2006) 
pp.7–31 for an descriptions of the Company’s struggle with shipbuilding. 
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Table 4: Funds issued by the Naval Treasury at Havana55 
Year Exenditure (vellon reals, maravedis) 
1748 1,045,937.14 (104,594 vellon escudos) 
1749 2,629,990.13! (262,999 vellon escudos) 
1750 1,009,490.13! (100,949 vellon escudos) 
1751 1,096,914.32! (109,691 vellon escudos) 
1752 1,132,270.7! (113,227 vellon escudos) 
1753 586,421.11 (58,642 vellon escudos) 
1754 163,570.4! (16,357 vellon escudos) 
1755 174,849.25 (17,485 vellon escudos) 
1756 443,373.21! (44,337 vellon escudos) 
1757 577,403.16! (57,740 vellon escudos) 
Total: 8,860,221.23! (886,022 vellon escudos) 
 
To continue with the analysis of naval expenditure in 1751, the navy’s expenses 
in Havana for that year, therefore, were 1,096,914 vellon reals and 32! maravedis 
(109,097 vellon escudos).  Of this 200,766 vellon reals and 7! maravedis were 
spent on fitting out the 80- and 74-gun ships Rayo, Princesa, Infante and Galicia 
                                                      
55 Compiled from AGI Contaduría 1168, ‘Cuenta del caudal de fábrica de bajeles en la Habana 
dada por D. Juan Thomas de la Barrera Sotomayor, contador, y D. Diego Peñalver, thesorero, 
tomada por dhos [debidos] Segueyra y Gelabert, 1748 á 1750’, signed by Barrera Sotomayor and 
Peñalver Angulo, Havana, 6 January 1750, ‘Cuenta del caudal de fabrica de navíos, construcción 
de muelle, máquina, almacenes, oficina de marina, y compra de madera todo en la Habana, dada 
por D. Juan Thomas de la Barrera Sotomayor, contador, D. Diego Peñalver Angulo, thesorero, y 
D. Antonio Rivero, factor supernumerario, tomada por D. Jorge Antonio Gelabert, 1750 a 1753’, 
signed Barrera Sotomayor and Peñalver Angulo, Havana, 3 February 1754, ‘Cuenta del caudal 
destinado a fábrica de navíos en la Habana dada por D. Juan Thomas de la Barrera Sotomayor, 
contador, D. Diego Peñalver Angulo, thesorero, y D. Antonio Rivero, oficial real supernumerario, 
tomada por los dhos contadores de cuentas, Gelabert y Manzano, con los autos y informe de la 
Contaduría del Consejo en 1759 y 1764, 1754 á 1757’, signed Gelabert and Manzano, Havana, 28 
September 1758. 
 285 
and the frigates San Jose and San Antonio56.  Dockyard expenses, including the 
cost of the arsenal’s expansion57, the transport of naval stores to Havana and 
timber to Spain as well as a payment to the Royal Havana Company for careening 
the Infante, amounted to 35,200 vellon reals and 24 maravedis.  A further 863,948 
vellon reals and 1 maravedi was spent on personnel, namely on the salaries of 
officials, officers, sailors, arsenal employees and pilots, the upkeep of convicts 
sentenced to work at the arsenal, the rewards for the capture of deserters, the cost 
of burials, accommodation58, victuals and water.   
This sum of 1,096,914 vellon reals and 32! maravedis (109,097 vellon escudos) 
spent on the navy in Havana can be added to that of 6,120,251 vellon escudos 
which can certifiably be said to have been spent in the Peninsula and includes 
only the budget and additional expenditure without including that which was 
charged back to the Departments’ Treasuries or that issued for miscellaneous 
payments.  The total of this sum, which is not comprehensive, makes naval 
spending in 1751 add up to 6,229,942 vellon escudos (62,299,420 vellon reals), 
far surpassing the five-million-vellon-escudo annual amount which Ensenada 
proposed to Ferdinand as sufficient for the navy in the Representation he 
submitted in that very year.  At this time, however, naval expansion was 
considered a top priority and, in the words of Benjamin Keene, the British 
ambassador, Ensenada, as Finance Secretary, ordered that the King’s treasurers 
                                                      
56 These were the last ships built by the Royal Havana Company for the navy and they were all 
launched between 1749 and 1750.  See Harbron (1988) p.168 
57 During the 1750s, a masting engine, a dock, warehouses and a head office were built in 
Havana’s arsenal.  Before and during their construction naval stores had to be kept in rented 
warehouses and the Comisario Ordenador, Lorenzo Montalvo, lived in a house rented for 750 
pesos a year which served as head office and warehouse, see AGI Contaduría 1168. 
58 During the 1750s, sailors waiting to sail were housed in the Hospital-Convent of San Juan de 
Dios.  In 1751, the cost of this accomodation came to 25,726 vellon reals, see AGI Contaduría 
1168. 
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‘open the coffers, that nothing may be retarded for want of money’59.  In the 
following years, the cost of shipbuilding, the construction of Ferrol and Cartagena 
arsenals, the purchase of naval stores and supplies and the increased time spent at 
sea by Spanish squadrons meant that the navy’s spending in the Peninsula 
continued to grow.  In 1752, the budget for the navy was set at 6,395,797 vellon 
escudos (63,957,970 vellon reals) and additional spending throughout the year 
expanded radically to 9,193,008 vellon escudos (91,930,083 vellon reals and 1 
maravedi)60.  The following year, the planned budget was significantly reduced, 
being set at 1,524,899 vellon escudos (15,248,990 vellon reals), and only 
expanded to 3,585,990 vellon escudos (35,859,900 vellon reals) as a result of 
extra spending during the course of the year.  Nevertheless, the Treasury was 
ordered to issue sums intended to be charged back to the Naval Departments 
which far exceeded their available budgets.  Ferrol’s annual budget in 1753, for 
example, was set at 178,666 vellon escudos (11,786,660 vellon reals) but a further 
1,857,908 vellon escudos (18,579,080 vellon reals) were issued by the central 
Treasury and charged to Ferrol as is shown in the following table.   
Table 5: Funds issued by the central Treasury to be charged to Ferrol Department 
in 175361 
Date Payment to Reason Amount (vellon 
escudos) 








12 Jan 1753 Isla (Guarnizo) Shipbuilding 540,000 (5,400,000 
vellon reals) 
25 May 1753 Mena (Gildemeester’s 
agent) 
Riga timber and hemp 200,000 (2,000,000 
vellon reals) 
4 Jun 1753 Navarrete (Santander) Additional naval 301,176 (3,011,760 
                                                      
59 Kew SP94/139, ff.232–6, Keene to Bedford, Antigola, 28 June 1751 
60 Nearly half the monarchy’s ordinary revenue within the Peninsula, see Appendix 10. 
61 Compiled from AGS Marina 768, Order Book 1747–1750 and AGS Marina 769, Order Book, 
1751–1754 
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expenditure vellon reals) 




29 Oct 1753 Mena (Gildemeester’s 
agent) 
Riga timber and hemp 150,000 (1,500,000 
vellon reals) 
15 Dec 1753 Bernardo de Guendica 
(merchant in Bilbao) 
Purchase of materials 
for Ferrol arsenal 
46,732 (467,320 
vellon reals) 
Total: 1,857,908 (18,579,080 vellon reals) 
 
There are indications that in 1753 naval spending was curtailed because the Royal 
Treasury was struggling to support it while, at the same time, coping with Spain’s 
particularly poor harvest that year62.  Towards the end of 1753, Keene reported 
that it was  
not very long since, that your Lordship was informed by His Majesty’s 
consul at the Coruña of the vivacity with which the works and ships were to be 
pushed forward to their perfection; great sums were issued by the Treasury for 
that effect without limitation, on accounts by Mr de la Ensenada’s chief secretary 
for the Marine; the government wanted money for other urgencies but found the 
Treasury near exhausted, at which Mr Ensenada was suprized & immediately sent 
orders to finish what was begun, but to lay no more keels’63.   
The scarcity of food in the Peninsula appeared to be directly associated 
with Ensenada’s naval project in the public mind.  Keene, for example, reporting 
on the general feeling at Court, observed that ‘Here is a good deal of ill humour, 
proceeding from the dearth of corn, and the general scarcity of all provisions in 
this country, which falls chiefly on M. de la Ensenada’.  And, in December, that  
No less than 20 millions of dollars have been expended upon the Marine, 
within these two years past …  He [Ensenada] is severely criticised for an 
enterprize so far beyond the natural force of this country to support, or it’s natural 
necessity requires …  Proper observations have not been wanting to set this 
                                                      
62 This was the reason why Erasún was sent to convoy wheat transports from Italy as described on 
p.215.  It is significant that it was the navy which was responsible for safeguarding the vital 
importation of wheat in 1753 when common opinion appears to hold the cost of the naval project 
as responsible for the dearth in Spain. 
63 Kew SP94/144, ff.198–200, Keene to Holdernesse, Madrid, 8 December 1753 
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extravagant scheme in its due light among the well-intentioned.  It has been 
shown that the execution of it is impracticable64.   
This feeling that Ensenada had squandered Spanish resources for nothing 
circulated with more vigour following his removal from government, with 
lampoons, such as that quoted by Egido López in his study of public opinion in 
the eighteenth century, which reads: 
 ‘Are there Troops? None, we are without soldiers. 
 And a Navy? None, look around this Port. 
 Are there People? None, notable by their absence. 
 Are there Pesos? None, they are stashed away in France.  
 … 
 There is neither money, commerce, people, ships, 
 Nor troops, nor even bread for tomorrow’65. 
Egido López, on his chapter on the fall of Ensenada, emphasises that as no 
formal charges were ever brought against Ensenada, public opinion was left to 
draw up its own conclusions over his removal from power and this was one of the 
repeated themes along with Ensenda’s own personal decadence and his reformist 
attitudes which offended Spain’s conservative society much as Esquilache’s 
reforms would do in 176666.  The state of poverty with which Ensenada’s regime 
was associated was also in dramatic contrast to the peaceful and prosperous reign 
that Ferdinand wished to be his legacy.  How he would have wanted posterity to 
remember him is touchingly reflected by his mausoleum in the Church of St 
Barbara in Madrid where pride of place is given to an allegorical figure (of 
Spain/Peace?) who holds the Horn of Plenty spilling out gold and silver coins 
whilst she sweeps away the instruments of war.  In addition, there is little 
evidence that Ferdinand himself took much of a personal interest in the navy 
                                                      
64 Ibid., ff.15–8, Keene to Holdernesse, Madrid, 15 July 1753, and ff.198–200, Keene to 
Holdernesse, Madrid, 8 December 1753 
65 Egido López (2002), p.206. 
66 Ibid. pp.195–230 
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despite attempts to draw his attention to it by such ploys as the construction of 
model warships for the lakes of the new palace at Aranjuez.  These, as depicted by 
Court painters, Francisco Battaglioni67 and Antonio Joli (1700–1777)68, represent 
the closest there is to a marine painting tradition at the Court at this time.  These 
paintings, along with Joli’s depictions of the fleet in Naples Bay ready to transport 
Charles III to Spain in 1759, is one of the few contemporary paintings of Spanish 
battleships69.  This absence of the sea and the navy from Court painting is also the 
case with most of the other arts and could be interpreted to reflect the fact that the 
Spanish Court, based in the centre of the Peninsula, was physically and 
psychologically distant from the sea and, correspondingly, therefore, maritime 
interest groups, such as merchants and fishermen, carried little weight in Madrid.  
Dominguez Ortiz, for example, in his study of Spanish society in the eighteenth 
century includes the mercantile and trading classes in his chapter on rural society 
noting that ‘the mercantile class continued to be a factor of little weight, which 
could not even remotely aspire to the role which it already had in Britain and 
France’70.  This psychological distancing, along with Ferdinand’s apparent 
personal lack of interest in the navy, meant that the Spanish navy relied for 
investment on powerful ministers such as Ensenada who considered naval 
strength a valuable instrument of state policy.  Without such ministers, the 
Spanish navy could find itself sorely lacking in financial support, especially since 
                                                      
67 Battaglioni, Fernando VI y Bárbara de Braganza con sus invitados en los jardines del Palacio 
Real de Aranjuez celebrando la festividad de San Fernando, 1756 (Museo del Prado, Madrid). 
68 Joli, Vista del Real Sitio, palacio y jardines de Aranjuez, post-1762 (Royal Palace, Naples).  
They are also depicted in Barbara’s favourite, Carlos Broschi’s (also called Farinelli) Descripción 
del estado actual del Real Teatro del Buen Retiro, 1758 (Biblioteca del Palacio Real, Madrid). 
69 Joli, Partida de Carlos de Borbón a España, vista desde el mar, 1759, and Partida de Carlos de 
Borbón a España, vista desde la dársena, 1759 (Museo del Prado, Madrid) 
70 Dominguez Ortiz (1955) p.188 
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it was not necessarily considered a vital instrument in the execution of foreign 
policy.   
Ensenada’s rival José de Carvajal, for example, who set out his alternative to 
armed neutrality in two works – the Testamento Político (1745) and Mis 
Pensamientos en orden de acá: Sistema político que conviene a España (1753)71, 
thought Spanish interests were best served through a system of alliances72.   By 
joining with Portugal, Britain and Austria against France, Spain could alter the 
European balance of power in its favour.  During Ferdinand’s reign, Carvajal 
sought to put his policies into effect in conjunction with Ensenada pursuing his 
own ideas on Spanish foreign policy.  As a result, he was responsible for the 
negotiation of treaties with Portugal (13 January 1750) and Britain (5 October 
1750)73.  In the Americas, he argued, Spain was investing heavily in the 
development and protection of its territories only to lose much of the profit to the 
predatory British, French and Dutch.  This situation could be retrieved by giving 
Britain a cut of the annual Indies treasure (the sum he proposed was a tenth) thus 
making Britain, with its powerful navy, indebted to Spain and binding it to protect 
Spain’s interests by curbing the illicit trade of others in Spanish territories under 
threat of the loss of this income, a threat which could also be used to control 
British policy within Europe74.  Much of the work in protecting the American 
empire would, therefore, be transferred to the British and so the navy would be 
required to play only a minor part in Spanish foreign policy.  Thus, though 
Carvajal still considered a navy necessary for Spain, he did not consider it as vital.  
                                                      
71 Delgado Barrado (2001) pp.23, 59 
72 See Delgado Barredo and Gómez Urdañéz (2002) pp.21–44 and Delgado Barrado (2001) pp.57–
100 for an analysis of Carvajal’s foreign policy.   
73 See Delgado Barrado (2001) pp.90–8. 
74 Delgado Barrado (2001) pp.66–7 
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In fact, during the War of Jenkins’ Ear, Carvajal had expressed frustration with 
the navy noting that ‘The naval action in America has been a cause of deep 
disappointment …  I despair of a navy that has served us to such little effect in a 
war at sea, that has swallowed untold millions which have disappeared without 
trace into thin air’75.  It is significant that this argument that the navy was too 
expensive for what it could actually achieve was echoed by the British consuls 
when reporting local opinion in Spain76.  Carvajal was also conscious that 
Ensenada’s plans for naval expansion were perceived by the British as a threat 
specifically directed against them and noted, in 1749, that ‘Our navy should be 
enlarged, but in proportion and without making a noise, because at the moment it 
is unsettling the whole world’77. 
In July 1754, when Ensenada lost his position at Court, he was replaced in 
government by those who, on the whole, supported Carvajal’s foreign policy 
ideas.  At this time, the offices of Finance and the Navy were separated so that the 
new Naval Minister, Julián de Arriaga, had no control, as Ensenada had done, 
over his budget78.  Juan Francisco Ruiz de Gaona y Portocarrero, Count of 
Valdeparaíso (1699–1760), who replaced Ensenada as Finance Secretary, pursued 
a policy of retrenchment designed to reduce Spanish debt for the remaining years 
of Ferdinand’s reign and in so doing he reduced the naval budget substantially79.  
As a result, there is a marked difference in the way the navy was managed before 
                                                      
75 Ozanam (1975) p.422, Carvajal to Huéscar, [Madrid], 25 December [1748] 
76 See Keene’s report p. and Jordan in Ferrol, p. 
77 Ozanam (1975) p.437, Carvajal to Huéscar, [Madrid], 29 January [1749] 
78 Evidence that Arriaga could not expand his budget include, for example, his instructions to 
Barrero in Cartagena to purchase whatever hemp he wished as long as he did not exceed the 
budget discussed in pp.153–4.  Furthermore, as Arriaga’s biographer, Baudot Monroy, argues, 
Arriaga’s powers were substantially circumscribed after it was determined that all his decisions 
had to be run past Wall, though this mainly relates to those concerning activities in the Indies, see 
Baudot Monroy (2012) pp.423–4. 
79 See Asensio Rubio (1995) p.169 and Baudot Monroy (2013) p.425 
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and after July 1754.  As has been demonstrated in this study, there was a great 
deal of investment in shipbuilding before this date but, after, the number of ships 
to be built was reduced with an attempt being made to return to contract-
shipbuilding at the arsenals.  The new policy meant there was less interest in 
foreign expertise, large proportions of the arsenal workforces were dismissed and 
the purchase of cheaper foreign materials was preferred to investment in domestic 
products.  Table 4 in this chapter, for instance, indicates the marked reduction in 
expenditure in the years after 1754. 
Spain, therefore, lacked the political stability that is generally considered vital to 
ensure a consistent and properly-financed naval doctrine.  This, in part, is 
explained by the fact that during the age of sail republics and constitutional 
monarchies such as the Netherlands and Britain, as Lambert has argued, ‘proved 
better able to sustain naval power’ because their politics reflected the interests of 
several groups, such as merchants, coastal towns, colonial speculators and 
investors, that benefited from naval strength80.  These groups did not enjoy a 
significant influence at the Spanish Court.  Instead, the impetus to maintain a navy 
stemmed from the Crown’s need to keep lines of communication open with its 
overseas territories and the manner with which the government aimed to protect 
these was not necessarily through naval strength, since some leading figures in 
government, such as Carvajal, did not view the navy as a necessary instrument of 
policy.  As a result, periods of great investment in the navy, for example from 
1748 to 1754, were followed by periods of very little spending, such as that from 
1754 to 1759.  When there was little outlay on the navy, much of the institutional 
knowledge, infrastructure, personnel and provisioning systems which it had been 
                                                      
80 Lambert (2000) p.16 
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costly to invest in initially withered and any future efforts would have to begin 
afresh, in the same way as they had under Ensenada, following a previous half 
century of sporadic investment despite the best efforts of ministers such as José 
Patiño and José de Campillo y Cossío. 
In contrast to Ferdinand VI, as early as Charles III’s journey from Barcelona to 
Madrid on his arrival in Spain in 1759, it is possible to perceive how much more 
Charles III was personally interested in the Spanish navy than his predecessor had 
been.  The correspondence between Charles III’s favorite, the Marquis de 
Esquilache, and the Naval Minister, Julián de Arriaga, shows Charles enquiring 
into the condition of the fleet and expressing his wish that it be well-organised 
and fully-manned in the future81.  This meant that until 1788 there was a 
consistent era of support for the navy in Madrid.  Charles’ navy continued in the 
same reform pattern his half-brother, Ferdinand VI, and his father, Philip V, laid 
down.  Naval expansion continued with the construction of warships and 
infrastructure at the arsenals, legislation continued to regulate the management of 
its people and resources and to bring all operations relating to the navy fully under 
state control.  Even then, as Barbier and Klein’s studies on Charles’ Treasury 
indicate, though investment in the navy continued to grow during his reign, as 
happens with most navies, investment oscillated in consonance with the political 
and financial condition of the state82.  This type of fluctuation, however, differed 
from that in 1754 by question of degree in that it was neither so marked nor 
motivated by change of opinion in government over the importance of the navy. 
                                                      
81 AGS Marina 441, ‘Expediente’ with correspondence between Esquilache and Arriaga to 24 
November 1759 
82 Barbier and Klein (1981) and (1985) 
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This tentative analysis of the financing of the Spanish navy, therefore, illustrates 
that more was being spent on the navy during the especially active years of 
Ensenada’s naval expansion programme than in the proposals he had put to 
Ferdinand VI.  In 1753, Spain’s economic situation, made worse by a poor 
harvest, helped to turn public opinion, as reported by the British ambassador and 
consuls, against Ensenada’s naval projects, with these being perceived as being 
beyond the Peninsula’s capabilities to support.  The divisions that existed at Court 
over the use of the navy and its value, with Ensenada’s rival, Carvajal, perceiving 
Spanish diplomacy and not the navy as the determining factor in Spanish foreign 
policy meant that there was no coherent or accepted naval doctrine.  Instead, there 
were few interest groups at Court which would favour naval strength and there 
was an absence of the influence of the sea on Madrid or its culture.  As a result, 
investment in the navy depended entirely on the interest of the King, an interest 
which Ferdinand did not appear to have, or of a minister with the capability of 
implementing his ideas, such as Ensenada.  Without Ensenada, investment in the 
navy lost its significance and Arriaga had to enforce such cutbacks as the 
reduction of shipbuilding, personnel and domestic provisioning systems.  Though 
there are as yet no definitive figures to prove the extent of the cutbacks, there is 
no doubt that there was a marked difference in the manner in which the navy was 
run before and after July 1754 when Ensenada was ousted from government.  As a 
result the Spanish navy lacked the sustained political and financial support which 
many naval historians consider a prerequisite for an effective naval power. 
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CHAPTER 8.  Conclusions 
 
During the years 1739 to 1740, when Spain, without any allies, had pitted itself in 
war against Britain, it had managed to hold out but only with difficulty and with 
the likely prospect that it would have been defeated if France had not intervened.  
At the conclusion of the war in 1748, it was clear that Spain’s treasure-rich empire 
still remained of interest to other European powers, particularly the British and the 
French.  A new approach to foreign policy was, therefore, required and this was 
provided by an ad hoc mixture of ideas prevalent at the Spanish Court.  Ferdinand 
VI desired his reign to be one of peace and his leading ministers each followed 
their own line on how this could be achieved.  José de Carvajal, for example, 
preferred a diplomatic approach while the Marquis de la Ensenada sought to 
ensure Spain’s neutrality in the face of France and Britain through the use of its 
armed forces, primarily the navy.  Ensenada, with control of more government 
offices than his rival and a closer alliance with those who formed the King’s 
circle, namely Barbara of Braganza, the Queen, her favourite, the opera singer 
Carlos Broschi ‘Farinelli’, and Francisco de Rávago, Ferdinand’s confessor, had 
free rein to push through his scheme in which the Spanish navy was to play a 
central role.  In the following years, Spain invested heavily in the creation of a 
navy intended to counterbalance Britain’s naval superiority.  This way, so it was 
reasoned, both France and Britain would be willing to respect Spanish interests in 
return for either neutrality or an alliance in a future, anticipated war between 
France and Britain. 
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Ensenada, following in the footsteps of his predecessors, José Patiño and José del 
Campillo y Cossío, insisted on the need to improve the navy so as to make it 
adequate to the task it was to carry out.  This was to be achieved by expanding the 
navy through building more warships and developing naval infrastructures.  An 
additional aspect of this was modernisation, which he thought could be achieved 
by copying the best that leading, foreign navies had to offer, and the establishment 
of its organisation in such a way that the navy as an institution had efficient, 
domestic systems of recruitment and supply.   
As this thesis has demonstrated, these aims were achieved but with mixed results.  
At the end of Ferdinand’s reign the size of the navy, despite cuts after Ensenada’s 
fall, had more than doubled since 1748 and the arsenals, particularly those at 
Ferrol and Cartagena, were nearing completion with cutting-edge technology such 
as dry docks, stoving-ovens and masting-engines which resembled and had the 
potential to rival those of other European naval powers.   
In the process the Spanish government had to overcome one substantial, endemic 
problem – the shortage of resources and men.  Ensenada’s line on this was that by 
protecting the trades and the men who provided the navy with the materials and 
skilled workers it needed the government would ensure the survival within Spain 
of these trades and give the Spanish navy the potential to be self-sufficient – a 
state of affairs most beneficial during war when access to external markets was 
likely to be unavailable.  Thus, for instance, hemp planters were provided with a 
steady customer in the form of the navy with the certainty that the prices they set 
would be respected and the government attempted to meet the terms and 
conditions called for by those who were employed at the arsenals.   Though in 
many ways this facilitated the purchase of naval stores and the recruitment of 
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skilled labour it was also very costly and designed to have bigger pay offs in the 
future than in the immediate present.  It was also a system which needed to be 
sustained over generations in order to be effective and, as has been demonstrated, 
Spain did not have the political stability to carry this through.  Moreover, with 
regard to the workforce, the essentially rural nature of Spanish society meant that 
the workforce still required frequent leave of absence to attend to business at 
home and home was usually at some distance from the arsenals.  It also created 
fresh difficulties since different regional workforces enjoyed different rights in the 
arsenals which often resulted in acrimony between them.  The result, thus, was an 
improvement but not a wholly successful one. 
Similarly mixed results were achieved in the recruitment of men for naval service.  
The Matrícula de Mar had the advantage of creating a quantifiable list of the men 
that were available to the navy so that the government could organise its fleets 
more efficiently.  By offering men who signed up certain protections and 
privileges, the system also encouraged men to enlist.  This, however, did not 
translate into the creation of a well-trained reserve of mariners willing to carry out 
naval service when it was required of them.  Registered men frequently deserted 
when called to service and the register continued to be too small to man Spanish 
fleets without resorting to further extraordinary measures.  Furthermore, the 
system of the register itself made it impossible to ensure the quality of ships’ 
crews since these, being formed principally of registered men, had such a quick 
turnover that men did not become fully adapted to naval service and crews did not 
have the opportunity to gel into efficient teams.  There was also the additional 
drawback that the rights and privileges given registered men antagonised coastal 
populations and their civilian authorities resulting in frequent outbreaks of 
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violence which placed a further strain on resources since these disturbances had to 
be dealt with.  
The most striking feature of Ensenada’s scheme was the speed with which naval 
expansion was carried out.  This was in part made necessary by the need for the 
Spanish navy to fulfil its foreign policy objectives quickly (especially considering 
that hostilities between France and Britain erupted as early as 1754) but it had 
many negative repercussions on the development of the Spanish navy, most 
significantly on the ships built at this time since an entirely new system of 
construction was hurried into existence.  As a result a large number of ships were 
built to new designs by foreign shipwrights unaccustomed to the domestic 
materials they were employing.  The introduction of a la inglesa shipbuilding was 
carried out in such a way that instead of gradually ironing out over time the 
difficulties which were bound to arise from the creation of a new construction 
style, 36 battleships and 16 frigates were built in eight years without addressing 
the fact that British-warship design relied on using dry-seasoned timber when 
Spanish seasoning practices which were continued throughout this period did not 
season timber dry, instead preferring to season in salt-water ponds or beaches.  
This resulted in the construction of warships with a major design flaw and led to 
much waste of finite resources such as timber.   
The vigour with which the naval programme was pursued, seemingly without 
regard to expense, contributed to an increasing dissatisfaction with Ensenada 
paving the way to his eventual removal from power.  After his exile, the navy was 
subjected to a period of frugality that contrasted with the largesse of Ensenada’s 
time and resulted in many of the projects initiated under him being abandoned.  
Naval construction was wound down and much of the workforce dismissed, 
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domestic producers of naval materials were no longer guaranteed a client if a 
cheaper, foreign alternative was at hand and experimentation with new ideas and 
technologies ceased for lack of funds.  This volte-face illustrated how much the 
Spanish navy depended for investment on a minister such as Ensenada taking an 
interest in it and the fact that without that the navy could suddenly find itself 
without adequate political support was very damaging to its development.  In the 
end, the navy was not a core interest, or a cultural concern, for Spain and, as a 
result, much as the Russian navy disintegrated without the figurehead of Peter the 
Great to ensure its survival following his death, the Spanish navy could 
deteriorate without a minister like Ensenada.  By contrast, Spain’s most 
challenging maritime rival, Britain, had a firmly established maritime culture, 
encompassing literature, painting and music that with patriotic anthems, such as 
‘Rule Britannia’ – set to music by Thomas Arne in 1740 – tied Britain’s survival 
and prosperity to the success of the Royal Navy.  There was no equivalent to this 
in Spain. 
The naval reforms carried out during Ferdinand’s reign, therefore, were only 
partially successful and many debilitating characteristics of Spanish society and 
its naval organisation that prevented it capitalising on its already scanty resources 
remained in place.   
Despite these difficulties and limitations the navy could have been more effective 
in achieving its foreign policy objectives if the government and its commanders 
had demonstrated a greater understanding of the potential of sea power.  This, 
Ensenada’s reforms did nothing to address because his ideas, the natural offspring 
of a career in naval administration, were the product of the institution in which he 
had been formed and the navy had yet to understand that a high level of 
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aggression among its senior command was more important than ship numbers.  As 
Glete argued the Bourbon powers had no hope of competing successfully in an 
arms race with a financially strong British state1.  The figures he provides further 
prove this demonstrating that the British navy could raise its already superior 
numbers in 1755 of 277 ships to 375 during war time in 1760.  In contrast, the 
French navy went from having 162 ships in 1755 to 156 in 1760 and the Spanish 
from 113 in 1755 to 137 in 17602.  For this reason, Glete also argues that French 
and Spanish commanders were right to think twice before engaging British fleets 
as any material losses inflicted on the British could easily be made good by the 
British state3.  Even so, in setting up the Spanish fleet as a force capable of 
deciding the balance of power in a conflict between France and Britain the 
Spanish navy could only achieve limited results as a ‘fleet in being’ and needed to 
act more aggressively as a battlefleet if it wished the British and French 
governments to accord it greater recognition.  But it lacked the core fighting spirit 
needed to generate mitigating aggression and victory, a fact corroborated if by 
nothing else by the fact that they were building smaller battleships and lacked the 
larger ships of the line needed to defeat their British equivalents, such as the 100 
gun Royal Sovereign, Victory, Royal George and Britannia, in battle.  Instead, 
Spanish commanders lacked governmental and institutional backing to defend the 
neutrality of Spanish waters during the Seven Years’ War and, even in the conflict 
against North African privateers, commanders were required to be careful with 
their ships and not to confront potentially superior forces.  In war, commanders 
were equally cautious preferring, as in the case of Havana in 1762, to operate 
                                                      
1 Glete (1993), vol.I, p.293 
2 Ibid. p.263 
3 Ibid. p.293 
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within the city’s waters to contribute to its defence.  Whereas Transporte’s actions 
in Havana could be institutionally tolerated, therefore, riskier moves, such as, for 
example, Sir Edward Hawke’s attack on Marshal Conflans’ fleet in Quiberon Bay 
in 1759, Admiral Howe’s tactics at the Glorious First of June in 1794 or Nelson’s 
attack on the French Fleet at the Battle of the Nile in 1798, would not have been 
acceptable to Spain.  The principal role of naval strength was perceived as that of 
providing escort for convoys and transport for Crown property and ships were 
regarded essentially as floating fortresses during conflict.   Thus, actual naval 
battle was perceived as a last resort and other aspects of naval strength, such as for 
instance its ability to become an unpredictable, moveable and easily concealed 
threat to the enemy or as a system of observation and control through the 
stationing of ships and frigates in loose formation were never employed.  
Ultimately, it was this lack of a cogent strategic vision and aggressive fighting 
spirit, which this thesis has highlighted as being an institutional characteristic of 
the Spanish navy during Ferdinand VI’s reign, that prevented it from being a fully 







APPENDIX 1.  Summary of an Account Written by Ulloa before he 
Left Paris for the Netherlands Listing All His Reports, AGS Marina 
712, No. 756i 
 Report on: Date posted: 
   
1. Fortifications, Maps and Topography Office at 
Versailles 
16 February 1750 
2. Navy Office in Paris 16 February 1750 
   
3. Port of Sète 20 March 1750 
4. Roads and countryside between Bellegarde and 
Narbonne 
20 March 1750 
5.  Marseille 20 March 1750 
6.  A machine for boring cannon 20 March 1750 
7. On the Inspector General of Manufactures, Arts and 
Trades 
20 March 1750 
8. Toulon; its arsenal and port 20 March 1750 
   
9. On the Inspector General of the Departments of France 8 March 1750 
10. Perpignan 8 March 1750 
11. Fortress at Bellegarde 8 March 1750 
   
12. Hôtes-Dieu de Lyon 6 April 1750 
13. Charity Hospital in Lyon 6 April 1750 
14.  Castelnaudary and system of measuring grain 6 April 1750 
15. Clockwork and its advances in Paris 6 April 1750 
16. Carcassonne and its cloth manufacturing industry 6 April 1750 
17.  On methods of oil production in Provence 6 April 1750 
   
18. On the ships in the French navy 20 September 1750 
19. Port of Le Havre 20 September 1750 
   
20.  On timber and timber seasoning for shipbuilding in 
France 
21 September 1750 
21. On the use of forced labour in France 21 September 1750 
   
22. On sailcloth production in France 2 September 1750 
23. On rope production in France 2 September 1750 
   
24. Brest, its arsenal and port 28 September 1750 
   
25. Rochefort and a method of salting meat without drying 
it 
7 October 1750 
26. [Ship] Construction practiced in France 7 October 1750 
   
27. Dieppe 21 October 1750 
28. L’Orient; Indies Company; its arsenal and port 21 October 1750 
29. Port Louis 21 October 1750 
   
30. Saint-Malo 2 December 1750 
31. Rouen; its manufactures, markets and fairs 2 December 1750 
   
32. Method of cleaning Paris and system which could be 
practiced in Madrid 
6 December 1750 
   
33. Port of Nantes, its river and commerce 16 December 1750 
   
34. La Rochelle; its port and commerce 26 December 1750 
   
35. Land transport in France; note on the mercury mines in 
Germany 
17 January 1751 
   
36. Water transport in France 18 January 1751 
   
37. Silk, gold and silver manufactures in Lyon 12 February 1751 
   
38. Carriages and stage coaches in France 2 February 1751 
39. Inns in France 2 February 1751 
 
                                                       
i A large proportion of Ulloa’s reports can be found in AGS Marina 712 but there are also 
several in the files on Arsenals and Arsenal Personnel. 
 APPENDIX 2.  Books sent by Ulloa from Paris on 10 April 1750, 
AGS Marina 712, No. 756 
As Ulloa did not transcribe the titles or give indications of place and date of 
publication, it is impossible to determine with all certainty which specific works these 
were, so the contents of each chest are here transcribed directly from Ulloa’s list to 
give an indication of his purchases. 
Chest 1: 
Athlas de Francia, en gran folio, 1 vol. 
… de la Alemania y la Italia, 1 vol. 
… de los Paises Vajos, 1 vol. 
*Traite de la Police de París, en folio, un exemplar, 4 vols. 
Mathemáticas Element, au 12, 2 vols. 
A Complet Sisteme of Astronomie, 12[mo], 2 vols. 
An introduction to the True Astronomie, 12[mo], 1 vol. 
Le voyage du Maracion in 12, 1 vol. 
+Planos de Puertos y Plazas en folio 2 exemplares, 2 vols. 
=Theatro de la Guerra en Italia, 4[to], 1 vol. 
=El Ducado de Brabante, 4[to], 1 vol. 
=Puertos del Mediterraneo, 4[to], 1 vol. 
=Routier des costes occidentales, 4[to], 1 vol. 
=Statutos del hospital de Lyon y lista de sus rectores, 4[to], 2 vols. 
El Espectator, 12[mo], 8 vols. 
Aplicación del Algebra a la Geometria, 4[to], 1 vol. 
Codo de Leyes antiguas, folio, 1 vol. 
Patarol opera omnia, 4[to], 2 vols. 
Eubres de Mr Mariot, 4[to], 2 vols. 
La banque redue facile, 4[to], 1 vol. 
L’Art de dresser les compres des banquiers negotiens, 4[to], 1 vol. 
La Guide des negotiens, 4[to], 1 vol. 
Quadernos sobre varios asumptos, 6 vols. 
L’etat de la France en 12[mo], un exemplar, 6 vols. 
Sisteme of Natural Philosophie, 8[vo], 2 vols. 
Lectures in Natural Philosophie, 8[vo], 1 vol. 
*Edictos de la Republica de Geneve, 8[vo], 1 vol. 
+Estado alfabetico de la Borgogne, 12[mo], tres exemplares, 3 vols. 
[Key: * means for Ensenada; + means there are more than one copy and one of them 
is for Ensenada; = means they have been sent separately]. 
Chest 2: 
Decretos y ordenanzas de Paris sobre distintas materias: milicia desde 1726 hasta 
1799 en 4[to], 1 vol. 
Pagamento de las tropas desde 1740 hasta 1749, 4[to], 2 vols. 
Cavallería desde 1740 hasta 1749, en 4[to], 1 vol. 
Marina desde 1740 hasta 1749, en 4[to], 1 vol. 
Infantería, ydem, 2 vols. 
Derechos de entrada y de salida de mercancias, ydem, 1 vol. 
 Derechos de entrada y salida de víveres, 1 vol. 
Manifacturas lo concerniente a ellas, 2 vols. 
Tratados de Paz desde 1739, hasta 1749, en 4[to] brochure, 1 vol. 
Inválidos de la Armada de tierra desde 1674 hasta 1750, 1 vol. 
Inválidos de Marina desde 1709 hasta 1750, 1 vol. 
Hospitales militares desde 1716 hasta 1747, 1 vol. 
Artillería desde 1723 hasta 1749, 1 vol. 
[All for Ensenada.] 
Chest 3: 
Historia de Geneve en 12[mo] un exemplar, 4 vols. 
Memorial de País en 12[mo] un exemplar, 2 vols. 
Entretenimientos Philosóphicos de Teliamed, en 12[mo], 1 vol. 
Las delicias de Italia en 16[mo], 4 vols. 
Historia de medallas en 16[mo], 2 vols. 
Obrage Chronologique de l’Histoire de France en 12[mo], 2 vols. 
Letres Peruvienes, 1 vol. 
Manual de Postas, 1 vol. 
Discionario geográphico portatil en 8[vo], 1 vol. 
Consideraciones sobre el comercio de Inglaterra 12[mo], 1 vol. 
Antiguedades de Hismes, 1 vol. 
*Reglamento de la mediacion de Geneve, 1 vol. 
2+ Athlas de Belin en gran folio 5 exemplares, 5 vols. 
2+ Le Neptune Oriental 3 exemplares, 3 vols. 
Colección de planos de ciudades y fortalezas, 1 vol. 
[Key: * means for Ensenada; + more than one copy and one of them for Ensenada 
and the other for Cadiz.] 
Sent separately: 
Exemplares de las cartas marítimas de Brokenear. 
Estatutos del Hospital de la Caridad de Lyon, 2 exemplares que son 4 vol sin contar 
el de los 3 cajones. 
Exemplares de mapas topográphicos del condado de Haneu[?] uno para SM otro para 
Sr Marqués y el 3ro para el Sr Delgado. 
Memoria sobre el pubogero[?] de las figuras Felipe sentences[?], 5 de marzo de 1750. 
Ordenanzas de Marina; y discursos sobre la Marina. 
Plano de Marseille, de Cete: y 2 exemplares desde París. 
Codo Rural; abregee militair. 
Memoria sobre el hospital general de Monpelier. 
Tratado de las tinturas de lana: Hellot. 
Recuiell de planos con 54 cartas cada uno; los dos para el Sr Marqués; el uno para mi. 
Sobre el méthodo de levantar las cartas topographicas, 15 Noviembre 1750?. 
Abrege methodique sur la jurisprudence des eaux et forets. 
Nouvele instruccion pur les gardes de eaux et forets, peche, et chase. 
Dictionair des chases. 
Reglamento de la Universidad de Caen. 
Reglamento sobre la ley del oro y plata. 
APPENDIX 3.1.  British Master Shipwrights in Spain1 
No. Department Name Position Annual Salary 
(vellon reals and 
maravedis) 







1 Ferrol Richard 
Rooth 
Master 
Shipwright and Capitan 
de Maestranza 
56,891.10 Catholic 1749–61 Deceased Juan 




Teniente de Maestranza 
40,080 Catholic 1749–67 Deceased Juan 
















Teniente de Maestranza 





Almon Hill Chief Draughtsman of 
the Navy, 
Shipbuilding instructor 





1 Compiled from AGS Marina 233 and 240.  Their positions and salaries are as assigned by their official patents issued following the Council of Constructors held in Madrid 
in 1752. 
!APPENDIX 3.2.  Others Recruited Directly by Jorge Juan1 
No. Department Name Position Annual salary 
(vellon reals and 
maravedis) 





        
6 Ferrol Thomas Hewett Assistant Shipwright 18,000 Catholic? 1749–61 Deceased 
7 Ferrol John Harris Assistant 
Shipwright 




James Pepper Master 
Joiner 
18,000 Catholic? 1749–? Still in 
Cartagena in 
1768 
9 Ferrol James Hewett Apprentice > Shipwright 6,776.16  1749–54?  
10 Ferrol James Lynch Apprentice > Shipwright 6,776.16  1749–54?  
11 Ferrol George McDonald Apprentice > 
Blockmaker 
  1750–54?  
12 Ferrol Joseph Archdeacon Apprencite > 
Blockmaker 
4,320  1750–66?  
13 Ferrol Walter Commons Apprentice > Joiner 5,624 (1758) 
6,296 (1765) 
Catholic? 1750–65?  
 
14 Ferrol (Sada) Patrick Lahey Master 
Sailmaker 
13,552.32 Catholic 1749–? Described as 
very elderly in 
1764 
15 Ferrol (Sada) James Cunningham Assistant Sailmaker 3,600  1749–62?  
16 Ferrol (Sada) Edmund Knight Assistant Sailmaker   1749–50?  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!Compiled from AGS Marina 233 and 234.  > indicates that promotion or increase in salary.!
!17 Ferrol (Sada) Henry Sawyers Master 
Ropemaker 
  1749–50 Deceased 
18 Ferrol (Sada), 
Cartagena 
William Clark Assistant 
Ropemaker 




19 Cartagena William Richards Master Joiner > Assistant 
Shipwright 
 Protestant > 
Catholic 
1750–55 Deceased 
20 Cartagena Stephen Richards Assistant 
Joiner > Master Joiner 






Richard Reynolds Apprentice > Assistant 
Shipwright 
 Protestant 1752?–62?  
 
!APPENDIX 3.3.  British Subjects Employed at the Arsenals following Jorge Juan’s Return1 

































18,000   ?–?  Morgan 
24 Ferrol Thomas 
Brown 
Shipwright  9  1754?–?   
25 Ferrol Francisco 
Everett 
Shipwright  6>8  ?–62 Left Spain Hugh 
Everett’s 
son 
26 Ferrol John Wilks Shipwright  8  1754–58?   
27 Ferrol? Patrick 
Hewett 
Shipwright  14    T. Hewett 




   1750–?  Rooth 
29 Ferrol Thomas 
Boswill 
Joiner 6,752  Protestant 1752–? Still there 
1765 
Pepper 
30 Ferrol Richard Joiner  15  ?–? Still there in  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!Compiled from AGS Marina 233 to 240.  > indicates a promotion or increase in salary or wage.!
!Bradi 1758 
31 Ferrol, Cadiz James 
Shannon 
Joiner  15  ?–54 Dismissed  
32 Ferrol John 
Statford 
Joiner  15  1754?–58 Arrested  













9,000   1752–56 Deceased Rooth 
35 Ferrol Hugh 
Everett 
?    ?–58? Deceased Rooth 
36 Ferrol Nicholas 
Owen 
Sawyer  11  1754?–? Still there 
1766 
 




 16  1754?   
38 Ferrol Balthasar 
Parel 
Blacksmith  7  1754?   
 







































12,000   1752–57, 
1758–? 
Still there in 
1768 
Shaw 
44 Cadiz Thomas 
Conne 
Shipwright      Mullins 
45 Cadiz William 
Faullert 
Shipwright   Catholic ?,1757–?  Mullins 
46 Cadiz John Moren Shipwright  12 Catholic ?–62 Dismissed Mullins’ 
apprentice 
47 Cadiz Michael 
Layons 




















50 Cadiz John Brown Apprentice > 
Shipwright 
 12  ?–62 Dismissed Mullins’ 
apprentice 


















53 Cadiz Richard 
Yons 
Apprentice  8  ?–62 Dismissed Mullins’ 
apprentice 
54 Cadiz Robert 
Fowley 
Apprentice      Loughnan’s 
apprentice 
55 Cadiz Edward 
Duff 





Joiner >  
Master Joiner 






Joiner 5,421   1752–54 Dismissed Howell 
58 Cadiz Joseph 
Archibould 
Joiner 5,400   1753–54 Dismissed  
59 Cadiz, Ferrol John Evans Joiner  15  1752–54?  Shaw 
60 Cadiz, Ferrol Michael 
Gorman 
Joiner  15  1752–64 Dismissed Shaw 
61 Cadiz John 
Cannon 
Joiner   Catholic 1751–62 Dismissed  
62 Cadiz John Cooke Joiner 5,421   1751–?  Mullins 
63 Cadiz John 
Macabe 
Joiner 5,421   1752–?   












5,421.6   1752–? Still there in 
1764 
Stuart 
!66 Cadiz Edward 
Whelan 
Rigger 5,421   1751–55 Dismissed Mullins 
67 Cadiz William 
Fowler 
Rigger    1751–54 Dismissed Stuart 




   1751–52 Deceased Mullins 






5,421.6   1751–65 Deceased Mullins, 
Stuart 
70 Cadiz James 
Baxter 
Sawyer 9,035   1752–54 Dismissed Mullins, 
Stuart 
71 Cadiz Thomas 
Price 
Sawyer 4,517.22 (2nd) 13 (1st) Catholic 1752?–1762 Dismissed Mullins? 
72 Cadiz, Ferrol James 
Muguer 




Sawyer 4,518   1752–54 Dismissed  





7,228   1753–54 Dismissed Mullins 





   1753–56 Dismissed Mullins 




5,270   ?–54 Dismissed Mullins 




   1753–55 Dismissed Mullins 
!78 Cadiz David 
Davis 
   Protestant 
> Catholic 
1758   
79 Cadiz John Sears Quarterman    1752–56 Dismissed Stuart 
80 Cadiz John Wall     1757–?   
81 Cadiz … Jeremiah  5,270   1752–?   
82 Cadiz Samuel 
Merzer 
      Deserter 
from 
Gibraltar 
83 Cadiz Thomas 
Priels 
 4,517.22   1752–62 Dismissed  
 







  1766–?   












13,240.32  Protestant  Still there in 
1768 
 
87 Guarnizo William 
Barnidell 
Shipwright       
88 Guarnizo John Joseph 
Panel 
Shipwright  12 ?> 
Catholic 
?–62 Dismissed  




10,800   ?–56 Dismissed Rooth and 
Morris 
 !
 APPENDIX 4.  Navy Ships Built from 1749 to 1759i: 
No. Ship Guns Department built Launched In Service until Cause for de-commissioning 
1 Fernando 70 Ferrol 8 Sept 1751 1760 Wrecked off Málaga 
2 Asia 70 Ferrol 17 Mar 1752 1762 Sunk in entrance to Havana Bay 
3 Oriente 68 Ferrol 15 Aug 1752 1806 De-commissioned in Ferrol 
4 Eolo 68 Ferrol 28 Aug 1752 1763 De-commissioned 
5 Aquilón 68 Ferrol 10 Mar 1754 1762 Captured in Havana by the British 
6 Neptuno 68 Ferrol 6 Jul 1754 1762 Sunk in entrance to Havana Bay 
7 Brillante 68 Ferrol 20 Aug 1754 1790 Burnt in careening accident 
8 Gallardo 68 Ferrol 18 Oct 1754 1797 Captured by the British in Trinidad 
9 Magnanimo 68 Ferrol 30 Nov 1754 11 Jul 1794 Wrecked off Sisargas, Galicia 
10 Vencedor 68 Ferrol 11 Jan 1755 1810 Broken up in Cartagena 
11 Glorioso 68 Ferrol 19 Jan 1755 1815 Broken up in Cartagena 
12 Guerrero 68 Ferrol 27 Mar 1755 1850 De-commissioned 
13 Soberano 68 Ferrol 9 Aug 1755 1762 Captured by the British in Havana 
Bay 
14 Héctor 68 Ferrol 22 Sept 1755 ? ? 
15 Triunfante 68 Ferrol 1 Feb 1756 1795 Wrecked on coast of Rosas 
16 Dichoso 68 Ferrol 18 Mar 1756 8 Mar 1784 Wrecked on Cuban coast 
17 Monarca 68 Ferrol 13 June 1756 1780 Captured by the British 
18 Diligente 68 Ferrol 25 Sept 1756 1780 Captured by the British 
19 Campeón 58 Ferrol 27 Jan 1758 1778 Converted into a hulk 
 
20 África 70 Cadiz 20 Nov 1752 1809 Broken up 
21 Firme 68? Cadiz 22 Jun 1754 1805 Captured in Calder’s Action 
22 Aquiles 68 Cadiz 5 Sept 1754 1790 Broken up in Cartagena 
23 España 68? Cadiz 1 Jun 1757* 1807 De-commissioned 
24 Conquistador 58 Cadiz 29 Jul 1758 1762 Captured in Havana by the British 
  
25 Septentrión 70 Cartagena 26 Dec 1751 1784 Wrecked 
26 Tridente 58 Cartagena 15 Jul 1754 1771 De-commissioned 
27 Terrible 58? Cartagena 10 Nov 1754 1811 Converted into floating battery in 
Cadiz 
28 Atlante 58? Cartagena 21 Dec 1754 1817 Broken up 
 
29 Arrogante 68/70 Guarnizo 1753 1797 Burnt to prevent capture in 
Chaguaramas 
30 Poderoso 68/70 Guarnizo 1753 27 Aug 1779 Wrecked and burnt 
31 Serio 68/70 Guarnizo 1753 1805 Broken up 
32 Soberbio 68/70 Guarnizo 1753 1764 De-commissioned 
33 Contento 68/70 Guarnizo 1756 1760 De-commissioned 
34 Hércules 68/70 Guarnizo 1756 1780 Broken up 
35 Príncipe 68/70 Guarnizo 1759* 1774 Out of service and hull sold 1776 
36 Victorioso 68/70 Guarnizo 1759? 1776 Broken up 
 
37 Astuto 58 Havana 10 Apr 1759 1810 Broken up 
 
Frigates 
38 Galga 20 Ferrol 1 Mar 1752   
 
39 Aguila 22? Cadiz 25 Aug 1753   
40 Victoria 26? Cadiz 26 Aug 1753   
41 Flecha 26? Cadiz 28 Oct 1753   
42 Hermiona 26? Cadiz 24 Nov 1753   
43 Venganza 20 Cadiz 1753   
44 Industria 26 Cadiz 26 Jun 1755   
45 Liebre 26 Cadiz 26 Jul 1755   
 46 Venus 26 Cadiz 6 Aug 1755   
47 Ventura 26 Cadiz 21 Oct 1755   
 
48 Perla 22 Cartagena 14 Feb 1753   
49 Dorada 22 Cartagena 15 Feb 1753   
50 Esmeralda 22 Cartagena 12 May 1753   
51 Juno 32? Cartagena 30 Aug 1755   
52 Palas 26 Cartagena 29 Nov 1755   
53 Astrea 26 Cartagena 29 Mar 1756   
 
Javeques 
54 Andaluz 30 Cadiz 4 Aug 1759   
       
55 Aventurero 30 Cartagena 12 May 1753   
       
 
                                                       
i Information on ship’s names, guns, department and date of launching is compiled from AGS Marina 320–329 except where marked * which 
comes from Harbron (1988), pp.164–73, and the website www.todoababor.es along with information on dates and cause for de-commissioning. 
  
APPENDIX 5.  Spanish Warships Seized by the British Compared with Established Dimensions for a 70-gun Ship of 
the 1745 Establishment in British feet and inchesi: highlighted in bold are the key measurements of length, breadth, 
depth and burthen 






















Length by the keel for 
tonnage 
131.4 143.6  143.4  145.8!  147.7 128.6 132.2 131.8!  144.6 
On the gun deck 
from the rabbet of 
the stern to the 
rabbet of the post 
160 175.3 175 174.10!  175.1 155.9 159.6 173.2 178.10"  
Breadth, extreme 45 49.7#  49.7 49.11#  49.10#  43.3 44.6 48.7 52.11"  
At the aftermost part 
of the main or wing 
transom, from out to 
outside of the plank 
27.6 31.4 31.6    28.0 32.7  
At the toptimber from 
out to outside of the 
plank:  
         
Afore 27.6 31.4 31.0    27.0 34.6  
Midships 33.9 37.0 38.4    35.0 37.2  
Abaft 42.8 34.7 22.11    23.10 26.3  
Heights:          
  
Of the cutting down 
in the midships above 
the keel 
1.6 1.11 1.9    2.0 2.3!   
Of the toptimber line 
or upper edge of the 
waist rail above the 
upper edge of the 
main keel: 
         
Afore 36.7 39.4 40.1    36.7 40.1!   
Midships 34.0 37.9 38.2    36.9 39.0  
Abaft 42.8 44.6 45.7!     42.0 45.3  
Rising of the midship 
flat 
0.5!  0.5!  0.5    0.11? 1.3  
Depth in the hold, 
taken from the 
strake next the 
limberboards: 
19.4 20.5#  21.0 20.8 20.6#  19.3 20.0 22.1 22.1"  
Strake next the 
limberboards: 
         
Thick 0.7!  0.7 0.6"     0.5!  0.6  
Broad 1.2!  1.2 1.4     1.0  
 
Burthen in tuns 1,414   1,880  1,875   1,934  1,952   1,278  1392.  1,653  
 
                                                
i This is only a comparison of some of the ships of various gun ratings captured by the British and compared against the 1745 Establishment.  They are 
generally a la inglesa ships, except the Reyna and Fénix (Gibraltar) which are put in to demonstrate the contrast with previous Spanish proportions.    The 
  
                                                
reason only these have been included is that they have been measured in the same way and with the same measurements as those dictated by the 1745 
Establishment. 
ii Lavery, The Ship of the Line vol. I, pp. 202–205, from Kew Adm 95/12 
iii Kew Adm 49/90 
iv Kew Adm 49/90 
v Winfield, British Warships in the Age of Sail, 1714–1792 pp. 86–7 
vi Winfield, British Warships in the Age of Sail, 1714–1792 p. 87 
vii Winfield, British Warships in the Age of Sail, 1714–1792 p. 134 
viii Kew Adm 49/90 
ix Kew Adm 49/90 
x Winfield, British Warships in the Age of Sail, 1714–1792 p. 37 
APPENDIX 6.  Measurements of 58-gun Campeón, Tridente and Conquistador, in Spanish codos and Englsih feet and 
inches1 
 
 Spanish feet and inches English feet and inches 
 Campeón Tridente Conquistador (codos) Campeón Tridente Conquistador 
Keel 141.5 138.3 69 135  132 
Length 161.4 161.2 81 154  155 
Breadth, from 
within the inside of 
the plank 
40.10 41 20.9!  39  39 
Breadth, extreme 45 45 22.11  43  43 
Height 19.4!  21.1 11.9 18.6  21.6 
 
                                                
1 AGS Marina 328, Arriaga to Gerbaut and Barrero, Madrid, 26 September 1758; Barrero to Arriaga, Cartagena, 11 October 1758; Gerbaut to Arriaga, Cadiz, 
9 October 1758 
 APPENDIX 7.  Captains’ Experiences of Commanding a la inglesa 
ships, 1758, all in AGS Marina 330 
 
1. Francisco Xavier Tilly, dated Cartagena, 10 November 1758, on command of 
Vencedor, Septentrión and Tridente: 
He thought the ships were, on the whole, very sturdy, seaworthy, stable, well-
proportioned and easy on their masts and rigging.  They were of average speed and 
handling.  Unfortunately, their rudders were excessively large, they needed larger 
waterways to support the decks and fewer treenails. 
 
2. Juan Antonio de la Colina, dated on board Triumfante, Cartagena, 24 
November 1758, on command of frigate Venganza and ships Firme, Contento 
and Triumfante: 
The Venganza took on excess water because her caulking fell out but ‘I have not 
forgotten her resilience, settled masts and that she defended herself powerfully at 
sea’1. 
The Firme was very strong but pitched too much and, although her rudder had at first 
been too large, Autrán had reduced it at La Carraca. 
The Contento had similar qualities to the Firme. 
 
3. Juan Ponce de León, dated on board Juno, Cartagena, 29 November 1758, on 
command of frigates Aguila, Industria, Liebre, Astrea and Juno: 
All these frigates had more or less the same speeds.  Their handling could not be 
better but they were too slow which, he assumed, resulted from them having an 
excess of iron bolts. 
 
4. Carlos de la Villa, Cartagena, 27 November 1758, on command of ship 
Hércules and frigates Juno and Astrea: 
The Hércules handled well, bore off easily, pitched comfortably and had an average, 
soft roll.  She did not struggle with her masts or rigging, tacked easily and took her 
sail well. 
Juno was resilient, took her sail comfortably, handled well and bore off and steered 
close to the wind easily.  She did not struggle with her masts or rigging but she rolled 
a little too slowly (with ‘descanso’). 
The Astrea’s properties were similar to those of the Juno. 
                                                       
1 ‘no se me ha olvidado su valentía en el aguante, descansada con su arboladura y que se 
defendía poderosamente del mar’ 
 In his opinion, the problem with the ships was the manner in which they were put 
together as ‘the strength of Spanish oak does not allow for treenails and only iron can 
join and hold it together’2. 
 
5. Joseph Ponze de León y de la Cueva, dated Cartagena, 5 November 1758, on 
command of frigate Astrea: 
In the entire time he had been at sea, she had been the ‘only one he has found that has 
always responded powerfully when at sea, strong in taking her sails, peaceful in her 
rolling and soft in her pitching, with the advantage that her masts and rigging 
consequently struggled less’3.  Her interior was spacious, lacking the defect, present 
in the ships constructed in the previous style, of not being able to carry the necessary 
quantities of gunpowder, supplies, victuals and water.  The cabin divisions in the 
lower gallery were difficult to remove and impossible to put back so he suggested 
replacing them with canvas divisions.  Sails, rigging and masts were good though he 
did not understand why the latter were bolted to their base as this made them difficult 
to replace.  Her cojas were made from one piece rather than two as in the past and 
this made them more difficult to carry.  The timber of her yards was not very good 
and some of the iron fittings in the rigging were poor quality.  She was not 
particularly fast and her rudder was too big.   
The defects noticed by others relating to these ships have not been found with this 
frigate.  Whether this was a result of Astrea having been more thoroughly bolted, or 
because she was made out of sufficient good timber, or because her first deck was 
only being used to accommodate the crew and not artillery, he did not think she 
needed strengthened waterways or any other reinforcements. 
He had noticed that these ships required more maintenance than those in the past. 
 
6. Manuel de Bustamante, Cartagena, 18 November 1758, as second in 
command of Tridente in the past: 
He had only sailed briefly as second in command of this ship but he wrote a report on 
all the ships generally reiterating the common complaints that they lacked iron 
instead of treenails, smaller rudders, etc. 
                                                       
2 ‘la brabura del roble de nuestra España no permite para su travajón cavillería de madera y 
sólo puede hacer ligar y unir de fierro’ 
3 ‘única que he hallado siempre poderosa a la mar, fuerte para la vela, descansada en los 
valanzes y suabe en las cavezadas, de que resulta el beneficio de travajar menos sus palos y 
jarcia’ 
  
7. Isidoro Garcia del Postigo, Cartagena, 12 November 1758, on command of 
Triunfante, Soberano and Tridente: 
On the whole, he thought them very steady, sturdy in holding their sails, without 
struggling with their masts and rigging and good to handle.  Their batteries, however, 
were too curved.   
The Triunfante had been bolted with iron so she was sufficiently strengthened and did 
not require larger waterways.  The Soberano had all the good qualities listed above 
and more.  When he fought in her against an Algerine flagship, she did not lose her 
caulking anywhere nor did her timbers shift when her cannon were fired and she was 
fast, being capable of keeping up with the Rayo, univerally acknowledged as a fast 
ship, with less sail.   
The Tridente constantly needed her caulking replaced due to the poor quality of the 
treenails and, as a result, she was very slow. 
 
8. Juan Francisco de Garganta, Graña, 29 October 1758, on command of 
Neptuno: 
She had avarage properties and many defects.  Her gunports were too big, scuppers 
too small, cabin divisions in the lower gallery useless and she needed to have been 
put together with iron as ships had been in the past.  The English pumps were useless. 
 
9. Juan de las Llanas, on board Palas, Ferrol, 4 November 1758, on command of 
frigates Esmeralda, Liebre and Palas: 
The Esmeralda was slow and difficult to manoeuvre.  Her constructution was average 
though she did not pitch violently nor struggle with her masts and rigging.  The 
cannon in her waist made them impossible to fire as they were obstructed by the 
galley and some cables. 
The Liebre was of average speed, stern heavy and resilient.  Her rudder was difficult 
in heavy seas but otherwise she was fairly good. 
 
10. Antonio Joseph de la Posada, Ferrol, 5 November 1758, on command of 
frigate Dorada: 
She was of average speed.  She did not struggle with her masts and rigging.  Her fore 
and mizzen masts struggled a bit but not her main mast.  She pitched very gently but 
rolled quite forcefully.  He thought the reason she rolled so much was because her 
gun battery was too high and her cannon too long.  She was quick when bearing off 
but slow when sailing close to the wind.  The English pumps, when used properly, 
were very valuable.  She needed protection for the cables on her ballast as these had 
become too damp.  She needed a greater proportion of iron in her freeboard as her 
timbers had dried too much to be able hold the treenails, a characteristic he had also 
 noticed on the Perla, Venganza, Tridente and Brillante.  The timber parts of her 
structure had not been sawn very well and the iron she had was of poor quality. 
 
11. Pedro Pablo Arrigoni, Cartagena, 3 November 1758, on command of the 
Héctor: 
He wrote a very brief report noting he had only sailed in her for 30 days but found her 
to have all the qualities to be desired in a warship. 
 
12. Luis de Córdova, dated Ferrol, 8 November 1758, on command of Asia, 
Fernando, Héctor, Gallardo and the frigate Victoria: 
They were very steady, pitched and rolled gently, did not struggle with their masts or 
rigging, held their sail without difficulty, handled well and were of average speed.  
They all suffered, however, from their caulking falling out so they tended to take on 
too much water.  He recommended they should be bolted with iron as ships had been 
in the past. 
 
13. Joseph de San Vicente, Ferrol, 30 October 1758, on command of Campeón: 
She could take very little sail and was top-heavy.  She pitched too much when close-
hauled which he attributed to her centre of gravity being too high.  His explanation 
for why she was so temperamental was that her gundeck was too high and her timbers 
there too thick.  The latter needed to be reduced and he also suggested she be given 
an extra 1,500 quintales of iron ballast to counteract the weight of her artillery.  She 
was very slow in all winds which he attributed to her construction.  She keeled over 
to a dangerous extent when close-hauled and she never sailed well, always sailing 
towards the leeward.  Neither did she govern easily. 
In his opinion, her only good quality was that she was relaxed in the water, partly as a 
result of the defect that her freeboard was too heavy because of an excess of nails and 
bolts.  But, since this was not equalled in her hull, she was also unstable.  
Additionally, due to the quantity of iron in her freeboard, her timbers had not shifted 
at all. 
He had not sailed in any other ships of this construction but her qualities contrasted 
so sharply with what he had heard about others that he could only attribute her defects 
to the extra iron she was carrying. 
 
14. Marquis González, Ferrol, 6 November 1758, on command of frigate Palas 
and ship Gallardo: 
The Palas had no defects in her construction.  Her hold, sides and decks were still 
watertight.  She had an average resilience and speed, sailing particularly fast to the 
windward.  But her scuppers could have been larger and she would have sailed better 
with her capstan in the waist. 
 The Gallardo handled well, was of average speed, could take a lot of sail and pitched 
and rolled gently.  However, though her hold did not take on water, her freeboard was 
weak from lack of timber and iron which was exacerbated when she pitched and 
rolled. 
15. Manuel de Guirior, Ferrol, 6 November 1758, on command of Brillante: 
She handled excellently, was good with her sail, did not pitch or roll violently, was 
robust and from his own personal experience he could say she was resilient in storms.  
Her defect was that she was too weak from the wales upwards. 
 
16. Joachín Gutíerrez, Ferrol, 6 November 1758, on command of Soberano, 
Esmeralda and Poderoso: 
The Soberano was exceedingly beautiful, handled very well, her pitch and roll were 
gentle, she did not struggle with her masts or rigging, held her sail well and was 
speedy.  The defects he had noticed, however, were that she provided little protection 
for sailors on her quarterdeck and that the cabin divisions in the lower gallery were 
inconvenient when clearing for action. 
The Esmeralda handled well, could take a lot of sail and did not struggle with her 
masts or rigging – qualities she had demonstrated in a powerful storm – but the galley 
was awkwardly located in the waist and her gundeck was too low in the water. 
The Poderoso was as good as the previous two and of average speed though in a 
recent storm she had suffered some damage and her scuppers had proved too small.  
The English chain pumps were very good but they did require someone on board who 
knew how to use them as well as to be made with better quality iron. 
 
17. Martin de Laztarria, on board Liebre, Ferrol, 4 November 1758, on command 
of Liebre: 
All her qualities were good and he had not noticed any defects. 
 APPENDIX 8.  Rooth’s assessment of timber available at Ferrol on 18 January 17521 
 
Thickness (inches) 1!  2–2!  3–3!  4–4!  5–5!  6–6!  7–7!  8–8!  9–9!  10–10!  11 12 
Timber requested by Rooth on 24 Jan 
1752 for 12 70-gun ships: 
   4,500 400 1,000 1,000 1,000 500 500   
 
Length of 9–14 codos: 24            
6–19:  596           
4–18/5–21:   1,975          
3–22/23:    6,133         
3–25:     4,612        
3–27:      4,750 1,704 673     
5–27:         271    
6–27:          336   
10–28:           154  
14–27:            16 
 
Still needed:        327 329 164   
Surplus: 24 596 1,975 1,633 612 3,750 704    154 16 
 
                                                       
1 Report written by Rooth on 18 January 1752 and handed in to the Contaduría.  21,000 planks were available at Ferrol, of which 6,000 were suitable as outside planking, the 
rest for the inside and other purposes.  AGS Marina 320. 
 APPENDIX 9. Purchase of Timber from Havana and the Baltic 
 
TABLE 9.1.  Annual cost of timber purchased in Havana to send to Spain1 
Year Lumbered by contract 
with private individuals 
or directly by the State 
Amount (Vellon 
Reals, Maravedis) 
1748 Private 16,000 
1749 Private 23,929.2 
1750 Private 2,481.25 
1751 Private 17,604.2 
1752 Private 2,773.17 
1753 Private 15,626.30 
1754 Private 12,081.29 
1754 State 14,672 
1755 State 13,060 
1756 State 14,237 
1757 Private 10,090.24 
1757 State 456 
 
 
TABLE 9.2.  Annual sums paid to Eugenio de Mena, Gildemeester’s agent in 
Spain, for Baltic pine planking, masts and hemp2 










                                                       
1 Compiled from Havana arsenal’s account books 1747–50, 1751–53 and 1754–57 in AGI Contaduría 
1168.  The timber, mostly guayacan but also cedar and mahogany, was, both, purchased from private 
individuals (referred to in the table as ‘Private’) in Havana and organised directly by the State (referred 
to as ‘State’) to send to Spain, in which case the ‘Amount’ consists of the total payments made to the 
officer in charge, Pedro de Acosta, Teniente Capitan de Maestranza, who organised the workers, 
lumber and transport.  Though it does not always specify that it is for the navy this can be generally 
assumed and that purchased for other functions, principally the Royal Palace being built in Aranjuez, 
has been excluded from these totals, as, also, has the cost of timber in which it is not specified whether 
it was to be sent to Spain or not. 
2 Compiled from AGS Marina 768 and 769 consisting of orders from the Secretary of the Navy to that 
of the Treaury for payments to be issued.  This includes the occasional cost of hemp when it is 
included with that for timber in the original documents.  
APPENDIX 10.  Annual Hemp Crop in the Different Regions of Spain1 
 
 1st grade (quintals, c. 100lbs, 46kg) 2nd grade hemp 
(quintals) 
3rd grade hemp 
(quintals) 
Totals 
Catalonia 25,119 16,067 4,383 45,569 
Aragon 23,200 12,100  35,300 
Navarre  3,500  3,500 
Valencia 9,889!  10,250  20,139!  
Murcia 8,000 4,000  12,000 
Granada 13,000   13,000 
Galicia 242   242 
 
Total 79,450! (3,654,723 kg; 317,802 
arrobas) 
45,917 (2,112,182 kg; 
183,668 arrobas) 




519,002  arrobas) 
 
                                                       
1 AGS Marina 318, ‘Estado del cañamo que anualmente se coge de distintos parages de España, segun las noticias que se han recivido, su calidad, y regulares precios’, 
[1750]. 
APPENDIX 11.  Crews of Spanish Warships 
 
TABLE 11.1.  Sample selection of ships’ musters representing the average crews for ships of different rates 
 San Felipe (110 guns)1 Aquilón (68)2 América (64)3 Liebre (26)4 Jupiter (xabeque)5 
Commissioned Officers 22 13 11 6 7 
Guardias Marinas 13 4 7   
Petty Officers 22 23 19 10 9 
 
Sailors 160 116 106 56 26 
Apprentices 124 114 73 49 36 
Pages 16 23 19 12 6 
 
Artillery officers 17 20 19 5 3 
Artillerymen 94 83 76 50 20 
 
Marine sergeants 8 6 6 3 2 
Marine corporals 11 12 12 6 3 
Marine drummers 2 3 3 1 1 
                                                       
1 AGS Marina 438, ‘Estado del navío San Phelipe con distinción de su armamento, ofiziales, guarnición y equipage’, San Felipe, Cadiz, 1 June 1750, Juan Gerbaut. 
2 AGS Marina 439, ‘Estado del navío Aquilón al ancla en el Puerto de Cadiz a 22 de maio de 1754’, Francisco de Lastarria. 
3 AGS Marina 438, ‘Estado’, Cartagena, 28 May 1754, Contador Manuel de Riva. 
4 AGS Marina 438, ‘Estado que comprehende las tripulaciones y guarniciones que se hallaron efectivas en los vaxeles y javeques de que se compone la esquadra del mando 
del Gefe Dn Pedro Messía de la Cerda en revista executada a sus bordos desde 27 hasta 30 de noviembre de 1750 por el ministro y contador de ella’, San Felipe, anchored in 
Cartagena Bay, 10 December 1750. 
5 AGS Marina 438, ‘Estado en que oy día de la fha [fecha] salen a navegar el navío y paquebotes de guerra, África, Jupiter, y Mercurio, al mando del capitan de navío Conde 
de Vega Florida’, Cadiz, 11 May 1753, Pedro Castejón. 
Marines 144 96 97 45 24 
 
Vagrants6  14 (+ 41 convicts) 18   
Servants7 31  14 7 7 
 
Total: 643 568 480 250 144 
 
 
TABLE 11.2: Ship’s muster of the San José in 17088 
Commissioned Officers 6 




Artillery Officers 4 
Artillerymen 79 
Marine Sargeants 9 
Marine Corporal  
Marine Drummers 3 + 1 standard bearer 
                                                       
6 On 31 July 1751, the Instrucción que el Rey ha mandado expedir por la Secretaría del Despacho Universal de la Guerra, para que persiguan y recojan las Justicias todos 
los Bagabundos, y Mal-Entretenidos, y se apliquen a la Tropa y Reales Arsenales, en consequencia de lo que está prevenido por Leyes del Reyno, con el fin de establecer la 
quietud en los Pueblos y seguridad en los Caminos (Buen Retiro, 25 July 1751, Marquis of la Ensenada) was distributed stipulating that all vagrants be rounded up and put to 
work in the army or navy.  From this date, most ship musters (excluding those of frigates and xabeques) include a contingent of vagrants in their crews.  In the table above, 
this explains why there are none registered on board the San Felipe in June 1750 but why both the Aquilón and the América in May 1754, include them. 
7 Officers were allowed a certain number of servants but these were employed on board purely as servants. 
8 Phillips (2007) pp.74–81.  For the number of guns see p.82 and for the sailing date see p.83. 




TABLE 11.3.  Ship’s Complements in the British Navy9 
 1st rate  
(100 guns) 
3rd rate  
(70 guns) 
3rd rate  
(64 guns) 




Commissioned Officers 7 5 5 2 2 
Warrant Officers 15 15 15 12 9 
Petty Officers 53 36 36 13 8 
Complement 880 480–550 480–520 160 120–130 
 
                                                       
9 Rodger (1986), Appendix I ‘Complements’, pp.348–9 
APPENDIX 12.  Timetables of the Academy of Guardias Marinas 
 
TIMETABLE 12.1.  Original Timetable for the Academy of Guardias Marinas, 17181 






















                                                       
1 AGS Marina 3003.  Also Lafuente y Sellés (1988) p.56 
TIMETABLE 12.2.  Revised Timetable for the Academy of Guardias Marinas designed by Diego Bordick in 17352 
Mon–Fri ! hour ! hour 
 
! hour ! hour 
  
Euclid’s ‘Elements’: 










1st, 2nd and 3rd Saturday of each month 1! hours 
 




The globe (36 
lessons): theory and 
instruments 
 
4th Saturday of each month 1 hour 
 










                                                       
2 Lafuente and Sellés (1988) p.68.  Taken from ‘Instrucción que era aprobado, con algunas rectificaciones, este proyecto con el título de “Instrucción que manda SM se 
observe por el Profesor Principal y Maestro de Facultades Matemáticas que dirige actualmente la Real Academia de Guardias Marinas establecida en Cádiz, y en sus 
ausencias y enfermedades el Capitán e Ingeniero ordinario de sus ejércitos Dn. Ambrosio Marnara, en que se trata el método y su dibujo” ’, San Ildefonso, 31 August 1735, 
signed Diego Bordick, AGS Marina 80. 
TIMETABLE 12.3.  Timetable Set Out in 1748 Ordenanzas3 
 1st Class 
 
2nd Class 3rd Class  
Morning 
3 hours 















Maps and globes, 
Cosmography and esfera, 
Nautical astronomy 
1st Maths teacher 
 
Art of navigation, 












Artillery Shipbuilding Manoeuvres 
2! hours  Geometry problems,  
Instruments, 
Maps and plans, 
Fortification, 
Ports and arsenals. 
Handling arms, tactics, 
gunpowder: use and 
production, cannon: use and 
production, Strategy. 
Naval architecture.  
 Languages, especially French 
and English 
Fencing. Dance. Military instruction. 
 
                                                       
3 Ordenanzas (1748), vol.II, trat.7, tit.6, pp.51–72, ‘De los exercicios de la Academia’.  Lafuente and Sellés (1988) pp.78–9. 
APPENDIX 13.  Matrícula de Mar Inspection, 1754 
 
TABLE 13.1.  Matriculated Men in Cartagena Department, 17541 
Mariners: Maestranza:  
Able Average Novice Carpenters Caulkers Other2 
Valencia Present3 49 263 271 18 4  
 Absent 36 148 189 18 1  
 
Alicante Present 58 205 249 11 6 1 
 Absent 13 102 128 8 5  
 
Mallorca and Ibiza Present 391 482 306 43 17 6 
 Absent 174 247 185 16 6  
 
Cartagena Present 149 256 186 150 63 23 
 Absent 33 80 43 16 8  
 
Vera Present 7 40 33 1   
 Absent 16 142 113    
 
                                                       
1 Compiled from AGS Marina 300, ‘Extracto de la gente de mar y maestranza de servicio efectiva de la Matrícula de la Provincia de Mallorca’, Nuñez Ibáñez, Palma, 18 June 
1754, 'Extracto de la gente de mar y maestranza de servicio efectiva de la Matrícula del Reyno de Valencia’, Nuñez Ibáñez, Elche, 9 December 1754, and ‘Extracto de la 
gente de mar y maestranza de servicio efectiva de la matrícula de la costa del Reyno de Murcia’, Nuñez Ibáñez, Cartagena, 22 February 1754[5?]. 
2 Consists of other workers, such as coopers, armourers or faroleros (lamplighters). 
3 Those marked ‘present’ were then present in their homes and those marked ‘absent’ were those then employed elsewhere but whose whereabouts were confirmed and 
licensed. 
Total:  926 1,965 1,703 281 110 30 
 
 
TABLE 13.2.  Matriculated Men in Catalonia, 17544 
Able Mariners: Totals 
 
Present  2,461 
Serving on the King’s ships 813 








In the King’s arsenals 250 




                                                       
4 AGS Marina 300, ‘Estado que comprehende y manifiesta la marinería hávil y maestranza que en el dia se halla existente en los pueblos que comprehende las quatro 
provincias y subdelegaciones de Marina de Tortosa, del Principiado de Cathaluña y hombres de mar que actualmente subsisten en navíos del Rey embarcaciones particulares 
y trabajando de sus respectivos officios de carpinteros y calafates en los reales arsenales que con distinción de destino es a saver’, Placido de Leyba, Barcelona, 26 January 
1754[5?]. 
TABLE 13.3.  Matriculated men in Ferrol Department, 17545 
 Mariners Apprentices Ship 
Carpenters 
Caulkers Other Retired Total 
Existent in the 
Department 
7,987 675 314 198 8 2,901 12,083 
Absent, at sea 148  2 4   154 
        
Total 8,135 675 316 202 8 2,901 12,237 
 
 
TABLE 13.4.  Matriculated men in Cadiz Department, 17566 
Total Present: 7,452 
Of which Able: 4,506 
Total maestranza: 763 
Total retired: 2,183 
Total absent: 3,822 
Of which serving on the King’s ships: 1,135 
Of which serving on private vessels: 1,110 
Of which absent with a licence and a known location: 443 
                                                       
5 AGS Marina 300, ‘Estado general de la gente de mar de servicio, muchachos, maestranza, y embarcaciones que se verificó existir matriculados en las siete provincias de 
Marina, que componen el Departamento de ella de Ferrol’, Pasqual y Sedano, Graña, 28 February 1754 
6 AGS Marina 300, ‘Estado General que comprehende lo que ha resultado de la revista de inspección executada de orden de SM por mí el comisario ordenador de Marina a la 
gente de mar de todas clases como maestranzas y embarcaciones, matriculadas y alistadas en todos los pueblos marítimos de que se compone este Departamento con arreglo a 
la Real Ordenanza de Matrícula y ordenes comunicadas a su efecto que con expresion de clases, destino y paradas todo es en la disposicion siguiente’, Bustillo, Cadiz, 19 
April 1756 
Of which without a licence or known location: 164 
Of which absent as a result of desertion or other such 
nefarious reason: 
933 
Of which absent being convicts or exiles: 37 
 
 APPENDIX 14.  Manning the Cartagena squadron, 1758 
 
TABLE 14.1.  Crews of Ships fitted out in Cartagena, 17581 
 Artillerymen Sailors Grumetes Total 
Triumfante (70) 93 153 120 366 
Vencedor (70) 93 153 120 366 
Soberano (70) 93 153 120 366 
Ships 
Septentrión (70) 73 100 80 253 
Astrea (28) 41 48 58 147 Frigates 
Juno (28) 41 48 58 147 
Abenturero (30) 72 79 49 200 
Vigilante 47 94 66 207 
Cuervo Marino 44 88 70 202 
Ibicenco 60 80 40 180 
Xabeques 
Catalan 80 40 60 180 
 
Total 737 1,036 841 2,614 
 
Men currently serving who do not finish their campaign at the end of 
June 
32 187 228 447 
 
Men required to complete the musters 705 849 613 2,167 
                                                       
1 AGS Marina 440, Barrero to Arriaga, Cartagena, 15 February 1758 and ‘Estado de la marinería que se necesita segun reglamento y en las clases de artilleros, marineros y 
grumetes para armamento de los vageles que avajo se expresarán con nominazión de la que hay existente y la que se deve pedirse a las provincias con presencia de la que 
tienen útil’, Barrero, Cartagena, 4 February 1758 
 TABLE 14.2.  Recruitment from the Matrícula de Mar for the Cartagena Squadron in 1758 
 No. of men available in 
the Matrícula 
Artillerymen to be 
requested 
Sailors to be 
requested 
Grumetes to be 
requested 
Total to be 
requested: 
Catalonia 5,129 440 450 80 970 
Mallorca 1,659 180 120 160 460 
Valencia 1,191 30 100 120 250 
Alicante 875 25 100 90 215 
Vera 316   66 66 
Cartagena 963 30 79 91 200 
 
Total 10,133 705 849 613 2,167 
 
 APPENDIX 15.  Manning of Andrés Reggio’s ‘Grand Squadron’ in 17581 
 
 Ships Officers de mar Artillerymen Sailors Grumetes Pages Total 
Rayo (80) 
 
26 74 143 236 36 515 
Aquiles (68) 
 
23 64 122 143 26 378 
Aquilón (68) 
 
22 71 118 140 25 379 
Reyna (70) 
 
19 93 153 120 24 409 
España (68) 
 
23 77 131 112 17 360 
Castilla (64) 
 
21 50 77 112 21 281 
Venganza (24) 
 




17 45 60 75 12 209 
Brillante (68) 
 
18 78 108 169 18 391 
Gallardo (68) 
 
20 83 125 186 24 438 
Ferrol: 
Neptuno (68) 18 74 133 143 15 383 
                                                       
1 AGS Marina 440, ‘Estado de los oficiales de mar, artilleros, marineros, grumetes y pages con que estan tripulados los 16 navíos y 6 fragatas, armados en los 3 




18 82 120 144 20 384 
Campeón (58) 
 
19 68 112 128 17 344 
Palas (26) 
 




14 33 66 62 10 185 
Triumfante (68) 
 
19 80 130 130 24 383 
Soberano (68) 
 
20 71 153 136 24 404 
Vencedor (68) 
 
20 70 137 132 27 386 
Héctor (68) 
 
20 67 142 119 24 372 
Septentrión (70) 
 
22 75 125 125 14 361 
Astrea (28) 
 
15 40 60 50 11 176 
Cartagena: 
Juno (28) 16 40 60 50 12 178 
 
Total 422 1,385 2,391 2,635 422 7,255 
 
APPENDIX 16.  The Havana Squadron, 6 March 17621 
Ships Sailors Marine Infantry Total 
 
Tigre (70) 422 119 541 
América (60) 305 123 428 
Asia (70) 278 120 398 
Reyna (70) 364 88 452 
Castilla (64/0) 284 116 400 
Neptuno (68) 373 105 478 
Soberano (68) 367 116 483 
Infante (70) 365 114 479 
Europa (64) 267 121 388 
Aquilón (68) 369 125 494 
Conquistador (68) 278 129 407 
Vencedor (68) 372 119 491 
Flora (36) 137 43 180 
Ventura (28) 160 58 218 
Tétis (22) 121 32 153 
Marte (18) 94 23 117 
 
Total 4,556 1,541 6,107 
 
                                                       
1 AGS Marina 406, ‘Estado que manifiesta el en que se hallan las guarniciones y tripulaciones de los 
navíos y fragatas que se expresan segun la última revista Tigre y marzo 6 de 1762’, Transporte and 
Juan Valcárcel y Bargas (Contador of the squadron). 





Rentas Estancadas Rentas 
Eclesiásticas 
Total Total in Vellon 
Escudos 
   Tobacco Salt Stamped 
Paper 
Lottery    
1748   61,697,788     61,697,788 6,169,779 
1749 86,950,840 51,234,113 69,094,622     207,279,575 20,727,958 
1750 77,092,991 54,283,873 68,955,243 16,335,949   20,241,521 236,909,577 23,690,958 
1751 78,310,975 58,478,338 71,588,882 15,691,483   20,171,479 244,241,157 24,424,116 
1752 78,136,403 52,527,888 75,971,108     206,635,399 20,663,540 
1753 78,895,893 52,648,590 76,494,216     208,038,699 20,803,870 
1754 78,060,417 49,707,527 75,018,899 33,596,909    236,383,752 23,638,375 
1755 79,118,535 45,729,515 75,353,057     200,201,107 20,020,111 
1756 82,532,034 60,451,051 78,904,993     221,888,078 22,188,808 
1757 80,593,439 46,945,323 78,310,587     205,849,349 20,584,935 
1758 80,549,099 51,729,253 77,254,519  3,051,020   212,583,891 21,258,389 
1759 82,427,556  79,791,506     162,219,062 16,221,906 
 
                                                       
1 Compiled from Artola (1982) pp. 306–11 
 APPENDIX 18.  Crown Income received from Rentas Provinciales, in 
vellon reals1 
 
 1714 1722 1749 1787 
 
Galicia 4,406,429 5,163,161 6,052,620 10,130,391 
León 10,692,019 11,630,843 12,367,359 16,645,261 
Old Castile 9,757,609 10,268,218 10,399,100 13,688,522 
New Castile 18,304,924 18,626,919 19,647,125 20,268,064 
Extremadura 4,279,997 4,520,087 5,408,503 6,579,125 
Andalucia 22,005,415 25,219,514 30,585,035 47,633,920 
Murcia 1,124,954 1,755,635 2,491,098 7,572,323 
 




                                                       
1 Taken from Artola (1982), pp. 303–4. 




pp.15–6: ‘el estudio de la Marina, desde ese punto de vista, es una introducción al 
estudio de las relaciones internacionales’. 
p.17, fn.39: ‘Lo que me parece grave en el caso español es que no vemos una 
evolución homogénea en los cambios, salvo dos excepciones, Gaztañeta-Autrán y 
Gautier-Romero-Retamosa.  Entremedias se han producido un par de alteraciones 
bruscas sin que haya, sin embargo, razones científicas, o serias al menos, que las 
justifiquen.  Es natural, en estas circunstancias, que se noten deficiencias importantes 
en los buques españoles construídos entre 1750 y 1778–80, aproximadamente’. 
p.18: ‘fue él quien organizó y estuvo en todas las juntas y quien recibió plenos 
poderes para fijar las características y las proporciones a adoptar’ 
p.18: ‘se copiaron y mejoraron los métodos utilizados en las islas británicas’ 
 
Chapter 2: 
p.25: ‘con preferencia á todo, al augmento y mexor régimen de armadas’. 
p.26: ‘se deduce que esta parte del gobierno merece la principal atención de VM’. 
pp.26–7: ‘como es menester dar un sistema fixo a la Marina y caminar sobre él’. 
p.30: ‘instruido en los intereses de Príncipes’ 
p.30: ‘el árbitro de la paz y de la guerra entre Francia e Inglaterra, y aún de Europa’. 
p.32: ‘lo que no se comienza no se acaba, y si el gran Luis XIV prescribió Reglas y 
Ordenanzas, que siguió y se siguen con tan feliz suceso, por qué no se podrán adoptar 
y practicar en España siendo V.M. el Rey?’. 
p.40, fn.43: ‘mui embidiada y respetada … aviendo echado profundas raíces en 
Ordenanzas y Reglamentos particulares para el todo, y sus partes de que todas las 
naciones tienen mucho que aprender’. 
 
Chapter 3: 
pp.45–6: ‘sacar agua con fuego’. 
p.46: ‘siempre sera bueno ver los modelos, en particular el de el martinete de Mr 
Vauloüe, que me parece muy ingenioso pero demasiado compuesto’. 
p.47: ‘tubo para la electricidad’. 
 p.48: ‘para acordar y reglar sólidamente todo aquello que hallen que tal vez lo 
necesite’. 
p.49: ‘con el fin de arreglar su Compañia’. 
p.50: ‘Dn Ciprián de Autrán tiene razón en decir que para carenar sus navíos y más a 
su modo se necessitan diques más profundos: pero gracias a Dios que no se harán ni 
carenarán a su modo.  El dique chico de Cartagena tendrá solo 17 pies ingleses de 
agua y el grande 21: en el primero se carenara el Septentrión y sus iguales: y en el 
segundo hasta los de 100 cañones quando Ciprián pide (solo para carenar navíos de 
70 cañones) 19 codos de agua en el dique que hacen 36 pies ingleses’. 
pp.51–2: ‘se observó un movimiento universal y quebrantamiento de cantería por la 
parte del assiento de las puertas que en la noche antes anunció el trabajo recio que se 
hizo para unirlas y no se pudo conseguir’. 
p.52: ‘la misma que generalmente y a vista de todos se practica en Inglaterra’. 
p.53: ‘un departamento tenga en si lo que necessita, sin dependencia de otro, ha 
pensado el Rey en que provisionalmente se fabrique en Sada de quenta de la Real 
Hacienda por estos nuevos maestros que se esperan de Londres jarcia y lona’. 
p.53: ‘el nuebo pie y méthodo inglés’. 
p.54: ‘Aunque VE no me tiene prevenido en las ordenes examine las fábricas de 
jarcia y lona, persuadido yo a que estas se pueden mejorar hasta el punto que no 
necesitaremos de ayudas extrangeras, passe a hacerle en compañía del Intendente Dn 
Francisco Barrero y halle precisamente el defecto principal de qual estoy persuadido 
depende el que hasta ahora no ayamos tenido ninguno de estos materiales buenos’. 
p.55: ‘Estos tres días de Pasqua ha sido mi ocupación ir á examinar el Río, sus 
astilleros, diques, máquinas, y obras por medio de un amigo [Alexander French], que 
no he visto sino con muchíssimo gusto y embidia …  Dexo aparte otras 
circunstancias, pues por lo que diré á VE, y especialmente por el zelo con que VE 
honra nuestra atrasada nación, espero en Dios se corrigan muchos nuestros antiguos 
descuydos’. 
p.58: ‘en St Malo, en Brest, en l’Orient, en Rennes, en Rochefort, en Nantes y en 
Angers; donde ay fábricas considerables de lonas y jarcia; tengo examinado este 
punto bastantemente y estoy tan impuesto en él, que conozco se pueden hacer en 
España, sin el auxilio de extrangeros, tan buenas lonas y jarcias como las mejores de 
Holanda’. 
p.59: ‘el modo establecido por Dn Jorge’. 
p.59: ‘este sugeto sera poco hávil en fabricar lona como lo son también los maestros 
que han venido’. 
p.60: ‘sin contradiccion el mejor que tiene la Inglaterra’. 
p.60: ‘hombre de muchos millones de libras esterlinas de caudal, hallandose con 
varios diques proprios, y fabricando muchos navíos de su cuenta’. 
 p.61: ‘Siendo uno de los puntos con que debemos poner todo nuestro mayor cuidado 
el de la elección de constructores, encarga SM a Us se asegure muy mucho de la 
habilidad de Mr Rooth antes de pasar a admitirle formalmente, no solo por lo que 
pueda deducirse de sus planos … sino por la practica de la construcción y fama entre 
los inteligentes, porque la experiencia nos ha enseñado con no pequeño gasto, y 
perjuicio del servicio, que en vez de utiles hemos admitido sobre su palabra 
extrangeros innutiles que nada han hecho de quanto avian ofrecido’. 
p.61: ‘son tres nuestros departamentos, y en todos es el animo fabricar a un tiempo’. 
p.61: ‘en tal manera que miro como gran fortuna el haver dado con él; pues además 
de estar instruido de lo mejor que he visto en la fábrica de planos y theórica, saca los 
más hermosos navíos del Rio, que los practicos aseguran son de muy buenas 
propiedades en el mar’. 
p.62: ‘emplear buen cáñamo, limpiarlo, hilarlo bien, buenos oficiales que lo texan y 
buenos telares, será preciso para que tenga buen efecto la fabrica que VE quiere 
establecer, que lleve ante todas cosas dos oficiales además de su muger (que tiene el 
por muy hábil en el hilado) para que enseñen a los demás; y así mismo telares, y 
instrumentos para el mismo hilado pues dize que mucha parte de la bondad de la obra 
consiste en los telares de acero que aquí usan cuyos peynes tienen con temple y 
fábrica que duda se le den y hagan tan buena en España: además de esto pide le 
conceda VE por su sueldo media libra esterlina por día y aquí una gratificación de 50 
libras para poderse transportar con su familia, y los dos oficiales al Ferrol’. 
p.62: ‘haciendo continuamente viages abaxo del Rio donde esta su alojamiento: y en 
atención a ello me prometió, despues de fenecida su fragata, que a los quince dias 
saldría: por lo que escriví a VE, sus correos ha, que la semana siguiente emprendería 
el viage.  Despues de esto le ha sobrevenido una enfermedad, y ha estado 15 dias con 
ella: ahora se halla ya bueno, y me promete partir sin falta la semana próxima’. 
p.62: ‘quanto más presto sea possible, pues ha llegado el caso de ser ya mui 
necessario, especialmente los constructores’. 
p.63: ‘No con poco trabajo y gasto he podido ya arrancar de esta Ciudad al 
Constructor Rooth.  Hace más de mes y medio que me iva prometiendo su salida de 
dia en dia; pero este no ha llegado hasta hoy que ya va marchando para Dover: tal 
estaba enredado en el comercio, de quien no ha podido deshacerse sin dexar 
abandonadas por su parte en manos de los mal pagadores 7,000 libras esterlinas, y sin 
que yo le fuera dando de 200 en 200 hasta 900, para satisfacer a sus acreedores, y 
dexar cubiertos los bienes raizes que aquí dexa.  De esta manera se ha podido 
componer su viage’. 
p.64: ‘me han dexado en el estado de volver a empezar a seducir; en lo que ay alguna 
dificultad más que antes, pues todos los que quedan habiles son Protestantes y 
fuertes’. 
p.64: ‘director y maestro de las fábricas de Birth, que ya escriví a VE es lo mejor de 
este Rio, aun incluyendo los astilleros del Rey’. 
p.65: ‘el Rio estaba alborotado; que Mr Birth a quien pertenecia Bryant, juraba de 
hacer todos los posibles y expensas hasta averiguar quian ha embiado tanta gente 
fuera del reyno, que se discubre ser a España’. 
 p.65: ‘se havia arrestado el capellán [Alexander Lynch] de quien se servia para hablar 
a los artifices’. 
pp.65–6: ‘Sin embargo de las ordenes dadas a todos los puertos por el Duque de 
Bedford, he logrado no solo ponerme ya en salvo por medio de mi disfraz, sino 
también todas las familias de los ingleses que he embiado, y dos mozos parientes 
suyos aprendices que corrian riesgo en el Rio de Londres.  Oy passo a Bolonia donde 
estan escondidas para embiarlas desde allí al Ferrol; queria hacerlo por mar, pero las 
mugeres tiemblan de miedo de una arrivada, y no se atreven con que tengo resuelto 
aunque sea con más costo el despacharlas por tierra’. 
p.66: ‘sin embargo que no es hombre que dissimula, reconoci en su modo de 
hablarme que ya savia algo en el pecho resalta de haver examinado estos dias al 
capellán y otros muchos …  Dissimule también y affecte más tranquilidad de la que 
realmente tenia’. 
p.66: ‘el modo con que havian trabajado este negocio tan grave en si demostraba la 
atención que tenian por nosotros pues podianle sin que le valiese proteccion alguna’ 
p.66: ‘el ministerio no havia parte en ello y que si alguna culpa hai en Dn Jorge era la 
de haver aceptado la oferta de algunos sugetos … de pasar a España’. 
p.68: ‘para acordar con los demás constructores de los otros departamentos las reglas 
que con uniformidad deben seguir en la construcción’. 
p.70: ‘esse plano es totalmente semejante a la fábrica de navíos de guerra que hoy se 
construyen en este Reyno: pero aunque muy bella, o la más perfecta que en el mundo 
se hace, no dexa de tener algunos pequeños inconvenientes que será fácil enmendar: 
yo espero explicárseles al mismo Rooth con cuya abilidad no pongo duda, que VE 
fabricará la mejor armada del mundo’. 
p.73: ‘dictamen de los constructores ingleses, Dn Jorge Juan, Gerbaut y muchos 
oficiales de inteligencia, nuestro roble, madera la mejor de el mundo para los demás 
fines, no sirve absolutamente para tablonería; añadiendome Dn Jorge Juan, que el 
haver logrado sea buena la que se aplicó a los navíos Asia y Fernando es en fuerza de 
haver escogido entre veinte y seis mil tablones que allí havia’. 
p.73: ‘hermoso, ancho y largo, no tiene la fuerza y duración que el nuestro’. 
p.77: ‘directa o indirectamente alterar o variar la idea de construcción que forme y 
quiera seguir Dn Matheo Mullan en la fábrica de vaxeles que va a emprenderse en 
esse Departamento, respecto de que la intención de SM es que este constructor dirixa 
por R en el todo y sus partes según y como lo tenga por conveniente no solo esta 
construcción, sino también el punto de reglar las arboladuras y cureñages de los 
vaxeles’. 
p.77: ‘expusimos Dn Cosme Alvarez y yo, a que cohincidieron los demás, que a 
menos de que se vaxase la septima parte en todo el aparexo de firme, y 
proporcionadamente en los cavos volantes, nos parecía era innecesariamente cargar 
los navíos, quando con fundamento se tratava de aliviarlos en el peso y de escusar el 
ocioso gasto, que en esta parte fomentava la misma inutilidad’. 
 p.78: ‘la tablonería era muy inferior, y que toda ella sea de la calidad que fuesse, no 
combenía estuviesse en agua, porque se le comia la substancia; y luego se rajava, que 
el método de conservarla era debajo de tinglado, a donde no la mojase el agua dulce, 
ní la diesse el sol’. 
p.78: ‘Sin embargo de la opinión de Rooth que discurre pierde el tablón de roble en 
agua salada, y se raja, parece, que secándose al ayre se rajará más, aunque este a 
cubierto, y finalmente siempre el tablón viene a estar debaxo del agua construido que 
sea el navío’. 
p.79: ‘las maderas de roble siempre se conservarán mejor en los diques, como en 
ellos logren el beneficio de alguna agua dulce, pues siendo solo la del mar ay 
experiencia de haverse abromado algunas piezas antiguas que mantenían aquí en esta 
disposición’. 
p.79: ‘porque en poco tiempo cría una capa de lodo que no solamente la conserva 
sana sino que la preserva de la broma’. 
p.81: ‘deven ser formadas de las rayces de robles, por ser la madera más fuerte, no 
sirviendo que se saquen del tronco, ní de sus ramos’. 
p.81, fn.164: ‘El nuevo método hacía barcos más redondos y algo más estables, 
mayor consumo de madera y menor de hierro, piezas más difíciles de encontrar dada 
su dimensión, necesidad de calafateo constante, etc.  Consecuencia de todo ello son 
las contínuas “juntas de constructores” celebradas durante los años 50, intentando 
siempre encontrar soluciones al problema’. 
p.83: ‘poco reclausado de las tablas, todo travajo del navío se desmienten por la 
ninguna sugeción de las cavillas, escupen la estopa y reciven toda el agua, lo mismo 
sucede por los costados con la falta de trancaniles por lo que temo encontrar todas las 
cavezas de los baos podridas pero no me atrevo a reconocerlas temeroso de que no 
me sea preciso emprender alguna carena tan costosa como desagradable’. 
p.84: ‘principio la construcción en este astillero me he aplicado, aún estando separado 
de esta comisión, a observar con proligidad el méthodo de ella, y modo de colocar sus 
piezas’. 
p.84: ‘la diferencia de la fortaleza que tienen a la que devían tener’. 
p.86: ‘todos los navíos de guerra … construidos en Inglaterra de la misma 
construcción, sin más fuerza o seguridad, … navegan en un clima más riguroso y 
nunca tienen motivos para semejantes quejas y es la razón que están echos con 
madera seca y bien curada especialmente desde la superficie del agua por fuera y 
dentro para arriba, y también siempre tienen cuidado de labar y mojar todos los días 
debidas obras y mucho más se nezesiten navíos de roble en estas climas’. 
p.86: ‘solo he esperimentado en estos lloverse las cuviertas, no por las tablas de pino, 
que estas no dan de sí, sino por las de roble, que por estar algo berdes, como el 
tiempo las ba secando, se encogen y las costuras se ensanchan en summo grado’. 
pp.86–7: ‘los daños del África procedieron de haver puesto la tablazón acavada de 
sacar del dique, y que se desecó y reclavó en los términos expresados se logró el 
reparo de ellos lo que devera servir de govierno para el de los demás’. 
 p.87: ‘la debilidad de la obra’. 
p.87: ‘al constructor de esse astillero, y entregándole copia certificada, le prevenga 
que en el término preciso de ocho días ponga a su continuación el dictamen de si 
embarazara o no para los galibos y medidas de la construcción’. 
p.89: ‘con menos madera han mantenido los navíos ingleses más pesada artillería sin 
recivir daño, haciendo el corso en el invierno en los mares de Vizcaya &c’. 
p.90: ‘los regulares empalmes y medidas de las maderas y tablones, y en la buena 
unión de estos a las maderas, asegurando los del costado con los del forro interior, 
como también en la buena disposición de poner las maderas, proporcionando las 
distancias, de suerte, que no quede mucha en ninguna parte, a cuio fin, en la nueba 
construcción se tubo particular cuidado en el establecimiento hechos para que cada 
madera tenga su proprio largo y que sus topes lleguen a donde se necesita menos 
fortificación’. 
p.90: ‘gastado, como también las maderas y tablazón a que havía llegado: que los 
clavos estaban comidos con el orín donde el agua salada los bañaba, más o menos 
deteriorados a proporción del tiempo, pero siempre de poco o ningún servicio, 
quedando algunas veces como alambre; de suerte que se podían arrancar con los 
dedos: motibo bastante para que el navío haga agua’. 
p.92: ‘que la grande porción de tablazón o madera puesta en un buque no le fortifica 
sino se toma particular cuidado de saber en que lugar se pone, y en esta construcción 
se ha tenido el de poner la gruesa en las partes más déviles y dónde el buque necesita 
la maior fortificación’. 
p.94: ‘si las curbas de fierro son perniciosas a las obras muertas, porque no lo ha de 
ser todo el fierro que dicen se ponga en las quadernas y fondo’. 
p.95, fn.189: ‘madera y madera siempre tienen mejor concierto, uno con otro, que el 
fierro y la madera’. 
pp.95–6: ‘y finalmente la manera en que una quilla puesta sobre los picaderos … 
pueda precaucionar el quebranto de los navíos … causar alguna diferencia en las 
cubiertas y facilitar el desaguarse para mi es un arcano incomprehensible’. 
p.98: ‘Mexor que yo save VE los incidentes que ha producido este método, pues no 
siendo, como se asentó más barato por el fierro que se escusa meter en los buques, 
sino antes bien de mayor costo, tampoco parecen de superior, ní de igual firmeza que 
los otros y se atribuyó a éstos por el augmento de madera que llevan y persuade a que 
su flaqueza dependa de la falta de encoramentos y herrages que mantengan las 
maderas y tablones’. 
p.98: ‘la más segura y reparar el grande gasto de continua maestranza’. 
p.99: ‘de la que han procedido las providencias correspondientes a la posible 
enmienda de lo que la necesitava, como se ha conseguido en este astillero con los 
navíos y fragatas que posteriores a ella se han construido.  No creo necesario 
dilatarme más en este asumpto’. 
 p.99: ‘la fábrica inglesa no tiene más endentado en palmejares, trancaniles, tablazón 
&c sino la cavillería y si ésta se quita quedan las maderas sin sugeción en el 
movimiento que puede originarselos de popa a proa, porque el clavo doblandose 
facilmente da lugar a dicho movimiento en tal manera que soy de dictamen que los 
clabos no deben usarse a menos que casí toda la construcción no se haga al méthodo 
antiguo; pues hay un encadenamiento de unas cosas con otras, que el quitar unas, 
precisa a que se quiten otras’. 
p.99: ‘las maderas se pusieron verdes y encharcadas, con que secándose han de abrir 
sus juntas y dar juego’. 
p.99: ‘en oposición se pueden dar muchas más: el navío el Septentrión hizo su viage y 
con artillería de 24 y 18 fuera de medida para el navío y no se quejaron sus oficiales 
de él, muy al contrario, y a otros muchos les ha sucedido lo proprio; con que todas las 
razones bien pesadas me parece que debemos atenernos a la junta que se hizo y a lo 
que en ella se voto’. 
p.100: ‘conducente a la mayor firmeza interior de los buques’. 
p.100: ‘Como no he navegado en otra embarcación de la última construcción y se 
oponen tanto las calidades de ésta a las que oigo dezir de las demás, creo que la gran 
diferencia se origine de haver bariado las reglas o medidas de su construcción como 
también en que ella se halla más fuerte por estar construida con clabazón y pernería’. 
p.100: ‘del demasiado grueso de las maderas y de la multitud de clavazón y pernos 
que ha llevado de la lumbre del agua para arriva para su mayor fortificación y evitar 
el quebranto no puedo decir de que proceda sino si acaso el ayudante de construcción 
Dn Guillermo Turner’. 
p.103: ‘se les aloxe bien, y trate bien, poniendo desde luego presos, para que sean 
castigados con rigor, y sirva de exemplo a todos, a los que les infurien, y maltraten; y 
del mismo modo atenderá Us a los demás maestros, sus familias, y officiales ingleses 
que deben seguir a los referidos’. 
p.103: ‘individuos ingleses que están empleados en esse Departamento de Marina con 
expresión de sus plazas y sueldos que por allá les estén asignados y goze de 
gratificaciones si algunos las tubiessen; acompañando a estas noticias las que huviere 
aí en quanto a contratas que expressen las condiciones bajo las quales se convinieron 
a venir a servir en España’. 
p.105: ‘el constructor pretende que por que lo dize él, y por ser inglés, deve ser 
preferido en su manera de construir, sin más examen ní fundamento en cuyos 
términos parece que quiere hablar de la fábrica española (que la llama antigua)’. 
 
Chapter 4: 
p.114: ‘ningún efecto han producido mis ruegos, ni mis oficios, pues, ni se me ha 
presentado la gente que ha pedido, ni contestándome en derechura, y con sencillez 
por la Diputación, esperanzado en que esta mudaría de conducta he estado esperando 
hasta ahora por no molestar a VE con especies de disgusto; pero viendo que el tiempo 
se adelanta tanto, y que la Diputación ni me escrive, ni me da seguridad alguna sobre 
 mi petición recurro, obligado de la necesidad, a VE para que haciéndolo presente al 
Rey se remedie, y tomen las providencias conducentes’. 
p.115: ‘pues el Rey no quiere que le sirvan con violencia o por fuerza’. 
p.116: ‘los escándalos que hasta aquí han suscitado estos operarios’. 
p.117: ‘crecida fábrica de navíos, que ha resuelto el Rey se construyan en el Ferrol, se 
necessita de porción de maestranza … Y no dudando SM que para un fin tan 
privilegiado, y de tanto interés al Estado, y a su Rl Servicio, concurrirá tambien Us 
con iguales esfuerzos, acreditando su celo y amor; me manda exprésamente 
manifestando a Us para que se esmere en procurar embiar a Ferrol toda quanta 
maestranza la sea dable, a la qual no faltara el buen trato, y paga puntual, que es bien 
notorio experimenta la que oy en aquel astillero ni en Dn Manuel Diego Escovedo un 
socorro que pueda hacer el viage; y a effecto de que yo pueda ponerlo en noticia de 
SM me dirá Us el número de maestranza que dirixirá al fin expresado’. 
p.118: ‘como la necessidad de carpinteros y calafates es en el día urgente en aquel 
Departamento para que se siga el empeño y actividad que conviene la crecida 
construccion de navíos’. 
p.118: ‘derrotados y pidiendo limosna, quejándose del corto jornal de cinco reales 
(que aquí le ganan) la carestía de aquel país y más especialmente de la falta de jornal 
quando no pueden travajar del socorro de los días festivos … por lo que no ay quién 
se anime a passar a aquel destino ni tenga disposición para ello’. 
p.119: ‘no llena la medidad de mis deseos’. 
p.119: ‘eran tratados con rigor de los oficiales, que les comendaban, no alcanzaban 
los sueldos por la carestía de los alimentos para más que su congrua sustentacion y 
otras ponderaciones tal vez nacidas de su voluntariedad o poco sufrimento, pero 
bastantes, para haver introducido en la sencillas de estos otros y sus mugeres un 
temor pánico y sospecha que experimentarán el mismo rigor, sin poder asistir a sus 
hijos y familia exponiéndolos a una extrema necesidad’. 
p.120: ‘Pues necesitamos de la persona de debido Síndico para que cuide y able por 
nosotros y nos defienda y asista a nuestras familias pagando en Bilbao lo que 
nosotros diezemos de nuestros sueldos que ganaremos en Ferrol porque haviendo 
como habrá tanta gente vizcaina de carpinteros y canteros no podemos estar sin 
persona que nos cuide y govierne es todo lo que pedimos con la humildad de 
vasaillos’. 
p.120: ‘no sólo los que aya hábiles en todos los pueblos de esse Señorío, sino también 
los que absolutamente no fueren inhábiles … pues no duda que a breves días de 
trabaxo en el astillero, se podrán imponer como los demás’. 
p.120: ‘malos paisanos’. 
p.120: ‘peores vasallos’. 
p.120: ‘mal paisano, merecedor de ser quemado y aorcado de suerte que estoi 
reducido con mi triste familia al acontezimiento de una desgracia y hora fatal y lo que 
 peor es con el deshonor de mal paisano que es lo mas sensible en hombres de honor; 
quando mis procederes en todos tiempos han sido justificados y sin nota’. 
pp.120–1: ‘que VE con sus venignos influjos intervenga para que SM por un decreto 
me declare por fiel vasallo y buen patricio … imponiendo penas a los que los 
contrario dijeren’. 
p.121: ‘se les prometa que a la entrada del invierno serán licenciados para sus casas 
para dar cobro a sus pobres agostos y dirección a sus familias con cuio beneficio no 
es dudable que con ansía se dedicaran al Real Servicio desde la primavera’. 
p.122: ‘no se ignora que ay en ese país muchos canteros’. 
p.122: ‘Que la Provincia de Alaba, abunda de esta clase de gentes y que a lo menos 
podrían sacarse de élla hasta 300 canteros, sin perjuicio de las obras regulares que 
pase ofrecieren en sus pueblos’. 
p.124: ‘tengo entendido que es mui crecido el numero de oficiales de estas clases, que 
se presenta a Aizpurua y sin duda por ésto no me pide otras providencias’. 
p.124: ‘Ha sido mui agradable al Rey’. 
p.125: ‘gente de sus casas y no acostumbrados a salir de ellas’. 
p.125: ‘entran con repugnancia a mudarse país’. 
p.126: ‘es casi imposible dar esta noticia, por que como la mayor parte de ellos son 
Provincianos y Vizcaynos que van y vienen con la mayor facilidad según les tiene 
cuenta, no es fácil contarlos, ni contar con ellos si se les buscan’. 
p.126: ‘han acudido a mí solicitando pasar a aquellos trabajos y he remitido una 
crecida porción’. 
pp.126–7: ‘no hay forma de reducirlos por buenos términos a que pasen allá, por estar 
consentidos en asistir a la fábrica de los quatro navíos que se han de hacer en 
Guarnizo, con la immediación a sus casas, donde con mexor jornal que en Ferrol 
hallan su quenta’. 
p.127: ‘nada podremos conseguir en el asumpto, ni aún en este caso lo aseguro, por la 
facilidad con que los Vizcaynos especialmente abandonan qualquiera obra’. 
p.127: ‘No siendo conveniente que esta gente vaya con violencia ni ignorantes de su 
destino, se lo advertirá Us haciéndola saver que ganarán un muy buen jornal; y si de 
los 20 huviese algunos que repugnaren pasar a Ferrol, los dejará Us en esa fábrica, 
reemplazándolos con otros de los antiguos en ella’. 
p.131: ‘tan opuesto a la nación gallega como afectíssimo a la suya vizcaina.  A estos 
amparándoles y señalándoles sueldos favorables, solicitándoles medios sueldos, 
hospital y curazión y aquellos bituperándoles e injuriándoles de palabra castigarles 
con obras, consignándoles sueldos muy cortíssimos como son al labrador con bueyes 
y carrón a tres reales de vellón, sin darles medio sueldo ni hospital, ni curación, 
haziendo visiblemente creer haver dos leyes distintas siendo sólo la voluntad real una 
y igual para sus vasallos’. 
 p.131: ‘no hallo cosa alguna que desdiga a las disposiciones que tengo dadas, pues 
por lo que mira a los jornales de la maestranza bizcaina, es muy cierto que son algo 
mayores que los de los del País, pero también es distinta la habilidad y actividad, 
pues apenas hay tal qual que sean carpinteros de rivera, y los de blanco, solo se 
estienden a lo muy basto, y la flojedad que padecen inseparable no les hace 
acriehedores a mayores ventajas’. 
p.131: ‘tan ruín, que apenas puede con la carreta’. 
p.132: ‘no encuentro medios para condescender a tan justas instancias como se me 
azen, sin minorar el numero de mercaderes cuias casas pudieran ser útiles para los 
oficiales … pues esta ciudad se ha aumentado mucho en becindario y se ha 
imposibilitado el aumento de fabricas de casas por emplearsen en las Rls obras’. 
p.133: ‘a fin de que sirva este ejemplar de escarmiento de los demás’. 
p.133: ‘para que sirva de exemplo a los demás y se contenga la deserción en el 
referido Departamento’. 
p.133: ‘Joseph de Arzueta y a todos los contramaestres de construcción vizcayinos y 
provincianos que están en Esteyro, y les lee la orden de VE advirtiéndoles de que 
experimentasen alboroto en la maestranza, ellos responderán a SM con sus cabezas’. 
p.134: ‘infelicidad a que están reducidas las familias’. 
p.135: ‘ha resuelto que en esse astillero se reforme para desde fin del corriente mes 
una tercera parte de la maestranza de construcción, manejándose esto con anticipado 
disimulo, para que sin que se conozca la idea, comprehenda Us quienes son los mas 
inútiles, a fin de que recaiga en ellos la expulsión … y que debe Us procurar que esta 
disminuicion no minore el trabajo en el navío mas adelantado, para que no se retarde 
su bote’. 
p.135: ‘combendría no hacer novedad con la maestranza hasta evaquar el todo y con 
el pretexto de que sólo quedan construyéndose las tres fragatas reglar el numero fixo 
que aya de subsistir’. 
p.136: ‘han servido de aprendisaje y travajaron todas sus vidas en navíos en debida 
facultad es lo que les hace ser expertos lo que los que tengo yo aquí no lo son que así 
estoy cierto que los tales sujetos que han travajado todas sus vidas en travajo de 
navíos harán duplicado travajo de otros que no han tenido tal experiencia’. 
p.136: ‘Buelva Us a reconvenir a ese constructor, entérele de la intención del Rey, y 
cíñase el total de jornales de astillero a 12 mil reales al mes’. 
p.143: ‘no sólo no resolvieron el problema de crear un modelo estable y convincente 
de navío, sino que además sus vacilaciones, desconexiones y descontrol ocasionaron 
daños importantes en los montes de Cantabria’. 
p.144: ‘excesivo número de árboles derribados de nueve años a esta parte en la 
Montaña y Asturias para maderas y tablon de 54 navíos de 70 y 100 cañones, 
aumento y reemplazo correspondiente a 44 de estos buques, 16 fragatas, 8 pingues, 
un paquebot, 30 lanchones y otras muchas embarcaciones menores, para cavillas y 
 cuñas, edificios, gradas, y aumadas del astillero de Guarnizo, y para varios fines de 
las obras del arsenal de Ferrol’. 
p.146: ‘se de principio a la separación de toda la restante madera de construcción que 
hubiere en los arsenales, examinando muy bien los caños en que este depositada, para 
sacar la que se sabe está enterrada en ellos, con el fin de que se vea precisamente que 
madera y la que ay en arsenales y para que navíos y de ella se formara relación’. 
p.146: ‘en los arsenales de la Carraca ni se ha llebado quenta y razón de la madera 
que se ha conducido a éllos para fábrica de navíos, ni se sabe la que existe 
formalmente en sus diques.  Este desorden tan perjudicial al servicio del Rey como 
aora se experimenta, procede de que en la Carraca no se recive la madera por piezas 
segun su figura, nombre y medidas sino por palos, curbas y derechos, y de que 
aunque hace dos años que en repetidas ordenes se ha mandado que se separase la 
madera tampoco se ha executado.  Como no se sabe la madera que ay en los diques, 
ni los fines a que puede aplicarse, falta el fundamento de lo que debe labrarse en los 
montes y conducirse al arsenal para la construcción de quatro navios de 80 cañones y 
ocho de 70, que ha sido y es el animo del Rey que se hagan en esse Departamento, 
sobre lo qual se han escripto muchas resmas de papel, pero con la desgracia de que 
nada de quanto se ha dicho, o no lo han entendido o no lo han querido entender los 
antecesores de Us’. 
p.147: ‘haciendo notable falta esta tablonería para lo que aquí ocurre convendrá se 
compre, assí por esta razón, como por asegurar el mismo constructor, y maestros 
maiores … ser de selecta calidad esta madera, que está labrada sin samago alguno, y 
que cada cien tablones de estos valdrán por 200 de los de Santander, su precio por 
cada tablon es el de veinte pesos … sus medidas son de dos codos cada uno poco mas 
o menos’. 
p.148: ‘tampoco se puede todavía hacer un cálculo formal de sus productos, porque 
no sirven las experiencias que de otras partes se tengan para formar juicio de lo que 
aquí se podrá adelantar bien sea porque así en la jarcia, igualmente que en la lona, se 
trabaxa ahora con otra proligidad, en que necesariamente se gasta mas tiempo, o bien 
por que a diferencia de otros obrages de esta calidad, se hila en éste, para las lonas, la 
mayor parte por mugeres al huso y a la rueca, y mui poco a la rueda’. 
pp.148–9: ‘no he señalado cantidad ni creo la determinó Dn Cosme Alvarez pues, 
segun VE conoce, no son capazes los reynos de Aragon y Navarra de producir en dos 
años las correspondientes al armamento y respetos de doze navios de setenta cañones 
que embeverán de quarenta y seis mil quintales de jarcia útil, en que no entra la 
merma o desperdicio ni tampoco la que se ha de emplear en las lonas, de suerte que 
unas y otras partidas, por regulaciones razonables, no rebajarán de doscientas 
quarenta mil arrobas [60,000 quintals] de las quales se han de suponer exclusas las 
que también se incluyeren o combirtieren en el tegido que llaman estopa, cuerda 
mecha y la mayor parte de la jarcia de tercera suerte que solo es aproposito para 
servicio de los arsenales y pequeñas embarcaciones’. 
p.151: ‘dexando a los vendedores y compradores en la livertad de que se ajusten 
como pudieren entre si, aunque el cáñamo sea para servicio de Su Real Armada, 
conducirá a que los mismos cosecheros fomenten la abundancia de este género, a 
vista de la salida que tendran de él, y a ello se seguirá la conveniencia en la compra, 
pues la tasa sólo contribuye a que aya escasez’. 
 p.152: ‘falta de observancia de las órdenes de VM que prescriben se tome para 
servicio de su Rl Armada el cáñamo sobrante a los usos del país, y a precios 
corrientes en él’. 
p.152: ‘y a precios mui infimos o mui moderados, tal vez por parecerle que serán los 
suficientes’. 
p.152: ‘que el ánimo del Rey es, que a los pueblos se les dege el cáñamo que 
necessiten para sus usos precisos, de suerte que la falta no lo encarezca de modo, que 
les resulte perjuicio, y que hecha esta consideración, compre Us lo restante que 
hallare apropósito  por su calidad para los fines a que debe aplicarse, pagándolo 
promptamente a precios corrientes del país, pues no quiere SM que los cosecheros 
experimenten pérdida en su venta, ni que de ello resulten los clamores de que avisan 
los Corregidores y Alcaldes por no averse Us arreglado a estas consideraciones, que 
son las que debió tener presente para evitarlos, y excusar la continuación de 
representaciones que se reciben de todos los correos con motivo del embargo del 
cáñamo, respecto de no saver aun los cosecheros el que Us les tomará y el que les 
quedará libre para vender a particulares’. 
p.152: ‘exceden en más de la mitad a los que se han pagado y pagan los cáñamos de 
Valencia, Cathaluña y Aragon, y a los de 1ra suerte de Riga, sin que en la calidad 
tengan ventaxa los de Granada a los de Valencia y Riga; y a los del plan de 
Barcelona’. 
p.154: ‘en ningun tiempo es la voluntad del Rey se obligue a los vasallos a que 
vendan sus frutos por menos de su valor’. 
p.154: ‘Y en caso de que aun falte cáñamo, cuide Us de procurarlo del de la mexor 
calidad que refiere, en inteligencia de que su costo ha de salir indispensablemente de 
las consignaciones mensuales de la dotación del Departamento, sin esperar socorros 
extraordinarios pues baxo de este concepto se han formado los presupuestos de 
gastos’. 
p.154: ‘Que el fin de averse dispuesto que el cáñamo se comprase en Cathaluña fue y 
es para que se fomente el cultivo de este género en el Principiado, como que siempre 
será menester para provisión de la Armada en crecidas cantidades, y evitar las 
compras del extrangero’. 




p.162: ‘sin interpretación alguna’. 
p.163, fn.6: ‘Haviendo fallecido el Conde de Bena, Director General de la Armada: 
Ha resuelto el Rey que VE passe a Cádiz con el mando de aquel Departamento y que 
consequente de lo prevenido en el artículo 33 del tratado 2 título 1 de las Ordenanzas 
de la Marina, se encargue de la Dirección General de la Armada, poniendo en 
execución lo que en éllas se advierte para su mejor regimen y disciplina’. 
 p.169: ‘El Cuerpo de los Batallones de Marina será considerado, en qualquier parage 
en que se halláre, como Cuerpo regular de Infantería Española; y como tal, alternará 
con los del Exército, con quienes concurriere, ocupando el lugar, que le tocáre, por la 
antiguedad que goza del año de mil quinientos treinta y siete, despues del Regimiento 
de la Corona’. 
p.169: ‘Sin embargo de esta obligación, de que la Tropa ayude a todos los trabajos en 
que sea necessaria su assistencia, no deberán los Oficiales abusar de élla para 
emplearla sin precisión en aquellos que, siendo proprios de la gente de mar, pueden 
executarse por ella sola; ni pretenderán que el soldado haga oficio de marinero, antes 
bien en todas las faenas en que intervenga, le tratarán con la distinción 
correspondiente al diferente exercicio de su profession’. 
p.175: ‘Es pues cierto señor, que para que SM pueda mantener el pie de Armada que 
premedita, es necesario se aumente los Guardias Marinas a lo menos hasta 300’. 
p.175: ‘Sin publicarlo, sino con disímulo’. 
pp.179–80: ‘en muchas cosas no ha sido puesta en práctica por mis antecesores, ha 
sido por falta de disposición para ello: siendo necesaria para la del maestro de 
lenguas, biblioteca; para la de los de construcción y maniobras, modelos del navío 
adequados; para la del de artillería, cañón con todo su aparejos y aderentes; y para la 
del director, instrumentos propios.  Todo esto, con la protección y ordenes de VE, 
espero poner en práctica, luego que passe a Cádiz; donde ya hay los libros e 
instrumentos que trage de Inglaterra y Francia, con que haciendo los modelos de 
navíos y cañon quedará completo todo lo necesario’. 
p.181, fn.94: ‘uno de los puntos essenciales del Servicio’. 
p.181, fn.94: ‘la marinería extrangera que sea posible, para que sirba, especialmente 
en los navíos de guerra que esten armados, y que se armaren, porque de esté modo no 
este tan pensionada nuestra marinería nacional matriculada’. 
p.187: ‘segun publica voz no dejan de jactarse estos matriculados, esto no ser nada, si 
de peores se verán’. 
p.187: ‘los términos benignos y suaves con que se les trata y ha tratado’. 
p.188: ‘nunca haver entrado en el mar para efecto de pescar, ni de navegación 
alguna’. 
p.188: ‘Que no pesquen, porque la Ordenanza lo prohibe a los que no son marineros 
matriculados’. 
p.189: ‘de que resulta graves perjuicios al Real Servicio y al fomento y conservación 
de la gente de mar que por todos los medios importa adelantar’. 
p.189: ‘reglado a la Ordenanza de Matricula, no perturben a la gente de mar 
matriculada en que se exerciten en su profesión’. 
p.190: ‘persuasiones, engaños y amenazas’. 
p.190: ‘tratándolos mal de palabras y obras, llamándolos enemigos de la patria y 
amenazándolos’. 
 pp.190–1: ‘a pedradas obligaron a los marineros a echar pie a tierra y buscar cada uno 
su defensa, como mejor pudiesse, lo qual visto por el oficial de mar [Juan Boch], hizo 
lo proprio sacando una espada en la mano, con el fin de aquietar sus gentes, como lo 
consiguió haciendoles bolver a sus galeras y restituyéndose el a la suya herido en la 
cabeza de un golpe de cordillón o podón; pero viendo que ya los del lugar se havían 
amotinado y salido con escopetas, legones, corvillones, hoces y otras armas blancas, 
partió a llamar uno de los dos alcaldes para que contuviesse aquel tumulto, quien no 
sólo no lo hizo, sino que metió entres los suyos y animando su arrojo iva a mandar 
tocar a rebato si el segundo alcalde, mas prudente, no huviesse llegado y apaciguado 
el alboroto de que han resultado heridos diferentes marineros’. 
p.191: ‘el odio que las justicias tienen a este fuero’. 
p.192: ‘La tripulazión que se compone de 563 plazas es inútil, por ser toda la más 
juventud criada en las rías, en el exercicio de la pesca, sin saver pisar navío, hazer 
travajo, ní suvir sobre una berga’. 
p.194, fn.138: ‘desde el en que salga del lugar de su domicilio hasta el que llegue al 
puerto, plaza o parage donde haya sido llamado’. 
p.194: ‘este método discurrido para fomento de la gente de mar para que volando 
aprendan todos y la suavidad de cortas campañas les atraiga es para mi entender de 
poco beneficio suyo y costosicimo a la Rl Hacienda’. 
p.194: ‘la idea de fomentar y havilitar marinería’. 
p.195: ‘cuyas ventajas da tanta utilidad al Servicio del Rey, y al bien del Estado, 
compensan mui bien el gasto que suppone se augmenta a la Rl Hacienda en la muda 
de la marinería’. 
p.196: ‘nos hubiéramos limitado de fuerzas proporcionadas, y los gobernantes no 
hubiesen roto una y otra vez las leyes de la matrícula … hubieran tenido nuestras 
armadas tripulaciones honradísimas, expertas y pundonorosas’. 
 
Chapter 6: 
p.203: ‘que los moros hacen el corso con sus javeques y fragatas no sólo en el 
Mediterraneo, sino en el Océano con grave riesgo de nuestro comercio’. 
p.208: ‘el de encontrar en ellos qualquier pertrechos y municiones de guerra, los 
tomará, y transbordarán a los de su mando, dejando la demás carga y los buques en 
livertad’. 
p.209: ‘guerra ofensiva y defensiva contra infieles’. 
p.212: ‘pues conocido inútil como que por la experiencia de tal se fue excluido’. 
p.213: ‘unidos los dos navíos no se sugeten en este rigoroso tiempo a la conserva de 
los javeques, y hagan estos su corso quedando la costa desde Cabo Sn Martín a 
Málaga sin perder el abrigo que los Puertos de ella les ofrece para tiempos o fuerzas 
superiores y se dejen ver del Puerto de Cartagena cada treinta dias’. 
 p.214: ‘la mayor complacencia y satisfacción y assí me manda significarlo a Us y que 
este servicio tendrá en su Rl ánimo el lugar que justamente se merece; y assí mismo 
el de los demás oficiales a quienes en nombre de SM expresara Us su benigna 
gratitud.  Y no dudándose de su conducta y valor igual desempeño en la continuación 
de su comisión de corso, deve Us prometerse ser atendido como corresponde sobre su 
antiguo mérito a el adquirido en este particular caso’. 
p.214: ‘con mucha seguridad pero sin opresión de prisiones’. 
p.215: ‘que toda evolución de fuga o vista de los enemigos augmenta su osadía y 
desdora a el que manda’. 
p.216: ‘Y que no menos fia SM del valor de Us que de su conducta’. 
p.216: ‘no se dexa de navegar en tiempo de guerra con dos, quatro y seis navíos aun 
sabiendo que ay en la mar esquadras de ocho, diez y doze’. 
p.218: ‘se prive á ingleses del dominio que han adquirido sobre el mar’. 
p.219: ‘a su tiempo nos entenderemos para proporner a nuestros amos el proyecto de 
VE que es justo y convenientíssimo a las dos coronas, cuya unión a pesar de sus 
émulos sera eterna’. 
pp.220–1: ‘Francia arrebató, en junio, Menorca a los ingleses para ofrecérsela a 
España a cambio de que saliese de su neutralidad y entrase en guerra junto a ella 
contra Inglaterra’. 
p.227: ‘este Us muy a la mira no sólo para el resguardo de sus dominios, sino es 
tambien para la indemnidad de sus mares, que sólo permitida su navegazión a los 
extrangeros para el preciso tránsito a sus colonias, seria quebrantar esta legítima 
posesión si por recíprocas hostilidades introdugesen las dos naciones sus esquadras o 
corsarios en ellos’. 
p.228: ‘con la qual obviar estos embarazos dara Us fondo en los puertos de SM 
quando se assegure de estar immediatas las otras en parage de batirse’. 
p.229: ‘con mucho ahínco’. 
p.229: ‘que no devía ignorar que ningun navío de guerra de España hechava el bote al 
agua, ní el devía solicitarlo, nada de esto basto, pues que prosiguió en su infundada 
pretensión, tanto que apurado le dije que no queria, y que hechase el suyo y me lo 
mandase abordo’. 
p.230: ‘que porque motibos asegurándole ser embarcaciones de guerra de España 
havía pretendido su capitan con tanto empeño a que hechase yo el bote al agua y 
porqué razón me disparó dos cañonazos bala, pasándolas por encima de mis palos, a 
lo 1ro solo satisfizo con decir que no se havían certificado si heran españoles o 
franceses, y a lo 2do que como se hallaban en guerra con debida nación se havían 
persuadido a que fuesen embarcaciones de ella; pidióme los nombres de las fragatas, 
de los capitanes, y su porte, que después de haver apuntado todo, me dixo llamarse su 
Capitan Kodrington y el navío Kingsthon de porte de sesenta cañones que su destino 
hera cruzar desde el Estrecho hasta Málaga’. 
 pp.230–1: ‘asegurando a VE que en todos el único objeto que me ha mobido ha sido 
el mexor servicio del Rey, persuadiéndome a que me hera indecoroso sugetarme a la 
voluntad de los ingleses que pretendieron hechase el bote al agua sobre cuyo punto 
me persuado será combenientíssimo el que VE dée una regla fija a fin de que con su 
literal observación se evite por los commandantes todo desacierto y se consiga el 
honor del pabellón’. 
p.231: ‘para que los corsarios de las dos naciones ingleses y franceses, no le 
interrumpan, ní incomoden a los vasallos de SM que la executan en estos mares’. 
p.231: ‘Si encontrare igualmente alguno de estos corsarios que ayga tomado 
embarcación en géneros pertenecientes a españoles; hará se conduzcan por el mismo 
corsario o por la misma embarcación a Puerto del Rey en donde se declarará la 
pertenencia de quien fuere’. 
p.235: ‘hacer respectar el pavellón del Rey y sus costas como es devido, pues no 
obstante la perfecta armonía que subsiste (y quiere SM observe VE) con las dos 
coronas de Francia y Inglaterra, ha acreditado la experiencia, que contra las 
intenciones de sus soveranos, se han excedido sus corsarios’. 
p.236: ‘reconociendo y dando caza a todas quantas embarcaciones pasa por ella’. 
p.236: ‘Lo que pareze violento por estar a vista de este Puerto muy immediatos, de 
toda esta costa, y de esta esquadra a la que no han respetado como hera devido, pues 
reconocieron y visitaron ayer tarde a un tiro y medio de cañón de este navío un 
paquebot español que con su vandera larga me vieron hize reconozer con mi bote 
poco antes’. 
p.236: ‘los referidos navíos y fragatas se han establecido en estos parajes y que todos 
los dias executarán lo mismo no hallándome con ordenes para embarazarlo a navíos 
de guerra, a menos que insulten bajo del tiro de los nuestros a qualquiera embarcación 
que se favorezca de ellos’. 
p.238: ‘modo de pensar de los ingleses respecto nuestra América en tiempo de paz y 
en el de guerra’. 
p.238: ‘la Havana llave principal de la América’. 
p.243: ‘el honor y crédito que corresponde a las armas del Rey, al de la nación y al de 
los que los manda’. 
p.244: ‘y aunque no dudo que este governador así como procura con el conato que es 
justo poner a cubierto todos los puestos de su plaza, castillos y baterías me auxilie en 
caso de dever salir esta esquadra con gente que recoja en estas immediaciones’. 
p.244: ‘aparejada, embargada y con su aguada dentro; y no la he bastimentado con el 
fin de que en el intermedio que reciva orden del Rey para salir, la imponderable 
abundancia de ratas y cucarachas que hai, no destruyan el prevenido repuesto’. 
p.244: ‘mi obligación, onor, y conciencia’. 
p.245: ‘se promete SM que el celo de Us y el de esse Governador se valdrían de las 
medidas que permita la humana diligencia, auxiliandose recíprocamente, como se 
executo por lo pasado’. 
 p.245: ‘la suma estrechez de su canal no es al propósito para que existan en el navíos 
de esta magnitud, pues aunque por el medio de ella ay agua suficiente se hace quasi 
necesario un milagro para poderlo promediar, vastando sólo el que no acuda 
puntualmente al govierno a que acontesca un embate como generalmente subcede 
llegando a emparejar con la altura del Morro’. 
p.247: ‘con especial harmonía’. 
p.247: ‘No me quedó que hacer nada para que se consiguiese’. 
p.248: ‘logré que la esforzada, gloriosa, y dilatada defensa del Morro se hubiere 
hecho principalmente por oficiales de marina, sus tripulaciones, guarniciones y 
constantemente por sus condestables y artilleros de brigada’. 
p.248: ‘con fuego incesante’. 
p.250: ‘Los más elebados obgetos’. 
p.251: ‘tan duplicados, y poderoso fundamentos’. 
pp.252–3: ‘bolbiéndose al Governador y diciéndole [quoting Transporte] “mire Us 
con lo que salen estos Señores” y respondió al Governador “a eso no se hace caso, 
sino que se ejecute lo que a resuelto en la Junta” ’. 
p.253: ‘[quoting Transporte] “sus casas las que se habían resuelto echar a fondo” ’. 
p.253: ‘sin alijerar ni sacar la artillería, ni aprovechar muchas cosas’. 
p.254: ‘una certidumbre de lauros en el énemigo y de desgracias en nosotros’. 
p.255: ‘su satisfacción merecería una pública condenación: a fin de evitar con 
semejante desaprobación que sus cláusulas impriman en los ánimos irresolutos igual 
modo de pensar; de exagerar los tropiezos propios, previniendo desdichas y tragedias 
y de engrandecer al énemigo como imbulnerable’. 
p.256: ‘[quoting Transporte] “que como no es lícito a un Governador de la Plaza 
antes de capitular su rendición bolar los fuertes exteriores que contribuieron a su 
defensa, sin exponerse al crudo lance de no ser admitido la capitulación; tampoco lo 
era sin incurrir en evidente riesgo el quemar en igual caso los nabíos, pues ellos eran 
fuertes flotantes y mobibles que allí tenía el Rey para que sostubiesen la Plaza y 
Puerto” ’. 
p.258: ‘malicia, cobardía o fin particular’. 
p.258: ‘se entiende que las culpas que de éstos y de todos los demás resultan 
cometidas, le demuestran distante de lo que es dolo, malicia u todo particular fin; 
pero no por eso se eximen de pena, antes bien es muy conocida y descubierta’. 
p.259: ‘como Gefe de la Esquadra, contribuyó más que todos a la gloriosa dilatada 
defensa que se hizo en la Havana, por haber facilitado al Governador todos los 
auxilios de ella: haviendo manifestado al mismo tiempo su celo y actividad en las 
prontas providencias con que a todo concurrió; y siendo tambien notorios sus méritos 
y dilatados servicios en la Armada y de haverse distinguido y acreditado en ella, por 
su honor, conducta, capacidad e inteligencia: se evidencia que los yerros 
 mencionados fueron involuntarios y procedidos de haverse errado en su concepto y 
no pudiendo deducirse de éllos con pruebas fundamentales que ayan sido directa o 
precisa causa de la perdida de la Plaza y toda la esquadra, ni por su culpa’. 
p.264: ‘pero resistir no es vencer’ 
 
Chapter 7: 
pp.288:  ‘Hay tropas? Nada, estamos sin soldados. 
Y Armada? Nada, dígalo este Puerto. 
Hay Pueblo? Nada, llórese de cierto. 
Hay Pesos? Nada, en Francia están guardados 
… 
Ni hay tesoro, comercio, gentes, naves, 
Ni tropas, ni aún pan para mañana’. 
p.289: ‘la clase mercantil seguía siendo un factor de escaso peso, que ni remotamente 
podía aspirar al papel que tenía ya en Inglaterra y Francia’. 
p.291: ‘El combate americano me ha dolido mucho …  Reniego de marina que tan 
malamente nos ha servido en una guerra de mar, aviendo consumido millones sin 
término y perdido vasos por insensible transpiración’. 
pp.291: ‘La marina nuestra debe augmentarse, pero con proporción y sin ruido, que 
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Zenón de Somodevilla, Marquis de la Ensenada (1702–1781) 
 
Portrait of Zenón de Somodevilla, marqués de la Ensenada, 1750, by Jacopo Amigoni (1682–
1752), in the Museo del Prado. 
This portrait of Ensenada is unusual in Madrid’s court painting of the time in that it illustrates 
the sea, ships and shipbuilding in the background.  Even the few existing mid-eighteenth 
century portraits of naval officers rarely include representations of the sea and ships as 
symbols of their naval professions.  The fact that these symbols are included in this portrait of 
Ensenada by Amigoni, one of Ferdinand VI’s court painters since 1747 and director of the 
Royal Academy of San Fernando, shows the importance which Ensenada attached to the 
navy and to the role that he played in its development. 
Ferdinand VI (1713–1759) 
 
Portrait of Ferdinand VI by Louis Michel Van Loo in the Palacio Real, Madrid. 
 
Ferdinand VI, who governed Spain from 1746 to 1759, was reported to have a nervous and 
rather weak disposition which those around him – the queen, Barbara of Braganza, his 
confessor, Father Francisco Rávago and his ministers, the Marquis de la Ensenada and José 
de Carvajal – had to manage. 
Jorge Juan y Santacilia (1713–1773) 
 
A nineteenth-century portrait of Jorge Juan by Rafael Tejeo (1800–1856), in the Museo 
Naval, Madrid. 
Throughout his career from his involvement in the geodesic mission to Quito organised by 
the French Academy of Sciences, to his mission to London and subsequent role in the 
development of the Spanish navy, to his diplomatic mission to Morocco, as well as to his 
contribution to Enlightenment science literature in the form of his Examen Marítimo 
Theórico-Práctico (1771), Jorge Juan y Santacilia proved himself to be highly talented, 
intelligent and energetic.  During Ferdinand’s reign, he dedicated these qualities to the 
improvement of the Spanish navy and he is responsible for many of the advances made at this 
time.  However, it is revealing of official attitudes that he, like his contemporary and equal 
Antonio de Ulloa, never really served as active naval officers at sea and command of Spanish 
battleships, unlike commands in the British Royal Navy, was left to more mediocre naval 
officers. 
Plan of a 58-gun Ship as Established at the 1752 Council of Constructors 
 
 
Referenced by the Museo Naval Madrid as [Plano de Navío de 58 Cañones.  Jorge Juan y Santacilia, c.1750], Ref. mnm-pb-album-07-01, in the Archive of 
the Museo Naval, Madrid. 
This ship plan along with those for ships of other gun dispositions was produced by the 1752 Council of Constructors, attended by Jorge Juan y Santacilia, 
Richard Rooth, Mathew Mullins, Edward Bryant and Almon Hill, to establish a la inglesa naval construction in Spain. 
Feringán’s Proposed Design for Cartagena Arsenal in 1749 
 
AGS MPD 4/76, Plano del projecto que se propone para construir un arzenal en el Puerto de Cartagena con darzena i los edificios correspondientes al 
armamento i desarmo de los nabíos de SM, Sebastián Feringán, Cartagena, 18 September 1749.  Relevant correspondence between Feringán and Ensenada in 
AGS Marina 377. 
‘A’ indicates the location of 3 slipways and, as yet, no dry docks are included. 
Proposed Cartagena Arsenal in 1751 
 
 
AGS MPD 21/11, Plano del proyecto para construir el arsenal de Cartagena, Feringán, [1751].  Relevant correspondence in AGS Marina 376. 
 
The two dry docks are marked ‘R’ and located on either side of the construction slipways (‘S’).  They still have the appearance of slipways in this plan. 
Dry Docks at Cartagena in 1751 
 
AGS MPD 17/17, Plano en que se demuestra la colocazión i terreno que han de ocupar los diques de carena i los astilleros en el Arzenal y Testero de su 
dárzena, Feringán, [1751].  Feringán to Ensenada, Cartagena, 27 October 1751, AGS Marina 376. 
The two dry docks are marked ‘A’ and ‘B’.  The pumps are not yet included. 
Dry Docks in Cartagena Showing the Location for the Four 
Pumps to the North of the Dry Docks and a Cross-Section 
View of Their Proposed Design, 1752 
 
 
AGS MPD 20/50, Plano en que se señalan las obras i edifizios de la vanda del norte de la 
dárzena i sitio en que pareze se deben colocar los molinos para agotar los diques, Feringán, 
Cartagena, 3 October 1752.  Report by Juan, dated 13 October 1752, and Feringán’s 




AGS MPD 20/51, Vista i perfil sobre la línea A.B.C.D. de la plataforma en que se propone 
colocar los molinos, pozos í bombas para que con el viento se agoten las aguas de los diques 
de carena según la idea de Don Jorge Juan, Feringán, Cartagena, [1752],  
Plan of Ferrol Arsenal, 1751, Showing the Four Dry Docks, to the Right of the Dock 
 
 
AGS MPD 3/23, Copia del plano original del proyecto del Arsenal de El Ferrol aprobado por S. M. en el año 1751, Cosme Alvarez, Ferrol, 30 March 1752.  
Correspondence in AGS Marina 321. 
As noted in the title this is a copy of an earlier 1751 plan, however, I could not find the earlier version in the archive to confirm whether it contained the dry 
docks. 
Works on Ferrol Arsenal to 6 August 1754 
 
 
AGS MPD 24/7, Plano con sus correspondientes elevaciones que demuestran el estado en que se halla la obras del real arcenal de marina del Ferrol oy día 
dia de la fecha, Francisco Llobet, Ferrol, 6 August 1754.  Llobet to Sebastián Eslava, Ferrol, 6 August 1754, AGS Marina 323. 
To the right is shown the area being excavated for a dry dock, numbered ‘16’. 
Cross-Section and Plan of Jorge Juan’s Planned Dry Docks for Ferrol, [1754] 
 
AGS MPD 22/8, Perfil cortado a lo largo del dique sobre la línea AB. del arsenal de El Ferrol, Jorge Juan, [1754].  Francisco Llobet to Ensenada, Ferrol, 23 
July 1754, AGS Marina 323. 
 
AGS MPD  22/9, Plano de un dique de carena para el nuevo arsenal de El Ferrol, Jorge Juan, [1754]. 
Cross-Section View and Plan of the Tarring-Oven for Rope Built at Sada 
 
AGS MPD 6/80, Plano y perfil de un edificio ... proyectado para la fábrica de Sada ... el hornillo, caldera y prensa para alquitranar la filástica, José de la 
Croix, Ferrol, 24 January 1752.  Antonio de Perea to Ensenada, Esteiro, 8 February 1752, AGS Marina 320. 
Based on English designs, drawn by the engineer Joseph de la Croix, 1752. 
The Morro Castle and Channel Entrance to Havana Bay, 1762 
 
The Morro Castle, 1762, by Dominic Serres (1722–1793) in the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. 
This view of the Morro Castle shows the narrow channel entrance to Havana Bay to the right.  In it, two of the ships have already been scuttled and the third 
is in the process of being so.  Also visible is the boom across the entrance to the channel, the heights of La Cabaña and the city walls on the other side of the 
channel. 
The Tagus Squadron at Aranjuez 
 
The Palace of Aranjuez and the Tagus Squadron by Antonio Joli (1700–1777), in the Palazzo Reale, Naples. 
This view of the new palace at Aranjuez depicts the mini-squadron of pleasure vessels which were kept on the Tagus for Ferdinand VI’s entertainment.  
Carlos Broschi, the celebrated castrato also known as ‘Farinelli’, the Queen’s favourite and one of Ensenada’s allies, organised many events for the 
monarch’s amusement aboard these vessels during Ferdinand’s reign.  These vessels included two 16-gun frigates, San Fernando and Santa Barbara, two 12-
gun xabeques Orfeo and Tajo and a royal barge.  They were manned by a group of 70 sailors sent from Cartagena.  See Fernández Duro (1900) vol.VI, 
pp.413–4 for more details.  Joli resided at the Spanish Court from 1750 to 1754. 
A Spanish Fleet Collecting the Future Charles III of Spain from Naples in 1759 
 
Charles III Embarking in Naples, 1759, by Antonio Joli (1700–1777) in the Museo del Prado, Madrid. 
This painting, along with another ‘Charles III leaving the port of Naples as seen from the sea’ by the same painter, are two of the few mid-eighteenth century 
paintings of a Spanish fleet which decorated the Spanish Court at Madrid as there was no tradition of marine art as was the case in the Netherlands or Britain 
of that time.  This also helps explain why most of the paintings depicting maritime scenes and men in the Museo Naval, Madrid, date to the nineteenth 
century, more specifically to around the date of 1897 when the museum was founded. 
Ferdinand VI as Protector of the Arts and Sciences 
 
Portrait of Ferdinand VI as Protector of the Arts and Sciences, 1754, by Antonio González 
Ruiz (1711–1788), in the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando. 
This portrait of Ferdinand VI promotes the view of the monarch as patron of the arts and 
sciences thereby reinforcing Ferdinand’s desired image of his reign as one of peace and 
prosperity.  It hangs in the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando which was 
formally established by Ferdinand on 12 April 1752.  By contrast, Ferdinand never chose to 
associate himself with the navy nor is there any record that he ever travelled to Spain’s coasts 
and saw the sea other than in paintings. 
